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This book is about public policy partnerships and their accountability and 
its theme derives from my work for the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi). 
At the institute, we have been following, analysing and debating the rise of 
public policy partnerships and their implications for global governance over 
many years. Time and again, we returned to questions of accountability. 
What effects do partnerships have on existing accountability relationships? 
How can partnerships themselves be held accountable? Answering these 
questions seemed central to any debate relating to partnerships, yet difficult 
since the necessary concepts were not sufficiently developed. Within the 
context of my doctoral dissertation, submitted to the University of Erfurt 
in late 2007 under the title ‘Defining Accountability Standards for Public 
Policy Partnerships’, I therefore set out to develop a concept and model of 
accountability that would help us understand, assess and guide the devel-
opment of partnerships. Since partnerships include public, business and 
civil society actors and are active in very different areas, I quickly found 
myself building a generally applicable accountability model. I hope that 
the thoughts developed in this book will be helpful for those working with 
partnerships and of interest for those thinking about accountability.
Naming all individuals who supported me during the research and writing 
phases or provided critical inputs would be impossible. My special thanks 
go first and foremost to Prof. Dr. Dietmar Herz, my supervisor, as well as 
Prof. Dr. Frank Ettrich, who acted as secondary supervisor. I would also like 
to thank Martin Sprott, Bernd Siebenhüner, Angelika Steets, Andreas Blätte, 
Thorsten Benner, Jan Martin Witte and Jenny Scharrer for their critical and 
supportive feedback and Kristina Thomsen for her support in revising and 
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1.1 Accountability – a fuzzy concept and its importance 
for partnerships
Accountability. Oh no, I don’t know that I can. […] I guess some of us, 
when we think of that […] word we understand the importance of checks 
and balances. We understand that there are some things that – where 
accountability is near instantaneous, and that there are other things 
where there are grey areas and it’s much less difficult. But what it means, 
very simply, is to – to me, anyway – is that people understandably look to 
individuals, who have responsibilities, to be accountable for the conduct 
of those responsibilities. […] you need to put in place a series of things 
that hold people reasonably accountable for their actions, and people,
I think, expect that.
US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld when asked about how 
he would define accountability (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004)
‘Accountability’ has become a prominent political catchword. The term 
serves as a rallying cry for civil society organisations aiming to control the 
actions of governments, international organisations and corporations,1 and 
is used by those who want to create a positive image for their organisation2 
as well as those attacking their opponents for irresponsible behaviour. 
Yet – as is often the case with political buzzwords – Donald Rumsfeld is 
not the only one who finds it difficult to put his finger on what exactly the 
term means. As Mark Bovens put it so aptly:
As a concept, however, ‘public accountability’ is rather elusive. It is a 
hurrahword, like ‘learning,’ ‘responsibility,’ or ‘solidarity’ – nobody can 
be against it. It is one of those evocative political words that can be used 
to patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an image of trustworthiness, 
fidelity, and justice, or to keep critics at bay. 
(Bovens, 2005, p. 182)3
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2  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
In addition, understandings about accountability vary between the  public, 
private and civil society sectors,4 adding to the conceptual confusion. 
Governments and public administrations, the business sector and increas-
ingly also the non-profit sector each have their own distinct accountability 
traditions.
The discourse and practice of accountability in the public sector, for exam-
ple, has developed in the context of representative democracy. Democratic 
governments around the world have espoused the same basic institu-
tional structure, comprising a legislative, an independent judiciary and an 
 executive. Each of these institutions has a range of typical accountability 
mechanisms. These mechanisms either allow for direct citizen control or 
work through a system of checks and balances.5 
Corporate accountability in its classical form has three distinct layers. 
Firstly, societies use legal and fiscal rules and their enforcement to hold 
corporations accountable for conforming to social norms and contribut-
ing to social goals. Secondly, consumers use market mechanisms to create 
accountability for product quality and price. Thirdly, owners use a variety of 
mechanisms treated in the corporate governance literature to induce man-
agers to maximise returns.
Questions of accountability of non-profit organisations have gained 
prominence concurrent with the recent rise in power of these organisations. 
But while the debate has intensified, it is far from reaching a  consensus. 
It is not only disputed who NGOs should become more accountable to 
or for what but also whether more accountability is desirable at all. In 
addition, the debate has largely remained theoretical and many of the 
recommendations have not (yet?) been translated into practice. Currently, 
NGOs are mainly accountable to public authorities, their donors and their 
members.
Most contributions to the literature on accountability are specific to one 
of these sectors, even though increasing efforts were made over recent years 
to apply the concepts and experiences from one sector to another. Reflecting 
the fact that accountability arrangements are often highly complex, many 
contributions focus on specific subgroups of agents and individual account-
ability mechanisms.6 
In the debate about partnerships, the issue of accountability is particularly 
salient. Partnerships are cooperative arrangements between international 
institutions, governments, corporations and civil society organisations to 
address pressing local and international policy problems.7 As the ability of 
traditional nation states to address complex questions has increasingly come 
under question and as states are transforming, partnerships have emerged 
in many areas as a promising mechanism for defining and  implementing 
complex and controversial policies. Partnerships now address urgent 
problems ranging from regulating the technical aspects of the Internet to 
enhancing the social responsibility of companies and providing remedies to 
9780230238978_02_cha01.indd   2 8/17/2010   8:04:25 PM
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global health crises. Prominent examples of partnerships at the global level 
include the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),8 a partnership that develops 
and disseminates standards to guide the sustainability reporting practices 
of companies and other organisations, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria,9 a global initiative to raise additional resources for 
the fight against these diseases.10 
Since partnerships routinely include actors from the public, corporate and 
civil society sectors, we cannot simply rely on any one established accounta-
bility system. Defining concepts and effective mechanisms of accountability 
is therefore even more complex for partnerships than for more traditional 
institutions. This complexity renders partnerships an interesting object of 
study for analysing different understandings, implications and new devel-
opments of accountability. A focus on partnership accountability also has 
the potential to generate insights for the discourse on the accountability of 
other institutions.
Moreover, most principled objections against partnerships are based on 
concerns about accountability. These criticisms imply that by shifting policy 
decisions to partnerships, governments can circumvent control by their 
domestic constituencies and international institutions can weaken control 
by member states.11 
Corporations for their part are accused of using partnerships to improve 
their reputation without significantly changing their management and 
operational practices.12 Thus they evade public pressure for moving towards 
more sustainable practices and counteract the drive for binding regula-
tions.13 At the same time, shareholders may criticise companies for their 
partnership activities because they are costly and (at least in the short term) 
inefficient. 
NGOs or other civil society organisations, finally, can be seen as risking, 
being co-opted and losing their critical edge by participating in cross- sectoral 
partnerships. Moreover, large NGOs that have the capacity to partner with 
other institutions may be tempted to claim they represent constituen-
cies that do not actually have any influence over the NGO’s policies and 
 activities.14
These critiques have a common denominator. They fear that partnerships 
reduce the accountability of the participating organisations without creat-
ing alternative accountability mechanisms.15 If validated, these critiques 
would seriously undermine the credibility and legitimacy of partnerships as 
a mechanism to address public policy problems.16 This has also been recog-
nised by the supporters of partnerships. In unison with many partnership 
critics, many of them now demand that partnerships should become (more) 
accountable.17 
But, for the most part, the demand for accountability has remained 
 general. It is rarely explained why exactly partnerships should be account-
able, let alone what this would entail in practice.18 Acar and Robertson 
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4  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
 confirm this gap in the literature and debate: ‘The question of accountability 
in multi-organizational networks and partnerships has not been adequately 
addressed in the literature’ (Acar and Robertson, 2004, p. 332).
Given how central the question of accountability is to the success of the 
partnership approach to public policy, a carefully differentiated conceptual 
and normative understanding of partnership accountability is critical. 
1.2 Purpose and structure 
This study aims to add to our conceptual and normative understanding 
of accountability by providing a unified model of accountability that can, 
beyond partnerships, also be applied to more traditional accountability 
debates in the public, private and civil society sectors. Moreover, its purpose 
is to add to the debate on and practice of partnerships by defining concrete 
and consistent standards for partnership accountability.19
Both ‘partnership’ and ‘accountability’ are political buzzwords. As such, 
they lack clear and broadly accepted definitions. To avoid building norma-
tive castles on conceptual quicksand, this book takes five steps for defining 
accountability standards for partnerships. These steps and the correspond-
ing chapter numbers are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Defining terms and clarifying concepts:
 To prepare the ground for empirical analysis and normative reflections 
on partnership accountability, this study begins with a discussion of the 
two terms at the centre of enquiry.
Chapter 2 proposes a working definition of the term ‘partnership’ 
that will be used throughout the study. To clarify exactly what the term 
denotes, it is compared and contrasted with other definitions and related 
concepts, namely networks and corporatism. 
To provide a clear understanding of the term ‘accountability’, the same 
chapter traces this concept to its theoretical roots in principal–agent 
•
Clarifying concepts: Definitions and models for the concepts of ‘partnership’ and
‘accountability’
Establishing the normative basis of accountability: The delegation of
authority creates the need for appropriate accountability arrangements
Categorising partnerships: Distinguishes partnership types
on the basis of their function






Figure 1.1 Structure of the argument
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theory. It proposes a basic model illustrating the general workings of 
 accountability relationships and analyses what this means in practice. 
The chapter also explores the contradictions between different kinds of 
accountability, underlining the fact that organisations need to choose 
carefully which accountability arrangements to adopt. 
Establishing the normative core of accountability:
Having delineated the subject of this study, Chapter 3 begins the norma-
tive enquiry. It asks what gives the concept of accountability its normative 
impetus or why we believe that organisations ought to be accountable.
To answer these questions, the chapter begins with a review of the 
relevant literature. Several different justifications for accountability have 
been proposed in different fields, but none of them is found fully satis-
factory. Therefore, the study goes on to develop its own argument. This 
alternative account is based on mainstream ideas in legal, political and 
economic  theory, as well as liberal political and moral philosophy. It 
suggests that it is the delegation of authority – be it explicit or implicit, 
ex-ante, ex-post or hypothetical – that creates the need for appropri-
ate accountability  arrangements. The chapter then takes the normative 
argument further. It asks which properties determine when an account-
ability arrangement is appropriate. Based on the argument that the need 
for accountability is grounded in delegation, it makes the case that an 
organisation’s function is key for deciding which type of accountability 
the organisation should espouse. 
Categorisation:
The abstract principles developed in Chapter 3 need to be applied to the 
reality of partnerships. Chapter 4 relies on a range of partnership exam-
ples and clusters them into four categories, distinguished by their main 
 function. 
Defining concrete accountability standards for different partnership 
types:
Chapter 5 develops concrete accountability standards for each of the four 
groups of partnerships. The chapter first takes the main function of each 
partnership group and analyses what authority is needed to exercise that 
function. To determine necessary accountability principles and stand-
ards, it then refers to and adapts standard accountability practices and 
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Before launching into normative reflections on accountability in Chapter 3, 
this chapter develops a basic understanding of the central terms around which 
this book is structured and sketches the necessary background and context for 
locating the debate.
2.1 Partnerships
Nowadays, partnerships are everywhere. Visit the website of any major 
international institution, government, large corporation and – increasingly – 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) and you will most likely find some 
information about this organisation’s partnership programmes or philoso-
phy. Similarly, if you participate in a conference on governance issues or 
global public policy1 problems, the odds that ‘partnerships’ will be on the 
agenda are good.2
As mentioned in the Introduction, partnerships today address a wide 
range of issues. As a result, the term ‘partnership’ is nearly ubiquitous. It is 
used to describe many different and often contradictory phenomena.3 To 
be able to use the term in a social scientific context, this section defines its 
essential characteristics and distinguishes it from other concepts, namely 
networks and corporatism.
2.1.1 Definition
For the purposes of this book, ‘partnership’ is defined in an ideal typical 
way4 as a voluntary cooperative arrangement
between organisations from the public, private and/or civil society sec-
tors. The public sector includes public institutions at the local, regional, 
national and inter- or supranational level. The private sector includes 
small- and medium sized, as well as large and trans- or multinational 
companies. Civil society organisations can range from local, community-
based organisations to large, transnational development initiatives.
•
2
The Concepts of Partnerships 
and Accountability
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The Concepts of Partnerships and Accountability  7
that display a certain degree of institutionalisation. While partnerships 
are often dynamic in their composition and working methods and don’t 
need to follow a uniform or standardised institutional model, they must 
show a minimum of formality. This minimum includes a clear under-
standing of who the partners are, some regular form of consultation and 
agreed decision-making procedures.
that have common, non-hierarchical decision-making procedures and 
share risks and responsibilities. Different organisations cooperating on an 
equal footing and determining policies and action plans jointly is what 
transforms any working relationship into a partnership. Of course, that 
does not mean that partnerships know no power differentials between 
their partner organisations or that decision-making procedures cannot in 
any way reflect these differences. But for a cooperative relationship to be 
a partnership, all partner institutions have to be involved in a significant 
way in the taking of important decisions. This also implies that partner 
organisations share risks and responsibilities involved in the partnership.
whose purpose is to address a public policy issue. Partnerships are of 
interest in the context of political science insofar as they work to achieve 
a societal goal and thus complement or substitute the work of govern-
mental actors. This criterion, however, is not a very strict one, since many 
governments have been liberal in defining what constitutes a public 
policy issue.
In brief, ‘partnership’ is defined as a voluntary cooperative arrangement, 
involving public, private and/or civil society organisations that is formal-
ised with common, non-hierarchical decision-making procedures and that 
addresses a public policy issue.
At the global level, partnerships address a broad range of issues. The 
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV), for example, aims at reduc-
ing air pollution caused by vehicles in developing countries. The Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) regulates the techni-
cal elements of the Internet’s name and numbering systems in order to pre-
serve the operational stability of the system and promote competition. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) aims to increase transpar-
ency and accountability to ensure that the revenues derived from extractive 
industries contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction. The 
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) seeks to reduce malnutrition 
of populations at risk through the fortification of staple foods and other 
strategies, and the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C) promotes 
sustainability in the production, processing and trading of mainstream coffee 
by compiling and promoting relevant standards.
The definition employed here shares some common traits but also dis-
plays significant differences with some other definitions of partnerships 
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The Political Declaration of the WSSD in Johannesburg, which was so 
instrumental in promoting the concept of partnership by including it as 
an official, ‘type II’, outcome of the summit, contains no more than the 
following:
We recognize that sustainable development requires a long-term perspec-
tive and broad-based participation in policy formulation, decision-making 
and implementation at all levels. As social partners, we will continue to 
work for stable partnerships with all major groups, respecting the inde-
pendent, important roles of each of them.
(World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002a, § 26)
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation that was adopted along with the 
political declaration is slightly more detailed in that it specifies the involve-
ment of ‘major groups’ in partnerships. At the same time, it constricts the 
definition to include only cooperative arrangements focusing on policy 
implementation (rather than policy definition, for example) in the area of 
sustainable development.
[T]he implementation should involve all relevant actors through partner-
ships, especially between Governments of the North and South, on the 
one hand, and between Governments and major groups, on the other, to 
achieve the widely shared goals of sustainable development. As reflected 
in the Monterrey Consensus, such partnerships are key to pursuing sus-
tainable development in a globalizing world.
(World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002b, § 3)
This definition of partnerships and the subsequent work of the UN are, how-
ever, based on a more detailed description of criteria for partnerships. The 
criteria were developed in the run-up to WSSD and endorsed in the decision 
of the eleventh meeting of the Commission on Sustainable Development. 
Like the definition proposed here, they recognise partnerships as voluntary, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. But they only focus on initiatives designed to 
contribute to the implementation of internationally agreed development 
goals and include a range of normative criteria, such as that partnerships 
should pursue an integrated approach to sustainable development, display 
a sectoral and geographical balance and be designed in a transparent and 
accountable manner.5
The WSSD’s focus on cooperation in order to achieve a public policy goal 
is echoed in the political science literature, for example, in Börzel and Risse, 
who focus on partnerships that transcend national borders:
Transnational PPPs [public-private partnerships] would then be institution-
alized cooperative relationships between public actors (both governments 
9780230238978_03_cha02.indd   8 8/17/2010   8:06:29 PM
The Concepts of Partnerships and Accountability  9
and international organizations) and private actors beyond the nation-
state for governance purposes, [i.e. for] the making and implementation 
of norms and rules for the provision of goods and services that are consid-
ered as binding by members of the international community.
(Börzel and Risse, 2005, p. 199)
By contrast, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a US government 
agency that actively encourages ‘partnering with the private sector’, sees 
partnerships as a predominantly commercial relationship and therefore 
includes only financial restrictions in its definition:
For example, a public/private partnership could be an arrangement 
whereby a contractor or third party develops and operates a system 
which is beneficial to the FDA and others and charges the cost of the 
service to users. Revenue generated by the system would be expended by 
the contractor or third party to maintain and improve the system.
(United States Food and Drug Administration, 2004, p. 1)
In a similar vein, the German government’s definition of partnerships 
focuses on co-financing mechanisms – mainly in the context of development 
policies.
We take ‘public private partnerships’ to be development partnerships with 
the private sector. Partnerships consist of projects that are co-financed by 
corporations and development agencies.
(Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2004) 
(Author’s translation)6
A comparable emphasis on the financial aspects of a partnership appears, for 
example, in Lindner and Rosenau – though they focus more on traditional 
contracting-out models, where the government plays the role of the finan-
cier that pays the private sector to provide public services, rather than the 
user-fee or co-financing models emphasised above by the governments:
[We generalise] the partnership notion to include almost any combination 
of public funding and private provision of services for public purposes.
(Linder and Rosenau, 2000, p. 7)
In some respects, then, the definition of ‘partnerships’ proposed here is 
narrower than other definitions in use (most notably with respect to the 
common decision-making criterion), while in others it is wider than at least 
some others (e.g. on the type of actors involved or the purposes pursued by 
the partnership).
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While these definitions differ from one another in various respects, they 
all belong to the same emerging discourse that places partnerships in the 
context of a public policy or governance context. As such, they have a signifi-
cantly different understanding of the term than a standard dictionary defini-
tion such as Merriam-Webster’s that defines ‘partnership’ as a legal term.
[A partnership is] a legal relation existing between two or more persons 
contractually associated as joint principals in a business, or a relationship 
resembling a legal partnership and usually involving close cooperation 
between parties having specified and joint rights and responsibilities.
(Merriam-Webster, 2004, entry for ‘partnership’)
2.1.2 Partnerships between networks and corporatism
While the term ‘partnership’ is by now much used in political practice and 
analysis, there is no extended theoretical work establishing a theory of policy 
partnerships. Networks and corporatism, by contrast, are concepts or models 
with a much longer and more refined theoretical pedigree. Both terms deal 
with modes of policymaking that include actors from the private and/or civil 
society sectors and have been applied to the study of partnerships. This sec-
tion provides a brief summary of both traditions of thought and explains the 
overlaps and differences as compared to the partnership concept used here.
2.1.2.1 Corporatism
Corporatism is a political system that provides for a legal representation of 
different industrial, economic and professional groups and their inclusion in 
political decision-making processes.7 Early proponents of corporatist political 
structures such as Adam Müller saw corporatism as a way to transform class 
conflict into class cooperation. Fascist economic theory and practice drew 
heavily on this concept, contributing to the negative associations made with 
the term today.8
Are partnerships between governmental organisations, corporations and 
civil society organisations, then, just a revival of corporatist structures under 
a new guise? This, in fact, is one of the more powerful criticisms that have 
been directed against proposed and existing partnerships.9
Some significant parallels exist between corporatism and partnerships that 
warrant a careful analysis of the arguments made and evidence collected in 
the literature about corporatism. First, corporatism, like partnerships, is about 
including organised interests in the policymaking process. As a consequence, 
the participation of individuals in the political process takes a setback in both 
arrangements – an argument that is particularly important for partnerships 
operating at the national or local level. At the same time, this means that in 
both cases the participation of groups can be regulated, thereby potentially 
minimising existing inequalities of access to people in power.
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Second, some thinkers such as John Ralston Saul have described corporat-
ism as a system in which organised elites get to influence the policy process 
at the expense of ordinary citizens.10 The same argument has been debated 
with respect to NGOs.11 For the question whether NGOs are an elite project, 
one should certainly differentiate between different types of civil society 
organisations, for example, between large and established institutions oper-
ating at an international level such as Amnesty International and small, 
community-based organisations. But when analysing partnerships between 
governmental organisations, corporations and civil society groups, one must 
bear in mind that large NGOs possess far greater visibility and resources for 
engaging in high-profile partnerships than grassroots organisations.12
Finally, both partnerships and corporatist solutions can have their most 
positive impact in policy areas rife with conflict. Addressing these conflicts 
through cooperative approaches does not only mitigate social unrest, it also 
improves compliance with the decisions taken. This aspect becomes the 
more important, the weaker the central control mechanisms of the political 
system in question are.
But there are also important differences between these two concepts. 
First, corporatist political systems normally only include labour and busi-
ness interests and focus on macroeconomic policy decisions. Partnerships 
can include these, but are rarely restricted to them. Rather, partnerships can 
cover the entire spectrum of policy issues. In each case, they will gather those 
groups that can affect the outcome and contribute to solving the problem 
addressed. Thus, for example, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) was 
composed of representatives of governments interested in large dam projects, 
companies specialised in building these large projects and civil society groups 
representing those affected by the dams, who were previously often engaged 
in violent protests against the dam projects.13
Second, the groups included in corporatist governance structures tend 
to be highly centralised, with business as well as labour organisations 
representing entire sectors. Partnerships, by contrast, often include small 
 community-based organisations representing one very specific section of 
society or individual businesses whose operations have an impact on the 
goals of the partnership.
Finally, corporatism is a system that usually operates in the context of 
a national political system.14 As such, its decision-making structures ulti-
mately depend on the authority of the state. This can, but does not have to, 
lead to hierarchical decision-making procedures in corporatist institutions. 
Partnerships also work at the inter- or transnational level. While partnerships 
thus often operate ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’,15 their decision-making 
processes by definition have to be non-hierarchical. Therefore only those 
 corporatist arrangements with common and non-hierarchical decision-
 making procedures would qualify as partnerships.
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2.1.2.2 Networks
Networks are the subject of an impressive body of literature in anthropology, 
sociology, political science and economics. Naturally, these studies contain 
a broad variety of approaches, themes and focal points. When trying to 
establish how networks relate to partnerships, it is useful to distinguish three 
modes of network research: network analysis, network theories or models 
and networks as empirical phenomena.
As an analytical approach, network analysis had an early precursor in the 
sociological work of Georg Simmel16 around the turn of the last century. 
It developed into a more widespread and coherent approach in sociology 
and anthropology17 in the 1970s and has further developed since. In essence, 
network analysis is an approach to social enquiry that focuses on the interac-
tions between individuals or organisations. To understand certain dynamics 
or outcomes, it typically maps the links and exchanges between different 
actors, often using complex mathematical and statistical tools. Based on pat-
terns of interaction or the position of different actors in the network, situa-
tions can be classified.18
In political science, policy network analysis is closely associated with the 
notion of ‘governance’.19 Governance theories and approaches often take 
the diminished capability of central government to govern using traditional 
methods as their point of departure20 and focus on ways of steering by polit-
ical authorities.21 Over recent years, a vast body of literature discussing the 
concept of governance and applying network approaches to policy analysis 
has developed. Yet the cumulative insights derived from the governance 
debate seem limited and network analysis as an analytical approach has seri-
ous shortcomings.22 Moreover, a network approach is ill suited for achiev-
ing the purposes of the present enquiry, namely, to develop accountability 
standards for partnerships. Therefore, this study does not adopt a network 
approach to social analysis.
Network theory, by contrast, is mainly concerned with explaining why 
networks emerge, how they operate and what impact they have on social 
interactions. An important source of network theory is transaction cost 
analysis. It posits that firms choose that organisational form which allows 
them to minimise their transaction costs in the production and marketing 
process. Thus they can either rely on the market, on hierarchies (i.e. the 
vertical integration of suppliers) or networks of known and trusted firms to 
secure needed inputs and sell their products.23 Unfortunately, ‘network the-
ory’ does not constitute a coherent body of work24 generating a consistent 
set of assumptions and hypotheses. While some specific network theories 
may offer interesting insights relating to the emergence and operations of 
partnerships, they are unlikely to contribute much to the question of how 
accountable partnerships should be.
Finally, the term ‘network’ is used as an empirical category. Since the 
applications of network analysis and theories are extremely broad, so are the 
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descriptions of what constitutes an actual network. Delimitating the fuzzy 
notion of ‘partnership’ from the equally ill-defined notion of ‘network’ can 
therefore seem a futile task.25 Yet when concentrating on policy networks, 
two broad approaches can be distinguished. Most authors employ a broad 
definition of networks, which encompasses all non-hierarchical forms of 
linkages among actors involved in the policy process. This can range from 
entirely informal and fluid arrangements with no fixed decision-making 
procedures to highly formalised corporatist structures or intergovernmental 
policy-coordination mechanisms.26 What these arrangements have in com-
mon is that the actors are mutually dependent on each other for solving the 
problem at hand and seek to coordinate their activities to that aim.27
As represented in Figure 2.1, if this wide definition of networks is used, 
partnerships can be understood as a specific form of network. A possible 
conceptual alternative to ‘partnership’ would therefore be ‘institutionalised 
network’. But, apart from the heavy and often problematic theoretical bag-
gage referred to above, the concept of ‘network’ also has a narrow definition 
with connotations that do not fit the subject of this investigation well. Take, 
for example, Grahame Thompson’s definition of networks:
Networks have often been considered as above all ‘informal’ practices 
of coordination. They rely upon direct personal contact. They tend to 
be localized as a result, or confined to a particular clearly defined group 
with similar concerns, interests or aspirations. Such that they display a 












Figure 2.1 Partnerships, networks and corporatism
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trust rather than administrative orders or prices. […] Governance of an 
activity is achieved through the identity of a common purpose or interest, 
for which all will work for a collective result. These tend towards a ‘flat’ 
organizational structure, where at least there is a lot of formal equality 
between the participants (though there may actually be significant real 
differences of power and authority in practice).
(Thompson, 2003, pp. 30–1)
This description suggests that networks arise among actors with similar 
interests and therefore only need a low degree of institutionalisation to 
coordinate their activities. Partnerships, by contrast, often form among 
actors with strongly diverging interests. To find cooperative solutions which 
benefit all participants, clearer rules and decision-making procedures as well 
as stronger commitments by the partner organisations are required. It is due 
to these connotations of extremely loose structures, identity of interest and 
the dominance of trust and loyalty28 that the term ‘partnership’ is preferred 
here over ‘institutionalised networks’.
2.2 Accountability
As indicated in the opening pages of this book, the concept of accountability 
is highly complex. Yet accountability does have a specific core meaning. This 
section proposes a general, ‘core’ definition of accountability, clarifies the 
concept by asking the questions ‘who is accountable, to whom, for what, 
how and why?’ and explores some of the general problems and dilemmas of 
accountability.
2.2.1 Defining the ‘core’ of accountability
A standard dictionary definition of accountability reads as follows:
[Accountability is] the quality or state of being accountable; especially: an 
obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s 
actions.
(Merriam-Webster, 2004, entry for ‘accountability’, 
emphasis original)
That definition contains two central elements: the notion of responsibility 
and that of accounting for something. The original meaning of ‘to account’, 
in turn, is the ‘reckoning of money received and paid’ (Douglas-Harper, entry 
for ‘account’). Accounting, then, primarily refers to the keeping and trans-
mitting of information. This meaning is reflected in our understanding of 
‘accountants’, that is, professional bookkeepers. In this context ‘ accounting’ 
is neutral, in the sense that it only implies an accurate reporting of facts, not 
an evaluation of these facts.
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When we say ‘to account for’, though, the term has a different connota-
tion. According to an etymological dictionary, it was around 1700 that the 
term started to be used in the sense of ‘explaining’ and ‘answering for money 
held in trust’.29 This is where the ‘responsibility’ part of the definition stems 
from. People entrust their money to others, who accept the responsibility 
to deal with it according to the terms agreed. ‘Accounting for’, then, means 
not only transmitting accurate information about the use of that money but 
also explaining whether the money was handled as agreed.
From the perspective of an actor (often termed the ‘agent’), then, 
‘accountability’ means:
providing accurate information about one’s activities or behaviour;
evaluating that behaviour with reference to certain standards, rules or 
expectations;
thereby recognising one’s obligations and accepting responsibility for 
one’s actions.
But accountability always involves a second side, since it is a concept that 
refers to the relationship between at least two actors. In the dictionary’s 
example, the other side are the people who entrusted their money to some-
body else (often termed the ‘principal’). They are only prepared to delegate 
control over their property to an agent if they can trust that the agent will 
honour his obligations and act in their best interest. To be able to hold the 
agent accountable for doing so, the principals need sufficient information 
about the agent’s behaviour. They also need to maintain some leverage over 
the agent, that is, the ability to impose positive or negative sanctions. In a 
working accountability relationship, the principal’s ability to impose sanc-
tions and the agent’s anticipation of these sanctions are sufficient to control 
the agent’s behaviour.
From the perspective of the principal, then, accountability is a mechanism 
to ensure that the agent does not abuse his authority and acts in the best 
interest of the principal. It is at this point that the concepts of accountability 
and legitimacy intersect. Where a principal has access to sufficient account-
ability mechanisms, he is likely to regard the agent’s exercise of authority as 
legitimate. Because of this connection, many authors writing from a politi-
cal background have a habit of mentioning both terms in the same breath 
and of using them almost interchangeably.30 Yet the concepts are different 
and it is important to be aware of their distinctions.
‘Legitimacy’ is a term used in political science to designate a situation in 
which citizens accept the authority of the government and are therefore 
prepared to comply with its policies.31 In his early treatment of the subject, 
Max Weber emphasised that legitimacy can have several sources, including 
tradition and charisma, as well as the formal correctness and legality of the 
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 commonplace to acknowledge that legitimacy can derive from the use of 
appropriate inputs or processes, as well as the achievement of desirable out-
puts or results.33 In a democratic understanding of governance, appropriate 
accountability arrangements create input accountability.34 But legitimacy can 
also derive from the effectiveness or efficiency of an organisation in achiev-
ing results, which does not require a similar accountability relationship.
The basic mechanism of accountability is represented in Figure 2.2. An 
agent behaves within the context of a certain set of obligations and expec-
tations.35 Information about this behaviour can either be provided by the 
agent herself or demanded and generated by the principal. The principal 
then evaluates this information and applies positive or negative sanctions 
accordingly. Insofar as the agent can anticipate this reaction, she can adapt 
her behaviour to avoid negative sanctions.
In the previous paragraphs, I have used the terms ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ 
to designate the accountability holder and holdee respectively. The terms 
derive from principal–agent theory, an important theoretical construct in 
economics. The theory was originally designed to analyse the relationship 
between the owners and managers of companies. Over time, this reasoning 
has been applied to a wide array of situations, relaxing some of the stricter 
assumptions of the economic formulations of the theory.
In an early paper on the problems arising in principal–agent arrange-
ments, Stephen Ross defined the basic relationship as follows:
[A]n agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when 









9780230238978_03_cha02.indd   16 8/17/2010   8:06:30 PM
The Concepts of Partnerships and Accountability  17
for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision 
problems.
(Ross, 1973, p. 134)
The theory assumes that both parties are autonomous actors and rational 
agents who want to maximise their expected utility. In most cases the princi-
pal’s utility function differs from the agent’s utility function, and that’s where 
the problem starts. The agent does not automatically act in the best interest 
of the principal. Since the activity takes place in an environment containing 
unpredictable developments which cannot be influenced by the agent, not 
all aspects of the agent’s behaviour can be predetermined in detail. In addi-
tion, the relationship involves an information asymmetry because the agent 
will always be better informed about his activities than the principal.36
Because of these three elements – diverging goals, a situation of uncer-
tainty and information asymmetry – a principal–agent relationship brings 
disadvantages to the parties involved. These so-called agency costs arise 
either from the efforts needed to make the agent act in the best interest of 
the principal or from the loss incurred if the agent’s activities diverge from 
the outcome preferred by the principal.37
To limit the negative impacts of principal–agent relationships – or, in 
other words, to improve the accountability of the agent to the principal – 
economists have focused their attention on two aspects of the relationship: 
the definition of sanctions and incentives to align the interests of agent and 
principal and the provision of information to reduce the principal’s moni-
toring costs. In a business context, solutions usually involve remuneration 
schemes for managers linking their income to company profits and strictly 
regulated and audited financial reporting mechanisms.
Economists working on principal–agent theory early on stressed the pos-
sibilities of expanding their reasoning to other social or political relations. 
Thus, Jensen and Meckling noted:
Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile to point out the generality 
of the agency problem. The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as 
if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general. It exists 
in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts – at every level of man-
agement in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, 
in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships 
normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in 
the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of 
theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these 
situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how 
and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which 
is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally.
( Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 313)38
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Particularly political scientists focusing on democratic accountability have 
taken up this suggestion and have applied the insights derived from eco-
nomic analysis to political processes. In many cases they have also adopted 
the focus on sanctions/incentives and the provision of information. Thus 
Andreas Schedler defines political accountability as follows:
[T]he notion of political accountability carries two basic connotations: 
answerability, the obligation of public officials to inform about and to 
explain what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity of account-
ing agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated 
their public duties.
(Schedler, 1999, p. 14)
Similarly, Robert Keohane, who develops a concept of accountability for 
inter- and transnational politics, proposes this definition:
Accountability refers to relationships in which principals have the ability 
to demand answers from agents to questions about their proposed or past 
behavior, to discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in 
the event that they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.
(Keohane, 2002b, p. 3)
In the original formulation of principal–agent theory in economics, a num-
ber of assumptions generated a clear framework which allowed analysts to 
focus on how to strengthen accountability. Most cases are based on a con-
tract which clearly defines the principal and the agent. What the agent is 
accountable for also tends to be uncontested. It is to maximise the principal’s 
expected utility, usually defined in financial terms. Finally, while different 
types of sanctions and incentives do exist, the main focus in economic rela-
tionships is on monetary rewards or sanctions.
All of those parameters, however, have become contested and problematic. 
Within economics, stakeholder theories, for example, demand recognition 
of other stakeholder groups as principals, thus also changing what the agent 
is held accountable for.39 When applying the concepts of principal–agent 
theory to wider social or political situations, the definition of agent and 
principal changes, as well as the aspects for which the agent is accountable 
and the sanctions and incentives used to strengthen accountability.
2.2.2 Who is accountable, to whom, for what and how? 
To characterise any given accountability relationship, it is useful to begin 
by clarifying the parameters outlined above: Who is the agent? Who are the 
principal(s)? For what is the agent accountable? and How is this account-
ability created or strengthened?40 Without exploring any specific answers, 
this section sketches the general scope of these questions.
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2.2.2.1 Defining the agent
In the example used above for defining the core of accountability, an account-
ability relationship was created by one party entrusting money to another. 
If the agent that is thus created is an individual, it is obvious who can be held 
accountable for the correct use of the funds. In modern societies, though, 
many aspects of our political, economic and social lives are dominated by 
organisations. When it comes to holding organisations accountable, the 
question of who exactly is accountable can turn into a major problem.
The basic dilemma has been coined the ‘problem of many hands’ by 
Dennis Thompson. In an essay analysing responsibility in politics, he defines 
the problem as follows:
Because many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions 
and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify 
who is morally responsible for political outcomes. This is what I call the 
problem of many hands.
(Thompson, 1980, p. 905)
If a process is too complex to identify individual contributions to specific 
outcomes, then holding individuals accountable for undesirable outcomes 
becomes difficult. As a result, individuals as well as organisations as a whole 
in many instances manage to escape blame and avoid accountability.41 This 
also undermines the preventive function of accountability, encouraging 
irresponsible behaviour.
Given the far-reaching impact of organisations on modern societies, 
strategies to address the problem of who can be held accountable are very 
important. Mark Bovens, for example, distinguishes four different solutions 
to the problem, each with its own pragmatic and normative advantages and 
shortcomings.
In systems of corporate accountability, organisations as independent entities 
are treated like persons. Most legal systems recognise organisations as ‘legal 
persons’, that is, as the bearers of rights and responsibilities. This approach 
makes it easy to identify the agent and can ensure that the organisation is 
held to account for its misconduct even when the individuals originally 
responsible for these decisions are no longer present.42 Mechanisms relying 
on corporate accountability can be problematic because organisations often 
do not behave rationally (hence undermining the preventive function of 
accountability); because lack of external insight makes control difficult; 
because organisations can dissolve to escape accountability; and because 
sanctions can affect people who are not responsible for the misconduct 
(Bovens, 1998, Chapter 5).
The three remaining solutions are different varieties of holding individu-
als within organisations to account for corporate conduct. A common form 
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is hierarchical accountability. Each official in an organisation is accountable 
to his superior and the individual at the top of the organisation is held 
accountable for the behaviour of the organisation as a whole. Again, this 
model presents a very clear and easy-to-apply solution to the problem of 
many hands. Problems arise when the leaders of organisations lack adequate 
information and control over all activities of the organisation. In these 
cases, hierarchical accountability only has a limited preventive and educa-
tional effect on the organisation43 (Bovens, 1998, Chapter 6).
Another solution is collective accountability, that is, a system in which each 
individual member of a group or organisation is held to account for the 
actions of the collective. This mechanism is certainly very effective in ensur-
ing that individuals are held to account and might have a strong preventive 
effect. At the same time, most individuals identify as members of specific 
groups and might feel individually responsible for group conduct. Yet enforc-
ing sanctions to implement collective accountability clearly contradicts 
fundamental principles of the rule of law and of Western conceptions of 
morality. The application of collective form of accountability in formalised 
accountability relations is therefore very rare44 (Bovens, 1998, Chapter 7).
Finally, models of individual accountability seek to identify the exact con-
tribution of a person to an outcome and hold her accountable accordingly. 
This solution corresponds most closely to the normative principles underly-
ing democratic societies but is fully affected by the problem of many hands. 
To overcome this problem, organisations can, for example, clarify who bears 
what responsibility and improve the transparency of working processes 
(Bovens, 1998, Chapter 8).
Since each of these approaches has advantages and shortcomings, Bovens 
suggests applying a mix of accountability mechanisms depending on the 
situation. The question of who is held accountable thus remains contested. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the most pressing 
contemporary public policy problems are influenced by a host of different 
institutions, groups and individuals. When speaking about the problems 
that partnerships are designed to address, the problem of many hands 
therefore applies not only within organisations but also for the multitude 
of organisations involved.
2.2.2.2 Defining the principal(s)
A politically even more controversial question than who is the agent is the 
definition of the relevant principal(s). In most cases, multiple actors are 
recognised or are struggling to be recognised as principals. In businesses, for 
example, shareholders are broadly accepted as having the right to hold man-
agement to account, but in many cases we also see customers, employees and 
suppliers making accountability claims. Similarly, leading public officials in 
democracies are accountable to parliament as well as to independent financial 
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agencies controlling the use of public funds and to the general public via the 
media.
The existence of multiple principals raises two problems. Firstly, as we 
have seen above when defining agency costs, monitoring the agent is costly 
for the principal. If multiple or fragmented principals exist,45 a collective 
action problem arises since no single actor has an incentive to bear the costs 
of providing information that could be used by all principals to monitor the 
activities of the agent.46
The second, more intractable problem lies in the fact that different prin-
cipals have different, potentially conflicting criteria for judging the agent’s 
conduct. Thus shareholders hold managers accountable for high returns on 
investment, employees for high salaries, good working conditions and job 
security, while customers emphasise low prices and high product quality.47 
Similarly, public officials are held to account for producing outcomes by the 
media and public, while financial oversight committees demand account-
ability for the correct use of funds.48
Agents can use the existence of multiple principals to avoid account-
ability.49 But they can also accept the complex task of assigning priorities 
among principals and balancing their various claims. R. Edward Freeman in 
his argument to adopt a stakeholder theory of the firm – which is no other 
than to recognise other stakeholders as co-principals on an equal footing as 
shareholders – described the scope of the challenge confronting managers:
The task of management in today’s corporation is akin to that of King 
Solomon […] management must keep the relationships among stake-
holders in balance.
(Freeman, 2001, p. 44)
All partnerships face a range of different principals. Depending on the for-
mality of their accountability claims, we can generally distinguish three lev-
els of accountability holders: legal and fiscal authorities, formal principals 
and informal principals. The different layers are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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Legal and fiscal authorities: The level of accountability with the strictest and 
most formalised definition of both obligations for agents and sanctions in 
case of their violation is to legal and fiscal authorities.
In the debate about institutions that act at the transnational or interna-
tional level, legal and fiscal accountability is often neglected, because there 
is no all-encompassing international legal code or court system. Yet almost 
all institutions are located and operate on national territories and are thereby 
bound by their respective rules and regulations.50 Multinational corporations, 
for example, despite their power have to abide by the rules of the countries 
they operate in. Integrated international markets and financial systems do, 
however, allow them to choose which national regulatory and enforcement 
system they want to be subject to. This can put corporations in a strong posi-
tion when they lobby for changes in national rule systems.
Formal principals: The next level of accountability is that defined by con-
tracts or other means of formal delegation. In these cases, contracts, statutes 
or briefs establish who transfers what authority to whom. Thus they clearly 
define the identity of both principal and agent, as well as the obligations of 
the agent and sanctions that apply in case of non-compliance. As a result, 
formal accountability relationships tend to be uncontested in principle. 
Disputes may arise over the details of honouring obligations or the appli-
cation of sanctions but not the existence of an accountability relationship 
itself. Examples for such principal–agent situations include the relationship 
between company owners and managers, between elected governments and 
their ministers as well as their delegations in international organisations and 
between civil society organisations and their members or donors.
Informal principals: A third level of accountability is based on the informal, 
implicit or hypothetical delegation of authority. As argued in greater detail 
in section 3.2.3, organisations often assume authority without explicit prior 
authorisation. In these cases, those who originally or rightfully hold the 
authority now exercised by the organisation have a claim to accountability. 
The lack of formality means, however, that these claims are often contested.
In practice, the relative power of groups or individuals often determines 
whether they can hold an agent accountable. Establishing clear criteria for 
determining who should be recognised as a principal is nevertheless impor-
tant, not least because legitimacy itself has become a currency of power in 
a globalised world.
2.2.2.3 What are agents accountable for?
Accountability was defined above in the context of a principal–agent 
 relationship. This makes it easy to define what an agent is accountable for in 
abstract terms. Agents are accountable for using the authority given to them 
in a way that fulfils the principal’s expectations. When somebody entrusts 
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the management of resources to somebody else, for example, she probably 
expects the agent to use those resources efficiently and effectively to achieve 
the agreed goal.
But principal–agent relationships can take on very different forms. In addi-
tion, any single agent can be subject to the accountability demands of a vari-
ety of principals. It is therefore impossible to describe all the possible aspects 
an agent can be held to account for in concrete terms. Generally speaking, 
though, agents are held accountable for the way they handle resources, for their 
compliance with rules and procedures and for the outcomes they  produce.
Accountability for finances: Financial accountability could be subsumed under 
the other two headings relating to processes and outcomes, but it deserves 
to be treated separately because it is so central both to our understanding of 
accountability51 and to the workings of organisations.
Agents can be held accountable for three different aspects of the way they 
handle resources. Firstly, it can concern the sources of an agent’s financial and 
other means. Whoever provides an organisation with resources gains influ-
ence over it. This can make the agent dependent and corrupt its impartiality. 
Public agencies, many civil society organisations and institutions involved in 
evaluation and monitoring are thus often held accountable for the sources of 
their funds.52
Secondly, agents are accountable for using their resources efficiently and 
effectively. Those who provide an organisation with resources usually want 
to ensure the agent uses them in the best way for reaching the desired goals. 
In the private sector, return on investment is a common measure for estab-
lishing whether resources were well used. In the public and civil society sec-
tors, similar measures are usually more difficult to find.
Thirdly, the way an agent handles resources can be under scrutiny. Because 
efficiency and effectiveness are often hard to measure in public agencies and 
civil society organisations, more weight tends to be attached to the rules and 
processes for managing resources. Thus donors and public agencies often pre-
determine in great detail which resources can be allocated for what purpose 
and agents are held accountable for following those rules. The key to proper 
financial management – professional bookkeeping and accounting, combined 
with adequate reporting – though, is expected of organisations in all three 
sectors.
Accountability for finances can create considerable conflicts and  dilemmas. 
Firstly, different principals often have different views on what resources 
should be spent on. Company managers, for example, can be pressured by 
shareholders to deliver maximum dividends. Employees may favour higher 
wages; consumers usually opt for lower prices and NGOs lobby for a greater 
share of resources to be invested, for example, in environmental protection.
Secondly, the three aspects of financial accountability are not necessar-
ily compatible. An environmental NGO that rejects contributions from oil 
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 companies to maintain its independence, for example, may be unable to 
reach its goals because of a lack of resources. Similarly, professional and accu-
rate accounting and reporting is costly and can divert resources away from 
other purposes. And strict and detailed rules on how to handle resources can 
curtail the flexibility of agents to such an extent that their efficiency suffers. 
As further discussed in section 2.3, organisations must therefore carefully 
determine which aspects of accountability they want to stress.
Accountability for compliance with rules and processes: Another general aspect 
that agents are held accountable for is their compliance with rules and 
procedures. Rules and predefined procedures serve to control the behaviour 
of agents. They can do so by directly protecting the interests of others. 
Companies, for example, in many countries have to pay their employees 
minimum wages and are restricted in their rights to fire them. Other rules 
and processes are components of accountability mechanisms. They make it 
easier for principals to enforce their accountability claims. An example of 
this is the right of workers to unionise or to participate in the management 
of the company. Principals are often interested in enforcing compliance 
with these rules and processes because it allows them to create effective 
accountability for their other interests.
The rules and processes regulating the behaviour of agents can be defined 
by governmental authorities in laws, regulations and fiscal rules. But they 
can also be determined by principals. When a new agency is created, for 
example, the founding institutions create a statute and by-laws determining 
the agency’s mandate and governance. Common types of rules and processes 
that agents are expected to follow include:
Legal and fiscal rules: The rules and processes prescribed for organisations 
are complex and vary between countries as well as between different 
organisational forms. They pertain, for example, to the requirements for 
registration or incorporation, the treatment of employees or competitive 
practices. Compliance with these rules can be enforced by national judi-
cial systems. Where judicial systems work well, accountability for compli-
ance with legal and fiscal rules is therefore high.
Decision-making procedures: Another important set of rules and pre-
scribed procedures covers the way organisations make decisions. This 
includes regulations on which body can take which decisions by what 
decision rule, as well as who needs to be included or consulted and who 
is bound by the decision. Decision rules can be important mechanisms to 
strengthen accountability. They help determine who bears what responsi-
bility for a certain outcome and allow those principals who are included 
in the process to articulate their preferences directly. Irrespective of the 
outcome of a decision, principals therefore often hold agents accountable 
for following the correct procedures when taking decisions.
•
•
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Which decision-making procedures are set for an organisation is highly 
dependent on context. The requirements are often stricter for the public 
than the private sector and more demanding for taking strategic deci-
sions than for implementing them. A standard that all types of organisa-
tions can be held accountable for is due diligence.53 Principals demand 
due diligence from managers and bankers in investment decisions. But 
the public also holds public agencies and NGOs accountable for ‘not 
doing their homework properly’. Thus Greenpeace, after the Brent Spar 
campaign, as well as the Bush administration in the follow-up to the 
invasion of Iraq experienced a sharp drop in public support.54
Transparency: A final crucial set of rules and regulations determines what 
information an organisation has to provide to whom. As we have seen in 
the definition of accountability above, access to reliable and useful 
information is essential to any accountability mechanism. Transparency 
requirements therefore figure prominently in the rules and procedures 
laid down for organisations55 and principals are often keen to enforce 
compliance with these rules. The rules regulate not only what needs to 
be communicated but also determine requirements for the quality of 
information. Many organisations, for example, are obliged to conform to 
strict standards in their accounting and reporting, and must have their 
accounts and activities verified by independent auditors.56
Accountability for results: Perhaps the most obvious aspect that organisa-
tions are held to account for are the outcomes or results of their work. This 
includes firstly which goals an organisation pursues. Take, for example, an 
advocacy NGO that claims to represent the interests of indigenous people 
and seeks to stop the construction of a dam on their behalf. The group of 
indigenous people may actually disagree and try to hold the NGO account-
able for its goals. Similarly, citizens hold governments accountable for the 
goals they pursue by endorsing or rejecting proposed policies in elections.
Secondly, accountability for results can refer to the way in which an organ-
isation achieves its aims. The main question here is whether the organisation 
is efficient in its operations. Consumers, for example, can hold companies 
accountable for efficiency by choosing products that, at similar quality, are 
offered at a cheaper price. Comparison is more difficult in the public and 
civil society sectors. But donors, for example, increasingly use measures like 
the ratio of overhead costs to total budget as shorthand for efficiency.
Finally, principals can focus on the quality of results. Is the organisation 
effective and successful in reaching the goals it set for itself? A government that 
was voted in on the promise to reduce unemployment, for example, may lose 
subsequent elections if it fails to deliver effective results. Similarly, a research 
institution can quickly lose its reputation as well as funding if its results fail to 
live up to scientific standards, just as a professional auditor will find himself in 
court and out of business if his results are not accurate and impartial.
•
9780230238978_03_cha02.indd   25 8/17/2010   8:06:32 PM
26  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
In practice, creating accountability for the efficiency and quality of results is 
often difficult. The chief reason for this is that some outcomes are much easier 
to evaluate than others. Thus, it is much easier to judge the financial returns 
of an investment than to measure the social or environmental effects of an 
investment decision, policy or civil society campaign. As a result, accountabil-
ity for easy-to-measure results often takes precedence over accountability for 
more fuzzy kinds of results, or accountability for easily evaluated procedural 
aspects dominate outcome accountability. As Robert Behn argued persuasively 
for accountability in the political sector, this can lead to serious shortcomings 
in the overall workings of a political system (Behn, 2001).
2.2.2.4 How is accountability created or strengthened?
The definition of accountability proposed above contained a description 
of the basic mechanism through which accountability works. An agent 
behaves in a certain way. Information about these activities is used by 
the principal to evaluate the agent’s behaviour. Depending on whether or 
not the behaviour conforms to the principal’s expectations, she will apply 
sanctions to control the agent’s activities, thus establishing what could be 
termed ‘retroactive accountability’. If the agent can anticipate this reac-
tion, the expectation of sanctions influences his actions, hence generating 
‘ proactive’ or ‘preventive accountability’.57
Accountability can go wrong at each of these four steps: Firstly, the effects 
of the agent’s behaviour can be unclear.58 Secondly, the information available 
to the principal can be biased or insufficient for an appropriate evaluation. 
Thirdly, accountability can fail if the expectations of the principal or princi-
pals are unclear or contradictory. Finally, the principal might not possess suf-
ficient means for sanctioning the agent or his threat to use those sanctions 
may not be credible enough to preventively change the agent’s behaviour.
Mechanisms to create or strengthen accountability, then, are measures that 
address any of these issues.59 Since an accountability system is only as strong 
as its weakest point,60 effective accountability strategies address all four areas 
at the same time, or focus on the area with the greatest shortcomings.
Clarifying the agent’s contributions and responsibilities: There are two situations 
in which the effects of an agent’s behaviour are unclear: Firstly, the activities 
and responsibilities of an actor may be well known, but the consequences of 
these actions are not. Many environmental problems, for example, are caus-
ally extremely complex and scientifically disputed. Apart from improving the 
scientific evidence relating to the problem, accountability can be improved 
if very specific behavioural goals are defined based on existing evidence. 
This happened, for example, in the area of climate change, where the Kyoto 
Protocol defined specific targets for the reduction of CO2 emissions. These 
are now used to either make companies reduce their emissions or pay for 
additional emission rights.
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Secondly, this lack of clarity can occur when the agent’s responsibilities 
are unclear. The obvious remedy here is to assign responsibilities and tasks 
more clearly. While the agents must retain flexibility to react to unexpected 
developments, a clearly defined mandate is important to establish account-
ability within an organisation, and also when different groups or institutions 
cooperate to reach a joint goal.
Improving the provision of information: As we have seen above, information 
asymmetry is one of the major drivers of agency costs. Correspondingly, 
transparency, or the availability of correct and useful information, is a cen-
tral precondition for accountability.61 The issues relating to transparency 
include the scope, source, quality, credibility, formats and associated costs 
of information:
Generally, principals want information on anything they hold the agent 
accountable for. This can refer to an organisation’s finances, its operating 
procedures and internal governance, as well as the outcomes produced in 
different areas. The challenge for any organisation is to find the right bal-
ance between the necessary scope and degree of detail in reports and their 
usability. In addition, certain aspects of an organisation’s work might be 
subject to legitimate confidentiality requirements, such as, for example, the 
takeover plans of a company.
Information can be generated by both the agent and the principal. In both 
cases, the quality of information is crucial and different types of reporting 
and auditing standards are used to guarantee quality. When it is the agent 
who makes information available, he often encounters credibility problems. 
These are most commonly addressed through external verification.62 When 
the principal generates the necessary information, credibility can also be 
an issue (e.g. Greenpeace’s Brent Spar episode), but in addition, the question 
of how sources of information are protected and how the agent deals with 
information requests are salient.63
Another important aspect concerns the format in which information is 
transmitted. To be useful, the format must fit the needs of the respective 
audience. Thus while publications of English language annual reports on 
the Internet might be appropriate for satisfying the information needs of 
Western NGOs, they might not be accessible to local communities in the 
developing world. Here, signs, billboards or public discussions in the local 
language might be necessary to convey information effectively.
Finally, the costs of providing and using information have to be considered. 
Providing detailed reports and evaluations of an organisation’s activities can 
be highly complex and requires specialised skills and staff time. From the 
perspective of an agent, bearing this cost is only worthwhile if it serves to 
avert sanctions. For principals, particularly when they are fragmented, gen-
erating information can lead to a collective action problem. Stock markets 
have solved this problem by specifying disclosure requirements for listed 
9780230238978_03_cha02.indd   27 8/17/2010   8:06:32 PM
28  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
 companies and by employing rating agencies to provide additional informa-
tion and evaluate available data.
Clarifying the principal’s expectations: To create a strong accountability rela-
tionship it is also crucial that the principal’s expectations be clearly defined 
and articulated. Clearly defined and, where possible, operationalised expec-
tations form the basis for evaluating the agent’s behaviour.
In many cases, the expectations and demands of a principal are ill defined. 
This can be the case in situations involving formal delegation. Even where a 
contract defines the principal–agent relationship, the tasks and achievements 
expected of the agent can be too broad to provide any practical guidance.64 
But a lack in clarity is even more frequent in informal accountability rela-
tionships such as between consumers and producers or civil society groups 
and political institutions. Here, expectations are often not articulated at all 
or are unclear and subject to change.
When the principal is a fragmented and dispersed group of individuals 
or organisations, formulating precise expectations presents a formidable 
challenge that might require the installation of a centralised spokesperson. 
The task is easier when the principal is an individual or a coherent group or 
institution. Here, the scope for improvement is often large, particularly in 
the political sphere. Yet a fundamental tension will always remain between 
the desire to define precise steps and responsibilities in a mandate and 
leaving the agent with a sufficient degree of freedom to react to unforeseen 
developments.65
The case becomes even more complex when different principals with 
diverging interests and expectations exist. As Robert Keohane pointed 
out, this can be abused by agents to avoid accountability.66 The flipside 
of this coin is that those agents who do not want to escape accountability 
and are confronted with multiple, conflicting expectations can find it 
impossible to do justice to all principals.67 Despite their best intentions, 
they can be subject to sanctions from various sides. To avoid sanctions, 
the agent can create transparency about which expectations exist and 
how she balances or prioritises them, hoping for understanding and 
approval from the principals. Alternatively, she can attempt to make 
the principals (or at least some of them) to agree on a coherent set of 
objectives among themselves. Companies conducting multi-stakeholder 
dialogues, for example, can use this forum for either of the two strate-
gies of explaining and creating transparency or developing a consensus 
among stakeholders.
Strengthening sanctions and incentives: The ability to impose negative or posi-
tive sanctions is the ultimate means through which principals control the 
agent’s behaviour. The types of sanctions available to different groups or 
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individuals vary considerably in their nature and their salience to the agent. 
They include:68
Legal and fiscal sanctions: Organisations, even if they work on a transna-
tional or international level, are bound by the laws and regulations of the 
country they operate in. Legal and fiscal systems around the world define 
very explicit rules for the behaviour of individuals and corporate actors, as 
well as the sanctions to be applied in case of their breach. Both the con-
tent of these rules and sanctions and the degree of their enforcement vary 
significantly between countries. Well-functioning legal and fiscal systems 
can impose tough sanctions and can therefore be very effective in creat-
ing accountability. This accountability, though, is usually limited in scope, 
sanctioning only outright transgressions of norms.
Elections: In democratic political systems, elections are commonly used as 
sanctions to ensure the political leadership respects the preferences of the 
people.69 Elections are also used within many organisations or cooperative 
bodies to make elected officials accountable to their electorate.
Disciplinary measures: In hierarchical organisations, superiors can usually 
resort to disciplinary measures for holding their staff to account for their 
actions. These can be quasi-legal (as is the case in military organisations) 
or result in pay-cuts, changes in the job description or dismissal.
Financial incentives: While legal sanctions, elections and disciplinary 
measures have a strong impact on agents, financial incentives and sanc-
tions can be more easily fine-tuned and thus allow for a more differenti-
ated form of accountability. Financial sanctions are used to hold both 
individuals and organisations to account. Thus managers’ salaries are 
often linked to the company’s performance, consumers and investors can 
exert pressure through their market decisions and donors often link their 
contributions to specific demands.
Withdrawal and voluntary compliance: A potent sanctioning mechanism 
for those who might not have formal or financial means to influence an 
organisation or process is the option to stop participating in it70 or fail to 
comply with its resolutions. To be effective, the actor who denies participa-
tion or compliance must be critical to the issue at hand. Thus, for example, 
the refusal of the US to participate in international agreements like the 
Kyoto Protocol seriously affects its effectiveness. Similarly, the quantity of 
individuals leaving the GDR prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall seriously 
undermined the state’s legitimacy. In the corporate sector, the operations of 
a company can be threatened if many employees quit their jobs or lay down 
their work in strikes. At the international level, where no centralised enforce-
ment mechanism exists, the necessity to achieve voluntary compliance with 
norms and resolutions is one of the key levers for groups demanding the 
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Reputation: A more subtle and diffuse type of sanction relates to an individ-
ual’s or an organisation’s reputation. The opinions held by relevant groups 
about an organisation or individual matter since they influence their ability 
to operate. Reputation affects, among others, who want to work for, engage 
with or vote for the actor and how seriously products or ideas are taken.71
Protest and violence: Finally, all those who feel they do not possess suf-
ficient alternative sanctions to hold an agent accountable can resort to 
protests or even violence to make their claims heard. From the so-called 
Monday demonstrations against labour market reforms in Germany, via 
the street protests against the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) policies 
in Seattle to acts of sabotage and violence against oil firms operating in 
the Nigerian Delta region, it is particularly those who feel excluded and 
marginalised who resort to protests and violence to create accountability.
With such a broad array of potential sanctions available, two main strategies 
exist to strengthen accountability based on sanctions. Firstly, institutional 
structures can be changed to give specific principals access to new kinds 
of sanctions. This can mean the creation of entities organising collective 
action to increase the sanctioning potential, such as trade unions or NGOs 
giving voice to marginalised groups. Or it can mean the inclusion of groups 
in decision-making processes, as is the case when corporations conduct 
multi-stakeholder dialogues or when the UN grants NGOs official status in 
its negotiations.72 The latter process is often an attempt to change available 
sanctioning mechanisms from those that work crudely and ex-post facto like 
protests and violence to more differentiated ones that are better suited to 
creating proactive or preventive accountability such as elections or partici-
pation in decision-making processes.
Secondly, the accountability effect of existing sanctions can be strength-
ened by improving their enforcement. Better enforcement not only allows 
stronger retroactive accountability but thereby also makes the threat of 
sanctions more credible, thus enhancing preventive accountability. One 
way to make the enforcement of sanctions more reliable is the creation or 
strengthening of enforcement institutions, such as state prosecution offices, 
disciplinary committees in institutions or control and evaluation units in 
donor organisations. Another way is to make sanctions more immediate and 
link them more directly to the agent’s behaviour. Thus, for example, manag-
ers’ salaries are now often directly tied to company performance. This means 
that sanctions and rewards are triggered automatically.
2.2.2.5 When is the agent interested in strengthening accountability?
We have now seen how accountability can be created or strengthened at each 
of the four steps involved in the basic accountability mechanism. Measures 
to improve accountability can be taken by both sides, the principal(s) and 
the agent. While it seems obvious why principals want to create strong 
•
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accountability (namely to align the agent’s behaviour as much as possible 
with their own interests and goals), it might not be so clear why an agent 
might be interested in strengthening his own accountability.
Indeed, Keohane suggests that ‘Opportunistic agents will seek to design 
institutional arrangements that only nominally control their behavior’ 
(Keohane, 2002b, p. 14). Similarly, Robert Behn argues that agents have a very 
clear view on accountability which does not make it sound like a desirable 
outcome: ‘Those whom we want to hold accountable have a clear understand-
ing of what accountability means: accountability means punishment’ (Behn, 
2001, p. 3).
Yet there are clear instances in which agents do take measures to make 
themselves more accountable. Of course, these actions can be taken in 
response to or anticipation of pressure for reform. But it can also be in the 
agent’s interest to actively push for improved accountability. Jensen describes 
this in his early definition of agency costs:
In addition in situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding 
costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm 
the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does 
take such actions.
( Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 5, emphasis original)
Figure 2.4 illustrates the motivation of principal and agent in creating or 
strengthening accountability.73 The situation is presented as a simple game 
involving two steps. Agent A can either pursue his own or the principal’s 
 interest. Principal P can either apply sanctions to A or not. The payoff struc-
ture (payoff A, payoff P) shows that the optimal outcome from the perspec-
tive of the agent is ‘pursue A’s interests’ and ‘no sanction’. The principal, 





















9780230238978_03_cha02.indd   31 8/17/2010   8:06:33 PM
32  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
by contrast, has a strong preference for the agent to pursue P’s interests. 
Therefore, the principal has an interest in making the threat of sanctions cred-
ible enough to induce A to choose ‘pursue P’s interests’.
From the perspective of the agent, the situation is slightly more complex. 
His first instinct is probably to try to weaken accountability so that he can 
pursue his own interests without incurring any sanctions. Two considera-
tions, however, can change this calculus. Firstly, the principal is probably 
only willing to engage in this game at all or to play it again if she sees a rea-
sonable chance that the agent will pursue P’s interests. As long as the agent 
derives a greater benefit from playing than from not playing, he has an inter-
est in making a credible commitment not to abuse his authority, that is, in 
strengthening accountability.74 Secondly, the agent also has a strong motiva-
tion to avoid a situation where he does his best to act in the principal’s inter-
ests, but gets sanctioned nevertheless. He can reduce this risk by demanding 
that the principal clearly articulates her expectations and preferences and by 
ensuring that the principal receives adequate information about the agent’s 
behaviour. In this sense, too, the agent can be interested in strengthening the 
accountability relationship.
2.2.3 The accountability dilemma
The term ‘accountability’ carries overwhelmingly positive connotations. 
Many therefore assume that it is simply a case of ‘the more, the better’.75 
This is particularly the case in the international sphere, where researchers 
and activists now increasingly come to see mechanisms to strengthen the 
accountability of different organisations as a means to balance the demo-
cratic deficit of global institutions.76
While accountability does play an important role in making the opera-
tions and policies of influential actors more responsive to the needs and 
interests of those affected, it is not always a case of ‘the more, the better’. In 
Mark Boven’s words, ‘Public accountability may be a good thing, but we can 
certainly have too much of it’ (Bovens, 2005, p. 194).
Accountability relationships can have negative impacts in three main 
respects. Firstly, principals can hold agents accountable according to multi-
ple, sometimes even contradictory standards. Where this is the case, account-
ability demands can have a paralysing effect on organisations. In addition, 
even well-intentioned agents will find it impossible to fulfil all expectations 
at once and face undeserved sanctions. Jonathan Koppell has described 
organisations trying to satisfy various conflicting accountability demands 
as suffering from a ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’ (MAD). In his experi-
ence, such situations are likely to undermine the overall accountability of an 
organisation: ‘Rather than satisfying all conceptions of accountability, the 
MAD-afflicted organization often satisfies none’ (Koppell, 2005, p. 99).
Secondly, accountability mechanisms generate costs. Creating transpar-
ency and monitoring activities, for example, requires substantial efforts on 
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the part of the principal as well as the agent. Where sanctions are imposed, 
they further reduce the benefits of at least one of the sides involved.
Thirdly, excessive accountability can hamper flexibility and innovation. 
When accountability means strict control, this constricts the agent’s flex-
ibility and ability to react to events and new developments. This means that 
the agent may not be able to act and to use resources as efficiently as he 
otherwise could. In addition, the threat of strong sanctions may lead many 
agents to act more cautiously and avoid taking risks. Risk taking, however, 
is essential for developing innovative solutions to problems.
Accountability can thus involve both benefits and negative conse-
quences.77 In the literature, opinions about the overall effect of account-
ability on performance diverge. First, there is a range of authors who see a 
positive effect. Thus, for example, Melvin Dubnick quotes numerous sources 
and describes the ‘promise of performance’ as follows:
According to proponents of accountability-centered reforms, enhanced 
accountability will (among other things) result in […] improvements in 
the quality of government services. 
(Dubnick, 2003, p. 1)
This view is contradicted by those who see a conflict between accountability 
and performance. Peter Self described this dilemma as a central one:
[T]he tensions between the requirements of responsibility or ‘accounta-
bility’ and those of effective executive action can reasonably be described 
as the classic dilemma of public administration.
(Quoted in Behn, 2001, p. 11)
Alnoor Ebrahim makes a similar claim for non-profit organisations (NPOs). 
He contends that
for NPOs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in activi-
ties of complex social development and poverty alleviation, too much 
accountability can hinder them in achieving their missions.
(Ebrahim, 2005, p. 56)
This last quote already indicates that authors searching for an answer to the 
question of whether accountability enhances or hinders performance that is 
valid across the board may be misguided. Many researchers reject the assump-
tion that accountability has either necessarily positive or always negative 
consequences. Aucoin and Heintzman, for example, argue that
[p]itting accountability against performance does not, in our view, address 
the issue in the most constructive manner. […] Improving accountability 
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arrangements does not necessarily improve performance, but the 
 proposition that there can be improved performance in the absence of 
improved accountability is a proposition that cannot be sustained.
(Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000, p. 54)
Similarly, Melvin Dubnick comes to the conclusion that
we cannot and should not continue to rely on the assumed relationship 
between accountability and performance [namely, that accountability 
improves performance].
(Dubnick, 2003, p. 40)
Rather than trying to solve the question of whether or not accountability 
enhances performance once and for all, researchers should therefore concen-
trate on determining under which circumstances which types of account-
ability have an overall positive effect on the situation. Robert Behn’s book 
Rethinking Democratic Accountability is a good example for such an approach. 
He develops detailed proposals for shifting accountability in public adminis-
tration from accountability for finances and fairness to more accountability 
for performance (Behn, 2001). This book hopes to make a contribution in 
a similar vein. It develops an abstract framework for defining what type of 
accountability is appropriate for which kind of organisation and develops 
concrete standards indicating which groups of partnerships should adopt 
which accountability measures.
2.3 Partnership accountability
Partnerships as cooperative governance mechanisms and the concepts and 
practices of accountability each on their own raise sufficient research puzzles 
to fill volumes. What is it, then, that makes accountability important for 
partnerships and why do partnerships create particularly challenging ques-
tions for accountability?
This section focuses on the special nature of partnership accountability in 
terms of the salience of accountability to partnerships, the specific acuteness 
of accountability trade-offs and the distinctive complexity of developing 
accountability concepts and mechanisms for partnerships.
2.3.1 Political salience
Accountability is important for any organisation that influences the lives of 
individuals. Yet in the debate about partnerships involving actors from the 
public, corporate and civil society sectors, the issue is particularly salient. 
As argued in the introduction to this book, most principled objections 
against partnerships are based on concerns about accountability.
Fears run deep that we cannot hold to account remote powers whose 
actions have far-reaching impacts on our lives. This is especially the case in 
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societies accustomed to liberal-democratic political arrangements, which at 
least theoretically grant their citizens extensive controls over government 
operations. Take for instance the intense debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ 
of the European Union. It shows how sensitively people react when their 
governments surrender authority to less directly accountable institutions.78 
By agreeing to common decision-making procedures, partners also delegate 
some authority to partnerships. This stretches the accountability links to the 
partners’ original accountability holders and thus weakens their control over 
outcomes. If the partnership does not have appropriate accountability mecha-
nisms in place to compensate for this accountability loss, a political backlash 
against its activities can be expected.
At the same time, partnerships are often created to address accountabil-
ity problems of the partner organisations. The focus here is less the abso-
lute level of accountability than to whom organisations are accountable. 
Reformers often demand greater inclusiveness and accountability to various 
stakeholder groups from government, international organisations and corpo-
rations. Partnerships are one avenue for achieving just this. By giving impor-
tant stakeholder groups a say in decisions, partnerships can create more 
accountability.79 Partnerships thus present challenges to established forms of 
accountability, yet promise more accountability to new principals.
Beyond that, reflections about partnership accountability have a special 
relevance now because most partnerships are still relatively young, in par-
ticular those launched during or in the aftermath of the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development. It is now that standards for their internal gov-
ernance structures, reporting requirements, transparency and other account-
ability mechanisms are being defined – yet most actors are still lacking the 
necessary experience with partnerships to take informed decisions on these 
issues.
If we take other institutional developments as an indicator, we can observe 
that accountability systems are typically reformed or strengthened after 
they failed, that is, in response to disasters and scandals. Thus the scandals 
that led to the resignation of the European Commission (EC) under Jacques 
Santer triggered important reforms concerning the transparency of EC pro-
cedures and the powers of control of the European Parliament.80 Similarly, 
the mismanagement and accounting problems leading to the spectacular col-
lapse of numerous companies like Enron encouraged corporate governance 
reforms in the US.81 While these changes will hopefully help prevent similar 
problems in the future, the damage in terms of losses of financial resources 
and trust was done.
Research leading to a better understanding of the types, mechanisms, 
trade-offs and minimum requirements of partnership accountability could 
contribute to the preventive installation of adequate accountability mecha-
nisms. This would give partnerships the chance to develop good governance 
structures without experiencing disastrous failures.
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2.3.2 Importance of trade-offs
As discussed above, accountability can be strengthened by addressing the clar-
ity of the agent’s responsibilities, the flow of information, the clarity of the 
principal’s expectations and criteria for evaluation or the availability of sanc-
tions. Each element in the accountability chain, though, has its downside:
Very clearly demarcated responsibilities of individual actors make it more 
difficult to adapt to changed circumstances and might prevent these 
actors from focusing on the big picture;
providing information that is timely, accurate and fits the needs of differ-
ent principals is labour-intense and creates substantial costs, thus divert-
ing resources away from other uses;
operationalising principals’ expectations is fraught with difficulties and 
can deflect attention away from broader goals and defining common 
expectations of different principals can be a lengthy, if not impossible, 
process;
strong sanctions diminish the readiness to assume risks, while giving 
many stakeholders access to new sanctions by including them can make 
decision-making processes very cumbersome.
The arguments mentioned so far apply to all actors that are accountable 
to someone. But just as the issue of accountability is especially relevant for 
partnerships, so are the trade-offs. Firstly, partnerships in many cases are not 
strongly institutionalised. Designed at least in part as an alternative to overly 
bureaucratised and inefficient traditional institutions, partnerships are a par-
ticularly valuable tool of governance when they remain flexible. This means 
that the risk of losing the ability to adapt quickly to new developments is 
especially high for partnerships.
Secondly, the provision of timely, relevant and accurate information 
presents bigger problems to new than to established institutions. When insti-
tutions are in the early stages of their development, they typically have few 
staff members and very constrained resources. That makes it difficult to spare 
the necessary time and money for providing information. In addition, young 
institutions change at a faster pace than old ones, making it more difficult to 
keep information up to date. Since the fashion of cross-sector partnerships is 
a relatively recent phenomenon, most partnerships are still young, making 
the costs of providing information relatively high.82
The third point relates to the difficulties that arise when different princi-
pals pursue diverging goals. The interests of different accountability holders 
rarely converge. Yet for most other types of institutions it is possible to priori-
tise these interests depending on the strength of the sanctions the principals 
have at their disposal.83 Partnerships by definition include actors from the 
public sector, businesses and/or civil society as partners. This means that 





9780230238978_03_cha02.indd   36 8/17/2010   8:06:33 PM
The Concepts of Partnerships and Accountability  37
layer of accountability holders and enjoy roughly equal status. Problems of 
conflicting goals can therefore not be solved by prioritising one principal’s 
issues over the others. Partnerships either have to resolve the conflict by rec-
onciling interests and finding compromises – often a long and burdensome 
process – or ignore it at the risk of making meaningful partnership activities 
impossible.
Finally, sanctions work most effectively if they work preventively. For an 
agent to be able to adapt his behaviour preventively, he must be in a posi-
tion to anticipate under what conditions which sanctions will be applied. 
This is unproblematic where a partnership explicitly defines these sanctions 
(e.g. by linking the salaries of partnership managers to performance or by 
deciding that the executive board has to be regularly approved through elec-
tions). For many other issues, however, expectations are shaped by different 
corporate or national cultures. Thus both the rules and the likelihood of their 
enforcement can vary significantly between national legal systems as well as 
between partner organisations. This can result in a lack of clarity about sanc-
tions and thereby undermine their effectiveness as means of prevention.
2.3.3 Complexity
Finally, as argued in the Introduction, defining concepts and effective mech-
anisms of accountability is even more complex for partnerships than for 
more traditional institutions. This complexity – together with the salience 
of the topic and the enhanced relevance of trade-offs – makes it important 
to arrive at a clear empirical, analytical and normative understanding of 
partnership accountability.
More specifically, the complexity stems from two major factors. Firstly, 
partnerships engage in a broad variety of activities, ranging from advocacy 
and awareness raising, generating information and verifying compliance, 
setting norms and standards to funding or coordinating policy implementa-
tion. As will be argued in Chapter 3, partnerships ought to embrace different 
accountability arrangements depending on what functions they exercise. 
Between the various partnership types, there are significant, albeit inconsist-
ent, variations in accountability.
Secondly, understanding and evaluating partnership accountability is 
complex because accountability concepts and mechanisms have so far been 
developed mostly for traditional institutions. The accountability traditions 
of democratic governments, international organisations, corporations and 
civil society organisations differ significantly.84 Since partnerships include 
actors from and perform the functions of several of these organisations, we 
need to define standards for partnerships that take these differences into 
account. This will be the subject of the normative inquiry in the following 
chapters.
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3
Why Organisations Ought to be 
Accountable
Why do organisations generally, including partnerships, need appropriate 
accountability mechanisms? For many this may seem like asking ‘why should 
individuals behave morally?’ so obvious seems the normative content of 
accountability. As argued in the Introduction, the moral appeal of the concept 
of accountability is so strong that it has become a rallying cry for partnership 
critics. If the charge that partnerships are unaccountable can be substantiated, 
this would seriously undermine the partnership approach to public policy.
It may be because accountability is a ‘hurrahword’ (Bovens, 2005, p. 182) 
that it is rarely discussed why we actually see it as a ‘good’. Without a clea r 
normative basis, however, there is bound to be confusion over what account-
ability means in practice. Note, for example, that our accountability expec-
tations differ significantly depending on the kind of institution  concerned. 
Thus an accountable government needs democratic elections, an informed 
public, effective parliamentary control systems and transparency on decision 
making and the budget. An advocacy NGO, by contrast, may be expected to 
be transparent about the sources of its funds and their allocation, but not 
necessarily to be democratic in its operations. Mulgan and Uhr confirm these 
differences in expectations when they write:
Although the term ‘accountability’ is fundamental to governance dis-
course, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different 
institutional and community perspectives.
(Mulgan and Uhr, 2000, p. 1)
Faced with these variations, some analysts propose to abandon accountability 
as a normative principle. Brown and Moore, for example, propose to treat
accountability not as an abstract, fixed moral ideal, but instead as a stra-
tegic idea. [… In this conception,] instead of there being one right answer 
of how best to structure accountability, one gives a contingent answer. 
(Brown and Moore, 2001, p. 2)
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This, however, is throwing the baby out with the bathwater.1 Rather than 
giving up on accountability as a norm because it has different practical 
manifestations, we need to investigate what the normative basis of account-
ability is. This will provide us with a firmer ground for formulating consist-
ent accountability demands.
This chapter aims to clarify why organisations need appropriate account-
ability mechanisms. It first conducts a literature review to identify which 
justifications for accountability are commonly given. Finding the main 
justifications for accountability lacking, it then proposes an alternative argu-
ment which grounds the demand for accountability in delegation.
3.1 Major justifications for accountability
This section reviews the literature directly concerned with interorganisa-
tional partnerships as well as arguments proposed in the broader global 
governance literature – and, where applicable, their intellectual roots in 
other disciplines. The latter was included because the partnerships analysed 
here operate at the international or global level and can be seen as part of 
the emerging system of global governance. In this literature, three main 
types of arguments have been proposed: consequentialist justifications for 
accountability, arguments derived from stakeholder theory and claims based 
on power and democracy.
3.1.1 Consequentialist justifications
Many authors argue that organisations should be accountable because this 
has positive effects. Most often, they claim that appropriate accountability 
arrangements enhance an organisation’s effectiveness. Pauline Vaillancourt 
Rosenau, for example, claims that ‘Public-private policy partnerships must be 
accountable if they are to fulfill policy objectives successfully’ (Vaillancourt 
Rosenau, 1999, p. 19).
Without further explanation or differentiation, this claim is puzzling. 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, strong accountability arrangements can have 
serious practical downsides. Establishing accountability processes can create 
significant direct costs and strict accountability regimes can hamper flexibil-
ity and reduce the agent’s willingness to accept risks. Therefore, in Thomas 
Risse’s words, ‘improving accountability as such does not insure the effec-
tiveness of governance arrangements’ (Risse, 2006, p. 186). Many authors 
thus explain how accountability is linked to effectiveness or efficiency. But 
accounts of what this link actually is vary.
Kovach, Neligan and Burall, for example, argue that accountability entails 
greater participation. Participation leads to better-informed decisions that 
affected groups are more likely to comply with. Thus accountability can 
make interventions more effective. For them,
9780230238978_04_cha03.indd   39 8/18/2010   1:22:49 PM
40  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
[i]n the end, accountability boils down to two things. To justice […]. And 
to efficiency; the involvement of people in the decisions that affect them 
leads to better decisions being made in the longer term. 
(Kovach et al. 2003, p. 1)
Others argue that the value of accountability lies in its potential to increase 
the level of trust in a political system. Trust reduces transaction costs and 
thereby enables institutions to work more efficiently.2 Margaret Gordon, for 
example, claims that
[p]ublic trust in government is important to public officials because it is 
central to the receiving of support for the creation and implementation 
of public policies, and subsequently for effective, cooperative  compliance. 
[…] Information that serves to make the actions of public officials trans-
parent to the public improves government accountability and enhances 
the public’s trust. 
(Gordon, 2000, p. 297)3
Yet others see accountability as a key element of legitimacy.4 For a system of 
governance, legitimacy is key, because it encourages voluntary compliance 
and cooperation. This way, accountability makes governance mechanisms 
more effective and more efficient. Robert Keohane, for example, argues that 
without adequate accountability in a democratic era
those who are being governed will regard processes of governance as 
illegitimate, and will tend to withhold their allegiance. Without signifi-
cant accountability, political systems are unlikely to yield either justice 
or stability. 
(Keohane, 2002b, p. 13)
Due to its practical drawbacks, more accountability certainly does not always 
create more effectiveness. The consequentialist case for accountability, then, 
can only be that the right type and right level of accountability increase 
effectiveness. The main arguments provided in the literature, however, do 
not explain coherently which type and which level of accountability are 
appropriate.
In addition, a consequentialist justification is always contingent and does 
not acknowledge the inherent value of a concept or practice. It has often 
been argued, for example, that authoritarianism is a more efficient form 
of government than democracy.5 One could defend democracy by arguing 
that this is factually incorrect. A more effective defence, however, would 
claim that democracy has a value in itself because it is based on the rights 
of individuals.
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In the case of accountability, emphasising its positive effects may be a 
good tactic for convincing institutions to strengthen their accountability 
mechanisms. But it renders the concept rather arbitrary. Take, for example, 
Brown and Moore who see accountability as ‘a strategic idea to be formu-
lated and acted upon by an INGO [international NGO] with the goal of bet-
ter understanding and achieving its strategic purposes’ (Brown and Moore, 
2001, p. 2).
If accountability serves to achieve something else, then an institution 
can always opt for alternative instruments promising the same results. Most 
straightforwardly, a partnership could argue, for example, that it can imple-
ment its programmes more efficiently and effectively if it eschews lengthy 
debates and costly participation.6 The same holds for the more sophisticated 
arguments, such as the one promoting accountability because it enhances 
legitimacy. As argued earlier, legitimacy can derive from sources other than 
accountability and only input-based legitimacy requires adequate account-
ability, not output-based legitimacy.
3.1.2 Power and stakeholder theory
The most common non-consequentialist claim for accountability is based 
on power. If institutions affect the lives of others, so the argument goes, 
they should be accountable to them. Accountability mechanisms are safe-
guards against the abuse of power. Peter Spiro asserts this connection very 
explicitly: ‘Wherever power is exercised, questions of accountability are 
appropriately posed. One can never assume that power will be deployed in 
a responsible manner’ (Spiro, 2002, p. 162).
More implicitly, many others are making a similar argument. Kovach, 
Neligan and Burall, for example, base their claim for more accountability of 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) 
and NGOs on the following account:
All three types of organisations [IGOs, TNCs and NGOs] have the power 
to affect the lives of millions of people throughout the world. […] The 
people and communities affected by all three groups of organisation 
[sic] are making ever-louder claims for increased power to hold them to 
account. [… People have a] right to have a say in decisions that affect 
them. 
(Kovach et al. 2003, p. 1)
The claim that power requires accountability has some intuitive appeal. 
This is why the argument is frequently used by campaigners. But without 
further justification, the underlying normative logic is not immediately 
clear. On what basis do people claim that powerful institutions should be 
 accountable?
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For corporations, the argument has been developed most extensively in 
stakeholder theory. A stakeholder, in the original definition of R. Edward 
Freeman, is ‘any group or individual who is affected by or can affect the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives’ (Freeman, 1984, p. 5).
The normative claim is that stakeholder groups should have a say in 
important decisions of the institutions they are affected by. Again, in 
Freeman’s words,
each of these stakeholder groups has a right not to be treated as a means 
to some end, and therefore must participate in determining the future 
direction of the firm in which they have a stake. 
(Freeman, 2001, p. 39)
What Freeman is advocating is much more than just consulting stakeholders 
before taking decisions. He envisages a system in which the claims of other 
stakeholder groups have the same weight as the interests of shareholders. 
The goal of his theory is to replace ‘the notion that managers have a duty to 
stockholders with the concept that managers bear a fiduciary relationship 
to stakeholders’ (Freeman, 2001, p. 39).
Kenneth Goodpaster calls this the ‘multi-fiduciary stakeholder synthesis’ 
and explains that this would involve
a management team processing stakeholder information by giving 
the same care to the interests of, say, employees, customers, and local 
communities as to the economic interests of stockholders. [… And] all 
stakeholders are treated by management as having equally important 
interests, deserving joint ‘maximization’. 
(Goodpaster, 2002, p. 53)
Stakeholder theory thus falls clearly into the category of arguments justify-
ing accountability on the basis of power. Stakeholders include those who 
are influenced by a company’s activities.7 They are said to have a right to be 
included in decision making, which means that the company has the cor-
responding duty to establish an accountability mechanism working through 
participation.
Many advocates of stakeholder theory simply assert that there is a moral 
basis for this claim, rather than argue for it.8 As his last quote indicates, 
however, Freeman does make the normative argument and bases his claims 
on a Kantian deontological approach to ethics.9 According to this approach, 
acts are ethical when they are guided by considerations of rights and duties, 
not consequences.10 For Kant, the defining characteristic of humans is their 
capacity to reason. Reason enables humans to transcend their desires, make 
ethical judgements and act accordingly. This free will gives humans dignity 
and constitutes their unconditional worth.
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Respect for the unconditional value of individuals is the basis for Kant’s 
moral system. From it he derives the ‘categorical imperative’, the general 
rule to which ethical behaviour and norms must conform. In one of its for-
mulations, the categorical imperative demands that we treat other humans 
as ends in themselves and not merely as means to other ends.11
Applying this to corporations, Evan and Freeman conclude that compa-
nies have a duty to respect the legitimate rights of others to determine their 
own freedom and to accept responsibility for their effects on others (Evan 
and Freeman, 1988). So far their argument does not go beyond claiming that 
managers have the same moral obligations to their fellow human beings 
as everybody else. But they take the claim a step further by translating the 
moral obligation into an institutional requirement. According to them, 
managers are not only morally required to take stakeholder interests into 
account but they should guarantee this by making themselves institution-
ally accountable to them.12 To come back to Freeman’s original articulation 
of the claim, stakeholders ‘must participate in determining the future direc-
tion of the firm in which they have a stake’ (Freeman, 2001, p. 39).
Stakeholder theory was developed to justify the moral obligations and 
institutional requirements of companies. The argument, however, can be 
applied to all types of institutions. In fact, the stakeholder concept is now 
also widely used in debates about political institutions and NGOs.13
There are, however, serious problems in stakeholder theory and the 
kind of institutional environment that would be created by its consistent 
 application. Firstly, the normative claim made by stakeholder theory itself 
has been vigorously attacked on moral grounds. Milton Friedman’s journal-
istic defence in 1970 of the shareholder approach to business has by now 
become famous. He argues that a manager has no fiduciary responsibility to 
other stakeholders. Rather he
has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to con-
duct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will 
be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in 
ethical custom. 
(Friedman, 2002, p. 33)
Friedman bases his claims on a theory of property rights derived from John 
Locke and follows Adam Smith in his description of the socially beneficent 
effects of the market. He argues that if managers took the interests of other 
stakeholders into account and deviated from maximising profits as their 
sole goal, it would imply that they were spending other people’s money on 
a social purpose of their own choosing. This, however, would amount to 
the same as taxing other people and deciding how that tax should be spent. 
In doing so, managers would usurp the role of government and  violate 
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 essential democratic principles designed to protect individual liberties: 
 elections as the mechanism to choose representatives and the separation of 
powers. As a result, not just economic freedom but political freedom as well 
would be undermined.14
Secondly, even if we do not contest the basic normative claim made by 
stakeholder theory, its consistent translation into institutional practice 
would create serious practical problems. Following Freeman’s argument 
quoted above, stakeholder theory requires that all stakeholders must par-
ticipate in determining the future direction of the firm. Implementing this 
demand would not only generate serious costs, given that stakeholder groups 
pursue very different interests, it would also make it extremely  difficult to 
take any decisions. Kenneth Goodpaster has articulated this objection for 
businesses. He argues that adopting a multi-fiduciary stakeholder approach 
would ‘blur […] traditional goals in terms of entrepreneurial risk-taking 
[and] push […] decision making towards paralysis because of the dilemmas 
posed by divided loyalties’ (Goodpaster, 2002, p. 56).
Thirdly, these institutional consequences would contradict some of the 
basic philosophical tenets underpinning the moral case for stakeholder 
theory. The creation of encompassing accountability systems would create 
something approaching total control. Total control may be an effective way 
to ensure that nobody violates ethical norms and that all behave according 
to the categorical imperative. At the same time, though, it would eliminate 
freedom. Individuals would no longer be in a position to make moral judge-
ments and follow their free will in acting accordingly. Respect for humans’ 
capacity to reason and their free will are, however, the starting point for 
Kant’s ethical theory. Demanding institutional control mechanisms for all 
moral requirements derived from the categorical imperative thus under-
mines the very philosophical basis on which stakeholder theory is built.
Current practice in the protection of stakeholder rights reflects the fact 
that a consistent application of stakeholder theory would create substan-
tial problems. Over the last century or so liberal democratic societies have 
increasingly enshrined the protection of certain stakeholder rights in law. 
Freeman, in fact, used these legal developments as support for his argument 
that stakeholder theory should replace shareholder theories of the firm. He 
argues that
the result of such changes in the legal system can be viewed as giving 
some rights to those groups that have a claim on the firm, for example, 
customers, suppliers, employees, local communities, stockholders, and 
management. 
(Freeman, 2001, p. 40)
In some cases legal regulations do not only protect specific rights of stake-
holders but strengthen their ability to hold managers or corporations 
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accountable. Workers in liberal democracies, for example, have the right 
to unionise, which strengthens their bargaining position in relation to 
 management. In some countries, they even have the right to be represented 
on the company board. The position of consumers is strengthened, for exam-
ple, by rules demanding companies to publish the ingredients of  products. 
And many local communities assert their right to influence companies’ 
activities by keeping a tight grip on planning permissions.
But these examples also show that the main demand of stakeholder 
theory, namely that stakeholders have a right to participate in decision 
making, is not being implemented consistently. Firstly, the stakeholder 
groups mentioned by Freeman are granted access to very different account-
ability mechanisms. Only very few apart from shareholders and managers 
are recognised to have a direct right to ‘determine the future direction of 
the company’ by being represented on the board. In Germany, Austria and 
the Scandinavian countries, for example, only employees have a right to 
representation.15 In countries that are closer to the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, not even employee representation is recognised.
Secondly, some stakeholder groups are not granted access to any account-
ability mechanisms at all. Take the employees of a competitor for instance. 
They are clearly stakeholders because the company’s policies affect the 
position of its competitors, which in turn influences the prospects of the 
competitors’ employees. Despite their status as stakeholders, their right to 
hold the company to account is not recognised in any major legal system. 
Similarly, the rights of communities that don’t live in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of a company are not usually protected by law.
Different stakeholder groups are thus treated differently in both practice 
and discourse. Stakeholder theory claims that institutions should be account-
able to all those who are influenced by a company or can influence it. 
This logic contains two options for differentiating between stakeholders: by 
the degree of influence they wield over the company or by the degree to 
which they are influenced by it. Neither version, however, provides a suf-
ficient explanation for why stakeholders should get access to different kinds 
of accountability mechanisms.
The first option was later pursued, for example, by the original propo-
nents of stakeholder theory. Edward Freeman and David Reed propose to 
recognise not only ‘stakeholders in the wider sense’ as defined earlier but 
also ‘stakeholders in the narrow sense’. The latter are defined as ‘Any iden-
tifiable group or individual on which the organization is dependent for its 
survival’ (Freeman and Reed, 1983, p. 91).16
This distinction based on the power of stakeholders generates results 
that are practically less problematic and provide a better match to current 
practice than the original formulation. But the match is not perfect. Even 
using the narrow definition, competitors must be recognised as stakehold-
ers and the demand that they should have a right to hold an organisation 
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to account is not widely supported. More importantly, though, the distinc-
tion itself cannot be justified when stakeholder theory is taken to be non-
instrumental and normative. If stakeholder theory demands accountability 
mechanisms out of respect for the rights of others, why should powerless 
actors be less worthy of protection than powerful ones?17
The alternative is to distinguish stakeholder groups on the basis of the 
degree of influence an organisation wields over them. This version is much 
less problematic on a normative level. At the same time, however, it can 
only justify convincingly that the level of stakeholder involvement should 
vary with the degree of being influenced. Why, though, should customers, 
for example, mainly exercise their right to accountability through consumer 
choice and access to information, communities through their right to set 
binding rules and regulations and employees through direct representation 
in decision-making organs?
Stakeholder theory, then, convincingly argues why individuals – including 
managers – have moral responsibilities towards the people they  influence. 
But it is contested whether they have a duty to actively promote the inter-
ests of all those they influence and whether their responsibilities should 
translate into accountability mechanisms.18 In addition, even differentiated 
versions of stakeholder theory cannot account for why different stakeholder 
groups should get access to different kinds of accountability mechanisms.
3.1.3 Power and the democratic deficit
In the political realm, demands for accountability are also often based upon 
power or influence. Usually, though, the argument does not refer to stake-
holder theory but is linked to the concept of democracy.
Take, for example, the claims articulated by Woods and Narlikar. They 
demand more accountability for the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank on 
the following grounds:
[D]ecisions and policies taken at the international level are increas-
ingly affecting groups and people within states. Where previously these 
people could hold their national governments to account for policies, 
they must now look to international institutions where the decisions are 
being made. The question therefore arises: to whom are these institu-
tions accountable and are they accountable to those whom they directly 
affect? 
(Woods and Narlikar, 2001, p. 569)
The argument thus is that influence has shifted from national governments 
to international institutions and that this creates a legitimate demand for 
more accountability. In the wider academic debate, two schools of thought 
have developed this argument in greater detail: democratic theorists and 
researchers concerned with global governance.
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Most democratic theory is concerned with the conditions and institutional 
forms of democracy within nation states.19 But, as some democratic theo-
rists note, the ability of nation states to govern themselves is being eroded. 
This erosion constitutes a serious threat to the democratic norm of self-rule. 
Relatively early on, Karl Kaiser stated this threat with some urgency:
Transnational relations and other multinational processes seriously 
threaten democratic control of foreign policy, particularly in advanced 
industrialised societies. The intermeshing of decisionmaking across 
national frontiers and the growing multinationalization of formerly 
domestic issues are inherently incompatible with the traditional frame-
work of democratic control. 
(Kaiser, 1971, p. 706)
David Held, a leading contemporary contributor to democratic theory, 
further elaborates that the principle of majority rule within nation states is 
threatened from two sides: citizens are affected by decisions taken in other 
states and international institutions increasingly assume decision-making 
powers. According to him, problems for democracy arise
because many of the decisions of ‘a majority’ or, more accurately, its 
representatives, affect (or potentially affect) not only their communities 
but citizens in other communities as well. [… And problems arise] from 
decisions made by quasi-regional or quasi-supranational organizations 
such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For these decisions can 
also diminish the range of decisions open to given national ‘ majorities’. 
The idea of a community that rightly governs itself and determines its 
own future – an idea at the very heart of the democratic polity – is today, 
accordingly, problematic. 
(Held, 1996, pp. 337–8)20
At this point, scholars of global governance join the debate. These scholars 
usually have a different starting point. They observe that various forms of 
governance exist beyond the nation state. These governance systems rarely 
take the form of a traditional government, but exercise some similar func-
tions. Extrapolating democratic theory from its domestic context, they often 
argue that global governance therefore needs to be democratic.
The most intensive debate has emerged in the context of the European 
Union (EU), a prime example of a strong supranational and intergovern-
mental regime. In some policy areas, the EU can adopt binding policy 
decisions by majority vote. Much more explicitly than other international 
institutions, the European Union thus curtails the autonomy of nation 
states. Many critics have argued that relative to its influence, the democratic 
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credentials of the EU are too weak. They have coined the concept of the 
‘democratic deficit’ to describe this state of affairs.21
While the EU has attracted most attention, analysts have extended the 
critique to other international organisations or the system of global govern-
ance in general. Favourite targets for diagnosing a democratic deficit and 
demanding institutional reform are the global financial institutions,22 the 
United Nations23 and other intergovernmental institutions or processes.24 
But the demand for more democracy does not stop with intergovernmental 
institutions. Rather, many scholars and political analysts extend it to all 
organisations contributing to global governance.25
The Commission on Global Governance, a panel of eminent persons initi-
ated by Willy Brandt, recognises NGOs, citizens’ movements, transnational 
corporations and capital markets along with intergovernmental institutions 
and processes as part of the system of global governance. In its influential, 
but controversial report ‘Our Global Neighbourhood’ it demands that
adequate governance mechanisms […] must be more inclusive and 
 participatory – that is, more democratic – than in the past. […] This 
vision of global governance can only flourish, however, if it is based on 
a strong commitment to principles of equity and democracy grounded 
in civil society. 
(Commission on Global Governance, 1995, Chapter 1)
This amounts to a general demand for democracy or democratic account-
ability for all influential institutions. Echoing Peter Spiro’s comment quoted 
above, Held and Koenig-Archibugi express this in a very concise way: ‘there 
is agreement among democrats that wherever power is exercised there should 
be mechanisms of accountability’ (Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 125).
Faced with the erosion of national autonomy and the increasing influence 
of international institutions, there appears to be a rough consensus that 
more democracy is needed.26 How this is to be achieved in practice, how-
ever, is highly controversial. It would be beyond the scope of this book to 
portray even just the major proposals in detail or to analyse their advantages 
and criticisms. The following paragraphs therefore only sketch some of the 
main approaches. What is important is that they all advocate the creation 
of stronger accountability, though they have very different mechanisms in 
mind.
One possibility for safeguarding democracy is to limit the influence of 
 global forces and to reassert national autonomy. Some leading thinkers 
doubt that intergovernmental institutions – let alone transnational cor-
porations, NGOs or partnerships – can ever be democratic. Robert Dahl, 
for example, the most respected and vocal sceptic in this regard, doubts 
that citizens can ever exercise effective control over international organisa-
tions. Nevertheless he acknowledges that international institutions can be 
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 necessary and useful. He only cautions against seeing the decline of national 
and local governments as unavoidable:
In weighing the desirability of bureaucratic bargaining systems in interna-
tional organizations, the costs to democracy should be clearly indicated and 
taken into account. […] Supporters of democracy should resist the argu-
ment that a great decline in the capacity of national and subnational units 
to govern themselves is inevitable because globalization is  inevitable.
(Dahl, 1999, p. 34, emphasis original)
Other intellectuals and activists take the argument further and demand strict 
limits to the influence of international regimes and actors. This, so the argu-
ment goes, would reassert the sovereignty and autonomy of nation states and 
thus safeguard democracy. The argument has, for example, been en vogue 
among neo-conservatives in the US. An influential group of  scholars dubbed 
‘the new sovereigntists’ argue that America should defend its  sovereignty 
and refuse to sign core international treaties.27 Jeremy Rabkin, for example, 
argues that
[b]ecause the United States is fully sovereign, it can determine for itself 
what its Constitution will require. And the Constitution necessarily 
requires that sovereignty be safeguarded so that the Constitution itself 
can be secure. 
(Quoted in Spiro, 2000)
This logic has proved influential in the US where policymakers have refused 
to support new international regimes from the Kyoto Protocol to the estab-
lishment of the International Criminal Court. But most American analysts 
are aware that a genuine limitation of global forces would be very costly 
for powerful states like the US and probably impossible for weaker nations. 
A rollback of globalisation and the abolishment of certain international 
institutions are therefore only advocated by some of the most radical anti-
globalisation movements and lack scholarly support.
Rather than limiting global forces, most scholars propose to strengthen 
democracy by making international actors more accountable. In  Joseph Stiglitz’ 
words, economic globalisation has outpaced political  globalisation, requiring 
the strengthening and democratisation of global political  institutions:
There are too many problems – trade, capital, the environment – that 
can be dealt with only at the global level. But while the nation-state has 
been weakened, there has yet to be created at the international level the 
kinds of democratic global institutions that can deal effectively with the 
problems globalization has created. 
(Stiglitz, 2006, p. 21)
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Proposals cover a continuum between the creation of a democratic world 
state and the increased use of existing accountability mechanisms. Some 
advocate revolution to reach their goals, whereas others hope for politi-
cal evolution. And while most scholars make a prescriptive case for their 
proposed solution, some believe that the developments they sketch are 
inevitable.
Alexander Wendt, for example, suggests not only that the creation of a 
world state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence 
is desirable but believes that it will be the natural outcome of the dynam-
ics inherent in the current ‘anarchical society’ of sovereign states (Wendt, 
2003). Immanuel Wallerstein also believes that the current international 
system faces a fundamental transformation based on its inherent tensions 
and dialectic forces. He, however, predicts that sovereign states will ‘wither 
away’ and pave the way for world socialism (Wallerstein, 1984).
Less radical but still far reaching are proposals that don’t envisage the 
creation of a fully blown world state but of certain elements of world 
 government. Falk and Strauss, for example, suggest the installation of a 
global parliament. This parliament would be elected by popular vote and 
would be in a position to adopt laws binding on all international actors. In 
addition, it would supervise the implementation of existing international 
laws and provide democratic oversight over institutions like the IMF, the 
WTO or the World Bank (Falk and Strauss, 2001). Similarly, Otfried Höffe 
proposes the creation of a minimal world republic. This federal construction 
would complement the system of sovereign states and work in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity (Höffe, 1999).
All of the proposals just mentioned seek to remedy the current demo-
cratic deficit of global governance by creating democratic institutions at the 
global level. Thereby, citizens and their representatives gain new means to 
hold powerful institutions to account and to participate in decision-making 
processes. In part, this is also how a number of proposals that envisage 
a system of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions would address the demo-
cratic deficit. In addition, however, these systems would rely on increased 
competition between systems or levels of governance to generate stronger 
 accountability.
In a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, for example, various levels of govern-
ance would coexist. Depending on their scope, problems would be tackled 
either at the local, state, interstate, regional or global level. A world consti-
tutional court would adjudicate conflicts over the allocation of authority 
between these levels (Archibugi, 2004).28 At each level, non-trivially affected 
 people would participate in the decision-making process (Held, 2004). In a 
similar vein, Eichenberger and Frey have proposed the concept of ‘FOCJ’: 
Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions. Key to their model is 
that there are not only various levels of jurisdiction but that different juris-
dictions compete for providing the same ‘governmental goods’. Democratic 
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control and competition are the accountability mechanisms ensuring justice 
and efficiency (Eichenberger and Frey, 2002).
Yet another set of proposals accepts the current institutional structure as 
it is and suggests strengthening its democratic accountability mechanisms. 
For most writers, this would entail an expansion of the possibilities for 
participation. Civil society organisations or NGOs already play an increas-
ingly influential role in international politics.29 Many analysts believe that 
increased NGO participation in international organisations could provide 
the key for creating more democratic accountability. Jan Aart Scholte, for 
example, argues that NGOs could help reduce the democratic deficit of 
global governance, both through their activism and their participation in 
international organisations (Scholte, 2002). Others, however, are sceptical 
about the legitimacy and representative nature of NGOs.30 Stutzer and Frey 
therefore present an alternative for increasing popular participation. They 
advocate giving groups of citizens chosen through a process of random 
selection direct voting rights in important decisions and control over leaders 
of international organisations (Stutzer and Frey, 2005).
Finally, some authors see attempts to increase the democratic account-
ability of international actors as unrealistic. Instead, they propose to rely 
on a broader variety of accountability mechanisms. Keohane and Nye, for 
 example, suggest that next to electoral accountability, there can be ‘hierar-
chical accountability’, ‘legal accountability’, ‘reputational accountability’ 
and ‘market accountability’. Faced with the realities of the current interna-
tional system, they propose to strengthen its overall accountability by focus-
ing on and fostering these different kinds of accountability:
Rather than offer a counsel of despair, we argue for more imagination in 
conceptualizing, and more emphasis on operationalizing, different types 
of accountability. It is better to devise pluralist forms of accountability 
than to bewail the ‘democratic deficit’. 
(Keohane and Nye, 2001, p. 8)
To cut a very long debate short, scholars of different backgrounds and ideo-
logical convictions propose strengthening accountability mechanisms to 
counter the democratic deficit of global governance. To achieve this they 
propose reasserting the authority of nation states, creating a world state or 
at least the functional institutions of a cosmopolitan democracy, increasing 
participation in international organisations or relying on varied forms of 
accountability – and this list could be extended further.
The number of authors writing in this vein indicates that the argu-
ment that influence creates a legitimate demand for accountability gains 
sway when couched in terms of democracy. But the vast discrepancies in 
the recommendations derived from this also suggest that the argument 
is problematic. Two aspects in particular fail to convince when a general 
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 requirement for accountability for all influential actors is derived from the 
norm of democracy:
Firstly, it is not clear why all institutions should have democratic account-
ability. Many propose extending the possibilities for participation at the 
international level as a realistic way of bridging the democratic deficit. This, 
however, runs into the same practical difficulties as the demands derived 
from stakeholder theory. Even when based on a democratic foundation, we 
have to agree with Robert Keohane’s assessment that ‘Merely being affected 
cannot be sufficient to create a valid claim. If it were, virtually nothing 
could ever be done, since there would be so many requirements for consul-
tation, and even veto points’ (Keohane, 2002a, p. 15).
In addition, the requirement of democratic accountability for all insti-
tutions does not really follow from the logic of the democratic deficit 
 argument. Even in the domestic context, the norm of democracy only 
requires that citizens elect a parliament. The main role of parliaments is to 
set rules and to control the executive. Transferring this to the international 
level, it would seem appropriate to demand democratic accountability of 
institutions exercising similar functions, that is, rule setting.31 But it is not 
evident why actors contributing to global governance in other ways should 
also be democratically accountable.
A closer look at the proposals introduced above reveals that many authors 
would probably not oppose this limitation. They often start their argument 
with the problem that the increasing influence of different actors in global 
governance creates a democratic deficit. This suggests that their proposals 
for more democratic accountability would apply to all actors involved in 
global governance. But their concrete examples are most often concerned 
with rule-setting institutions. This is obviously the case for those advocat-
ing the creation of a world state or a world parliament. It is also true for 
proponents of cosmopolitan democracy and ‘FOCJ’ who speak of the crea-
tion of ‘jurisdictions’ at different levels. And it also applies to many authors 
proposing increased participation. Their favourite examples for concrete 
reforms are all involved in defining norms and rules: the European Union, 
the United Nations and the international financial institutions, in so far 
as they set rules for international trade or for the internal macroeconomic 
policies of states.32
Secondly, where the use of different forms of accountability is proposed, it 
remains unclear which institutions ought to have what kind of  accountability. 
A ‘pluralistic system of accountability’ (Benner et al., 2004) avoids the first 
problem just discussed. If various types of accountability are considered, it 
becomes much easier to see how they can apply to all actors involved in 
global governance. Transnational corporations for instance are clearly sub-
ject to market accountability, whereas NGOs are often subject to reputational 
accountability. It is also plausible that the application of these different 
accountability mechanisms can be diversified. In the ‘FOCJ’ proposal, for 
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example, various jurisdictions would compete for providing  ‘governmental 
goods’. This amounts to the creation of market-based accountability for gov-
ernmental institutions. It is very difficult, however, to use this ‘pluralistic 
system of accountability’ as a normative concept. It shows how account-
ability could be created, but not how it should be created.
A justification of accountability based on power and democracy, then, 
relies on a more solid normative basis than consequentialist and stakeholder 
arguments. As in the case of stakeholder theory, however, the translation of 
the moral claim into institutional practice is problematic. Analysts support-
ing this line of reasoning either demand democratic accountability for all 
kinds of institutions, which is neither logically convincing nor practicable, 
or they allow for various forms of accountability but are not in a position to 
indicate when which kind of accountability should be in place.
3.2 The alternative: Justifying accountability through 
delegation
Another way to justify the demand for accountability is through delegation 
and authorisation. As discussed in section 2.2.1, the concept of accountabil-
ity is closely linked to the idea of delegation. ‘To be accountable’ originally 
meant to ‘answer for money held in trust’. This section argues that the 
link between accountability and delegation is not just etymological and 
 definitional. Rather, delegation also forms the normative core of the concept 
of accountability.
The argument based on delegation intersects and overlaps with instru-
mental, stakeholder and democratic approaches in various instances. The 
basic claim, however, is different and leads to a more stringent and differ-
entiated assessment of the accountability requirements of different organi-
sations. This approach is therefore better suited as the basis for developing 
accountability standards for partnerships.
The claim that delegation demands the creation of appropriate account-
ability mechanisms is developed in three steps. Firstly, it is argued that 
delegation creates a duty for the agent to act in the best interest of the 
principal. Then, the case is made that in institutional settings only appro-
priate accountability mechanisms can guarantee respect for the principals’ 
interests and autonomy. Finally, it is maintained that the argument holds 
not only for explicit forms of delegation but also for implicit, ex-post and 
hypothetical delegation.
3.2.1 Delegation and the duty to act in the best interest of the 
principal
It is widely accepted as a norm that individuals or organisations acting on 
behalf of others have a duty to act in their best interest. This is reflected in 
different legal and philosophical traditions.
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The first philosophical and legal principle supporting the obligation to 
promote principals’ interests is the duty to keep promises and honour contracts. 
Delegation is often formal and its terms and conditions are enshrined in 
a contract. To establish a partnership, for example, different organisations 
may sign a memorandum of understanding defining the authority, struc-
ture, tasks and goals of the partnership. In this constitutional contract, the 
partners define their expectations and interests. The partnership then has an 
obligation to fulfil its mandate because it has agreed to do so in a contract.
Promise keeping is a central norm in Western moral philosophy that is 
reflected in most legal systems around the world. In Holly Smith’s words: 
‘For centuries it has been a mainstay of European and American moral 
thought that keeping promises – and the allied activity of upholding 
 contracts – is one of the most important requirements of morality’ (Smith, 
1997, p. 153).
In David Hume’s sceptical tradition, promise keeping is seen as a very use-
ful social practice enabling, for example, the division of labour. Since it is in 
everyone’s interest to protect promise keeping as a social institution, break-
ing one’s promises is morally bad (Hume, 1969). Based on very different 
assumptions, rationalist philosophers arrive at the same conclusion. In John 
Rawls’ formulation, the principle of fairness demands that if you benefit 
from a social practice, you ought to adhere to it yourself (Rawls, 1971). It has 
also been argued that promises create a moral obligation in themselves and 
not just because they are a useful and just social practice. Thomas Scanlon, 
for example, reasons that promise breaking is morally wrong because it dis-
appoints expectations and can lead to losses for other parties who acted on 
these expectations (Scanlon, 1990).33
Reflecting this broad moral agreement, most societies have enshrined the 
duty to uphold contracts in law. Partnership officials are therefore bound 
by moral standards and law to act in the interests of their principals in so 
far as these are expressed in a mutual contract. If the obligation to act in 
the principal’s interest were only founded on contract, however, it would 
be very limited. Contracts can never provide a full and detailed definition 
of the principal’s interests. Even when adhering to the terms defined in the 
contract, agents have significant autonomy and discretion. In addition, 
many instances of delegation are not formalised in a contract.
Independent of any contractual obligations, there is a wider norm 
demanding that agents promote the interests of their principals. This 
norm finds various expressions in legal practice and reasoning. In common 
law countries, for example, it is enacted through the concept of fiduciary 
 obligations. A fiduciary relationship exists when one person acts on behalf 
of another, has significant discretion and by exercising this discretion can 
affect the interests of the principal. Typical fiduciary relationships include 
that between agent and principal, director and corporation, guardian and 
ward, lawyer and client, partner and fellow partner and trustee and trust 
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beneficiary.34 A fiduciary relationship generates the obligation that the 
 fiduciary act in the principal’s best interest:
If a person in a particular relationship with another is subject to a 
 fiduciary obligation, that person (the fiduciary) must be loyal to the 
interest of the other person (the beneficiary). The fiduciary’s duties go 
beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the 
beneficiary’s best interests.
(DeMott, 1988, p. 882)
More specifically, the evolving common law practice in this area demands 
that fiduciaries have no conflict of interest with their fiduciary duty, do not 
accept different fiduciary duties that conflict with each other and do not 
profit from their position.35 The purpose of these rules is to create a basic 
protection against the abuse of delegated authority:
The need to control discretion has been a justification for the imposition 
of the harsh rule concerning fiduciaries since the beginning. […] The 
desirability of deterring the fiduciary from using his discretion except for 
the benefit of the principal or beneficiary is often mentioned in subse-
quent judgements, and this aspect is also enshrined in the prohibition 
against allowing a conflict of interest and duty. 
(Weinrib, 1975, p. 4)
The concept of fiduciary obligations was introduced by the English courts 
of equity and has since been developed through case law in common 
law  countries. As such, the concept has no direct equivalent in civil law 
 countries. The norm that agents should act in the best interest of their 
principals nevertheless finds expression in civil law systems. Lacking gen-
eral regulations on fiduciary duties, most civil law countries have instead 
developed more specific rules governing individual fiduciary relationships. 
A comprehensive analysis of these rules is impossible here – on the one 
hand because many different relationships are at stake and on the other 
because there are infinite variations between civil law countries. A few 
examples must therefore suffice to indicate that the norm that agents 
should act in the best interest of their principals also pervades systems of 
civil law.
The German institution of Treuhand, for example, covers the trustee – 
trust beneficiary relationship. Stefan Grundmann argues that most civil 
law jurisdictions have functionally equivalent institutions to trust and 
Treuhand which are all characterised by the fact that the ‘trustee adminis-
ters the assets for the benefit of the settlor’ (Grundmann, 1999, p. 414).36 
The  fiduciary relationship between guardian and ward corresponds to the 
German Vormundschaft. According to the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), 
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a Vormund is obliged to care for and represent the ward and his assets (BGB, 
2006, §§ 1793 and 1796). When the interests of the ward conflict with those 
of the guardian, a court can withdraw the Vormund’s authorities. The Roman 
principle of negotiorum gestio also exists in many civil law countries. It covers 
instances of ex-post delegation and decrees that a previously unauthorised 
agent cannot demand remuneration for his services to avoid conflict of 
interest.37
The norm that those who act on behalf of others have a duty to promote 
their principals’ interests is not only prominent in legal thinking and prac-
tice but also in political theory. In fact, it lies at the heart of liberal democratic 
thought.
Liberal democracy has its intellectual roots in the Enlightenment. Rather 
than accepting government as God given, philosophers of the Enlightenment 
were searching for ways to legitimise political authority rationally. The most 
prominent school of thought uses the concept of a social contract to do 
so. While there is a huge diversity between social contract thinkers,38 they 
usually start with describing or imagining a state of nature. In the pre-social 
state of nature, humans are born free and equal and this endows them with 
a set of natural rights. This, however, also leads to pervasive conflict – be it 
because the human instinct for self-preservation inevitably creates competi-
tion and conflict over scarce resources39 or because social interactions cor-
rupt humans and make them selfish and competitive.40 In any case, conflict 
challenges humans to use their capacity to reason to overcome the state of 
nature. They conclude a social contract and establish society and/or  political 
authority.
What are the implications for the government thus created? Using the 
same intellectual construct, contract theorists have arrived at fundamentally 
different answers to this question. Thomas Hobbes famously argued that life 
in the state of nature was a constant war of all against all, violating natural 
law. To ensure ‘their own preservation’ and ‘a more contented life thereby’ 
(Hobbes, 1909, Chapter XVII), all individuals permanently transfer their 
liberties to a central institution, the Leviathan. The Leviathan is created 
through this contract but is not himself a party to the contract. Therefore, 
and because it is necessary to establish security, argues Hobbes, his authority 
is absolute and cannot be revoked.
Another version of the social contract justifying absolutist rule is that of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Very much concerned with preserving individual 
liberty, Rousseau’s individuals in the state of nature only enter a contract 
of association, not one of submission. They square the circle and gain a 
system of government while preserving their liberty by ruling themselves. 
The resulting doctrine of popular sovereignty nevertheless creates absolute 
power. Embodying the volonté générale, the sovereign holds indivisible, inal-
ienable and unlimited authority.41 Both Hobbes and Rousseau thus arrive at 
a somewhat paradoxical conclusion. They assume that individuals are born 
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free, equal and rational, yet voluntarily create a sovereign with unlimited 
power who is under no obligation to respect individual rights.
It may be because of this inherent contradiction that another version of 
social contract theory has become much more widely accepted.42 Similar to 
Hobbes and Rousseau, John Locke argues that conflict prevailing in the state 
of nature threatens individuals’ liberty and property. And since humans are 
rational, they can be presumed to agree to the establishment of a central 
authority to determine rules and adjudicate their application. But accord-
ing to Locke, this consent is only imaginable if the government fulfils the 
purpose for which it was established, namely to protect liberty and property. 
The social contract therefore limits the sovereign’s authority and creates an 
obligation for him to act in the interest of his subjects. In Locke’s words:
[Y]et it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve 
himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be sup-
posed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power 
of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed 
to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every 
one’s property, by providing against those three defects above men-
tioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. 
(Locke, 1690, Chapter IX, §131)43
This key argument in John Locke’s political theory thus embodies the norm 
that agents (in this case the government) have a duty to promote the inter-
ests of their principals (the citizens). The claim is central to our current nor-
mative understanding of politics. Locke stands at the beginning of a strong 
tradition of liberal and constitutional thought. Of course, neither social 
 contract theories nor the doctrine of liberal democracy have remained with-
out their critics,44 but since at least the eighteenth century, they have become 
dominant in Europe and America. David Held, for example, describes at once 
the significance of John Locke as one of the first exponents of the liberal 
tradition and recognises the centrality of this school of thought:
Locke […] signals the clear beginnings of the liberal constitutionalist 
tradition, which became the dominant thread in the changing fabric of 
European and American politics from the eighteenth century. 
(Held, 1996, p. 74)
Boucher and Kelly also emphasise the importance of the social contract 
tradition for contemporary politics: They write that it
is also clear that the ideal of political life as an agreement on fair terms of 
association between individuals who have a recognized status as free and 
equal is a moral ideal that has a very deep resonance in modern culture, 
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and it is one that has proved a great inspiration to those who do not 
enjoy the recognition of that status. 
(Boucher and Kelly, 1994, p. 29)
And while this philosophical tradition originated and developed in ‘the 
West’,45 liberal democracy has come to enjoy broad support as a normative 
ideal throughout the world.46 Amartya Sen emphasises this point in an essay 
on the universality of democracy as a value:
While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed uniformly 
accepted, in the general climate of world opinion, democratic govern-
ance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right. 
(Sen, 1999, p. 5)
3.2.2 Delegation and the need for appropriate accountability 
mechanisms
The norm that delegation creates a duty for the agent to act in the best inter-
est of his principal, then, is well established in philosophy and legal think-
ing. It is argued in this section that the need for appropriate accountability 
mechanisms in institutional settings involving delegation follows quite 
directly from this norm. Before further developing this thought,  however, 
an important objection has to be considered. What happens when the norm 
is rejected?
The main branch of thought rejecting the norm that agents have a moral 
duty to act in the best interest of their principals is economics. This is sig-
nificant since economic principal–agent theory forms the main basis for 
our understanding of accountability. Interestingly, despite the differences 
in philosophical assumptions, economists arrive at the same institutional 
conclusions. They also argue that appropriate accountability mechanisms 
are necessary. Before returning to our main argument, let us therefore briefly 
consider the economic case for accountability.
Economists following the tradition of Adam Smith agree with many moral 
and political philosophers that humans are free and rational beings. But, 
while many moral philosophers condemn self-interested behaviour, econo-
mists accept it. More than that, they believe that self-interest gives rise to 
the division of labour and trade and thereby vastly increases the wealth and 
well-being of societies. Adam Smith famously described this as an effect of 
the ‘invisible hand’:
Every individual […] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. […H]e intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
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Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pur-
suing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. 
(Smith, 1904, Book IV, Chapter 2, §9)47
Even in a principal–agent relationship, economists would therefore expect 
agents to act in their own self-interest. But while economists would not, 
in general, condemn this behaviour as immoral, they would also see it as 
problematic. Because the interests of owners and managers diverge, owners 
must expect a loss when they delegate management authority. Adam Smith 
describes the problem for joint stock companies, where ownership is divided 
and control over managers weak:
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small mat-
ters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a 
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company. 
(Smith, 1904, Book V, Chapter 1, §107)
First and foremost, this loss affects the owners and stockholders of compa-
nies. But it also reduces the overall wealth of society because it implies an 
in efficient allocation and use of resources. Seen from a utilitarian perspective – 
which most economists share – the efficiency loss created by delegation is 
therefore not only economically but also morally bad.48 Most economists 
would probably reject demands for accountability based on the claim that 
agents have a moral duty to act in the best interest of their principal.49 
But they do demand the creation of adequate accountability mechanisms 
because it can limit the efficiency loss inherent in delegation.50
The economic justification for accountability also contains the criteria 
for establishing what ‘appropriate’ accountability mechanisms are. The goal 
is to minimise the loss incurred from delegation. Not only does the self-
interested behaviour of agents generate costs but the creation of account-
ability as well. Principals have to invest in incentives for the agent and 
monitor the agent’s behaviour. Agents incur so-called bonding costs trying 
to assure the principals that they will act in their interests. ‘Agency loss’, the 
overall loss from delegation, thus comprises incentive and monitoring costs, 
bonding costs and the remaining loss resulting from diverging interests.51 
An ideal accountability arrangement is one that minimises the combined 
agency loss.
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It is reassuring that the school of thought that rejects the basic assump-
tion underlying the argument for accountability presented here arrives 
at similar conclusions regarding the need for accountability mechanisms. 
Ultimately, however, the economic argument is a consequentialist one. It 
demands accountability because, and as long as, it increases efficiency. As 
discussed in section 3.1.1, consequentialist arguments can neither provide a 
solid defence of accountability, nor can they account for the inherent value 
we tend to attach to accountability. A more stringent demand for account-
ability can be derived from the rights of principals and the corresponding 
duty of agents to act in their best interest.
Let us thus return to our main argument. We have established that 
agents have a duty to act in the best interest of their principals. How, then, 
does this lead to the demand for appropriate accountability mechanisms? 
Accountability creates control over agents. Since agents cannot always be 
trusted to respect their duties, accountability mechanisms are necessary to 
prevent the abuse of authority and to protect the principals’ rights.
The argument is so well established in political philosophy52 that it is only 
rarely made explicit. John Locke, for example, seems to perceive no need to 
argue why the duty of the government to act in the interests of the governed 
requires certain institutional practices. As if it were self-evident, he simply 
claims that because government should protect the interests of citizens, 
it has to respect and promote the rule of law:
And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-
wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated 
and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent 
and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and 
to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of 
such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the 
community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no 
other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people. 
(Locke, 1690, Chapter IX, section 131)
The rationale behind this and other demands for procedural and substantial 
controls on government activities is quite simple. Humans are assumed to 
be fallible and corruptible. There is therefore always a risk that those who 
are put in a position to govern over others will abuse their authority and 
violate the rights of the governed. A ‘good’ form of government is therefore 
one that has effective accountability mechanisms in place to prevent this 
from happening. Most famously and eloquently, James Madison has articu-
lated this connection:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were 
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government 
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would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered 
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it 
to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
 control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
(Hamilton et al. 1992, Federalist No. 51)
Next to periodic elections, Madison proposed ‘checks and balances’ between 
different government departments as effective mechanisms of control. His 
claim that governments need to be controlled has been accepted by most 
subsequent political thinkers. The bulk of the debate has not centred on 
whether or not accountability is necessary but on which accountability 
mechanisms are most effective. Standard debates in the normative and 
comparative political science literature, for example, tackle questions such 
as which electoral system best enables citizens to express their preferences 
and control parliament and the executive; how elements of direct democ-
racy can strengthen citizen control; whether federal or centralised, presiden-
tial or parliamentary systems are best suited to create accountability while 
allowing for an effective system of government; and what role independent 
government agencies play to strengthen or weaken accountability.53
More recently, the tone of this debate has changed. Rather than explor-
ing how the public sector can be controlled most effectively, a range of 
authors now focus on the negative side effects of existing accountability 
 mechanisms. The predominantly procedural controls, so the argument 
goes, stifle creativity and discourage public officials from taking risks. As a 
result, public services are often inefficient. Despite this critique, however, 
these authors do not simply demand the abolition of existing accountability 
structures. Rather, they advocate the adoption of different kinds of account-
ability mechanisms. The New Public Management literature,54 which is at 
the forefront of this debate, for example, demands replacing procedural 
accountability with accountability for outcomes. Christopher Pollitt sum-
marises the New Public Management proposals as follows:
Responsibility is to be decentralized, targets – not procedures – are to 
become the key focus for public officials, costs will be cut, bureaucracy 
eliminated, standards raised, and service to the citizen-customer thrust to 
the foreground of concern. 
(Pollitt, 1995, p. 203)
Even among the critics of the standard accountability arrangements of 
governments it is thus widely accepted that a ‘good’ form of government 
is an accountable one because this protects citizen rights and ensures that 
officials respect their duty to act in the best interest of citizens. Molly Beutz 
9780230238978_04_cha03.indd   61 8/18/2010   1:22:52 PM
62  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
even goes so far as to suggest that the consensus on the desirability of 
accountability is so great that democracy is most appropriately defined in 
terms of accountability:
Focusing on accountability provides the basis for a functional vision of 
democracy that both attends to questions of social and material equal-
ity and structural change and can be applied in a variety of contexts. 
A vision of democracy as accountability is more robust than a purely 
procedural definition because it attends to important substantive goals. 
At the same time, however, it avoids the necessity of a priori agreement 
on the substantive ends to be achieved by leaving those decisions in the 
hands of those who are in the best position to make them. 
(Beutz, 2003, p. 405)55
It is understandable why the concern with accountability is so central in 
political thinking. After all, citizens do not just delegate any authority but the 
authority to define and enforce the rules by which a society lives. This makes 
the transfer of authority very far reaching and potentially difficult to reverse.56
But the argument also applies to other spheres. It is true for all kinds of 
institutions that a ‘good’ institutional set-up is one that effectively protects 
rights and encourages ethical behaviour. For institutions involving delega-
tion this means that the ‘ideal’ institutional form includes accountability 
mechanisms that effectively protect the principals’ rights. Both the legal 
practice in liberal democracies and a plethora of additional, voluntary gov-
ernance codes reflect this normative consensus.
Earlier, in the section on stakeholder theory, it was discussed that in many 
countries companies are required by law to have certain accountability 
mechanisms. Legal rules determine standards among others for organisa-
tional structures, procedures and the transparency of companies and other 
organisations. How strict these standards are depends on the nature of 
the organisation and differs from country to country. Under German law, 
for example, all companies are required to maintain correct books and 
publish annual results. Medium and large companies additionally have 
to conduct professional audits and have to allow worker representation 
(Handelsgesetzbuch §§ 238–325, Mitbestimmungsgesetz). The governance 
requirements are also usually much stricter for public companies. In the US, 
for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 applies only to publicly traded 
companies. It demands that companies evaluate and disclose their internal 
control systems, establish independent audit committees and that chief 
executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) swear by oath 
that their accounts are correct.57
Over recent years, these legal regulations have been supplemented by a 
veritable flood of voluntary governance codes. For companies, for  example, 
Holly Gregory has compiled a ‘partial listing of corporate governance 
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 guidelines and codes of best practice’ for developed markets that includes 
over 100 such codes (Gregory, 2001). For non-profit organisations, the 
NGO Independent Sector publishes a compendium of standards, codes and 
principles that lists over 60 examples applicable in the US.58 These codes 
are published by intergovernmental organisations, governments, profes-
sional associations and social groups and vary significantly in scope and 
 strictness.59 The application of these codes is usually voluntary. Nevertheless 
their number and spread shows that the normative consensus that ‘good’ 
organisations need accountability mechanisms is widespread.
Earlier in the chapter stakeholder theorists were criticised for using these 
laws and emerging regulations to support their claim that all stakeholders 
should have the right to participate in determining a company’s future. In 
what way, then, is the argument made here different? Firstly, the claim here 
is that there is a normative consensus that organisations need appropriate 
accountability mechanisms, not that all groups should be allowed to partici-
pate in decision making. What exactly counts as ‘appropriate’ will be analysed 
in greater detail at the end of this chapter. Secondly, a closer look at the exact 
requirements made by law and voluntary codes reveals that only those stake-
holder groups that are principals, that is, those who delegate some form of 
authority to an organisation, are included in accountability arrangements.
To illustrate this, let’s return to the example of a public company. An 
operating company has various forms of authority delegated to it. Investors 
delegate the right to manage their money to the company. Local communi-
ties or governments authorise it to operate on their territory. Employees give 
it the authority to determine under what conditions they work. Consumers, 
finally, by buying the company’s products, authorise it to take over a spe-
cific segment in the division of labour. Laws also protect the rights of other 
groups. Competitors, for example, are shielded from unfair competition 
by anti-trust and anti-dumping legislation. But only the groups delegating 
authority to the company are recognised to have a right to accountability. 
Thus most governance codes are concerned with issues that enable share-
holders to control managers. Local communities are included in the plan-
ning process, workers have the right to unionise or sit on the company’s 
board and consumers at least get some rights to information so they can 
take informed decisions. Competitors, suppliers or non-local communities 
that are affected by the company’s activities, by contrast, are not granted 
any rights that would enable them to hold the company to account.
Accountability mechanisms, then, are designed to prevent the abuse of 
authority and protect the rights of principals. Appropriate accountability 
arrangements are therefore an integral part of what constitutes a ‘good’ insti-
tutional set-up. This is the normative core of the concept of accountability 
and the main reason why we cherish accountability as something good.
The argument leaves one potential loophole. What if people are not as fal-
lible and corruptible as James Madison and the political thinkers  following 
9780230238978_04_cha03.indd   63 8/18/2010   1:22:52 PM
64  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
him assumed? Would accountability mechanisms not be superfluous if 
agents were less prone to abuse their authority? The answer is no. Even 
where agents have the best intentions, accountability mechanisms are nec-
essary because individuals are autonomous and determine their preferences 
and conceptions of the good individually. Agents can therefore not simply 
assume they know their principals’ interests. As illustrated in the basic model 
of accountability presented in section 2.2.1, accountability is not only about 
evaluating the agent, accountability mechanisms can also enable principals 
to articulate their preferences by formulating a mandate, through consul-
tations or by sanctioning agents who get it wrong. Even well-intentioned 
agents therefore need appropriate accountability arrangements.
As already alluded to earlier, a core assumption in liberal philosophy is 
that humans are by their nature free and rational. The concept of human 
autonomy, which derives from the Greek ‘autonomos’ or ‘self-ruling’, 
encompasses exactly these two elements.60 Firstly, humans are autonomous 
in the sense that they are independent of others. And secondly, humans are 
autonomous because they are rational. Rather than blindly following their 
passions, their capacity to reason enables humans to develop moral and 
ethical norms and to act according to them.61
The term ‘autonomy’ can refer to the capability, actual ability, the right or 
the value of self-government.62 Philosophers also disagree on what it means 
exactly for an individual to act autonomously.63 All accounts, however, at 
least agree that individuals have the capacity to form their own understand-
ing of what is good and to pursue this in their actions. Autonomy in this 
sense is an essential human characteristic that deserves respect.
Liberal philosophers have used the demand for respect for human auton-
omy to justify a range of different norms. A prominent argument is that 
respect for autonomy renders most instances of paternalism illegitimate.64 
Autonomy has also been used to defend the right to free speech, the right 
to vote, the right to be free from taxation for redistributive purposes, as well 
as the right to contraception, abortion, association and religion.65 While the 
value of autonomy tends to go undisputed, it is controversial which specific 
rights can be derived from it.66
The argument put forward here should be much less controversial. If 
autonomy means that individuals have the capacity to form their own con-
ceptions of the good, this implies that they determine their preferences and 
interests individually. Without communication or observation, it is therefore 
difficult if not impossible for outsiders to determine what exactly the pref-
erences of an individual are. The assertion that preferences are specific to 
individuals is widely accepted. Mainstream economic theory, for example, 
sees preferences as individually determined and builds its rational choice 
models67 around that assumption.68
If preferences are intrinsically determined by individuals, it implies that 
agents can never fully anticipate the preferences of their principals. If they 
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really want to live up to their duty and act in the best interest of their princi-
pals, agents need some mechanisms to determine what these interests are.
Depending on their nature, accountability arrangements can contribute 
to a clarification of the principals’ interests in at least three different ways. 
Firstly, some accountability mechanisms enable principals to express their 
preferences by formulating a mandate at the outset of the exercise of del-
egated authority. Secondly, accountability mechanisms can enable principals 
to provide feedback on the agent’s ongoing performance. Finally, all account-
ability mechanisms include an element of sanction or reward. This enables 
principals to signal after the fact whether or not they agree with the agent’s 
performance. Democratic elections are a good example for an accountability 
mechanism that fulfils two of these functions. They formulate a mandate for 
incoming politicians and sanction incumbent officials.69 Opinion polls or 
midterm elections are an example for an ongoing feedback mechanism.
In addition to preventing the abuse of authority and protecting the rights 
of principals, accountability mechanisms thus provide principals with an 
opportunity to articulate their preferences and interests and to protect their 
autonomy. Irrespective of whether an agent is well intentioned or not, 
a good institutional set-up requires appropriate accountability  arrangements.
3.2.3 Ex-post and hypothetical delegation
Any accountability relationship […] always presupposes some delegated 
authority. 
(Löffler, 2000, p. 15)
It has been argued that delegation is not only an important defining char-
acteristic of accountability but that it also lies at the heart of the normative 
content of the concept. What exactly, though, is meant by delegation? Does 
the argument only apply to instances of explicit and formal delegation or 
also to other situations? This section argues that it is also valid for implicit, 
ex-post and hypothetical delegation.70
When individuals or organisations delegate authority, they can do so 
explicitly, implicitly or hypothetically, as well as before or after the agent 
engages in any activities. The classical and most easily recognisable form 
of delegation is explicit and ex-ante. It occurs when somebody formally 
entrusts an agent with a certain authority and the agent subsequently acts 
on this authority. Most partnerships are created through an act of explicit 
and ex-ante delegation. The founding partner organisations take the deci-
sion to set up a partnership and define its mandate. WCD, for instance, was 
formally set up by a stakeholder workshop convened by the World Bank and 
the World Conservation Union (IUCN). Its authority and tasks were defined 
to include a review of the development effectiveness of large dams and their 
alternatives, as well as the development of internationally acceptable  criteria, 
guidelines and standards for large dams (World Commission on Dams, 
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2000, p. 28). All major activities of the commission thereafter – the creation 
of a knowledge base, deliberations and negotiations among commissioners 
and communication and awareness raising – served to achieve these goals.
The ex-ante delegation of authority can also be implicit. Here, the trans-
fer of authority can be inferred from somebody’s behaviour and the agent 
subsequently bases his action on this implicit or inferred delegation. Take 
a simple example: before getting on a bus, I hand my suitcase to the driver 
who stores it in the luggage compartment. By handing over my luggage, 
I implicitly confer the authority and responsibility to look after my lug-
gage on the bus company. Within the realm of partnerships, implicit ex-
ante  delegation could happen, for example, when the Roll Back Malaria 
Partnership (RBM) collects signatures for a petition on malaria.71 By signing 
the petition, individuals indicate not only their support for a specific issue 
but also their acceptance that RBM will speak on their behalf on this issue.
When authority is transferred before the agent takes action, it is usually 
easy to recognise the act of delegation. Often, though, no prior authorisa-
tion takes place. Many organisations acting for or on behalf of others simply 
usurp the authority to do so and define their own mandates.
One set of organisations, for example, receive appropriate initial authori-
sation, but over time, they expand their activities beyond the original 
 mandate. Critics have coined the term ‘mission creep’ to describe this 
expansion of responsibilities. In international politics, the charge of mission 
creep is most frequently levelled against international financial institutions 
like the IMF. The IMF was originally set up to act as a lender of last resort to 
promote the stability of the international exchange rate system. Over time, 
however, the IMF has also come to extend loans to countries for various 
different reasons. It has especially been criticised because it attaches condi-
tionalities to its loans and thus influences the domestic economic policies 
of the borrower countries.72
Another group of organisations lacks appropriate formal authorisation. 
They have been given a mandate and respect it in their activities, yet those 
who defined the original mandate had no or only partial authority to 
do so. Many partnerships fall under this category as they are initiated by a 
small group of relevant stakeholders, while their activities aspire to be more 
broadly applicable. The Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C), for 
example, was founded by only two organisations, GTZ and the Deutscher 
Kaffee-Verband.73 Its mandate is to develop a code for sustainability in the 
production, processing and trading of mainstream coffee. The code aspires 
to be applicable at the global level and to be accepted as binding by all 
organisations dealing with coffee. Similarly, GRI was founded by CERES, an 
NGO. It set itself the goal to develop and disseminate standards to guide 
the sustainability reporting practices of companies and other organisations. 
None of the organisations that – as GRI hoped – would later accept these 
standards as binding for themselves authorised GRI to assume this task.
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Organisations acting without appropriate prior authorisation are not, 
however, necessarily illegitimate. Authority can also be delegated retrospec-
tively or agents can act as if they were properly authorised. Ex-post authori-
sation can be explicit. Affected parties can, for example, formally ratify an 
organisation’s mandate by joining at a later stage. Thus states joining the 
European Union have to accept the acquis communautaire and delegate the 
authority to legislate in all areas that have already been integrated. Similarly, 
new partner organisations typically have to formally endorse the partner-
ship’s mandate. When a range of important coffee processing and trading 
companies as well as producers’ associations joined the 4C initiative, they 
formally acknowledged its authority to develop a sustainability code.
Ex-post delegation can also occur implicitly. In some instances, we can infer 
from the behaviour of an organisation that it has retrospectively accepted the 
delegation of authority. Take GRI as an example. The initiative boasts that 
by the end of 2005, 750 organisations were using the GRI guidelines as the 
basis for their sustainability reporting (Global Reporting Initiative, 2006a, 
p. 4). Even though they have not formally joined the partnership, these 
organisations implicitly accept the GRI’s authority to develop guidelines by 
using them. In other cases, even the failure to protest can be interpreted as 
implicit ex-post delegation. Voigt and Salzberger, for example, do this for the 
delegation of legislative powers in domestic democratic systems:
[Whenever collective decision-making powers] that are not constitution-
ally assigned to a body other than the legislature are in fact being exer-
cised by such a body, this can be regarded as a delegation of legislative 
powers. [… This includes] Ex post delegation, which occurs when another 
organ performed decision-making and the legislature refrains from 
reversing (or positively affirming) the decision. 
(Voigt and Salzberger, 2002, p. 292, emphasis original)
Finally, delegation can be hypothetical. In this case, the organisation does 
not intend to achieve real authorisation. To determine a legitimate course of 
action, it nevertheless tries to imagine what the principals would or ought 
to consent to. Organisations promoting animal rights, acting on behalf of 
severely mentally handicapped people or the rights of small children, for 
example, can rely on hypothetical delegation to guide their activities. For 
governments, Hanna Pitkin was one of the first to explicitly name hypothet-
ical consent as a criterion for legitimate authority. She explains the ‘doctrine 
of hypothetical consent’ as follows:
For a legitimate government, a true authority, one whose subjects are 
obligated to obey it, emerges as one to which they ought to consent, quite 
apart from whether they have done so. 
(Pitkin, 1965, p. 999, emphasis original)
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Hypothetical and ex-post delegation play a particularly important role in 
circumstances where prior authorisation is difficult, costly or impossible 
to achieve. At the international level, for example, the lack of an estab-
lished political system and the existence of a very broad range of actors 
with different interests make it hard to organise consensus.74 Many areas 
of political concern would never be addressed if ex-ante delegation were 
always required. The system of international law, for example, could only 
come into existence through implicit and ex-post consent.75 Organisations 
acting without proper authorisation can therefore play a constructive part 
in international politics and other similar areas.
The frequency and impact of organisations acting without ex-ante 
authorisation make it all the more important to define institutional criteria 
for their legitimacy. Where organisations act without appropriate authori-
sation, a simple criterion applies. They usurp authority unless they intend 
to achieve ex-post authorisation, or, where this is not possible, act as if the 
necessary authority had been delegated to them.
This has important implications for our discussion of accountability. Even 
where no explicit prior act of delegation has taken place, legitimate agents 
have the obligation to act in the best interest of their future or hypotheti-
cal principals. Therefore, a good institutional set-up under these conditions 
requires that agents identify their principals and create appropriate account-
ability mechanisms to them.
There is, however, a significant difference between ex-post and ex-ante 
delegation. Ex-post delegation means that principals – at least in theory – 
reserve the right to accept or reject the activities of the agent and thereby to 
grant or deny retrospective authorisation. This links the argument back 
to power and effectiveness. In some cases, the agents become so powerful 
that the principals do not actually have the freedom to choose whether or 
not they agree to ex-post delegation. Take the IMF, for example. Borrower 
countries are typically in an economically difficult position that makes 
them dependent on extended or new IMF loans. This forces them to accept 
conditionalities and does not allow them to freely decide whether or not 
they want to accept the IMF’s authority to impose such conditions. In situ-
ations like this, appropriate accountability mechanisms remain necessary to 
protect the principals’ rights.
In other cases, no such power asymmetries prevent principals from exer-
cising their freedom of choice. Here, accountability, while in theory still 
based on the principals’ rights, in practice becomes more a question of 
effectiveness. The principals’ rights are automatically protected as princi-
pals can reject the agent’s activities. But accountability remains important 
when seen from the agent’s perspective. The agent’s efforts are in vain 
if they are not accepted by the relevant principals. Appropriate account-
ability mechanisms provide the agent with a better understanding of the 
principals’ real preferences. They also assure principals that their interests 
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are taken seriously and thereby increase the principals’ sense of ownership 
and perception of legitimacy. This makes principals more likely to support 
or comply with the results generated by the partnership and thus grant 
ex-post  authorisation.76 This way, accountability becomes an important tool 
for increasing  effectiveness.
Both GRI and the 4C initiative illustrate these mechanisms. Both part-
nerships define rules or guidelines in order to change the behaviour of 
 organisations. Their success thus depends on whether or not relevant actors 
accept the proposed rules and act accordingly. It may be for that reason why 
both initiatives have opted to structure themselves as partnerships. By turn-
ing their key prospective principals into partner organisations, they make 
themselves accountable to them.
Deriving a requirement for appropriate accountability arrangements from 
ex-post or hypothetical delegation is also a widespread and broadly accepted 
practice in other disciplines. It has been argued here that the normative core 
of the concept of accountability is based on the rights of principals that 
are created through delegation. Earlier, we found that the rights of principals 
are recognised in today’s major legal systems and that they are a central 
element in liberal democratic thought. Closer examination of these legal 
norms and philosophical arguments shows that both also cover instances of 
ex-post and hypothetical delegation.
First, the legal regulations. Most domestic legal systems have elaborate 
rules covering instances of explicit delegation. Cases in which agents act 
without prior authorisation are an exception from the rule. Under certain 
conditions, though, ex-post and hypothetical delegation are recognised. 
Where they are, the agents are considered to have the same or, if anything, 
stricter obligations towards the principal than in instances of explicit ex-ante 
delegation.
Under German law, for example, ‘mission creep’ is covered by § 665 BGB. 
It states that agents can only diverge from their original mandate if they 
can assume that the principal would consent to this if he knew about the 
circumstances. In addition, the agent is required to inform the principal 
about this change and should wait for a reply, unless action is neces-
sary to avert danger. The BGB also regulates the actions of unauthorised 
agents. It clearly states that agents have to respect the real or hypotheti-
cal interests of the principal and have the same obligations as authorised 
agents:
If somebody acts on behalf of somebody else without being authorised 
by him or without otherwise having the right to do so, he must act in 
the way required by the interest of the principal as defined by his real or 
assumed will. […] Otherwise, the duties of an authorised agent as defined 
in §§ 666–8 apply to the agent. 
(BGB, 2006, §§ 677 and 681) (Author’s rough translation)77
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Interestingly, in German law and other civil law systems, hypothetical delega-
tion also creates obligations for the principal. Following the Roman principle 
of negotiorum gestio, unauthorised agents are not allowed to make a profit from 
their activities, but they are entitled to receive compensation for the damages 
they incur.78 Common law countries are often more restrictive in this respect. 
The obligation for the restitution of damages and costs is recognised more 
rarely, thus providing even stronger protection of the rights of principals.79
Another legal institution recognising hypothetical and ex-post delegation is 
prominent in common law countries. As already discussed,80 the concept of 
fiduciary obligations is key to regulating principal–agent relationships. It cre-
ates protections to ensure the agent uses his discretionary power  beneficently. 
The concept also covers situations in which the principal has not authorised 
the agent to act on his behalf, as, for example, the relationship between a 
guardian and a ward. In this case, fiduciary obligations apply and demand 
that the agent act in a way that would meet the ward’s approval if he had the 
capacity to consider the situation or that he will accept once he has achieved 
the ability to do so.
Admittedly, most legal systems only recognise ex-post or hypothetical delega-
tion under relatively strict conditions. But where it is recognised, the agents are 
considered to have the same or more far-reaching obligations as in instances of 
explicit ex-ante delegation. In normative philosophy, ex-post and particularly 
hypothetical delegation enjoy a much stronger standing than in legal practice. 
The most prominent rights-based approaches in political and moral philoso-
phy rely on hypothetical consent as the basis for their arguments.
Social contract theory was introduced here as a cornerstone of liberal 
thought. Early proponents of the theory such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke 
described the pre-social state of nature and the process leading to the forma-
tion of societies as part of their argument. Many critics read these parts as an 
interpretation of history and attacked the philosophers on the ground that 
their reading of history was unrealistic.81 Robert Filmer, for example, argued 
that individuals were not actually born free and equal as assumed by the 
contractarians. Instead, Filmer contends, humans are born into pre-existing 
authority structures and have a natural obligation to respect the authority of 
their fathers. On this account, individuals cannot transfer their right to self-
rule to a ruler because they do not have it in the first place.82 David Hume 
rejects Filmer’s patriarchalism, but also doubts the realism of the social con-
tract. He argues that the existing governments he knows are actually founded 
on usurpation or conquest, not the consent of the  governed. To those 
arguing that the original contract was concluded in ancient history when 
humans first grouped in societies, he counters that such historical agreement 
cannot be binding for governments or citizens today:
But the contract, on which government is founded, is said to be the origi-
nal contract, and consequently may be supposed too old to fall under 
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the knowledge of the present generation. If the agreement, by which 
savage men first associated and conjoined their force, be here meant, 
this is acknowledged to be real; but being so ancient, and being obliter-
ated by a thousand changes of government and princes, it cannot now 
be supposed to retain any authority. […] But besides that this supposes 
the consent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the most remote 
generations, (which republican writers will never allow) besides this, 
I say, it is not justified by history or experience, in any age or country of 
the world.
(Hume, 1994, p. 190)
Even among the early contract thinkers, though, the social contract was 
often understood as a mental construct rather than historical fact. John 
Locke, for example, does make repeated efforts to find real life examples for 
his contract argument. But at the same time, he argues that moral principles 
cannot be derived from history. Rather, it is from reason and through reason 
that moral norms are discovered:83
[A]t best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, 
has no great force […]. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, 
that men are naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the 
governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning 
laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; 
there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has 
been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first erecting of 
governments.
(Locke, 1690, Book 2, Chapter VIII, §§ 103–4)
In modern political and moral philosophy, the social contract remains 
 central. Modern contractarians have given up all pretence about the histo-
ricity of the contract. Instead, they rely explicitly on hypothetical models of 
consent and delegation to derive the principles of morality as well as criteria 
for the legitimacy of government. Fred D’Agostino, for example, stresses this 
point:
In its modern guises, contract approaches are not intended as accounts 
of the historical origins of current social arrangements, but, instead, as 
answers to, or frameworks for answering, questions about legitimacy and 
political obligation.
(D’Agostino, 2006)
In moral philosophy, for instance, thinkers writing in the tradition of 
Immanuel Kant use a hypothetical contract to derive the principles of 
morality. Kantian contract thinkers argue that individuals can determine 
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what it right and what is wrong by doing a thought experiment. Would 
rational individuals agree to the norm underlying or the reasons given for 
an activity? If they would, the activity is morally acceptable, but if they 
would not, the activity is morally wrong. Kant expresses this principle in 
the first formulation of the categorical imperative: ‘handle nur nach derjeni-
gen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein allgemeines 
Gesetz werde’ (Kant, 1996/1786, p. 68).84
John Rawls, the most famous contemporary Kantian philosopher, tries to 
make this thought experiment more impartial. He demands that individuals 
ignore their actual situation while considering the same question. To achieve 
this, individuals must make the morality test from an ‘original  position’ or 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ disguising their real current position:
[T]he principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object 
of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational 
persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an 
initial position of equality […]. Among the essential features of this situ-
ation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social 
status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural 
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. […] The prin-
ciples of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
(Rawls, 1971, pp. 11–12)
For Thomas Scanlon, a wrong action similarly is one that ‘I could not justify 
to others on grounds I could expect them to accept’ (Scanlon, 1998, p. 4). 
Also seeking to include a criterion of impartiality, this leads him to describe 
judgements about right and wrong as ‘judgments about what would be per-
mitted by principles that could not reasonably by rejected, by people who 
were moved to find principles for the general regulation of the behavior of 
others’ (Scanlon, 1998, p. 4).
The contract argument in this form involves hypothetical consent. 
Kantian contractarians are typically concerned with establishing the legiti-
macy of specific norms and actions. The contract they are using therefore 
tends to involve the direct hypothetical consent of individuals to moral or 
legal norms and principles. Only rarely do moral contract thinkers consider 
the legitimacy of institutions. But where they do, they tend to follow the 
logic of their moral argument and rejoin the political social contract tradi-
tion based on Locke’s writings.
Kant, for example, treats the question of what good political institutions 
ought to look like only fleetingly.85 According to him, humans need to live 
in societies ruled by law to realise their innate capabilities. Government is 
necessary because humans are not purely governed by reason but some-
times also follow their animal-like instincts, violating the freedom of others. 
Government enforcing obedience to just laws is thus necessary to protect 
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the freedom of all. Kant realises that this poses a dilemma because rulers are 
also fallible humans prone to succumbing to their instincts. While perfectly 
just rule is impossible, Kant’s theory demands that humans seek to approach 
it – presumably by creating accountability mechanisms that prevent the 
abuse of authority and protect the rights of the hypothetical principals:
The head of state should be just in himself, and yet a human. This task is 
therefore the most difficult of all; its complete achievement is impossible: 
humans are made from such twisted material, that nothing totally straight 
can be built from it. Nature only demands us to approach the idea. 
(Kant, 1996a, p. 316) (Author’s rough translation)86
For contemporary thinkers using a social contract argument, Ann Cudd con-
firms that most moral contractarians are also political contractarians, though 
she does not see this link as a necessary one: ‘There is no necessity for a 
contractarian about political theory to be a contractarian about moral theory, 
although most contemporary contractarians are both’ (Cudd, 2006).
Accordingly, most social contract thinkers agree that legitimate institu-
tions are those that rational individuals could or would consent to. In 
other words, institutions need to be set up as if individuals had delegated 
the necessary authority to them or so that they will delegate this authority 
 retrospectively.87 Social contract thinkers thus base their influential argu-
ments on models involving hypothetical consent or delegation.
But social contract theory has not remained undisputed. As indicated, 
Filmer and Hume criticised the realism of the social contract. Hypothetical 
contracts have also created intense debate. Communitarians following in 
the footsteps of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for example, doubt that 
humans can be thought of as independent of their communities. They posit 
that individuals can only develop their potential and capacities within a 
community and that it is therefore only in the context of a community that 
individuals can be said to be free and have rights. Even hypothetically, the 
idea of a social contract to establish a political or moral community there-
fore makes no sense.88 Marxists claim that individuals are shaped by the 
material conditions they live in. They argue that material exploitation and 
alienation first need to be overcome before individuals can enjoy freedom. 
It is only after the revolution that individuals can found a genuine human 
community allowing them to achieve their full potential.89 Feminists, 
finally, criticise social contract thinkers for ignoring the ‘sexual contract’ 
that precedes the social contract and subjects women to the authority of 
men, for implicitly giving the ‘free and equal individuals’ (white) male char-
acteristics and for ignoring the morality of care.90
These and other criticisms present serious challenges for social contract 
theories. Contractarians have particular difficulties in countering the 
argument that humans are shaped by society. Because they are so deeply 
9780230238978_04_cha03.indd   73 8/18/2010   1:22:54 PM
74  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
 embedded in concrete social structures, it is questionable whether social 
contract thought experiments can create impartial judgements.91 But this 
critique is much less damaging for the argument on accountability proposed 
here. It acknowledges that individuals are socially embedded and pursue 
particular interests. In fact it is because humans have different concep-
tions of the good and different interests that appropriate accountability 
structures are necessary. Recall that hypothetical or ex-post delegation cre-
ates an obligation for the agent to act in the best interest of his principals. 
Accountability structures are necessary to prevent the abuse of authority and 
to enable the autonomous principals to articulate their specific interests and 
preferences. The communitarian, Marxist and feminist critiques may thus be 
problematic for social contract theorists, but they attack other assumptions 
made by contractarians and do not question the construct of hypothetical 
consent or delegation itself.
There is, however, another challenge against the social contract that is more 
directly relevant to the argument proposed here. An important number of 
thinkers deny that a hypothetical contract can be binding. Ronald Dworkin, 
for example, argues that
hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent argument for the 
fairness of enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not simply a 
pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all. [… I]t may be that 
I would have agreed to any number of […] rules if I had been asked in 
advance […]. It does not follow that these rules may be enforced against 
me if I have not, in fact, agreed to them. 
(Dworkin, 1973, p. 501)92
Contract thinkers have reacted in different ways to this charge. Rawls 
argues that even if hypothetical agreements cannot bind, the concept of 
the original position is significant because it describes the conditions under 
which individuals agree on a political conception of justice that we con-
sider fair (Rawls, 1993, pp. 24–7). Similarly, Thomas Scanlon is prepared 
to admit that hypothetical consent is mainly used as a heuristic device or 
a metaphor to help unearth what we believe is ‘reasonable’ or ‘just’. Other 
contractarians including Jeffrey Paul, Samuel Freeman, Brian Barry, Gerald 
Gaus, Christopher Morris and James Fishkin agree with Dworkin that a 
hypothetical contract may not be binding. Nevertheless they argue that it 
has argumentative force as a justification for specific norms.93 Cynthia Stark 
suggests distinguishing between a contract that is morally binding and one 
that is enforceable. She proposes that a hypothetical contract is binding 
in the sense that it justifies moral principles and gives individuals reasons 
why they should comply with these norms. But she argues that hypothetical 
consent is not sufficient for justifying governmental enforcement of these 
norms (Stark, 2000).
9780230238978_04_cha03.indd   74 8/18/2010   1:22:54 PM
Why Organisations Ought to be Accountable  75
The dispute on whether or not or to what degree a hypothetical contract 
can be considered as binding cannot be resolved here. But neither does it 
need to be resolved for the argument on accountability. Critics question 
only whether social contracts can be binding on individuals, by creating 
either political obligations or specific norms. They do not, however, protest 
when the social contract is used to argue for a limited government that has 
an obligation to promote the interests of its citizens and needs accountabil-
ity mechanisms to ensure this.
Where does this difference stem from? Hypothetical contracts can 
have different structures with implications for the standing of the parties 
involved. Consider first a contract à la Rawls or Kant that justifies norms. Its 
hypothetical members are the same individuals who would then be bound 
by the norm. In that sense, the contract is symmetrical, and in this case, its 
binding force is disputed. In political theory, it is more common to deal with 
contracts that involve both individuals and a government. Here, the contract 
is asymmetrical. Individuals conclude a hypothetical contract conferring 
authority on a government. The government assumes this authority con-
sciously and explicitly. While the individuals thus grant their consent only 
hypothetically, the government actually agrees to the delegation contract. As 
a result, it is controversial whether the individuals can be considered bound 
by the contract. But, as long as we believe that individuals are autonomous 
and have certain rights, it is beyond dispute that the government incurs cer-
tain obligations through its involvement in the social contract.
In the argument on accountability presented here, we are concerned with 
real, ex-post and hypothetical delegation. If the contract establishing these 
principal–agent relationships is hypothetical, it is asymmetrical. Just like 
the government in the example above, the agent assumes authority that 
originally belongs to individuals or other institutions. If the agent acts legiti-
mately, it does not rob others of their rightful authority, but becomes party 
to a delegation contract. Again, the consent of the agent to this contract can 
be considered real, whereas the consent of the principals is hypothetical. 
Even when no actual delegation takes place, the agent is bound by the same 
obligations as an agent who was properly authorised.94
Assuming that individuals are autonomous and endowed with certain 
rights, this leaves us with the following conclusion: delegation of authority 
creates an obligation for the agent to promote the interests of the principals. 
Appropriate accountability mechanisms are necessary to prevent the abuse of 
authority and to protect the principals’ autonomy. An agent acting without 
prior authorisation can only be legitimate if she acts as if the authority had 
been delegated to her or so that it will be delegated later on. Hypothetical 
and ex-post delegation may not be binding for principals but create the same 
obligations for agents as real delegation. A good institutional set up therefore 
involves appropriate accountability mechanisms protecting the rights of 
those who originally held the authority now exercised by the organisation.
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3.3 The advantages of justifying accountability 
through delegation
The argument based on delegation proposed here intersects and overlaps in 
various ways with the other justifications of accountability sketched at the 
outset of this chapter. In what ways, then, does it differ from and how does 
it improve on alternative accounts? Put very briefly, it provides a theoreti-
cal basis for accountability that at the same time creates a firmer normative 
basis and leads to more differentiated practical results.
Let’s recapitulate in slightly greater detail. Three main existing approaches 
to justifying accountability were found in the literature relevant to partner-
ships. The claims based on a consequentialist logic, on stakeholder theory 
or on arguments derived from democracy were found open to criticism on 
different levels. An important recurring problem was that the arguments 
either relied on a weak normative basis or that their political demands did 
not follow from their main normative case.
Thus consequentialist arguments only demand accountability if and in 
so far as it promotes another good, such as efficiency or effectiveness. In 
doing so, accountability is not recognised as a value in itself. The demand 
for accountability remains contingent and accountability can be replaced by 
other mechanisms if they produce the same result.
Stakeholder theory, at least in its original formulation by Edward Freeman, 
stands on much firmer philosophical grounds. Based on an account of indi-
vidual rights, it provides a strong – though disputed – case for why managers 
ought to act morally and consider the effects of their decisions on others. 
As argued above, though, the theory becomes more problematic when it is 
used to justify demands for accountability mechanisms. The claim that all 
stakeholders ought to be included in decision making is not widely accepted 
or reflected in social practices. Moreover, a consistent realisation of these 
demands would contradict the philosophical principles the argument is 
built on.
Democratic theory, finally, makes a philosophically sound and widely 
accepted claim that governments ought to have democratic accountability 
mechanisms. Researchers have extended the democratic argument to other 
situations. To remedy a democratic deficit or to create a legitimate system 
of global governance, they demand the extension of accountability mecha-
nisms to all influential organisations. As argued earlier, however, the demo-
cratic logic does not really back a call for democratic accountability for all 
institutions. And where more differentiated accountability mechanisms are 
proposed, the theory provides no guidelines for determining which account-
ability mechanisms should apply to which organisations.
The argument based on delegation presented here provides a clearer jus-
tification for accountability as well as a firm normative basis for its claims. 
Firstly, like stakeholder and democratic theory, it relies on a rights-based 
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philosophical approach, emphasising the value of individual autonomy. 
As a result, the normative power of the argument is stronger than that of 
consequentialist justifications.
There is, however, an exception to this. Where delegation is ex-post and 
the principals can genuinely choose whether or not to grant authorisation 
after the fact, the argument relapses into a consequentialist one.95 In this case 
accountability is not necessary to protect rights but only to enhance the effec-
tiveness of an organisation’s work. But even in this instance, the argument 
based on delegation does not create a normatively less powerful demand for 
accountability than stakeholder and democratic theory. Rather, like them, 
it claims that accountability is a matter of right only where an institution 
wields significant power. Beyond this, it provides a coherent account of when 
accountability is (also) a matter of expedience, namely, when organisations 
need ex-post approval and support to be successful.
Secondly, delegation avoids some of the theoretical problems of stake-
holder theory. The basic claim is that delegation creates an obligation for 
agents to promote the interests of their principals. This, together with the 
need to protect the autonomy of principals, justifies the demand for appro-
priate accountability mechanisms. This claim is much more widely accepted 
in the social sciences and more broadly reflected in social practices than the 
case made by stakeholder theory that all those influenced by somebody’s 
actions have a claim to accountability. Moreover, as will become clear in 
Chapter 5, the concrete demands derived from delegation do not create 
the kind of total accountability that a consistent application of stakeholder 
theory would. Thus the application of the theory does not undermine the 
philosophical principles it is built on.
Finally, like the democratic deficit and global governance arguments, the 
case based on delegation builds on the strong normative foundations of 
democratic theory. But rather than directly extending democratic theory to 
other institutional settings, delegation makes the analogy at a more abstract 
level. All organisations rely on some form of delegated authority. Therefore, 
they all need appropriate accountability mechanisms, but these do not nec-
essarily have to involve democratic accountability. This way, the delegation 
argument applies the principles of democratic theory more consistently to 
other spheres.
Another important criticism against existing justifications concerns their 
ability to generate differentiated demands for accountability. The existing 
consequentialist, stakeholder or democracy arguments either lead to a gen-
eral, undifferentiated claim for accountability or provide no basis for estab-
lishing which situation requires what kind of accountability mechanisms.
Consequentialist arguments, for example, do allow for the application 
of different accountability mechanisms. If accountability is necessary to 
achieve other goals, organisations should choose the mechanisms that best 
promote these goals. But rather than providing a normative case for the 
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adoption of specific accountability mechanisms, it is left to each organisa-
tion to figure out which arrangement best suits it. Diversity and flexibility 
thus come at the cost of arbitrariness.
Stakeholder theory in its original formulation recognises all groups that 
are influenced by or can influence an organisation as stakeholders. Apart 
from the degree of influence, it contains no criterion allowing for a dif-
ferentiation between stakeholders. As a consequence, the same kind of 
accountability is demanded for all stakeholder groups. This, however, does 
not clearly correspond to widely held moral convictions as expressed by 
laws, regulations and the demands of accountability activists.
Arguments based on democratic theory, finally, either demand democratic 
accountability for all or recognise different possible accountability mecha-
nisms without providing guidance on how and why to apply them. The 
accountability demands derived from delegation, by contrast, are more dif-
ferentiated in two respects. On the one hand, delegation recognises a smaller 
group as legitimate accountability holders than stakeholder and democratic 
theory. Only those who originally or rightfully hold the authority exercised 
by an institution have a right to access to accountability mechanisms. This 
excludes a number of groups who are only influenced by an organisation. 
On the other hand, within this smaller group, delegation allows for a variety 
of accountability mechanisms and provides criteria for their application. 
What authority is delegated determines which accountability mechanisms 
are appropriate. How exactly this works and which authority requires which 
accountability type is discussed in the next section.
3.4 Form should follow function
Wherever authority is delegated, appropriate accountability mechanisms are 
necessary. What, though, counts as an ‘adequate’ or ‘appropriate’ account-
ability arrangement for the wide variety of partnerships?
To date, there are only few initiatives or organisations that define explicit 
accountability standards applicable to partnerships. The few that exist – like 
the Global Accountability Index of the NGO One World Trust96 – propose to 
apply the same standards to companies, the public sector, civil society and, 
by implication, to all forms of partnerships. Most existing governance and 
accountability standards, however, refer to a much more limited group of 
organisations. This can be companies, civil society organisations and public 
agencies or even more specific groups, such as the extractive industries, 
educational institutions or health care providers.97 These standards define 
very different accountability requirements depending on the type of organi-
sation they address. At the same time, they usually fail to define a more 
general principle that would explain why different standards are valid under 
different circumstances. Without such a principle, however, it is difficult to 
apply the standards to new situations such as partnerships.
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This section establishes a general criterion for determining when an 
accountability arrangement is appropriate. It argues that concrete account-
ability requirements depend on the organisation’s function. Function deter-
mines which accountability mechanisms are appropriate.
If delegation makes accountability necessary, it also establishes which 
accountability mechanisms are appropriate. What authority is delegated 
affects what the agent is accountable for. Different mechanisms are suited for 
creating accountability for different aspects. An organisation’s function indi-
cates what authority has been, will be or is assumed to have been delegated 
to it. Therefore, function determines which accountability mechanisms are 
appropriate. This, in a nutshell, is why form should follow function in part-
nership accountability.
The previous section established that agents need adequate accountability 
arrangements because they exercise authority that originally or rightfully 
belongs to somebody else. This argument already includes a general defini-
tion of what the agent is accountable for. Agents are accountable for exercis-
ing their authority in a way that corresponds to the interests of the original 
authority holders (the principals).98
Principal–agent relationships, though, can involve the delegation of dif-
ferent kinds of authority. It can be, for example, the authority to manage 
property, the authority to set rules and standards or the authority to generate 
information or knowledge. What exactly the agent is accountable for, then, 
depends to an important degree on what authority has been delegated. Thus 
property managers are typically accountable for generating high returns. 
Legislators are accountable for adopting policies that promote the interests 
of society and for creating rules that are implemented in a fair and impartial 
manner. Monitoring agencies or scientific institutions, finally, are account-
able for generating accurate and high-quality information or knowledge.99
To create or strengthen the accountability of organisations, a variety of 
concrete mechanisms can be employed. They can range from elections, par-
ticipation rights and process rules to performance evaluation and incentive 
packages. In any given situation, those mechanisms are appropriate that 
are likely to strengthen accountability for the relevant issue area. Accurate 
accounting and reporting combined with sanctions or incentives, for exam-
ple, are well suited for creating accountability for financial results. Elections, 
opinion polls and direct participation, by contrast, are better suited for ena-
bling individuals to articulate their preferences and process rules can help to 
ensure that rules are implemented in a fair and impartial way. The participa-
tion of independent experts and compliance with quality standards, in turn, 
are safeguards for accurate and high-quality information or knowledge.
These brief examples show that the adequacy of an accountability arrange-
ment to an important degree depends on the nature of authority that is 
 delegated. As discussed in the previous section, the notion of delegation used 
here is wide. It includes not only explicit and ex-ante delegation but also 
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implicit, hypothetical and ex-post delegation. This means that what counts 
for evaluating an accountability arrangement is not just what authority has 
been formally delegated. Rather, it depends on the authority an organisation 
actually exercises and thus on what function is fulfils. Therefore, organi-
sational function is key to judging what accountability arrangements are 
appropriate under what circumstances. It is in this sense that the dogma of 
‘form follows function’100 applies to partnership  accountability.
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It was established in the previous chapter that an organisation’s 
accountability arrangements should depend on its function. What func-
tions, though, do partnerships fulfil? This chapter proposes a functional 
classification of partnerships and outlines some of the main variations in 
partnership accountability.
4.1 Partnership types …
Partnerships come in many guises. They differ from each other in many 
respects. Correspondingly, partnerships can be classified in many different 
ways. Criteria that have been used or could be used for the categorisation1 of 
partnerships include:
Composition:2 In section 2.1.1, partnerships were defined as cooperative 
arrangements between public, private and civil society sectors. Depending 
on who participates, we can differentiate between business-government, 
business-NGO, NGO-government and tri-sectoral partnerships. By the 
same token, we can distinguish local, national and international partner-
ships. Another option would be to classify partnerships according to the 
type of organisation leading or convening the partnership.
Size: The number of organisations participating in a partnership can vary 
widely. This could be used as the basis for a distinction, for example, 
between bilateral, trilateral, small, medium and large partnerships.
Reach: Partnerships differ in their ambitions and can try to address local, 
national, regional or global problems.
Field of activity:3 Another possibility is to distinguish partnerships 
according to the issue area they seek to address. A classification based on 
this criterion would include, for example, health, education, water and 
forestry partnerships.
Governance:4 Partnerships also vary in the institutional form and 
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informal partnerships, partnerships that are run by one leading partner 
organisation and partnerships that are incorporated as independent 
entities.
Degree of involvement:5 Many partnerships aim at involving other 
organisations in the work of a core partner. For these partnerships, 
a significant criterion is how strongly and in which areas the other part-
ner organisations get involved.
Relationship between the partner organisations:6 One important determi-
nant for the relationship between partner organisations is the difference 
in their power status. At the extremes of the spectrum would be horizon-
tal partnerships (with all partners enjoying equal status) and hierarchical 
partnerships (though really hierarchical forms of cooperation would no 
longer count as a ‘partnership’). Another important dimension is the 
degree of prevailing conflict. At one extreme, all partner organisations 
have identical interests so that the partnership merely serves to coordi-
nate activities. At the other end, partner organisations start with oppos-
ing interests and use the partnership to negotiate compromises.
Reason of engagement of the main partner organisation(s):7 Organisations 
have different motives for engaging in partnerships and this can serve as 
a basis for categorising partnerships. Governments, for example, can 
enter into partnerships to gain access to additional resources, to induce 
voluntary compliance with regulations by private actors, to increase their 
legitimacy and responsiveness or to manage conflicts between different 
parties. Corporations can join partnerships for philanthropic reasons, 
to improve their reputation, to motivate staff or to manage risks. And 
NGOs, finally, can be motivated by a desire to influence relevant deci-
sions by partner organisations, increase their leverage by joining forces 
with others or to receive resources.
Function: Finally, partnerships can be classified according to their con-
tribution to a public policy problem. This is the approach chosen here, 
which is discussed in greater detail below.
If partnerships can be classified according to all these and probably more 
criteria, why choose a categorisation based on partnership function? To be 
valid and useful, a classification needs to be well defined and consistent and 
rest on criteria that are relevant to the subject under scrutiny.8 If this study 
aimed, for example, at uncovering why different parties engage in partner-
ships, then a classification linked to partnership composition or the reason 
of engagement of the main partner organisations would be appropriate.
Here, the research interest is to develop standards for partnership account-
ability. As argued in the preceding chapter, concrete accountability require-
ments depend on organisational function, defined in terms of the relevant 
authority transferred to or assumed by partnerships. Therefore, a classifica-





9780230238978_05_cha04.indd   82 8/17/2010   8:25:26 PM
Partnerships in Practice  83
A number of other political scientists have also proposed functional clas-
sifications of partnerships. Often, these researchers approach partnerships 
from the perspective of global governance. Thus their primary research 
interest is to analyse how governance is exercised at the international or 
global level and what contribution partnerships make.
In their analysis of ‘global public policy networks’, Reinicke and Deng, 
for example, distinguish six partnership functions: placing issues on the 
agenda, negotiating and setting standards and regulations, developing and 
disseminating knowledge, making and deepening markets, implementing 
ideas and decisions and closing the participatory gap (Reinicke and Deng, 
2000, pp. 25–55). In a later publication on partnerships between the UN and 
business, Witte and Reinicke differentiate four functions: advocacy, develop-
ing norms and standards, sharing and coordinating resources and expertise 
and harnessing markets for development (Witte and Reinicke, 2005, p. 8). 
Inge Kaul, in a publication for UNDP, lists seven functional purposes, includ-
ing trading comparative advantage, exploring new products and markets, 
improving market inefficiencies by developing and disseminating norms 
and standards, expanding markets into new countries and to new consumer 
groups, brokering special market deals, encouraging innovation and research 
and development and pulling together all available forces and resources to 
respond to a pressing global challenge (Kaul, 2006, p. 223).
Even these few examples of classifications based on partnership function 
show significant variations in the number and kinds of categories created. 
In part, this is due to different definitions of what constitutes a partnership. 
But in part it is also due to the fact that the identification of functions is 
influenced by the researchers’ perspective. With an underlying interest in 
finding out what authority is delegated to or assumed by partnerships, the 
four following functional partnership types can be identified: advocacy and 
awareness raising, rule setting and regulation, policy implementation and 
information-generating partnerships. These categories can also accommo-
date the functions uncovered by the researchers just cited.9 While there is no 
reason to suspect that the following list is not exhaustive, further empirical 
evidence could lead to the discovery of additional functions. This would, 
however, not invalidate the present reflections but require extending the 
analysis to the newly discovered functional groups.
4.1.1 Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships
Many partnerships require only basic forms of authority to operate. At a 
minimum, this includes a licence to operate granted by the country of incor-
poration or the host agency(ies) and the authority to manage operational 
resources. The partnerships operating on the basis of minimal authority 
include those whose main function is to engage in advocacy activities, to 
raise awareness, to collect and disseminate information or to offer a plat-
form for coordinating the activities of partner organisations.
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Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships are formed because their 
members hope they can draw attention to a policy problem more effectively 
when they join forces. Those engaging in advocacy lobby other policymak-
ing institutions, such as governments or intergovernmental organisations, 
to change their policies. The Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles 
(PCFV), for example, which was launched during the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002 by a group of automobile and fuel compa-
nies, environmental NGOs, international organisations, government agen-
cies and research organisations, tries to convince governments to introduce 
and implement stricter regulations in order to achieve greater use of cleaner 
gasoline and vehicle technology.10
Other partnerships focus more on awareness raising to achieve their policy 
goals. In that case, they target their efforts directly at those whose behaviour 
they want to change. A good example for this is the Global Public–Private 
Partnership for Handwashing with Soap, which campaigns to convince  people 
to regularly wash their hands with soap to reduce diarrhoeal diseases.11
To facilitate the exchange of information and to encourage learning 
across institutional boundaries, many partnerships collect and disseminate 
relevant information. Very often, the collection and dissemination of infor-
mation is part of or supports a partnership’s advocacy or awareness-raising 
activities. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), whose 
goals are to increase accountability to ensure that revenues derived from 
extractive industries contribute to sustainable development, for example, 
maintains on its website a collection of materials from other organisations 
relating to transparency and the extractive industries.12
The collection of information can also serve to facilitate coordination. 
Especially at the international level, important policy problems are often 
addressed by a multitude of different actors. This fragmentation can lead to 
overlaps as well as contradictions and result in inefficiencies. A number of 
partnerships present themselves as platforms facilitating the coordination 
between various actors.13 RBM, a partnership aiming to provide a coordinated 
international approach to fighting malaria, for instance, encourages local as 
well as international actors to coordinate their activities. Similarly, the Global 
Water Partnership (GWP), which was created in 1996 by the World Bank, 
UNDP and SIDA in order to promote and support sustainable water manage-
ment, encourages diverse actors to build local and regional coalitions with 
the goal of achieving integrated water resources management.14
4.1.2 Rule setting and regulation partnerships
In many areas, especially at the international level, no binding rules or 
regulations exist. A range of partnerships has been created to address this 
regulatory gap. They develop norms, standards and codes of behaviour for 
specific fields of activity. In the absence of a global executive, compliance 
with these norms is usually voluntary. Nevertheless the partnerships usually 
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aim at achieving widespread compliance. In this sense, they exercise a quasi-
legislative function and assume the corresponding authority.
One example for a rule-setting partnership is the WCD. When conflicts 
relating to the construction of large dams escalated, the commission was 
convened to develop generally accepted standards for the construction and 
running of large dams, based on a common assessment of their effective-
ness for development. While not considered binding, the standards are 
now used as a reference point by different stakeholder groups affected by 
dams. Another example is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN).15 ICANN is the coordination body for the domain name 
system of the Internet. It regulates the technical elements of the Internet’s 
name and numbering systems in order to preserve the operational stability 
of the system and promote competition. While it lacks the backing and sta-
tus of a world government, its regulations are considered authoritative by 
the concerned communities.
Not all partnerships operating with rules and standards, though, are genu-
ine rule-setting or regulation partnerships. Rather than creating new norms 
and codes, some simply advocate and create incentives for compliance with 
broadly accepted existing standards. The 4C initiative, for example, is an 
advocacy partnership that may be confused with a rule-setting partnership. 
It encourages coffee producers and traders to comply with a set of norms that 
are derived from major conventions, resolutions or guidelines of the United 
Nations, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), or from conservation 
legislation.
4.1.3 Policy implementation partnerships
Yet other partnerships have formed around pressing development issues 
and seek to address them directly. Real implementation partnerships mobi-
lise significant resources and allocate them for implementing policies. By 
contributing funds or other resources, other organisations or individuals 
explicitly authorise the partnership to manage and allocate these resources. 
The Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), a joint initiative of 
international organisations, bilateral donors, industry representatives, NGOs 
and private foundations to reduce malnutrition of populations at risk, for 
example, has over 60 million US$ at its disposal for grants, technical assist-
ance and start-up investments.16 The GAVI Alliance, launched in 2000 as the 
‘Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation’ by a group of governments, 
donors, health organisations, NGOs, companies and research institutions to 
increase the rate of vaccinations among children, has an annual budget of 
600 to 800 million US$ to support the development of new vaccines and the 
immunisation of populations in need.17
Other partnerships can only spend resources at a much lower level. As a 
complement to their advocacy and awareness work, they engage in what has 
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been labelled ‘implementation support’ earlier. They offer selected support 
services to facilitate the implementation of the policies they promote. The 
Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP), whose goal is to improve access 
to modern energy services for the poor, for instance, provides training to 
entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries.18 Another good example is the 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), a global part-
nership between over 200 organisations, business and non-profits to expand 
the development of renewable energy.19 REEEP provides training to financial 
institutions and sometimes seeds funding for the establishment of funds for 
energy projects.
4.1.4 Information-generating partnerships
Finally, there is a set of partnerships tasked with generating information on 
behalf of others. Where information is disputed or multiple agents face a 
collective action problem in generating it, partnerships can contribute to the 
solution of public policy problems by providing it. This can refer to different 
kinds of information. In the case of the WCD, for instance, the partnership 
was called upon to provide an impartial assessment of the effects of a con-
troversial practice. The Marine Stewardship Council, an initiative to improve 
the health of the world’s oceans and create a sustainable global seafood mar-
ket, by contrast, verifies and certifies the compliance of businesses with its 
principles and code of conduct.20
4.2 … and their accountability arrangements
The remainder of this section outlines some of the main variations in part-
nership accountability.
4.2.1 Legal and fiscal accountability arrangements
The partnerships mentioned above operate at the international or global 
level. This does not mean, however, that they operate in a regulatory void. 
Rather, they operate within different and usually across several concrete legal 
and fiscal systems. Like all other individuals and corporate bodies, partner-
ships and their staff can be held accountable through the systems of criminal 
and civil law of their countries of origin and operation. Where individuals 
enjoy diplomatic status, they are mainly held accountable through their 
home country’s legal system. Beyond this common criminal and civil legal 
accountability, however, there are significant variations concerning their 
legal status.
Firstly, partnerships can be incorporated as independent entities. Through 
incorporation, they become subject to the special legal and fiscal rules of 
their host country. The rules and regulations depend on the one hand on 
which country the partnership is incorporated in. On the other hand, they 
depend on what kind of incorporation the partnership chooses. Among the 
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case examples, incorporation as some type of non-profit organisation or 
foundation is most common. Thus, for example, GRI operates as a founda-
tion under Dutch law, ICANN is a non-profit, public benefit corporation 
incorporated in California, REEEP is an international NGO under Austrian 
jurisdiction and the 4C initiative is a membership organisation under Swiss 
law. With this status, these partnerships are exempt from taxes and can 
often receive tax-deductible donations. In exchange, they have to demon-
strate that they pursue a charitable objective and submit regular financial 
and activity reports.
Some of the partnerships incorporated as independent organisations enjoy 
special status. Thus, for example, GWP is now operating as an intergovern-
mental organisation in Sweden and the Global Fund is recognised by the 
Swiss government as having international personality. The special status 
confers privileges and immunities on the partnership and its staff and thus 
reduces legal and fiscal accountability to the host state.
Secondly, partnerships can opt for a semi-institutionalised form. Rather 
than enjoying independent legal personality, partnerships can be coordi-
nated by a secretariat hosted by a third organisation. In that case, legal and 
fiscal accountability are channelled through the host organisation. The staff 
members of the secretariat are then usually employed by the host organisa-
tion and are subject to its internal rules and regulations. With the other 
partnership bodies lacking corporate legal standing, the secretariat is usually 
responsible for financial management and represents the partnership in rela-
tion to external parties. This constellation thus often confers more respon-
sibility and influence on the secretariat than other governance options. 
In PCFV, for example, the secretariat assumes most of the legal and fiscal 
accountability. PCFV is coordinated by a clearing house hosted by UNEP. The 
other partner organisations explicitly reject legal reliability for partnership 
activities. In many cases, arrangements like this also reflect the dominant 
commitment of one of the core partners. Thus it is no coincidence that the 
EITI secretariat was for a long time hosted by DFID21 and the secretariats of 
RBM and the Global Partnership to Stop TB,22 a partnership including over 
500 partners from all sectors aiming to eliminate tuberculosis as a public 
health problem by 2050, are coordinated by WHO.
Finally, some partnerships have even more informal arrangements than 
that. Rather than having one official secretariat responsible for finances and 
contractual relations, partnerships can be run by informal management 
teams. In these cases, the partnership as an entity has no legal and fiscal 
accountability. Instead, all participating individuals are held accountable 
through their own organisations. With the secretarial functions distributed 
among various organisations, moreover, it is difficult to assign clear respon-
sibilities and create formal accountability. The Partnership for Handwashing 
with Soap, for example, is managed by an informal coordination team 
composed of members of the World Bank and the Water and Sanitation 
9780230238978_05_cha04.indd   87 8/17/2010   8:25:26 PM
88  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
Program. Similarly, the secretariat of the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights in the Extractive Industries partnership, a joint initiative 
of almost 30 governments, companies and NGOs, is split between two host 
organisations.23
4.2.2 Financial accountability
Financial accountability is a crucial component in any accountability 
arrangement. Firstly, appropriate financial procedures prevent basic forms of 
abuse, such as corruption and fraud. Secondly, as the old proverb points out, 
‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’: Control over finances permits influ-
ence over many substantive decisions. This is why, for example, the power of 
parliaments to approve budgets counts as an important criterion for demo-
cratic governance.
Financial accountability has different facets to it and the case examples 
analysed here show variations along all of these dimensions. A first aspect 
concerns the question of how strongly an organisation depends on its 
 financiers. De facto, the presence of a single dominant donor implies more 
dependence than reliance on a broad range of different financial sources. 
GAIN, for example, strongly depends on an individual donor. Around 
70 per cent of the resources committed for its first five years of operations 
were contributed by the Gates Foundation. This is in stark contrast to ini-
tiatives that seek to protect their independence by relying on as broad a 
financial basis as possible. ICANN, for instance, is financed through fees 
contributed by members. Similarly, the 4C initiative has recently been trans-
formed into a membership organisation.
The standing of donors is also influenced by the partnerships’ formal 
arrangements. Some organisations reserve special positions for important 
donors, whereas others explicitly avoid this. REEEP, for example, belongs to 
the former category. All organisations contributing at least €70,000 per year 
are given a seat on the finance committee, which oversees the partnership’s 
financial activities. Similarly, GAVI grants major donors permanent member-
ship on the GAVI Board. GRI, by contrast, stresses its formal independence 
from donors. It explicitly states in its main governance documents that 
‘A contribution does not allow any special role in the governance of the 
Foundation [or] any special access to information separate from what is avail-
able to others’ (Global Reporting Initiative, 2002a, Art. 25.2).
A second important question relates to who takes financial decisions and 
authorises the organisation’s budget. In partnerships with strong member 
control, for example, the general assembly or meeting of partners can have 
the authority to approve work plans and budgets. Among the partnerships 
reviewed here, only PCFV follows this model.
It is more common for the partnership board to exercise financial over-
sight and control. In RBM, for example, the work programmes and budgets 
are prepared by the secretariat and require board approval. In many cases, 
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boards are supported by or delegate financial decisions entirely to independ-
ent committees. Thus, for example, the foundation board of the Global Fund 
takes funding decisions based on recommendations by a technical review 
panel. Similarly, an independent proposal review panel prepares funding 
decisions for the GAIN board. In the GAVI Alliance, a special, independent 
fund board, made up of eminent persons, bears fiduciary responsibility.
As already mentioned, another set of partnerships gives donors a special 
role in their governance, including financial oversight and control. Finally, 
very informal partnerships sometimes have no formal, centralised budget 
process. Partnership activities are either financed one-by-one by individual 
partner organisations or the secretariat or coordination team takes financial 
decisions. The Handwashing with Soap initiative, for example, has no formal 
governance rules for deciding on financial matters. In GVEP, before its incor-
poration as GVEP International, the secretariat had fiduciary responsibility.
A third important issue relates to the procedures for accounting, auditing 
and reporting on finances. All organisations entrusted with managing non-
trivial resources have processes in place for accounting for their use. Since 
most partnerships have non-profit status or are part of public or non-profit 
organisations, they are subject to relatively strict accounting requirements. 
The partnerships surveyed in this book differ in two main respects.
Firstly, they differ strongly in the scope and detail of the financial data they 
report publicly. At one extreme are partnerships publishing no financial data 
at all, like the Voluntary Principles or the Handwashing with Soap initiative. 
At the middle of the spectrum are partnerships like the WCD, which pub-
lishes details about the sources of its funds, but not their allocation, or RBM, 
which accounts for the finances of individual projects, but not the partner-
ship as a whole. At the other end of the transparency spectrum are initiatives 
like GWP or the Global Fund. They regularly publish comprehensive data 
detailing both financial contributions and expenditures.
In addition, partnerships differ in whether or not they undergo an inde-
pendent, external audit. Initiatives like PCFV, for example, are relatively 
transparent about their financial situation. With an annual budget of signifi-
cantly less than a million US$, however, it employs no external auditors. For 
partnerships with larger budgets, by contrast, professional audits are standard 
practice.
4.2.3 Elements of process accountability
‘Process accountability’ is shorthand for the way decision making and imple-
mentation processes make an organisation accountable to members and 
external stakeholders. Partnerships differ markedly concerning the degree 
to which they create accountability to stakeholders through governance 
processes. Process accountability can be created through inclusion, repre-
sentative composition, member control, possibilities for external participa-
tion and transparency.
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The first crucial aspect to consider in relation to a partnership’s process 
accountability is its inclusiveness. Who can join the partnership as a member 
and under what conditions? The most inclusive partnerships among the case 
examples are those engaged in advocacy and awareness raising. Often, like 
GWP or GVEP, they are open to all those who share the partnership’s mis-
sion and objectives. In other cases, membership is tied to conditions. Thus, 
for example, organisations joining the Stop TB partnership have to commit 
to measures contributing to the fight against tuberculosis. The 4C initiative 
demands that corporate partners score an average ‘yellow’ on the common 
code principles and engage in a process of continuous improvement. Yet 
other partnerships are closed to new members. The WCD, for example, was 
set up by a workshop convened by IUCN and the World Bank. In reaction to 
protests, the initial reference group was expanded. Despite this, the initiative 
never defined criteria or processes for accepting new members.
A second important feature concerns how representative a partnership and 
its bodies are. To ensure an adequate representation of different interests, 
some partnerships define a specific stakeholder composition for their  decision-
 making bodies. The Global Fund, for instance, reserves a fixed number of seats 
on its board for donors, recipient countries, affected communities, NGOs, 
companies, foundations and operating partners. Other broad coalitions like 
GWP have no predetermined stakeholder composition.
Thirdly, inclusion is not only a question of who can become a member and 
how representative partnership bodies are but also of how much influence 
members have over partnership decisions. The case examples differ strongly 
on this count as well. Some partnerships involve their partner organisations 
directly in defining policies. GRI, for example, demands of all its members 
to participate at least once every three years in a working group. The work-
ing groups are responsible for revising the GRI reporting guidelines, which 
form the heart of the initiative. In others, members play an authorising and 
supervisory role. The PCFV meeting of partners, for instance, approves work 
programmes and budgets and hears regular reports on activities. Often, this 
role is linked to the authority to select the partnership board or executive 
committee. GVEP members, for example, formally have the authority to 
select the majority of the partnership’s board members, but only by accept-
ing a slate of candidates. In a final group of partnerships, members do 
not have much influence on the decision-making process. In the Stop TB 
partnership, for example, partner organisations only have an advisory and 
consultative role.
Accountability to stakeholders, however, cannot only be created through 
membership. An alternative is to create meaningful opportunities for exter-
nal stakeholders to participate in partnership governance. Stakeholder inputs 
can be solicited to determine the strategic direction of a partnership, but also 
to take very concrete decisions. Among the case examples, the partnerships 
with the most proactive stance towards involving external stakeholders are 
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ICANN and the WCD. In the case of ICANN, all affected or concerned par-
ties, be they organisations or individuals, can submit comments on proposed 
regulatory changes, demand the reconsideration of existing policies, trigger 
an independent review or use the ombudsman to articulate their interests 
and concerns. The WCD solicited the inputs of a broad range of stakeholders 
when creating its knowledge base. This included on-site meetings, regional 
consultations, Internet conferences and fora, as well as public submissions.
A final important element of process accountability is transparency. The 
availability of accurate, relevant and timely information is crucial because it 
enables members and external stakeholders to evaluate the performance 
of the partnership. Therefore, as depicted in the model of accountability 
in  section 2.2.1, information is an essential building block for creating 
accountability. In addition, access to information is a precondition for the 
active participation of external stakeholders and partners in the governance 
and decision making of partnerships.
Different kinds of information are relevant in this respect. Firstly, transpar-
ency about the governance and working processes used by partnerships is 
important. Information on who plays what role and has what kind of author-
ity in a partnership makes it possible to assign responsibility for performance 
to individuals or organisations. It also enables interested groups to under-
stand their possibilities for participation. Secondly, financial transparency is 
significant. Openness about the sources of funds used by a partnership allows 
gauging its independence. Transparency on the allocation of funds is key for 
avoiding fraud and provides the basis for assessing performance. Finally, infor-
mation about the activities of partnerships is critical. A detailed account of 
past engagements is essential for evaluating the agent’s work. Openness about 
upcoming decisions and actions, in turn, promotes active participation.
On all three fronts, partnerships can create different degrees of transpar-
ency. At one extreme are partnerships that publish no or little information 
about their governance, finances and work and are reluctant to make this 
information available even on request. Among the case examples presented 
here, the Voluntary Principles are the least transparent. There is barely any 
information about the partnership and its workings available online or in 
other publications. Requests for additional information were well received, 
but did not provide any significant new insights. Most of the partnerships 
included in the case examples provide relatively far-reaching disclosure 
through their website and printed publications such as annual reports. 
A small group spearheaded by ICANN proactively disseminates relevant 
information to enhance public participation.
4.2.4 Accountability for outcomes
Partnerships are created by their partners in order to achieve some public 
goal – be it the fair and smooth running of the Internet or the effective 
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prevention and treatment of diseases like AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. 
The accountability mechanisms discussed so far, however, do not focus 
directly on outcomes. Rather, they are mainly designed to prevent fraud and 
the abuse of authority and to allow different groups to influence partnership 
decisions. Which mechanisms, then, are used to ensure that partnerships 
work efficiently and effectively towards achieving their goals?
In creating accountability for outcomes, partnerships and their principals 
face a major difficulty. For organisations providing public goods, it is often 
very difficult and complex to assess performance. Firstly, this is because part-
nerships do not have obvious and measurable targets that would be compara-
ble, for example, to a company’s financial bottom line. Instead, partnerships 
and their principals have to translate their general goals into measurable 
objectives. Secondly, partnerships usually seek to address issues that result 
from a complex interplay of factors. This often makes it very hard to establish 
what impact can be attributed to a particular organisation.
Creating the conditions for assessing a partnership’s performance and 
evaluating its impact is therefore no easy feat. Faced with these problems, 
some partnerships reviewed here eschew attempts to create accountability 
for outcomes altogether. Thus, for example, EITI has no concrete targets for 
its work. It also lacks mechanisms to verify whether member organisations 
comply with its recommendations. Other partnerships, by contrast, invest 
significant efforts to assess their performance and impact. This includes 
setting precise targets, assessing the partnership’s outputs and impact and 
linking performance assessments to sanctions and incentives.
Many partnerships define precise targets for their work. REEEP, for exam-
ple, translates its priorities into measurable aims such as ‘remove the barriers 
of investment in at least two countries’, ‘establish at least one functioning 
fund’ or ‘build a database of at least 1000 experts’.24 This makes it easy to 
assess whether or not the partnership has reached its immediate goals. But 
there are two major problems with quantitative output targets like this.
Firstly, they provide little information about the quality of the outputs 
and do not show whether the organisation was efficient in its operations. 
If REEEP manages to build a database listing 1000 experts, for example, this 
does not tell us whether the database is well designed, or whether REEEP 
built the best database for the available resources. To evaluate quality and 
efficiency, some partnerships rely on comprehensive external reviews of 
their performance. The Handwashing with Soap partnership, for example, 
commissioned a review of its strategy, activities and organisation.25
Secondly, it is often difficult to link immediate outputs to impact. To 
remain with the REEEP example, does the database really trigger more invest-
ment in renewable energy and energy efficiency? Some partnerships there-
fore also define impact targets for their work. RBM, for example, set itself 
goals in terms of malaria prevention and treatment. According to the Abuja 
Declaration, the aim was to reach 60 per cent of those infected with  diagnosis 
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and treatment within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms and to provide 
60 per cent of those at risk with effective preventative measures by 2005.26
To turn impact targets into an effective accountability tool, a system for 
measuring changes relating to the public policy problem addressed must be 
in place. In the case of RBM, the partnership regularly publishes the World 
Malaria Report. The report assesses the global prevalence of malaria as well as 
treatment and prevention coverage and thus allows the tracking of progress.
Where partnerships rely on intermediaries for implementing activities, 
assessing their achievements becomes key to creating outcome account-
ability. The Global Fund has developed very strong policies in this respect. 
To achieve ‘performance based grant making’, it negotiates indicators of suc-
cess and reporting requirements with each recipient country. Each funded 
project annually submits a progress report and undergoes an external audit. 
Where the administrative capacity to conduct those is missing, the fund 
provides capacity-building measures.
Assessing a partnership’s performance is only the first step in creating 
accountability for outcomes. To be effective, the assessment should be linked 
to sanctions or incentives. At one level, these can be directed at partnership 
managers and staff. None of the partnerships described above has a differenti-
ated incentive package for managers that would be comparable to those used 
in companies. Even so, the threat of dismissal and the promise of a salary 
increase or promotion related to performance assessments can be effective as 
sanctions or incentives.
At a second level, the sanctions and incentives can aim at implementing 
organisations. Partnerships like the Global Fund provide financial resources 
to other organisations promising to contribute to the fights against AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria. Its sanctions in case of bad performance are clearly 
spelled out. Only those recipients who can demonstrate progress in reaching 
their targets receive future disbursements of funds.
At a third level, effective sanctions and incentives can apply to the part-
nership as a whole. Most partnerships depend in some way on the support 
of others. Advocacy and awareness partnerships need the endorsement of 
other actors to be able to state their claim forcefully. Implementation part-
nerships can usually only work if they can convince donors to commit sub-
stantial resources. And all partnerships need to cover their operational costs. 
Demonstrating that the partnership is effective and efficient in reaching its 
goals is one of the key factors for attracting new supporters and retaining 
old ones. In some cases, the continued support of external parties, especially 
donors, is explicitly linked to good performance.
The partnerships surveyed here, then, rely most commonly on self-defined 
targets, evaluations as well as incentives and sanctions to create account-
ability for outcomes. Outside the realm of partnerships, another mecha-
nism of outcome accountability is prominent. Companies are mainly held 
accountable for operating efficiently by the market. In a market setting, 
9780230238978_05_cha04.indd   93 8/17/2010   8:25:27 PM
94  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
consumers or clients choose between the products and services offered by 
competing organisations. These organisations depend financially on cus-
tomer demand. By choosing the best products or services for the best price, 
consumers thus automatically create accountability for outcomes.
Most of the partnerships described above do not work through the mar-
ket. They are usually donor financed and if they offer services, they do so 
in a non-competitive environment. The few exceptions to this among the 
case examples are often imperfect. Thus, ICANN charges fees for its services. 
Accountability to its ‘customers’, however, remains limited because ICANN 
holds an undisputed monopoly in regulating the Internet. The 4C initiative 
is also in the process of becoming more dependent on market mechanisms. 
It has transformed itself into a membership organisation and seeks to cover 
its core costs through membership fees. Since other organisations have alter-
natives to belonging to the 4C initiative, it operates under more competitive 
conditions.
These incipient market mechanisms do allow ‘clients’ at least in part to hold 
partnerships accountable for their performance. But this can also be problem-
atic when the interests of the ‘customers’ conflict with the partnership’s original 
goals. The 4C initiative, for example, wants companies to conform to certain 
sustainability standards in their behaviour. Conceivably, companies have an 
interest in reaping the reputational benefits of complying with the common 
code, but want to avoid strict standards or real behavioural changes.
4.2.5 Accountability through independence and professionalism
Performance evaluation and market mechanisms serve to create account-
ability for efficiency and effectiveness. For the work of some organisations, 
however, efficiency and effectiveness are not the only or the most relevant 
criteria. For partnerships tasked with generating information, for example, 
the quality and objectivity of the outcomes is more important. This is true 
for partnerships seeking to establish accurate knowledge, as well as for part-
nerships verifying the compliance of third parties with norms and standards. 
Neither quantitative measures of success, nor customer demand are usually 
adequate means for creating accountability for quality and objectivity.
Instead, partnerships rely on independence and professionalism to create 
confidence in the information they provide. The WCD, for example, organ-
ised broad and diverse participation to ensure the objectivity of its knowledge 
base. The 4C initiative separates the compliance verification mechanisms 
from its main work. It relies on independent auditors to verify the activities 
of its members. To ensure their professionalism, auditors have to fulfil 4C 
standards and be accredited by the initiative. Similarly, MSC uses independ-
ent auditors to verify compliance with its standards. Auditors are accredited 
through a professional accreditation organisation.
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4.2.6 Overview over partnerships and their main accountability 
arrangements
Table 4.1 provides an overview over the partnerships mentioned above, 
indicating their main functions (where partnerships have more than one 
dominant function, they are listed several times) and their most important 
accountability arrangements.
The categorisation of the partnerships and the description of their account-
ability arrangements are rough. Nevertheless this overview unveils certain 
 patterns. The group of advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships is the larg-
est and shows the greatest diversity with respect to accountability. Relatively 
many partnerships in this group have generally weak formal accountability 
arrangements. Many are also intent on creating financial accountability, 
while exceptions emphasise process and outcome accountability.
Table 4.1 Partnership functions and accountability arrangements









Partnership for Clean Fuels 
and Vehicles





to donors and increasing 
accountability to stakeholders
Global Partnership to Stop TB Mixed accountability with 
emphasis on accountability 
for outcomes
Global Village Energy 
Partnership
Some financial accountability
The Global Public–Private 
Partnership for Handwashing 
with Soap
Incipient accountability for 
outcomes
Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Partnership
Financial accountability to 
donors; accountability for 
outcomes




professionalism in compliance 
verification
Global Water Partnership Financial accountability to 
donors
Roll Back Malaria Process accountability to 
partners; accountability for 
outcomes
(Continued )
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Table 4.1 Continued





Global Reporting Initiative Process accountability to 
stakeholders
Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and 
Numbers





to donors and increasing 
accountability to stakeholders
Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights in 
the Extractive Industries
Little formal accountability
World Commission on Dams Process accountability to 
stakeholders; independence
Marine Stewardship Council Process accountability in rule 










Global Partnership to Stop TB Mixed accountability with 
emphasis on accountability 
for outcomes
Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunisation
Financial accountability to 
donors; accountability for 
outcomes
Roll Back Malaria Process accountability to 
partners; accountability 
for outcomes
The Global Fund to Fight 








Marine Stewardship Council Process accountability in rule 
setting; independence and 
professionalism in verification
World Commission on Dams Process accountability to 
stakeholders; independence




professionalism in compliance 
verification
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Some of the partnerships engaged in regulating the activities of others or 
setting norms and standards also display few formal accountability mecha-
nisms. The clear majority of them, however, focus on process accountability. 
Often, they have adopted very complex work processes that allow for or 
actively solicit the participation of a diverse group of external stakeholders.
Implementation partnerships overwhelmingly emphasise a combination 
of financial accountability and accountability for outcomes. Usually, this 
includes very detailed and externally audited reports on the sources and 
allocation of funds. Most often, it also includes sophisticated analyses or 
tools to measure the outputs and/or impact of the partnership’s activities.
Partnerships generating information or verifying compliance, finally, tend 
to stress independence and professionalism in their work. In the case of the 
WCD, the inclusion of external stakeholders is used to ensure professional-
ism and objectivity in the creation of knowledge. MSC and the 4C initiative 
have programmes to verify the compliance of companies with their stand-
ards. It is noticeable that both partnerships separate compliance verification 
from their other activities and underline the professionalism and independ-
ence of the verification process.
In the previous chapters, the argument was made that, seen from a nor-
mative standpoint, accountability requirements should depend on organisa-
tional function. This chapter clustered the partnerships into four categories, 
depending on their main function: advocacy and awareness raising, rule 
setting and regulation, implementation and information generation. It also 
examined which accountability arrangements were espoused by the partner-
ships. Great differences were found between individual partnerships, both in 
how strong their overall accountability was and in what aspects of account-
ability they emphasised. When grouped by function, it became apparent 
that – with the exception of the advocacy, awareness raising and coordina-
tion group – partnerships with similar functions tended to focus on similar 
elements of accountability.
These emerging, but imperfect, empirical patterns add two messages to 
the discussion here. Firstly, they confirm that the argument proposed here 
is rooted in broadly held normative convictions. While the demand that 
accountability arrangements should depend on organisational function 
has not previously been made explicit, the incipient practice of partnership 
accountability displays variations that are consistent with this claim. This 
demonstrates that the logic implicit in existing normative discourses is com-
pelling and has an intuitive appeal.
Secondly, however, the overview underlines the need for developing explicit 
accountability standards for partnerships. The patterns linking partnership 
function to accountability focus are far from perfect. Moreover, even partner-
ships emphasising the same aspects of accountability can vary strongly in the 
strength and quality of accountability they create. To enable  differentiated 
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external assessments and to guide partnerships in their development of 
accountability systems, a consistent translation into practice of the normative 
principles introduced earlier is therefore necessary.
In Chapter 3, the implications of widely held normative assumptions 
for the concept of accountability were made explicit. Two steps remain to 
be taken. Firstly, it needs to be determined which accountability focus is 
adequate for which type of partnerships. Secondly, concrete criteria and 
standards need to be defined for each aspect of accountability. Both elements 
are the subject of debate in the next chapter.
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In Chapter 3, it was argued that accountability arrangements should depend 
on organisational function. In Chapter 4, it was shown that depending on 
their main function, four different groups of partnerships can be distin-
guished. Which kind of accountability should each of these groups concen-
trate on? And which standards do partnerships need to live up to in order to 
create a sufficient level of accountability?
This chapter takes each functional group of partnerships in turn and 
establishes which accountability standards it, as well as other organisations 
with similar functions, should fulfil.
5.1 Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships: Basic 
standards for all partnerships
The first group of partnerships identified above includes those whose main 
purpose is to promote certain issues through advocacy and awareness 
campaigns. Often, these partnerships also collect and disseminate relevant 
information and offer a platform for the coordination of the activities and 
programmes of members.
As indicated above, these partnerships only require basic forms of author-
ity to operate. They are basic in the sense that they are a precondition for any 
partnership to work. Partnerships exercising functions other than advocacy 
and awareness raising demand other forms of authority in addition to this 
basic set. All partnerships should therefore comply with the accountability 
standards developed here for advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, 
in addition to their more specific requirements. The common basis for all 
partnership types includes three forms of delegated or assumed authority.
Firstly, partnerships need the authority to exist and operate. Who grants 
this authority depends on the formal constitution of the partnership. 
Partnerships can be incorporated and have independent legal status. In this 
case, the country of incorporation determines the rules and conditions for 
registration. Most countries have stricter rules for organisations that are 
5
Concrete Partnership Accountability 
Standards
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granted exemptions from taxes.1 Partnerships that are not incorporated as 
independent entities derive their authority to operate from their founding 
members and the institution(s) hosting the partnership secretariat. Thus 
the host organisation, often in cooperation with the founding partners, can 
determine which rules and procedures apply to the partnership.
Secondly, partnerships need to acquire authority over the necessary opera-
tional resources. For their financial needs they can rely on a variety of sources. 
Some draw on an initial endowment to support their ongoing activities, oth-
ers use contributions from members, individual or institutional donations 
or, in rare exceptions, revenues from commercial engagements. In addition, 
partnerships often rely on volunteer staff time, as well as office space and 
equipment contributed by partner organisations.
Thirdly, partnerships require the support of partner organisations or 
members. Even where they do not contribute financial or other resources, 
partners are important because they express support for the partnership and 
its mission through their membership. This kind of support is especially 
important for advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships. Their members 
usually have to explicitly endorse the partnership’s goals by signing up to its 
mission statement. The more individuals and organisations do so, the more 
forcefully an advocacy and awareness-raising partnership can promote its 
cause. Supportive partner or member organisations are also more likely to 
contribute relevant information to the partnership, to take up knowledge 
and information disseminated by the partnership and to accept the partner-
ship’s proposals for coordinating member activities.
As depicted in Figure 5.1, the basic forms of authority required by 
 partnerships – the licence to operate, authority over operational resources 
and support by partner organisations – give rise to three basic forms of 
accountability. All types of partnerships should at a minimum be subject to 
procedures and mechanisms to ensure accountability for complying with 
relevant rules and regulations, to create financial accountability and to gen-
erate accountability for working towards the partnership’s mission.
Many NGOs are functionally similar to advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships. While NGOs do engage in many different kinds of activities,2 
advocacy and awareness raising as well as the collection and dissemination 
of information and the provision of platforms for coordination are often 
core components of NGO work.3 While developing concrete accountability 
standards for advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, we can therefore 
draw on broadly accepted and established governance and accountability 
standards for NGOs.
5.1.1 Accountability for complying with relevant rules 
and regulations
Rules are designed to regulate behaviour. They serve to prevent individuals and 
organisations from abusing their authority and violating the rights of others. 
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Because societies, host institutions and partner organisations grant them the 
right to operate, partnerships have a duty to ensure they comply with the rel-
evant rules and regulations. These rules are defined by various kinds of institu-
tions and are often linked to different accountability mechanisms.
Firstly, partnerships exercise their activities in specific countries. Wherever 
they operate, local civil and criminal laws apply. Compliance with civil and 
criminal legislation is enforced by local court systems. Their efficiency in 
creating accountability for compliance with laws varies between countries. 
In well-governed societies with an established tradition of the rule of law, 
compliance tends to be relatively widespread, even though individual vio-
lations can go undetected or remain unpunished. In countries with weak 
legal systems and rampant corruption, by contrast, illegal behaviour may be 
common and legal accountability often remains low.
Secondly, many partnerships choose to incorporate or register themselves 
as independent legal entities. Incorporation and registration usually take 
place in individual countries and are linked to specific rules and regulations 
for the chosen form of organisation. It is most common for partnerships 
to seek registration as tax-exempt organisations or charities. Among the 
partnerships presented earlier, for example, GRI is incorporated as a Dutch 
foundation, ICANN is a non-profit, public benefit corporation in California, 
GAIN is a Swiss foundation, GVEP International is recognised as a charity in 
the UK, REEEP is an international NGO in Austria, the 4C initiative a Swiss 















































Figure 5.1 Accountability of advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships
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as a charity in the UK and with non-profit status in the US. While the exact 
stipulations vary from country to country, partnerships have to fulfil specific 
criteria to be recognised as a charity or tax-exempt organisation. This usually 
includes the requirement to promote an accepted public good, to adopt cer-
tain standards relating to the governance of the organisation and to submit 
regular reports on activities and finances.4
The authority to register organisations and to recognise them as charita-
ble or tax-exempt can be vested in different institutions. In some countries, 
the tax authorities are responsible, in others it is a branch of the judiciary, 
a government ministry or an independent commission. Irrespective of their 
institutional identity, these authorities can hold partnerships accountable for 
complying with the rules linked to registration. Thus if they are not satisfied 
with the institutional design and purpose of the organisation at the outset, 
they have the authority to deny registration or recognition.5 Moreover, these 
institutions usually demand regular and standardised reports on the part-
nership’s financial situation and activities. If the partnership fails to comply 
with this stipulation or if its reports reveal an infraction of other rules, the 
organisation’s charitable status can be revoked. Some charity commissions 
or registration offices can, in addition, supervise or audit registered organisa-
tions in greater detail. If properly applied, these options allow registration 
offices significant control over partnerships.
Thirdly, partnerships that are not registered as independent legal entities 
are usually hosted by other organisations. In most cases, one or several of the 
core partner organisations assume this role. EITI, for example, is hosted by the 
Norwegian Government, Stop TB and RBM by WHO and GAVI by UNICEF. It 
also occurs, though it seems to be less common, that external organisations 
are entrusted with this task. The Voluntary Principles, for instance, have a 
secretariat hosted jointly by the International Business Leaders Forum and 
Business for Social Responsibility. The host organisations, especially if they 
are large and established, have detailed rules governing their operations. 
Intergovernmental organisations such as UNICEF or WHO are usually free to 
determine what these rules are. Others, like the International Business Leaders 
Forum, are themselves registered as charities and must therefore comply with 
the applicable national rules. However the rules may be defined, a partnership 
that is hosted by a third organisation thereby becomes subject to its internal 
rules and regulations.
The mechanisms available for enforcing the internal rules of host organi-
sations vary widely. As ultima ratio, host organisations can terminate their 
cooperation with the partnership. In addition, more established organisations 
often have internal disciplinary measures to enforce compliance with their 
rules. These can include complaints procedures, as well as internal evalua-
tions, audits and disciplinary sanctions. The WHO, for example, has a system 
of internal controls under the auspices of its director general that includes 
the review, evaluation and monitoring of all its operations and activities.6 
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The institutional set-up of the host organisation is thus an important deter-
minant for the effectiveness of its rules as an accountability mechanism for 
partnerships. Another important factor is whether the partnership is hosted 
by one or several institutions. With more than one host organisation, respon-
sibilities are split and more difficult to assign and it is potentially unclear 
which rules apply in which situation.
Finally, internal rules and processes can support and complement these 
external and externally enforced rules. Partner organisations usually deter-
mine internal rules in the mutual agreement setting up a partnership, in 
the partnership’s statutes or by-laws, in the terms of reference for individual 
partnership bodies or in a code of conduct for partnership staff. These docu-
ments usually define the partnership’s mission, goals, targets and values; the 
composition, function and responsibilities of the various partnership bodies; 
work processes for taking decisions, accounting, reporting and auditing; as 
well as rules governing conflicts of interest or other standards for the behav-
iour of staff members. The by-laws of the Global Fund, for instance, specify 
the partnership’s mission and goals, as well as the purpose, composition, 
function, responsibilities and working methods for each partnership body. In 
addition, the partnership has adopted an ethics and conflict of interest policy 
that, for example, defines standards of conduct for contacts with members of 
the Global Fund involved in funding decisions.7
Partnerships can take various steps to make internal rules effective as 
accountability mechanisms. Firstly, the rules, processes and responsibilities 
need to be explicit, clear and known to those concerned. This implies that 
internal rules and regulations should be available in written form, should 
cover the most important aspects of the organisation’s work and should be 
communicated adequately to all staff members and partners.
Broadly recognised governance requirements for NGOs also emphasise this 
point. Thus, for example, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law iden-
tifies as a generally accepted international practice that national laws require 
non-profits to submit their governance arrangements with registration and 
may require rules on conflicts of interest.8 The Panel on Accountability and 
Governance in the Voluntary Sector proposes that boards adopt ‘a code of 
ethical conduct and an effective monitoring and complaints procedure’ as 
well as ‘a framework for internal regulations, including a constitution and 
bylaws’ (Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, 
1999, p. 29). Similarly, the International Non Governmental Organisations’ 
Accountability Charter stresses that organisations should have ‘written pro-
cedures covering the appointment, responsibilities and terms of members 
of the governing body, and preventing and managing conflicts of interest’ 
(International Non Governmental Organisations, 2006, p. 4). The Handbook 
on NGO Governance goes into greater detail and suggests that the basic 
documents of an NGO should include the name of governing body(ies), their 
relation to other organisational entities, the basic responsibilities and powers 
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of different bodies, the duties of individual board members, the minimum 
number of board members, membership rules, terms of office, number of 
meetings per year, the method of convening meetings, decision-making pro-
cedures and conflict of interest provisions.9
Secondly, partnerships need effective oversight to ensure compliance with 
internal rules. The main responsibility for exercising oversight lies with a 
formal board or a group of partner organisations exercising board func-
tions. What enables boards or their functional equivalents to fulfil this task 
 effectively? There is a broad literature addressing this question relating to 
non-profit organisations, which often draws on the more established lit-
erature on corporate governance. Researchers reviewing this literature have 
found it diverse and conclude that ‘there is no consensus about an ideal way 
of governing nonprofit organizations’ (Bradshaw et al., 1998, p. 11).
Despite this lack of consensus, most recommendations and codes cover a 
limited range of recurring themes.10 They usually contain measures intended 
to ensure that board members know their responsibilities and the processes 
used to exercise oversight. This includes, for example, recommendations that 
board responsibilities should be clearly defined, standard practices should be 
described in board manuals and new board members should get an orienta-
tion or training. Another group of suggestions aims at creating the precondi-
tions for board members to exercise effective oversight by focusing on their 
skills and the information available to them. This comprises proposals to 
select board members with an adequate mix of skills, to ensure they work 
actively to acquire information about the organisation’s activities and that 
they receive adequate activity and financial reports. A final set of propositions 
is concerned with the willingness of board members to fulfil their duties. This 
includes, for example, recommendations to make attendance of board meet-
ings mandatory, to ensure the independence of board members and to create 
regulations governing conflicts of interest.
Finally, partnership oversight bodies need to be in a position to apply sanc-
tions or incentives to enforce compliance with internal rules. Partnership boards 
or their functional equivalents can often rely on the following sanctions: Most 
boards have the authority to accept and control financial and activity reports 
and to approve future work plans and budgets for the partnership. This means 
that they can require additional or changed reports and they can veto activi-
ties that seem to run counter to internal rules or the partnership’s mission. 
Partnership boards also often hold the authority to appoint and dismiss the 
partnership’s CEO or manager. Thus they can react to suspected misconduct 
by firing the responsible manager. Finally, core partner organisations, which 
are often represented on the board, can sanction insufficient compliance 
with internal rules by withdrawing their support from the partnership.11
The first pillar of accountability for partnerships is compliance with rel-
evant rules and regulations. Partnerships have little influence over many 
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important factors shaping the effectiveness of external rules and their 
enforcement systems. They have little bearing, for example, on the qual-
ity of national regulatory systems and the reliability of courts in host and 
operating countries. Likewise, partnerships can rarely influence the quality 
of governance arrangements of host organisations. But, as the preceding 
discussion has shown, partnerships can take a range of steps to increase their 
accountability for complying with relevant external and internal rules and 
regulations. These measures are the concrete accountability standards that all 
partnerships, including advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, should 
comply with. They include the following elements.
5.1.1.1 Choose a well-governed host organisation
Partnerships usually determine where they want to operate based on their 
mission and goals, rather than accountability considerations. But they have 
greater flexibility in choosing their host organisation. For this decision, 
issues relating to accountability should be strongly considered.
If a partnership incorporates itself as an independent legal entity, for 
example, it should seek incorporation in a country that has well-defined 
legal and fiscal rules for private organisations. The host country should also 
have a well-established and well-functioning legal system and low levels of 
corruption. Among the case examples, all independently incorporated part-
nerships heed this advice. They are incorporated in the Netherlands, the US, 
Switzerland, the UK, Austria or Sweden.
Instead of incorporation, partnerships can also opt for a secretariat or coor-
dinating mechanism hosted by a third organisation. Arrangements like this 
can create equally strong accountability for complying with relevant rules 
and regulations if a few principles are respected when choosing the host 
organisation. Firstly, partnerships should decide on one host organisation, 
rather than two or more. Where more than one organisation act as hosts, it 
becomes more difficult to assign responsibilities and determine whose rules 
apply under which circumstances. Secondly, the organisation chosen as host 
should itself be incorporated in a well-governed country and/or have a well-
established and well-functioning internal governance system. Most of the 
partnerships contained in the case examples are hosted by intergovernmen-
tal organisations such as UNEP, WHO or UNICEF.
Partnerships can also be managed by largely informal coordination teams, 
usually made up of founding partner organisations. The Handwashing with 
Soap partnership, for instance, is organised by a coordination team from the 
World Bank and the Water and Sanitation Program, as well as through work-
ing groups involving various partner organisations. Arrangements like these 
diffuse accountability for complying with relevant rules. With various inter-
national partners cooperating, it is neither clear which national laws apply to 
the activities of the partnership, nor can a clear host institution be identified. 
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Instead of informal coordination teams, partnerships should therefore either 
incorporate or choose an organisation to host their secretariat.
5.1.1.2 Adopt clear internal rules
In addition to external rules and regulations defined by host countries or 
organisations, the founding members of a partnership can define internal 
rules and processes. Internal regulations are important to ensure that the 
partnership operates in the way and for the goals intended by the founding 
partners. Internal rules can also be an additional means for ensuring compli-
ance with external norms.
To establish an effective set of internal rules, partnerships should conform 
to the following principles:
Partnerships should state their internal rules, processes and governance 
arrangements clearly and in writing.
Internal rules should cover the central elements of the partnership’s gov-
ernance, including all of the partnership’s bodies, committees or working 
groups, detailing their authorities, roles and responsibilities; the processes 
for taking decisions and reporting on activities and finances; and the ethi-
cal standards and values guiding the partnership’s work.
Partnerships should also take measures to ensure that all those concerned, 
especially members of the oversight body, know the rules and their 
responsibilities. Basic steps to achieve this include making the rules and 
procedures easily available and providing new staff and board members 
with an introduction or training on the rules.
5.1.1.3 Create an effective oversight body with the ability to apply sanctions
In a final important step to create accountability for complying with relevant 
rules and regulations, partnerships should create an effective internal over-
sight body. This board or committee monitors whether or not the partnership 
and its staff comply with relevant rules. Its role is important because it creates 
awareness about the rules, can have a preventive effect and can uncover and 
rectify cases of non-compliance or abuse.
Partnerships can take a number of steps to establish an effective internal 
oversight mechanism:
Partnerships must clearly assign the responsibility to exercise oversight to 
one of their bodies or committees, such as the partnership board. When 
defining these institutional arrangements, partnerships should make sure 
that the oversight function is clearly separated from management respon-
sibilities. This increases the likelihood that the oversight body will act as 
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Partnerships should ensure that members of the oversight body clearly 
understand their responsibilities. Next to choosing committed individu-
als to serve on the oversight body, partnerships can support this by high-
lighting oversight duties during the recruitment process and providing 
members with written or oral instructions and good practice examples on 
implementation.
Partnerships should also make sure that members of the oversight body 
are in a position to exercise their responsibilities properly. This requires on 
the one hand that board members have the necessary skills and expertise. 
Important skills include expert knowledge relating to the thematic focus 
of the partnership, a good understanding of the legal and regulatory envi-
ronment for the partnership’s work and experience in accounting, report-
ing and evaluation practices. Individual members do not have to cover 
all of these areas of expertise, but the oversight body as a whole should. 
On the other hand, this entails that other partnership bodies supply the 
oversight body with relevant, timely and accurate information. Oversight 
bodies should have the formal authority to receive and approve annual 
financial and activity reports and get regular updates from partnership 
management. Staff members reporting instances of malpractice can be 
another important source of information. Policies offering protection to 
so-called whistleblowers can further encourage a good information flow to 
the oversight body.
Effective oversight also depends on the willingness of board members to 
exercise their responsibilities adequately. Ultimately, their willingness to 
act lies in the hands of individual board members, but partnerships can 
take some measures to support them. The first crucial step is to select 
individuals suited for this task to serve as members of the oversight body. 
Board members should have high personal integrity and be committed 
to their role. Members of the oversight body should also be independent, 
that is, they should not be closely related to management, and the board 
as a whole should either be neutral or represent the interests of all major 
stakeholders. Partnerships should also define a policy on conflicts of inter-
est and implement it for their board members.
Finally, partnerships should give their oversight bodies the authority to 
apply sanctions. With the means to enforce their conclusions, oversight 
bodies are both more likely to take their own task seriously and to be taken 
seriously by other members and bodies of the partnership. The authority 
and responsibility for accepting annual activity and financial reports is 
key in this regard. It ensures that the partnership provides members of 
the oversight body with relevant information and allows the oversight 
body to demand additional information. This right should be coupled 
with the authority to sanction management. One possible instrument is 
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the oversight body with significant clout, it can also blur the boundaries 
between  management and oversight and undermine the independence 
of the oversight body. Another, less problematic, possibility is to give 
the oversight body the authority to hire (potentially subject to a veto of 
the host organisation) and fire partnership managers.
5.1.2 Financial accountability
Institutions or individuals delegate the authority to manage and allocate 
resources to partnerships. Partnerships, in turn, delegate this authority to 
their managers and responsible staff members. These instances of delegation 
give rise to a legitimate demand for financial accountability. Since all part-
nerships need resources to be able to operate, basic financial accountability 
is expected of all of them.
In practice, accountability for finances involves various levels. Those who 
provide the partnership with resources have the most obvious claim for 
financial accountability. Most partnerships rely predominantly on contribu-
tions from partners or external donors. Some, like ICANN also demand fees 
for the services they provide. Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, 
however, do not usually offer goods or services. The following paragraphs 
therefore only consider the role of donors – be they partner organisations or 
external donors – as providers of funds.
Donors have various possibilities for ensuring that their funds are used 
in the way they intended. Most commonly, the contributions of large 
donors are linked to specific reporting requirements. They determine when 
partnerships need to report on their activities and financial decisions. This 
can range from quarterly or annual to project-related reports. In addition, 
donors often prescribe the format to be used for reporting. For partnerships 
depending on various donors all working with different formats, this can 
create a significant workload and costs.
Donors can also tie their contributions to specific activities or areas. MSC, 
for example, reports that of the total donations of £2,283,894 it received in 
2006, £740,148 were restricted in their use (Marine Stewardship Council, 
2006, p. 21). Similarly, REEEP received €876,533 in general donations in the 
financial year 2005–6, and €5,177,228 in donations related to specific projects 
(Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, 2006, p. 39). Tied con-
tributions allow donors to influence relatively directly how their money is 
spent. At the same time, however, they restrict the flexibility of the recipient 
organisation and can thus undermine its ability to react to unforeseen circum-
stances and allocate resources in the most efficient way.12
While most of the partnerships surveyed here rely mainly on large insti-
tutional donors, some also seek contributions from individuals. Thus, for 
example, the Stop TB partnership, the Global Fund and MSC all solicit indi-
vidual donations. Small-scale individual donors cannot negotiate the same 
conditions to their contributions as large donors. Like them, however, they 
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can refuse to donate or discontinue their support. To strengthen the trust of 
individual donors, these partnerships are therefore likely to create transpar-
ency relating to their use of resources. Sometimes, they even allow individual 
donors to select particular activities they want to invest in.
Another possible donor model that partnerships could rely on is that of 
a foundation or trust. In this model, donors provide the partnership with 
a large initial endowment which finances ongoing operations. While none 
of the case examples analysed here can draw on such an endowment, this 
would have important implications for the partnership’s financial account-
ability. The main difference to other donor-based financial models is that 
donors provide all funds upfront. This means that they cannot use the threat 
to discontinue funding as a sanction. Even more than agreements with large 
regular donors, the terms connected to an endowment are likely to define 
very specifically what activities can be supported with the funds and which 
procedures the partnership needs to comply with when taking decisions.
On a second level, partnerships are held accountable for finances by their 
host states or other host organisations. Two different rationales can be at 
work here. In one set of cases, the host organisation also plays the role of a 
donor. This is the case, for example, when states recognise partnerships as 
charities or tax-exempt institutions. As discussed above, this status usually 
restricts the range of permissible activities and is linked to special reporting 
requirements.
In another set of cases, host organisations do not act as donors. Instead, 
they use their authority to grant partnerships the ‘licence to operate’ and 
include rules on financial accounting and reporting as part of their overall 
rules and regulations. The Global Partnership to Stop TB, for example, is 
hosted by WHO. As part of its role as a host, WHO is responsible for finan-
cial administration. While the coordinating board takes decisions with 
financial implications, WHO can veto those on administrative grounds.
On a third level, partnerships further delegate the authority over resources 
internally. Thus, in a typical set-up such as the one chosen by GAIN, donors 
provide the partnership with resources. Internally, the partnership board 
bears fiduciary responsibility. It approves the partnership’s annual work plan 
and budget, receives and approves activity and financial reports and appoints 
the executive director of the secretariat. The executive director appoints 
further staff members and delegates operational authority to allocate and 
account for financial resources to them. Internal rules and procedures on the 
handling, accounting and reporting of finances, linked to internal oversight 
mechanisms, can help to ensure that financial accountability is created at 
this level as well.
Financial accountability, then, is created at various levels. As with 
accountability for complying with relevant rules and regulations, partner-
ships cannot freely determine all relevant parameters at all of these levels. 
In order to ensure an adequate level of financial accountability, advocacy 
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and awareness-raising partnerships, as well as partnerships fulfilling other 
functions, should adopt the following basic accountability standards relat-
ing to finances.
5.1.2.1 Adopt a system of internal financial controls
Internal controls are the first step towards establishing financial account-
ability. They include policies and processes designed to manage the risk of 
fraud and misappropriation. They serve to ensure that resources are used as 
intended and that they are accounted for properly.
A standard set of basic internal control measures are generally accepted as 
good practice for any kind of organisation handling resources. For NGOs, 
these basic standards have been articulated, for example, by the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales, by Mango, a non-profit organisation 
working to improve the financial management of NGOs, and by the Office 
of New York’s Attorney General.13 The recommendations issued by these as 
well as other institutions contain broadly similar components and are subject 
to little controversy.
Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, as well as other types of 
partnerships, should adopt the key elements of these standards. They include 
the following measures:
Partnerships should have a clear internal delegation of responsibilities 
relating to resources. Ideally in a written format, the authorities to receive 
payments, authorise expenditures, maintain accounts, oversee accounting 
processes and prepare and approve budgets should be clearly assigned to 
individual staff or board members. It is also important to ensure that the 
assigned individuals have the necessary skills and qualifications to exer-
cise their respective responsibilities.
When assigning the various responsibilities, partnerships should ensure 
that key duties are separated and a system of checks and balances is estab-
lished. Thus, for example, a single individual should not be responsible 
at the same time for processing complete transactions and recording 
them. Similarly, accounts should not be controlled by the person respon-
sible for recording transactions in the first place. Moreover, significant 
expenditures should require the approval and signatures of more than 
one individual.
To enable oversight and control over their activities, partnerships should 
operate on the basis of budgets and financial plans. Regular reconcilia-
tions between the planned budget and actual incomes and expenditures 
as well as reconciliations between partnership records and actual cash, 
property and bank deposits should be carried out.
Finally, partnerships should adopt controls for cash and other assets. Cash 
and valuables should, for example, be kept in a safe place to which gen-
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 individual reference numbers for objects. Receipts should be issued for 
money received and expenditures should be supported by documentation. 
In addition, partnerships should reduce cash transactions to a minimum 
and adopt policies to safeguard investments and fixed assets.
5.1.2.2 Adopt accounting and reporting policies complying with donor demands 
and generating reliable, relevant, comparable and understandable information
Adequate accounting and reporting policies are a further element of a system 
of internal financial controls. They are the cornerstones of financial account-
ability to internal as well as external principals.
A partnership’s accounting system tracks incomes, expenditures and 
changes in assets. It enables those responsible to uncover instances of fraud 
and misappropriation. Reports are based on the data generated by the 
accounting system. They collect and present relevant information in a sys-
tematic manner. They usually cover not only the organisation’s finances but 
also its activities and achievements. Reports thus serve to assess the financial 
situation of a partnership. They allow analysing whether spending decisions 
and activities conform to the partnership’s policies and relevant external 
rules. Importantly, they also help establish what the partnership has achieved 
and how efficiently it works.
Which criteria, though, do accounting and reporting policies need to com-
ply with to create a true and fair view of an organisation? There is a general 
consensus that the generated information must be relevant, reliable, compa-
rable and understandable. These criteria were defined by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB).14 The IASB is an independent, private 
organisation based in London, leading efforts to create internationally 
recognised accounting and reporting standards. It issues the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These standards are not automatically 
binding but are adopted by an increasing number of countries. Thus, for 
example, the European Union endorses many IFRSs and incorporates them 
into European law.
The standards defined by IASB mainly apply to corporations and there 
is no equivalent body setting standards for NGOs that could be applied to 
advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships.15 In the absence of interna-
tional standards specifically designed for NGOs, many see the UK Charity 
Commission’s Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) on Accounting 
and Reporting for Charities as an important reference document. The state-
ment reflects the same general principles of relevance, reliability, compara-
bility and understandability (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 
2005, p. 10).
These general principles are relatively abstract. How can they be translated 
into practice? Answering this question requires consideration for a broad 
array of specific and often complex issues. Without going into too much 
detail, the following paragraphs discuss which specific standards are emerging 
9780230238978_06_cha05.indd   111 8/18/2010   1:26:46 PM
112  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
for the accounting practices of non-profit organisations. They then discuss 
requirements for reports to internal governing bodies, donors and public 
authorities.
Relevant and broadly accepted criteria for the accounting practices of non-
profit organisations, which can be applied to advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships, have been defined in several documents. Firstly, as already men-
tioned, the UK Charity Commission’s SORP on Accounting and Reporting for 
Charities is a widely used reference document. It often refers to principles laid 
down by the UK Financial Reporting Council and its Accounting Standards 
Board. This body defines Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) 
and Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs), most of which also apply to NGOs 
or charities.16 Secondly, due to the large number of non-profit organisations 
registered in or financed by the US, the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practices (GAAP) in force there also enjoys wide recognition. The main insti-
tution defining GAAP for charities in the US is the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB). Its statements 93, 116, 117, 124 and 136 set down 
important accounting practices.17
These documents contain an emerging consensus on accounting rules 
that are specific to non-profit organisations and go beyond or deviate from 
generic good accounting practices:
Non-profit organisations should distinguish their incomes and assets 
depending on whether or not their use has been restricted by donors. They 
should also include certain in-kind contributions of services as incomes.18
Non-profits should account separately for expenses related to their mis-
sion or function and those amounting to overhead costs.19
Non-profit organisations should also, like companies, report the gains and 
losses made on assets and investments. In doing so, they should report 
assets and investments at their fair value and take account of depreciation.20
Detailed and broadly accepted accounting standards, then, have been 
defined for charitable organisations and NGOs. Since advocacy and aware-
ness-raising partnerships are functionally similar to non-profit organisa-
tions, they should comply with these accounting standards.
Based on the information generated through the accounting system, part-
nerships should also prepare regular financial and activity reports. The author-
ity over financial resources allowing a partnership to cover its operational 
costs is often delegated by various parties. Partnerships should therefore issue 
reports at different levels, including reports to internal supervisory  bodies, 
reports to donors and reports to host organisations or fiscal authorities. To 
date, only few broadly accepted standards for those reports have emerged. 
The issue is further complicated by the fact that requirements differ depend-
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Firstly, partnerships should prepare internal reports for their governing 
bodies, such as partnership boards or meetings of core partners. As already 
discussed, it is broadly accepted as a standard of good governance for non-
profit organisations that boards or their functional equivalents bear fiduciary 
responsibility. Boards usually take strategic decisions but delegate the task of 
managing and allocating resources to the organisations’ management and 
staff. They exercise control by approving work-plans and budgets and by 
receiving regular reports. There are no commonly accepted standards defin-
ing criteria for these internal reports. Beyond the basic requisite that reports 
should be accurate and understandable, however, the purpose of board 
reports dictates some necessary conditions:
Internal reports should be frequent and be made available regularly before 
the supervisory body convenes.
Partnership boards or equivalent bodies exercise control through their 
approval of work-plans and budgets. Internal reports should therefore 
provide the necessary information to allow for an accurate comparison 
between those documents and the partnership’s actual activities, incomes 
and expenditures.
Internal reports should also support the supervisory body in its strategic 
planning role. To this aim, they should include information on projected 
future financial developments, the financial implications of key decisions 
and the relative effectiveness and efficiency of individual programmes 
and activities.
Secondly, partnerships should submit regular reports to their donors. The 
partnerships described in the case examples rely mainly on the financial 
and other contributions of donors to cover their operational expenses. The 
reports should enable donors to assess whether the partnership has fulfilled 
potential conditions attached to the contributions. Moreover, they should 
allow donors to establish whether or not the resources were used, and were 
used efficiently, to achieve the intended purposes. Which format these 
reports take and whether commonly accepted standards for their content 
exist depends on the type of donor involved.
States represent one important kind of donor. Governments can  sponsor 
partnerships as well as other organisations directly. In terms of creating 
standard reporting requirements, however, their role as indirect donors or 
supporters is more important. As discussed earlier, many partnerships are 
incorporated as independent legal entities and enjoy the status of tax-exempt 
charities or non-profit organisations. As such, they face special reporting 
requirements defined by state authorities. Because of their widespread appli-
cation, these requirements often turn into more generally used parameters 
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similar information or where the official reports are openly accessible and are 
used as a basis for assessing non-profit organisations.
Due to the large number of charities registered there, the annual reports 
requested by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the US Department of 
the Treasury are seen as an important model for official reports.21 In the US, 
all registered charities with annual revenues exceeding US$25,000 must file 
a completed IRS form 990 every year.22 On this form, non-profits have to 
report their revenues, expenses (differentiating between programme expenses, 
administrative costs, fund-raising expenses and payments to affiliates) and 
changes in their net assets. Moreover, they have to provide balance sheets, 
details on functional expenses, lists of key current and former staff members, 
directors and trustees and discuss their activities and achievements. Following 
a regulation of 1999, non-profits have to make the three most recent IRS 
 filings available to anyone interested upon request.23 With IRS data publicly 
available, it has become an important source of information for NGO assess-
ments. GuideStar, for example, is an organisation collecting information on 
non-profit organisations and rating their accountability. It relies heavily on 
data derived from IRS form 990.24
The reporting requirements in other important host states for non-profit 
organisations including partnerships tend to be broadly similar. In the UK, 
charities with an annual income exceeding £10,000 must file an annual 
return with the Charity Commission.25 What information charities need to 
include depends on their size. With revenues below £250,000, they need 
to list their total incomes and expenditures, the contact details of trustees 
and a summary of their activities. Above £250,000, charities need to include 
further details on fund-raising, benefits for trustees, properties, relations to 
connected trading companies and instances of misappropriation. If revenues 
exceed £1 million, charities have to include a ‘summary information return’, 
which differentiates income by sources and contains additional information 
on aims, strategy, activities and achievements, as well as programme expen-
ditures, governance and future plans. Through the Charity Commission’s 
website, all filed reports are publicly accessible and they are used by agencies 
like GuideStar UK to evaluate organisations.26
For partnerships incorporated as tax-exempt institutions or charities, then, 
official annual returns are an important element of financial accountability. 
Filing these reports is not optional. To fulfil their reporting duty adequately, 
partnerships should:
Incorporate important reporting parameters into their accounting system 
from the outset. If the official annual return requires, for example, to 
distinguish between different types of incomes and expenditures, only 
an accounting system that mirrors these criteria can deliver the necessary 
information.
•
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Complete all required sections of the report and verify the accuracy of 
the data.
Prepare and file reports in a timely manner.
Make copies of the report available to interested parties, preferably by 
posting it on the Internet.
Institutional and individual contributors are another important kind of 
donor. Among the partnerships surveyed for this book, most rely on govern-
ments, multilateral institutions, corporations and foundations as their main 
donors.
Large donors tend to attach conditions, including specific reporting 
requirements, to their contributions. Problems can arise when partnerships 
depend on a range of large donors, each imposing different reporting condi-
tions. To reduce the resulting administrative burden, partnerships can try to 
negotiate with donors to achieve a harmonisation of reporting requirements. 
This could, for example, involve a convergence of standards around the cri-
teria for official annual returns.27
Some partnerships, such as Stop TB for example, also solicit individual con-
tributions. In this case, partnerships need to be more proactive for providing 
adequate reports to donors. Small individual donors may not be powerful 
enough to set their own reporting rules, but they do have a right to receive 
adequate information on how their funds are spent. In addition, they can sanc-
tion organisations violating this right by refusing future support. Partnerships 
should therefore publish regular reports for small donors of their own accord.
The most relevant and broadly accepted existing standards for public 
annual reports of advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships are again 
those contained in the UK Charity Commission’s SORP on Accounting and 
Reporting by Charities.28 According to this document, an annual report 
should contain reference and administrative details for the charity, its trus-
tees and advisors; information on the organisation’s structure, governance 
and management; a statement of its objectives and activities; an analysis of 
its achievements and performance; a financial review; as well as an expla-
nation of future plans (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2005, 
pp. 7–9). For the summarised financial statements, the commission specifies 
that they should contain information on both financial activities and the 
balance sheet, that they ought to be consistent with statutory accounts and 
that they should not be misleading either through omission or inappropriate 
amalgamation.
Regarding their reports to direct donors, advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships should therefore comply with the following principles:
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Partnerships relying on or intending to reach small individual donors 
should in addition publish an annual report containing accurate and not 
misleading summary financial information and describing the organisa-
tion’s activities and achievements.
Thirdly and finally, partnerships must report to their host organisations. In 
this case, the demand for financial accountability is not based on financial 
support. Rather, it is part of the general rules and regulations that host organ-
isations can attach to the licence to operate. Partnerships can, for example, 
be incorporated as independent legal entities without receiving indirect state 
support through tax exemption. The local fiscal authorities will nevertheless 
demand detailed annual financial reports to determine the organisation’s 
tax burden and to verify its compliance with other rules. Similarly, partner-
ships hosted by a third organisation usually have to report regularly on their 
activities and finances. Again, the reports serve to establish whether the part-
nership complies with internal rules and regulations. Moreover, the reports 
deliver necessary information to host organisations enabling them to fulfil 
their reporting duties.
To strengthen their financial accountability through adequate reporting 
to host organisations, partnerships should ensure they follow relevant rules 
and regulations as described in section 5.1.1.
5.1.2.3 Conduct independent audits for large partnerships
Financial audits work to control an organisation’s accounting and report-
ing practices.29 They involve internal or external professionals assessing 
the fairness of financial statements and their compliance with GAAP or the 
IFRS. Auditors do not usually verify an organisation’s accounts in all their 
detail. Instead, they most often use a sampling technique to test accounting 
practices.
Independent, external financial audits provide the strongest assurance that 
financial statements are fair. External auditors have to fulfil strict professional 
qualification criteria.30 Commissioning an external audit can therefore incur 
significant costs.31 Regulations determining audit requirements often differ 
depending on the kind of organisation concerned. Thus it is common that 
publicly traded companies are generally required to have independent audits. 
Private companies below a certain financial turnover threshold are usually 
exempt from audit requirements.32 For NGOs and non-profit organisations, 
audit regulations vary strongly even among leading Western countries. Over 
recent years, however, a trend has been emerging to make audits obligatory 
for large NGOs exceeding specified financial thresholds.33
In the UK, for example, charities whose gross income exceeds £500,000 or 
charities with a gross income over £100,000 and assets exceeding £2.8 million 
must commission an independent audit.34 In the US, organisations receiving 
federal or state grants of US$500,000 or more must have an independent 
•
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audit.35 So far, non-profits that do not rely on major government grants are 
not subject to an audit requirement. An important recent panel, though, 
was encouraged by leaders of the US Senate Finance Committee to propose 
reforms to strengthen the governance and accountability of the non-profit 
sector. In its final report, the panel recommends the introduction of external 
audits for non-profit organisations with total annual revenues exceeding 
US$1 million.36
The practice of demanding obligatory audits has not been consistently 
implemented in other countries. Despite this, evaluation agencies focus-
ing on NGOs have adopted the standard. The Standards for Charitable 
Accountability of the BBB Wise Giving Alliance, for example, states that 
organisations with an annual gross income of over US$250,000 should have 
an external audit (BBB Wise Giving Alliance, 2003, §11). Moreover, many 
larger NGOs recognise their obligation to provide audited financial state-
ments. In their Accountability Charter, for example, a range of international 
NGOs commit to attaching audit results to the financial data they present in 
annual reports (International Non Governmental Organisations, 2006, p. 4).37
Since there is an emerging consensus that non-profit organisations with 
substantial revenues should undergo independent audits, the same standard 
should apply to advocacy and awareness raising as well as other partnerships. 
Defining a financial threshold after which the standard applies is necessar-
ily somewhat arbitrary. For NGOs, the revenue threshold is often between 
€500,000 and 1 million. For private companies, though, audit exceptions can 
apply up to a turnover of €8.8 million. The threshold chosen here presents a 
relatively conservative limit because the consensus on audit requirements is 
still emerging and not yet firmly established. Therefore, and due to the high 
costs of audits, only partnerships with annual budgets exceeding €5 million 
should be subject to independent, external audits to strengthen financial 
accountability.
To be effective, audits have to fulfil certain principles. The most basic 
requirement is that only professional and independent auditors should con-
duct audits. As for accounting, other, more detailed auditing standards have 
been defined by various professional and regulatory bodies. At the interna-
tional level, a crucial rule-setting institution is the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) and its International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (IAASB). It sets the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). ISA 200, 
for example, defines the ‘objective and general principles governing an audit 
of financial statements’ and applies to audits in all sectors.38 It requires audi-
tors to comply with the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
(International Federation of Accountants’ Ethics Committee, 2005), to adopt 
an attitude of professional scepticism, to reduce audit risk, to obtain rea-
sonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstate-
ments and to determine whether the financial reporting framework adopted 
by the organisation under scrutiny is acceptable (International Federation 
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of Accountants, 2007, pp. 213–29).39 Audits on the financial statements of 
partnerships should comply with relevant international and national audit-
ing standards.
In summary, partnerships should observe the following principles relating 
to audits:
Partnerships with annual budgets exceeding €5 million should submit 
their financial statements to professional, independent audits.
The audits should comply with applicable ISAs, as well as relevant addi-
tional national regulations.
Audit results should be published together with the audited financial 
statements.
5.1.3 Accountability for working towards the partnership’s mission
Finally, advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships need the general sup-
port of partners or members to be able to work effectively. ‘General support’ 
is a more diffuse notion than either the granting of a licence to operate or 
the delegation of authority over operational resources. It is therefore also 
less immediately clear which kind of accountability demand follows from 
the granting of support.
The lack of clarity stems from two factors. Firstly, general support can 
manifest itself in different ways depending on the orientation of the partner-
ship. Partnerships like PCFV focus mainly on advocacy campaigns to influ-
ence important decision makers. Support in this case means that partners 
subscribe to this call and grant the partnership the authority to speak on 
their behalf when advancing its claims. Partnerships like REEEP aim to serve 
as information hubs. Here, active support implies that partners supply their 
information to the partnership and use and integrate the information offered 
by the partnership in their work. Advocacy and awareness-raising partner-
ships can also emphasise their role as coordinators, as does, for example, 
RBM. In that case, support entails that partners accept the authority of RBM 
to propose modalities for coordination.
Secondly, partner organisations can have very different motives for joining 
or supporting partnerships. Businesses, for example, are often  interested in 
showing good corporate citizenship, increasing their reputation or improv-
ing their investment markets. Governments and intergovernmental organi-
sations may be driven by a desire to mobilise additional resources, by the 
urge to demonstrate leadership or by the wish to develop more effective 
approaches to problem solving. NGOs, in turn, can in addition be motivated 
by the desire to gain influence over key decisions.40 These different motives 
give rise to different expectations of what partnerships should deliver. 
Partner organisations will therefore hold a partnership to account by either 
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Despite these variations, support is in all cases closely linked to partner-
ship mission. As described above, the partnership’s mission strongly influ-
ences what support entails in practice. Moreover, the partnership’s mission 
usually serves as a common denominator for all partner organisations. 
These organisations are presumably only willing to join a particular partner-
ship with its specific mission if they believe that this meets their expecta-
tions. Both, a company trying to enhance its reputation and a government 
 seeking new ways to address public policy problems, for example, can only 
achieve their objectives if the partnership works successfully towards its own 
goals.
In exchange for the general support of their partners and members, advo-
cacy and awareness-raising partnerships should therefore be accountable for 
working towards achieving their mission. To create this kind of accountabil-
ity, partnerships should follow some basic standards in their work:
5.1.3.1 Define a clear mission
An obvious and necessary precondition for making partnerships accountable 
to their mission is to have a clearly defined and understood mission. Writing 
down a clear and meaningful mission statement is not always an easy task. 
The challenge is to define a goal and vision that is broad and flexible enough 
to integrate various actors with potentially very different interests and to 
allow the partnership to adapt flexibly to changing circumstances. At the 
same time, however, the mission statement should be specific enough to 
have meaning for partners and supporters and to be able to guide strategic 
planning and programming.
The Stop TB partnership provides a good example for the required level of 
specificity of mission statements. The partnership pursues the strategic goal 
of eliminating tuberculosis as a public health problem and achieving a world 
free of TB. In this quest, it defines its mission as follows:
To ensure that every TB patient has access to effective diagnosis, treat-
ment and cure; To stop the transmission of TB; To reduce the inequitable 
social and economic toll of TB; To develop and implement new preven-
tive, diagnostic and therapeutic tools and strategies to stop TB.
(http://www.stoptb.org/stop_tb_initiative/#vmg, 
last accessed 27 August 2009)
To ensure their mission is clear, meaningful and relevant, partnerships 
should adhere to the following principles:41
Partnerships should adopt mission statements that are specific enough 
to provide guidance for their strategic planning and the development of 
programmes and activities.
•
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Mission statements should be published in a prominent position in pub-
lications and reference documents and should be known to the partner-
ships’ key stakeholders.
To increase the mission statement’s practical relevance and ensure that 
it is and continues to be backed by partner organisations, partnerships 
should periodically discuss and review their missions.
5.1.3.2 Orient partnership activities along the mission
Once a partnership has created a clear and meaningful mission statement, 
the next challenge is to ensure its relevance to the partnership’s activities. 
Accountability to mission implies that the mission statement plays a central 
role in the planning and work of a partnership. This can be achieved if the 
following principles are respected:
Partnerships should not conduct any major activities that are unrelated to 
their mission. Instead, all important elements of their work programmes 
should promote their mission.
Mission statements should guide the strategic planning of partnerships. 
Using a results chain or logical framework approach,42 partnerships should 
identify which courses of action are likely to contribute to achieving their 
mission and select them accordingly.
To make the rationale behind their work programmes transparent, part-
nerships should also structure their activity reports around their mission. 
These reports should contain an explanation of how the partnership’s 
main efforts are intended to contribute to the mission. Moreover, activity 
reports should portray the partnership’s achievements, the obstacles it 
encountered and the consequences it drew from past experiences.
5.1.3.3 Employ resources efficiently in pursuit of the mission
Finally, an organisation intent on creating accountability for working 
towards its mission needs to demonstrate that it uses its resources efficiently 
in pursuing its goals. Measuring efficiency in organisations addressing public 
policy problems is notoriously difficult, because they have no clearly defined 
bottom line and address complex issues.43
Most efforts to evaluate the efficiency of public policy programmes rely 
on benchmarks. Benchmarking is a technique originally developed by com-
panies. It involves identifying the best competitor and using that organi-
sation’s performance as a yardstick.44 Benchmarking can be a useful tool 
for assessing the relative efficiency of partnerships or other organisations 
working in the same field. It could be used, for example, to compare the 
efficiency of the Global Fund, RBM and other health providers in fighting 
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efficiency criteria that would be applicable to organisations working in dif-
ferent fields.
The efficiency standards defined here for advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships therefore have to remain very general. They include the follow-
ing basic principles and criteria:
Partnerships should define priorities for the allocation of scarce resources 
depending on how efficiently the various possible activities contribute to 
the achievement of the partnership’s mission.45 To create a reliable basis 
for these decisions, partnership boards or management should encourage 
evaluations of ongoing programmes.
Partnerships should control their costs related to administration and 
fund-raising and ensure that the clear majority of their resources is 
spent on programme activities. Following a broadly accepted benchmark 
for NGOs, partnerships should at the very least allocate 65 per cent of 
their total funds to activities designed to directly contribute to mission 
achievement.46
5.1.4 Summary of standards
Table 5.1 contains a summary of relevant accountability standards for advo-
cacy and awareness-raising partnerships.
•
•











Incorporate as an independent legal 
entity in a country with well-defined 
rules for private organisations and a 
well-established and functioning legal 
system
Or choose one organisation to host 
the partnership, which is itself well 
governed
Adopt clear internal 
rules
Clearly define internal rules, processes 
and governance arrangements 
Rules cover roles and responsibilities 
of partnership bodies, decision-making 
procedures, reporting requirements 
and ethical standards
Ensure that internal rules are known 
to all those concerned, especially the 
oversight body
(Continued )







Create an effective 
oversight body with 
the ability to apply 
sanctions
Clearly assign responsibility for 
oversight to one body or committee 
and separate it from management 
responsibility
Ensure members of the oversight 
body understand their responsibilities 
by choosing committed individuals, 
emphasising responsibilities during 
recruitment and offering 
information
Ensure that members of the oversight 
body have the necessary skills and 
expertise and are adequately supplied 
with information, including through 
whistle-blower protection 
Select independent individuals with 
strong personal integrity to serve on 
the oversight body and adopt a conflict 
of interest policy
Enable members of the oversight body 
to apply sanctions and incentives
Financial 
accountability
Adopt a system of 
internal financial 
controls
Clearly delegate internal 
responsibilities for resources
Separate key duties and install a system 
of checks and balances
Operate on the basis of budgets and 
financial plans








Distinguish incomes and assets 
depending on whether or not their use 
has been restricted by donors
Account separately for expenses 
related to mission/function and 
overhead costs
Report gains and losses made on 
assets and investments, using their 
fair value and accounting for 
depreciation
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Internal reports should be available 
before board meetings, enable a 
comparison between budgets, 
work-plans and actual activities and 
enable strategic planning
Incorporate reporting requirements in 
the accounting system, file complete 
and accurate returns on time and make 
them publicly available on request
Reports to donors should comply 
with the conditions set by large 
donors; partnerships relying on small, 
individual donors should publish 
annual reports including a financial 




audits for large 
partnerships
Partnerships with annual budgets 
exceeding €5 million should undergo 
professional, independent audits
Audits should comply with relevant 
ISAs and national regulations






Define a clear 
mission
Mission statements should be specific 
enough to guide strategic planning and 
programming
Publish mission statements 
prominently and ensure it is 
understood by stakeholders




Do not conduct any major activities 
unrelated to partnership mission
Use mission statements as a guide to 
strategic planning
Structure activity reports around the 
mission
Employ resources 
efficiently in pursuit 
of the mission
Define priorities based on mission-
related efficiency and evaluate 
ongoing programmes
Control overhead costs and ensure 
they do not exceed 35 per cent of total 
revenues
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5.2 Standards for rule setting and regulation partnerships
A second group of partnerships comprises those engaged in defining new 
rules, standards or regulations for specific policy areas or groups of organisa-
tions. GRI, for example, develops standards and guidelines for sustainability 
reporting, ICANN regulates important aspects of the Internet, WCD has 
created criteria for decisions relating to the building of large dams, MSC 
developed rules for sustainable fisheries, EITI has proposed standards on 
transparency in the extractive industries and the Voluntary Principles created 
guidelines for the security arrangements of companies.
In all those cases, compliance with the proposed rules or regulations is ulti-
mately voluntary. The partnerships chosen as case examples here all operate 
at the international level. Thus they work outside the realm of nation states 
and their rule-making and rule-enforcement systems. The proposed norms 
do also not enjoy the status of international law. To be considered as bind-
ing under international law, governments either have to back norms through 
explicit agreement or through consistent customary practice.47 The partner-
ships analysed here, however, usually only include a very limited number of 
governments, their rules have not (yet) become common state practice and 
do often not address states but companies or other organisations.48
Yet the rules and regulations defined by partnerships are not always and 
not necessarily non-binding. Partnerships can, for example, involve private 
actors in the decision-making processes of official norm-setting institutions, 
such as national parliaments or international conventions. The results of 
the work of these partnerships are immediately incorporated into national 
or international law and are therefore binding. In addition, even voluntary 
rules set by partnerships can assume a de facto binding character when the 
affected stakeholders depend strongly on the partnership.
The rules and regulations defined by partnerships are thus very often, but 
not necessarily, non-binding. What does this imply for the authority del-
egated to or assumed by rule-setting partnerships? As discussed in detail in 
section 3.2.3, especially organisations operating at the inter- or transnational 
level often lack prior authorisation. Instead, they rely on ex-post or even 
hypothetical delegation to legitimise their activities. Most of the rule-setting 
partnerships under scrutiny here operate in the hope that as many relevant 
actors as possible will comply voluntarily with the proposed rules and thus 
accept them as binding for themselves. In order to achieve this kind of 
ex-post authorisation, rule-setting partnerships should therefore adopt the 
same accountability arrangements as if they had the authority to determine 
binding rules.
What, then, are the accountability principles linked to the authority to 
set binding rules? Building on respect for the principle of autonomy, the 
authority to determine rules requires democratic accountability. Rule-setting 
partnerships should therefore focus on creating democratic accountability to 
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those delegating the authority to establish rules. This accountability focus, 
in addition to the basic accountability standards defined in the previous 
 section, is depicted in Figure 5.2.
5.2.1 Applying democratic accountability standards to rule-setting 
partnerships
Because of their concentration on developing new rules and regulations for 
certain areas or groups of actors, rule-setting partnerships should espouse 
democratic accountability mechanisms. The traditional field for the applica-
tion of democratic accountability is the public sector. Rule-setting partnerships 
assume functions resembling most closely those of the legislative. Parliaments 
are typically held accountable by a combination of elections, supplementary 
mechanisms to involve citizens, rules and a system of checks and balances.
Partnerships operate in a very different institutional environment than 
traditional legislative bodies. Therefore, the mechanisms used to create leg-
islative accountability should not be applied directly to rule-setting partner-
ships. Rather, legislative accountability mechanisms fulfil various purposes. 
The accountability arrangements that rule-setting partnerships should adopt 
do not necessarily have to take the exact same form, but they must achieve 
the same effects as parliamentary accountability mechanisms.
Legislative accountability pursues two major aims: to give those affected 





















































Figure 5.2 Accountability of rule setting and regulation partnerships
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legislative authority. Individual democratic polities emphasise different ele-
ments, but tend to use a common set of mechanisms to achieve these ends.
To achieve the inclusion of citizens in the legislative process, most demo-
cratic countries rely on regular parliamentary elections, as well as elements 
of direct democracy. Supplementary accountability mechanisms strengthen 
the provision of information to citizens, for example through transparent 
governance processes, the work of the media and the opposition. Another set 
of supplementary tools provides citizens with additional means to articulate 
their interests. They include official consultation processes, opinion polls, 
interpretations of the ‘public mood’ created by the media, as well as interest 
groups, protests, lobby activities, petitions and the use of public complaints 
procedures.
In order to avoid the abuse of legislative authority, democracies typically 
rely on rules and systems of checks and balances. Constitutional rules, for 
instance, safeguard fundamental rights and delimit the authority of parlia-
ments. Procedural rules, moreover, determine the formalities and ensure that 
decisions are taken in a transparent manner. Through checks and balances, 
both the executive and the judiciary have certain possibilities to control leg-
islative actions. This puts them in a position to prevent or counter potential 
abuses of legislative authority.
Fulfilling their responsibility to be democratically accountable, rule-setting 
partnerships should adopt accountability arrangements that are functionally 
equivalent to legislative accountability. In other words, they should adopt 
accountability mechanisms that allow for the effective participation of those 
affected by the rules and that prevent an abuse of the partnership’s authority.
5.2.2 Accountability through participation
Giving those affected an influence over decision-making processes has long 
been accepted as a hallmark of democracy. More recently, the principle has 
also been recognised as important for many organisations working at the 
trans- or international level, especially those focusing on development.49 For 
organisations defining rules, guidelines or standards, two sets of international 
standards exist. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
which is very influential since its standards are often translated into binding 
rules, has published a guide outlining procedures and participation rules for 
standard-setting bodies.50 Building on this document, but taking the criteria 
much further, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and 
Labelling Alliance (ISEAL) has produced a code of good practice for organisa-
tions setting social and environmental standards.51
For international organisations and NGOs not involved in setting rules 
and regulations, similar standards for the inclusion of affected stakeholders 
have not been defined. Since the practice enjoys great popularity, however, 
numerous handbooks, ‘how-to’-guides and studies on the effectiveness of 
individual techniques have been published.52
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In the following paragraphs, democratic accountability standards for 
rule-setting partnerships are proposed. They are either derived from general 
democratic principles, the ISO and ISEAL codes or draw on broadly accepted 
practices of participation. The standards cover two main areas: formal ave-
nues for participation and inclusion and the provision and dissemination of 
information.
5.2.2.1 Create formal possibilities for participation and inclusion
The first and most obvious step for giving those affected a say in the delibera-
tions and decisions of rule-setting partnerships is to create formal avenues 
for participation. Partnerships can choose between various options of how 
to include stakeholders. Each model has its own problems and advantages. 
Which alternative is most effective and best suited to the situation depends, 
among other factors, on how many groups or individuals need to be included 
and on how strongly those groups are organised.
As a first alternative, partnerships can include stakeholder representatives 
in their formal governance structures. The WCD, for example, emphasised 
the multi-stakeholder composition of its central decision-making bodies. 
The 12-member commission itself took the most important decisions and 
approved the text of the report, containing standards and principles for 
the building of large dams. The commission was selected by a multi-stake-
holder working group to represent various stakeholder groups, including 
governments, project-affected people, NGOs, people’s movements, the 
dam-construction industry, export credit agencies, private investors and the 
international development community.53 Moreover, the commission relied 
strongly on the WCD Stakeholder Forum as a sounding board and advisory 
group. This forum was made up of 68 members, including the participants of 
the original multi-stakeholder workshop, as well as additional members that 
were granted access to make the forum more inclusive.
Including stakeholders in the decision-making bodies of partnerships 
strangthens their democratic accountability. Through their direct involve-
ment, stakeholder representatives have immediate control over the outcomes 
of the rule-setting process. This model corresponds most closely to the tra-
ditional democratic paradigm, where citizens tend to elect the members of 
 parliament. Instead of citizens, partnerships include stakeholders. In princi-
ple, this appears to be a fitting equivalent since both citizens and stakehold-
ers are those affected by legislation. Moreover, the inclusion of multiple 
stakeholders is congenial to the idea of partnerships. Many favour this form 
of governance arrangement precisely because it allows for the involvement of 
various groups on an equal footing. Finally, this model also offers pragmatic 
advantages. Because participation is channelled through representatives, the 
number of individuals involved in the governing bodies stays limited. This 
means that decision-making processes remain manageable, both logistically 
and financially.
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At the same time, however, the inclusion of stakeholder representatives 
raises a number of serious problems. In traditional democratic polities, citi-
zens tend to be clearly defined as all individuals of a certain age holding the 
country’s nationality.54 Stakeholder groups, by contrast, have to be defined 
individually for each project or organisation.55 This raises the critical question 
of who is recognised as a stakeholder and who takes this decision. The WCD, 
for example, while renowned for its high degree of democratic legitimacy, has 
been criticised for disregarding women and populations living downstream of 
dams as significant stakeholder groups.56
Another basic democratic principle that can turn problematic when 
applied to ‘stakeholder democracy’ is the ‘one person, one vote’ rule. Should 
all stakeholder groups have an equal number of representatives? If not, 
which criteria should be applied to weigh the influence of individual groups? 
Their size? The degree to which they are influenced by the rules? This is 
another aspect that was criticised about the work of the WCD. It operated 
on the assumption that all identified stakeholder interests should be treated 
as equally important and legitimate. Klaus Dingwerth sees this as a general 
problem of stakeholder approaches: ‘the stakeholder rhetoric, by conceptu-
ally leveling the interests of individuals or groups with different qualities of 
affectedness, conceals that not all interests are necessarily equally legitimate’ 
(Dingwerth, 2005, p. 75).
A third problem relates to the question of how stakeholder representatives 
are selected and how they can be made accountable to their stakeholder 
groups. A relatively small multi-stakeholder working group, for example, 
selected the commission members of the WCD. In addition, they were 
asked to serve in a personal capacity, rather than as representatives of their 
organisations. The commission members were therefore not accountable to 
broader stakeholder groups.57 Another partnership with a multi-stakeholder 
board is the Global Fund. It has a fixed allocation of seats for various stake-
holder groups. Each constituency is responsible for selecting its representa-
tive and can freely determine the process for doing so. Where stakeholder 
groups are well defined and well organised, this can create a democratically 
acceptable selection process. It is equally possible, however, that individual 
actors who have little accountability to the other members dominate stake-
holder groups.
Considering these opportunities and potential pitfalls, partnerships 
including stakeholder representatives in their governing bodies should com-
ply with the following standards:
Provide stakeholder representatives with real decision-making power. 
Partnerships choosing to include stakeholder representatives in their 
governing bodies should involve them in the committees that take deci-
sions relating to rules, norms and standards. If this is not the case and 
stakeholders are only included in consultative fora, partnerships have to 
•
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deal with problems of stakeholder selection and representation without 
reaping the democratic benefit of granting stakeholders immediate con-
trol over outcomes.
Adopt a considered definition of relevant stakeholder groups that remains 
open to review. Determining which groups should and which should 
not be represented in a partnership is always difficult. To optimise their 
approach, partnerships should go through a carefully designed stake-
holder identification process. This involves mapping all those groups 
and individuals that have an important input to make and that are sig-
nificantly affected by the partnership’s work.58 Representatives of these 
groups should be invited to participate. Crucially, partnerships should 
also have a transparent process for reconsidering their stakeholder com-
position. Thus non-participating stakeholders should be able to state their 
stake and demand representation. The partnership should have a clear 
process and criteria for deciding on such applications.
Determine the relative weight of the different stakeholder groups depend-
ing on the legitimacy of their interests and their size. The task of deter-
mining how many votes or representatives each stakeholder group should 
have is even more difficult than the process of stakeholder identification. 
To ensure their democratic accountability, partnerships should not take this 
decision purely based on the degree of power held by the various groups. 
Instead, they should consider the groups’ degree of affectedness, the legiti-
macy of their interests and the number of individuals they involve.
Follow basic democratic principles when selecting stakeholder represent-
atives. Another important aspect of democratic accountability relates to 
the method for choosing stakeholder representatives. An appropriate pro-
cedure needs to meet several requirements. Firstly, the stakeholder groups 
should be able to select their representatives themselves. Secondly, the 
groups should hold periodic elections with an open nomination proc-
ess to choose their representatives.59 Finally, the representatives should 
regularly report back to their constituencies and solicit their inputs on 
current issues and decisions.
A second possibility for enhancing participation is to conduct formal con-
sultation processes with stakeholder groups. Irrespective of the composition 
of their governance bodies, partnerships can solicit the inputs of relevant 
stakeholders while devising their work procedures, when defining rules or 
standards or when revising them.
Of the case examples discussed above, ICANN has developed compara-
tively refined consultative techniques. Thus, for example, a task force usually 
oversees each process of rule development or revision. One of the principal 
missions of the task forces is to gather information on the positions of rele-
vant constituencies. Once a draft version of the new regulation exists, ICANN 
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possible, it also holds public fora to discuss new policies. Moreover, special 
consultations are conducted with organised constituencies, like, for exam-
ple, the Government Advisory Committee, which gets involved when issues 
relating to public policy are at stake.
Formal consultations have distinct advantages as tools to enhance partici-
pation. In contrast to the inclusion of stakeholder representatives in govern-
ing bodies, they allow for the involvement of a large group of individuals and 
organisations. This enables partnerships to design their participatory proc-
esses in an open manner. As a result, groups overlooked in the stakeholder 
identification process are not permanently excluded but can contribute to 
the partnership at a later stage. Moreover, individual stakeholders can voice 
their positions and interests directly. Any complications related to differences 
within stakeholder groups, the selection of stakeholder representatives and 
their accountability to their constituencies can thus be avoided.
But consultations also have their downsides. One set of problems is linked 
to the lack of control over who gets engaged in consultations. Important 
stakeholder groups may, for example, find it difficult to get access to the nec-
essary information about the process.60 In addition, strongly affected groups 
may lack the necessary skills and resources to articulate their concerns and 
interests effectively. The risk is that few powerful, well-organised and vocal 
actors dominate the process.61
Another set of potential problems stems from the uncertainty of how the 
inputs will be used. Organisations holding consultations may use them as a 
sham to create a semblance of democratic legitimacy. Rather than seriously 
considering all contributions, these organisations may be tempted to ignore 
inputs or to selectively use only those reaffirming their original positions.62 
Poorly designed consultative processes that lack credibility may therefore fail 
to create democratic accountability as well as the ownership among stakehold-
ers that is necessary to achieve voluntary compliance with the proposed rules.
Rule-setting partnerships can opt for consultations as their preferred 
method of participation or complement the inclusion of stakeholder repre-
sentatives in governance structures through formal consultations. To design 
consultative processes in an effective and legitimate way, partnerships should 
adhere to the following principles:
Use an open consultation process. Partnerships can use a broad range of 
consultative techniques. They range from written questionnaires and com-
ments procedures for new policies to online discussion fora and in-person 
meetings or workshops.63 Irrespective of which technique is chosen, 
partnerships should design the process in an open manner, enabling the 
participation of all interested parties. Thus, for example, questionnaires 
used to gather information about the positions of different stakeholder 
groups should not only be sent to a predetermined set of stakeholders but 
should also be available for other interested parties.
•
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Disseminate information about the issues addressed as well as the possi-
bilities for submitting contributions widely. This is an important precon-
dition for ensuring broad participation. The dissemination effort should 
contain two elements. Firstly, partnerships should identify relevant 
stakeholders and contact them directly. Secondly, they should openly 
publish information through as many appropriate channels as possible. 
Depending on the circumstances and the types of stakeholders involved, 
this may include prominent postings on the partnership’s website, on 
newsletters and websites of thematically related organisations, in relevant 
publications, the media or on local notice boards.64
Open several consultation channels simultaneously to further increase the 
number of stakeholders involved. A range of different consultation tech-
niques was mentioned above. These methods can reach diverse audiences 
and can encourage contributions of differing quality. By using several 
consultation channels at the same time, partnerships can broaden the 
scope of both participation and types of submissions. Thus, for example, 
a partnership may at first hold personal meetings to determine whether 
and where new standards or rules are necessary. It may then distribute 
questionnaires among a wider group of stakeholders in order to collect 
information about their positions. Finally, it may open drafts of the rules 
to public comments.
Select consultation techniques suited to the needs and skills of key stake-
holder groups. When selecting avenues for consultation, partnerships 
should bear in mind that stakeholder groups can have very different 
resources and skills at their disposal. Partnerships should tailor their con-
sultation methods to the capacities of important stakeholder groups. This 
can become relevant, for example, for determining the languages used, 
for choosing between verbal or written and electronic or non-electronic 
means of communication.
Ensure a balanced representation of interests by supporting disadvantaged 
groups. In addition to choosing their consultation methods according to 
the needs of important stakeholders, partnerships should take measures 
to facilitate the participation of disadvantaged groups or  individuals. 
Disadvantaged stakeholders are those lacking the resources or skills needed 
to make their voices heard. NGOs in developing countries may, for exam-
ple, not be able to cover the travel costs for participating in international 
meetings and may have difficulties in gaining access to relevant knowl-
edge. Within communities, women or certain minorities may find it hard 
to speak out. Depending on the identity of the disadvantaged groups, 
assistance can range from financial support and capacity building to the 
use of facilitation tools designed to achieve equal participation.65
Give contributions due and equal consideration and deal with them in a 
transparent manner. Once partnerships have achieved broad and balanced 
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This implies firstly that partnerships treat submissions as objectively as 
possible. Secondly, it entails that partnerships either integrate the propos-
als in their work or provide a justification and explanation for why they 
were not taken into account.66 Thirdly, partnerships should be transparent 
in this process. A good way to create transparency is to create a collection 
or summary containing all contributions together with the partnership’s 
reactions. This document should be freely accessible to all interested par-
ties, for example by posting it on the partnership’s website.
Finally, partnerships can strengthen participation by establishing permanent 
mechanisms that allow interested parties to raise issues or voice concerns. In 
this case, partnerships do not actively solicit inputs during the rule- making 
process. Instead, stakeholders can act on their own initiative and trigger 
debates or certain policy procedures. Permanent complaints and comments 
mechanisms are a good complement to the active involvement of stakehold-
ers in partnership activities. On their own, however, they are not sufficient 
for creating an adequate level of democratic accountability for rule-setting 
partnerships.
There is a variety of tools and institutional features providing stakeholders 
with the opportunity to articulate their concerns and preferences. In addition 
to its other elaborate channels for participation, ICANN, for example, has insti-
tuted several mechanisms to deal with stakeholder complaints. This includes 
a reconsideration policy, an independent review policy and the office of an 
ombudsman.67 Thus anybody materially affected by an ICANN action can 
request the ICANN board to reconsider this action. A special board committee 
decides within 30 days whether or not it accepts the request and is obliged to 
justify any rejections. Within 90 days, the committee should forward its final 
recommendation to the board. All reconsideration requests and subsequent 
decisions are published on ICANN’s website. The independent review policy 
covers instances when actions by ICANN or its staff are deemed inconsistent 
with its articles of incorporation or by-laws. An independent international 
arbitrator handles these complaints. Finally, ICANN has an ombudsman who 
deals with any disputes not covered by the other two mechanisms. The mis-
sion of the ombudsman is to resolve conflicts informally, relying, for example, 
on negotiations, facilitation or ‘shuttle diplomacy’. Other procedures com-
mon in many democratic polities, though not applied by any of the partner-
ships discussed as case examples here, include formal petitions as well as the 
possibility to introduce draft norms to the rule-setting process.68
Open comments and complaints procedures create important benefits in 
terms of democratic accountability: They are usually open to contributions 
from all interested parties and they allow stakeholders to decide when and 
on what they want to comment. Thus they complement both main alterna-
tives for the inclusion of stakeholders well. They enhance the democratic 
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accountability of partnerships including stakeholder representatives in their 
governing bodies because they enable all stakeholders, including those that 
may not have representation, to voice their interests and concerns directly. 
Partnerships relying on stakeholder consultations often have access to a 
broader group of interested parties, but they tend to solicit their inputs on 
very specific questions. Open comments and complaints procedures can 
strengthen democratic accountability here by broadening both the scope of 
issues open for comment and the time frame for submitting contributions. 
Due to these benefits, both ISO guide 59 and the ISEAL code of good practice 
for standard-setting organisations recommend the institutionalisation of 
comments and complaints mechanisms.69
At the same time, however, open comments and complaints procedures 
face strong limitations as instruments of democratic accountability. Firstly, 
the contributions received are very unlikely to provide a representative picture 
of the different stakeholder interests relating to any specific issue. Since inter-
ested parties submit comments on their own initiative, a systematic collection 
of viewpoints on a specific issue does not usually take place. Moreover, it is 
very likely that well-informed, well-resourced and vocal interests dominate 
these open comment mechanisms. Lack of control over who gets involved 
was already mentioned as a problem in stakeholder consultations. It is 
strongly exacerbated in open comments and complaints procedures, however, 
since they usually do not involve any process of stakeholder identification or 
proactive outreach to disadvantaged groups.
A second problem relates to the effectiveness of comments or complaints in 
generating changes. Many institutions inviting open comments do not clarify 
how these inputs are treated. And even where a procedure is defined, such as 
the right to receive a reply that is guaranteed by various European institutions, 
the influence of comments on the policy process may remain unclear. As a 
result, open comments and complaints procedures easily lack credibility and 
stakeholders may not have sufficient incentives for using these avenues for 
participation. Therefore, open comments and complaints procedures cannot 
generate appropriate democratic accountability if used on their own. In con-
junction with other participatory techniques, however, they can be beneficial.
To reap the benefits of open comments and complaints procedures while 
avoiding their pitfalls, partnerships should adhere to the following related 
principles:
Generate possibilities for submitting open comments and complaints as 
a complement to other procedures for participation. Rule-setting partner-
ships should allow for continuous comments relating to any aspect of 
their work. These comments and complaints procedures should, however, 
only be used as a complement and not as an alternative for other means 
of participation.
•
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Broadly disseminate information on how and when interested parties can 
comment or complain. Open comments and complaints procedures do 
not usually allow partnerships to actively identify and contact relevant 
stakeholder groups. To encourage widespread use of the mechanisms and 
increase the representative nature of submissions, partnerships should 
as a minimum explain clearly how the comments and complaints pro-
cedures work. This information should be made easily accessible to all 
interested parties.
Use open comments and complaints to raise issues, rather than as a 
decision-making procedure. As discussed above, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to receive a representative sample of stakeholder views through 
open comments and complaints. The main function of comments and 
complaints procedures should therefore be agenda setting. Issues raised by 
interested parties should then be discussed and resolved with the help of 
other, more representative, participatory tools.
Define a procedure for dealing with comments or complaints. To make 
their comments and complaints procedures credible, partnerships should 
have a clear process for handling contributions. This process should 
provide some guarantee that legitimate inputs are treated properly, while 
allowing partnerships to reject insincere or immaterial comments. As a 
minimum, everybody submitting a comment or complaint should be 
granted the right to receive a reply outlining how the partnership will 
deal with the submission or justifying why the contribution is rejected.
Ensure transparency in dealing with comments and complaints. Finally, 
to further strengthen the credibility of the process, partnerships should 
handle comments and complaints in a transparent way. This entails firstly 
that the procedures for managing comments and complaints are clearly 
defined and easily accessible to all interested parties. Secondly, it involves 
collecting and regularly publishing the inputs received as well as the cor-
responding reactions.
5.2.2.2 Provide stakeholders with relevant information, knowledge and skills
Transparency has repeatedly been discussed in this book as an essential ingre-
dient for any type of accountability. Following the basic model of account-
ability outlined in section 2.2.1, access to relevant information is crucial 
because it enables principals to evaluate the behaviour of their agents. For a 
different reason, transparency is once more key at this juncture. Democratic 
accountability, it was argued above, is to an important degree about giving 
those affected a say in the rule-making process. Effective stakeholder partici-
pation, however, cannot be guaranteed solely by instituting formal possibili-
ties for participation. Stakeholders are only able to execute their rights and 
provide meaningful inputs if they are equipped with the necessary informa-
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In his frequently quoted and powerful words, James Madison describes 
the importance of knowledge for democratic government as follows:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be 
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowl-
edge gives.
(Hunt, 1900–10, Vol. 1, Chap. 18, Doc. 35)70
Organisations like Privacy International, which runs a major campaign for 
freedom of information legislation, emphasise the link between access to 
information and the ability to participate:
Democracy is based on the consent of the citizens and that consent turns 
on the government informing citizens about their activities and recogniz-
ing the right to participate. The public is only truly able to participate in 
the democratic process when they have information about the activities 
and policies of the government.
(Banisar, 2006, p. 6)
Because of its centrality to both accountability in general and to participa-
tion, transparency has become a very broadly recognised standard of demo-
cratic governance. Thus, for instance, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights rec-
ognise the right to seek, receive and impart information.71 Moreover, the 
UN Convention against Corruption requires governments to take measures 
to enhance the transparency of their public administration and the Rio 
Declaration demands access to environmental information to enable par-
ticipation.72 The importance of transparency is also increasingly reflected in 
government practice. Thus by 2006 70 countries from across the globe had 
adopted comprehensive freedom of information legislation, while another 
50 were in the process of developing it.73
Consequently, the codes defining governance norms for standard-set-
ting organisations also emphasise transparency. Both, ISO guide 59 and the 
ISEAL code of good practice, demand that standard-setting organisations 
publish their future work programmes or notify stakeholders of upcoming 
decisions, make available copies of the draft standards, publish approved 
standards promptly and document the process of standard development. 
Beyond that, ISEAL proposes that organisations publish all received com-
ments, as well as the ensuing reactions and that they create a dedicated focal 
point for enquiries to facilitate the provision of information.74
As discussed in section 2.2.2.4, as well as in section 4.2.3, transparency can 
concern many different aspects of an organisation. Several of these areas are 
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relevant in the context of participation. For stakeholders to be able to deliver 
meaningful inputs, they need sufficient information about the rule-setting 
process, including the schedule of planned activities and the procedures for 
submitting contributions, as well as the subject matter under consideration. 
To strengthen the credibility of the process, two further elements of transpar-
ency are instrumental. Firstly, organisations should handle submissions in a 
transparent way so that stakeholders know how their contributions influence 
the rule-setting process. Secondly, transparency on their financial sources 
can help address potential concerns about a partnership’s independence and 
objectivity.
Organisations can take very different steps to create transparency. Which 
activities are required to generate an adequate level of transparency depends 
on the nature of the stakeholders involved. In the case of ICANN, for exam-
ple, affected stakeholders are by definition engaged in activities related to 
the Internet. Therefore, it seems appropriate for ICANN to rely mainly on 
electronic means of communication to publish and disseminate relevant 
information. For partnerships dealing with well-organised and well-informed 
stakeholders, moreover, a relatively passive approach to information dissemi-
nation may be sufficient. EITI, for instance, predominantly addresses mul-
tinational companies active in the extractive industries that have a strong 
interest in and awareness of international norm-setting processes. The WCD, 
by contrast, faced different requirements. Among its key stakeholders were 
local communities affected by dam-building projects. To inform them and 
encourage their participation, on-site meetings, non-electronic communica-
tion, active outreach, capacity building and the use of local languages were 
essential.
This dependence on context makes it difficult to establish general stand-
ards relating to the concrete modalities necessary for generating appropriate 
levels of transparency. Nevertheless rule-setting partnerships should respect 
the following principles to create the conditions for effective participation:
Provide and disseminate information about the rule-setting process, the 
procedures for participating, the subject matter under consideration, the 
way contributions are dealt with and the partnership’s financial sources.
Choose the format and language for providing and disseminating infor-
mation depending on the needs and capacities of key stakeholders. A basic 
starting point for partnerships is to publish relevant information online. In 
many cases, however, information will have to be available in several lan-
guages and may require the use of non-electronic forms of communication.
Where necessary, reach out actively to disadvantaged stakeholders and 
provide them with training and capacity building. As described in the pre-
vious section, measures to support disadvantaged stakeholder groups may 
include the organisation of separate meetings, capacity building, man-
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Respond appropriately to inquiries from third parties. Partnerships should 
be prepared to make information available in response to inquiries from 
interested parties. To do so in an appropriate way, partnerships should 
have an agreed information policy, which defines, where necessary, 
legitimate confidentiality areas. They should also respond to inquiries in 
a timely manner.
5.2.3 Accountability to avoid the abuse of authority
Parliamentary accountability mechanisms, it was argued above, aim not only 
at allowing affected parties a say in the norm-setting process but also seek 
to prevent the abuse of legislative authority. For that purpose, democracies 
have devised a range of different mechanisms. Citizens can use their right to 
vote to replace parliaments abusing their authority. Constitutional rules limit 
parliamentary authority and protect basic rights. These rules can usually not 
be changed through a simple parliamentary act but require popular referenda 
or supermajorities. Systems of checks and balances, moreover, enable other 
governmental bodies to control legislative action. Most importantly, the judi-
ciary can use the process of judicial review to determine the constitutionality 
and rule conformity of legislative acts. Depending on the political system, the 
executive can also play an important role in exercising political oversight, for 
example through its right of veto or its authority to dissolve the parliament.
Compared to the complex institutional set-up of democratic govern-
ments, the rule-setting partnerships analysed here have adopted only few 
similar accountability mechanisms. In many cases, partnership boards take 
the final decision on new or amended rules. The procedures for selecting 
partnership boards vary, but rarely include fully democratic elections. Thus, 
for example, the stakeholder council formally appoints the GRI board. The 
council, however, can only accept or reject a slate of candidates proposed 
by a nominating committee, which contains a majority of board members. 
ICANN used to conduct general elections for its board but now relies on a 
nominating committee and a fixed stakeholder composition.
In some of the case examples, the partnerships are also able to unilaterally 
change their mandates and authorities. GRI’s board, for example, can amend 
the partnership’s articles of association with a two-thirds majority. The 
WCD, by contrast, had its mandate clearly defined by an initial stakeholder 
workshop. Similarly, ICANN cannot autonomously change its constitutional 
documents, since they are contained in a contract with the US-American 
government.
The weakest point, however, relates to the partnerships’ systems of checks 
and balances. In the case examples, power is often strongly concentrated. 
The authority to adopt rules, for example, is in most cases invested in a 
single body, be it the board, a meeting of partners or a multi-stakeholder 
committee. ICANN is the only exception here. It has a policy that is simi-
lar to judicial review. Through its independent review process, an external 
•
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arbitrator can establish whether or not actions taken by the partnership are 
consistent with its by-laws and articles of incorporation.
Should it be a cause for concern if rule-setting partnerships do not match 
most institutional features of parliamentary accountability? In answering 
this question, we have to distinguish between various levels of accountabil-
ity and between two kinds of rule-setting partnerships. Firstly, it was estab-
lished in the first section of this chapter that all partnerships need to fulfil 
certain minimum requirements for their governance and internal control 
structures. These provide a basic protection against the abuse of authority 
and all rule-setting partnerships have to comply with them. Secondly, it was 
argued that the accountability arrangements espoused by rule-setting part-
nerships do not have to be identical, but should be functionally equivalent 
to democratic accountability mechanisms. What functional equivalence 
entails in this context, however, strongly depends on the potential of 
organisations to abuse their legislative authority. In this respect, there is a 
significant difference between institutions that can pass binding rules and 
those that can only propose voluntary rules. The standards defined in the 
following paragraphs therefore distinguish between these two cases.
5.2.3.1 Partnerships proposing voluntary rules: No additional measures 
are necessary
Parliaments have the authority to set rules that are binding for all those 
within the jurisdiction of the state. These rules are usually not only binding 
in theory but can be enforced by the judiciary and executive branches of gov-
ernment. Most rule-setting partnerships, by contrast, only have the authority 
to propose non-binding rules. They rely on voluntary compliance and are 
not linked to strong enforcement mechanisms. The Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights, for example, already contain their voluntary 
nature in their title. Both governments and companies can decide freely 
whether or not they want to join the initiative. Once they have subscribed 
to the principles, all participants commit to promoting the principles and to 
reporting publicly on the activities undertaken in their support. Similarly, 
the transparency principles and templates proposed by EITI are adopted 
voluntarily by governments and companies involved in the extractive indus-
tries. By comparison, the standards developed by the WCD enjoy greater 
authority. They have become a reference point for many debates and deci-
sions relating to the construction of large dams.75 The standards, however, 
derive their authority mainly from the comprehensive and inclusive process 
that led to their development. Formally, any acceptance of the standards is 
entirely voluntary.
Partnerships developing voluntary rules, though, can hardly abuse their leg-
islative authority. Stakeholders concerned about the process of rule develop-
ment or the content of the proposed rules can always reject them. Should, for 
example, GRI proclaim new standards in an area unrelated to  sustainability 
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reporting or should those norms violate basic rights, affected parties can 
withhold their ex-post authorisation and refuse to comply with the rules. The 
stakeholders of partnerships setting voluntary rules thus enjoy automatic pro-
tection against the abuse of legislative authority. Therefore, there is no need 
for these partnerships to adopt additional measures to achieve functional 
equivalence with parliamentary accountability.
5.2.3.2 Partnerships setting binding rules: Authorisation, mandate, 
judicial review
While most partnerships define voluntary rules, some are in a position to 
set norms with a binding character. This can be the case, for example, where 
stakeholders depend strongly on a partnership. The dependence can be cre-
ated through financial links, strong power asymmetries or through the neces-
sity of working with one common system of rules. Partnerships can also be 
authorised by the relevant authorities to take binding decisions. In classical 
corporatist arrangements, for instance, partnerships can define rules relating 
to labour.
Among the case examples, ICANN is the only partnership asserting that 
its rules are binding. As an analyst puts it:
ICANN, in short, was both asserting control over the design of the name 
space and imposing constraints on people using that space. ICANN’s 
exercise of authority looked, walked, and quacked like public regulatory 
power.
(Weinberg, 2000, p. 217)
ICANN was created through an agreement with the US government. As such, 
it lacks appropriate authorisation for issuing policies and rules that are bind-
ing for the entire Internet community. Its stipulations also lack the backing 
of a compulsory enforcement system. But the nature of its task provides its 
decisions with strong authority. ICANN regulates the definition and assign-
ment of Internet domain names and ensures that each name is linked to 
a unique IP address. This is a condition for the smooth functioning of the 
Internet.76 In theory, other organisations could set up domain name registers 
outside the realm of ICANN. Yet this would undermine the functioning of 
the entire system. In actual practice, ICANN’s policies and rules therefore 
enjoy a strongly binding character.77
Where partnerships set rules with a strongly binding character, stakehold-
ers do not enjoy automatic protection from a potential abuse of legislative 
authority. Additional accountability measures akin to those used for parlia-
ments or independent regulatory agencies are therefore necessary:78
Achieve appropriate and revocable authorisation for the partnership. 
Partnerships with the power to set binding rules should derive their 
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authority from appropriate external bodies. For partnerships active at the 
international level, appropriate authorisation can either be granted by 
intergovernmental bodies or by affected stakeholders. In either case, the 
delegating body should be in a position to revoke or renew its authorisa-
tion. For intergovernmental organisations this entails retaining the right 
to withdraw the authorisation and entrust another organisation with the 
task. Where stakeholders delegate the necessary authority directly, they 
should either make up the rule-setting body themselves or periodically 
elect its members.
Define a clear mandate delimiting the partnership’s authority. Rule-
 setting partnerships should have mandates that spell out clearly where 
the partnership has authority and where it does not. It is also important 
that the mandate cannot be changed unilaterally by the partnership. The 
first definition as well as any significant changes of the mandate should 
require the consent of the relevant authorising bodies.
Partnership activities should be subject to a process of judicial review. 
Finally, allegations that a partnership violates its mandate or critical pro-
cedural rules should be subject to authoritative review by an independent 
body. All interested parties should be able to submit cases, at least if their 
concerns can be shown to be substantial. This also makes it necessary to 
devise a reasonable way to deal with the costs arising from the procedure 
so that they do not constitute a material barrier against bringing cases. To 
be effective, the independent arbitrator or review panel should also be in a 
position to pass final and binding decisions on the matters referred to it.
5.2.4 Summary of standards
Table 5.2 provides an overview of relevant accountability standards for rule 
setting and regulation partnerships.
•
•

















Provide stakeholder representatives 
with real decision-making power
Adopt a considered definition of 
relevant stakeholder groups that 
remains open to review
Determine the weight of stakeholder 
groups depending on the legitimacy of 
their interests and their size
Follow basic democratic principles 
when selecting stakeholder 
representatives













Use an open consultation process
Widely disseminate information about 
issues addressed and possibilities for 
submitting contributions
Open several consultation channels 
simultaneously
Select consultation techniques 
suited to the needs and skills of key 
stakeholder groups
Ensure a balanced representation of 
interests by supporting disadvantaged 
groups
Give contributions due and equal 









Establish comment and complaints 
procedures as a complement to other 
participatory mechanisms
Broadly disseminate information on 
how and when to use the comment or 
complaints procedures
Use comments and complaints to raise 
issues, rather than to settle them
Specify a process for dealing with 
comments or complaints, including 
at least a guaranteed formal reply to all 
submissions
Ensure transparency in dealing with 
comments and complaints
Transparency Create transparency relating to rule-
setting process, the procedures for 
participating, the subject matter under 
consideration, the way contributions 
are dealt with and the partnership’s 
financial sources
Choose the format and language 
for providing and disseminating 
information depending on the needs 
and capacities of stakeholders
Where necessary, reach out actively 
to disadvantaged stakeholders and 
provide them with training and 
capacity building
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5.3 Standards for implementation partnerships
A third group of partnerships identified among the case examples focuses 
directly on policy implementation. The term ‘implementation partnership’ 
sometimes generates confusion because almost all partnerships engage in 
some form of implementation. Partnerships typically set their agendas, 
develop policies and then seek to implement them. The label for this group of 
partnerships, however, does not refer to the partnerships’ internal processes. 
Rather, it describes which part of the global policy cycle the partnerships seek 
to contribute to.79 In this context, implementation partnerships differ from 
the partnerships described thus far. Advocacy and awareness-raising partner-
ships seek to influence how a policy problem is defined and how central it 
is on the political agenda. Rule-setting partnerships add to the decision and 
policymaking stage. Implementation partnerships, by contrast, seek to sup-
port the implementation of set policies by contributing necessary resources.
Implementation partnerships thus have to mobilise substantial resources 
beyond those needed to finance their own core operations. During the finan-
cial year 2006, for example, GAIN received over US$7.6 million in donations, 
GAVI received US$250 million, Stop TB had an income of US$42 million and 
for the Global Fund, pledges worth over two billion US dollars were due in 
2006. These partnerships all focus on public health problems – a compara-
tively non-controversial and highly visible policy area. Their main donors are 
typically governments as well as large corporations or private philanthropic 
organisations. Governments, for instance, provide most of the resources for 
the Global Fund, whereas the Gates Foundation is the dominant donor for 
GAIN and GAVI.
This means that to be successful, implementation partnerships need 
to achieve the delegation of authority over resources at a very different 













need no additional 
accountability 
Stakeholders enjoy automatic 
protection against the abuse of 
legislative authority through their right 
to reject rules
Partnerships setting 




Achieve appropriate and revocable 
authorisation for the partnership
Define a clear mandate, delimiting the 
partnership’s authority
Subject partnership activities to a 
process of judicial review
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 problem usually have many options on how to allocate their resources. 
Other things being equal, they are likely to spend their funds in the way 
that is seen as most effective in addressing the problem.80 Therefore, imple-
mentation partnerships need to demonstrate their efficiency and effective-
ness in achieving development outcomes. In addition to the basic forms of 
accountability required for all partnerships, implementation partnerships 
should thus emphasise accountability for outcomes. This accountability 
constellation is depicted in Figure 5.3.
This is not to say that outcome accountability cannot be relevant to other 
forms of partnerships as well. Since all partnerships depend to some extent 
on the delegation of authority over resources, it is always beneficial if they 
can demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness in their operations. Yet the 
discussion about financial accountability earlier has already shown that the 
scale of financial contributions matters for defining which accountability 
standards are appropriate. Creating accountability for outcomes is always 
costly and often very difficult. Implementation partnerships typically oper-
ate with greater resources than other types of partnerships. Moreover, they 
focus directly on effecting development outcomes so that their work tends 
to lend itself more easily to measurement and results-based evaluation. The 
ensuing principles of outcome accountability are therefore only defined as 
expected standards for implementation partnerships.
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5.3.1 Applying corporate accountability standards to partnerships
Attempts to create or increase accountability for outcomes can be observed 
in all sectors. The archetypal area of practice for outcome accountability, 
however, is the corporate sector. Therefore, this section briefly revisits the 
mechanisms at work in corporate accountability and discusses how these 
principles can be transferred to implementation partnerships.81
Accountability arrangements in corporations focus overwhelmingly on 
creating accountability for outcomes. This happens at several levels, only 
some of which an individual company can influence. Firstly, the classical 
tool for ensuring companies’ efficient and effective operations is the market. 
A well-functioning market is characterised by competition between various 
providers of similar goods and services and the availability of adequate infor-
mation about these goods and services. Under these conditions, consumers 
can choose the products that best suit their needs and that offer the best 
quality for the relatively lowest price. Since consumption behaviour decides 
on the economic survival of individual firms, the competition inherent in a 
functioning market puts companies under continuous pressure to optimise 
their processes and improve their performance as seen by consumers.
Secondly, the majority of larger companies today are run by professional 
managers. Owners, who delegate the authority over their resources to man-
agers, have developed a range of mechanisms to make them accountable for 
performance. These aim either at aligning the interests of managers to those 
of the owners or at improving the monitoring of managers. The mechanisms 
include several forms of sanctions and incentives, such as hiring and firing 
policies, performance-related compensation and the option for owners to sell 
their stake in the company. They also include tools to improve monitoring 
by reducing the information asymmetry between owners and managers, for 
example through strict accounting, reporting and auditing standards as well 
as the institution of a supervisory board.
In many respects, implementation partnerships work under different cir-
cumstances than companies. Firstly, they often provide goods or services for 
which there is no or a very constrained market. The implementation partner-
ships among the case examples analysed here, for example, all address public 
health issues with a focus on developing countries. The partnerships’ benefi-
ciaries usually do not have to pay at all or at least not for the full cost of the 
goods or services they receive. Secondly, implementation partnerships usu-
ally do not face competition in the traditional sense. The partnerships were 
created to fill existing gaps in the provision of goods and services. Often, 
therefore, there are no or few alternative providers of similar goods and serv-
ices. And even where various providers coexist, they do not tend to compete 
for ‘customers’. Their ultimate goal is not to make a profit but to provide 
a public service, and their economic survival depends on the continued 
commitment of donors, rather than the individual choices of beneficiaries. 
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Finally, partnerships usually lack a clearly defined performance measure that 
would be comparable to a corporation’s financial bottom line.
Given these differences, how can corporate accountability standards be 
applied to partnerships? Over recent years, both public and civil society 
organisations have experimented with introducing results-focused account-
ability mechanisms in their work. These experiences have shown that the 
translation of private sector principles for the public and non-profit sectors 
faces some inherent limitations. At the same time, however, a range of mech-
anisms were introduced to strengthen accountability for outcomes. These 
include a focus on performance evaluations, as well as the introduction of 
market elements in the provision of public goods and services.
5.3.2 Outcome accountability through performance evaluation
Creating accountability for outcomes entails assessing the performance of 
an organisation or individual against a certain yardstick or measure.82 In 
the corporate sector, a clearly defined, common yardstick exists. No matter 
what product or service a company offers and no matter which additional 
objectives individual owners pursue, all companies share one goal. This 
goal is firstly to ensure the company’s economic survival and secondly to 
maximise profits.
Government agencies, NGOs and partnerships, by contrast, work on 
a non-profit basis. They may share an interest in institutional survival. 
Beyond that, however, they have no common or equally clearly defined 
bottom line. In the words of an analyst commenting on the difficulties 
involved in assessing the organisational performance of NGOs:
NGOs must contend with the fact that they belong to a category of organ-
isation with no straightforward or uncontested measure of organisational, 
as distinct from project, effectiveness. In other words […] non-profits have 
no readily acknowledged ‘bottom line’.
(Fowler, 1995, p. 147)83
To build accountability for outcomes, implementation partnerships should 
nevertheless try to assess their performance. As a first step, this necessitates 
setting clear goals and targets. As a second step, it requires monitoring per-
formance and linking it to incentives for performance improvement.
5.3.2.1 Define clear objectives and performance targets
Organisations can only evaluate their performance if they have clearly 
defined organisational objectives that can be translated into measurable 
performance targets. The implementation partnerships among the case 
examples all emphasise the definition of goals and targets. Yet they differ 
both in the clarity of the targets chosen and the level at which performance 
is evaluated.
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GAIN, for example, set itself the target of reaching one billion people at risk 
of malnutrition with fortified foods by 2008 and has defined several indicators 
for tracking organisational performance.84 Similarly, Stop TB has committed 
itself to reaching time-bound targets relating to the diagnosis, treatment and 
prevention of TB. To date, however, it has not established performance criteria 
that would indicate how the partnership’s activities contribute to reaching 
these goals.85 Similarly, RBM emphasises quantified objectives in the overall 
fight against malaria without singling out its own contribution to that goal.86 
GAVI and the Global Fund, by contrast, have defined both overall outcome 
targets (reflected in performance agreements with recipient countries) and 
quantified, time-bound performance measures for their own activities.87
With the growing popularity of results-based management strategies over 
recent years, many government agencies and civil society organisations 
have made first experiences with quantified goals and performance targets. 
This is especially the case in countries with an Anglo-American background, 
including the UK, the US, Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. The 
introduction of performance measures is particularly popular in policy areas 
like public health, education, welfare and development.88 The effects of these 
measures are controversial and have generated much academic and political 
debate.89
Analysts have identified several potential problems related to the defini-
tion of clear organisational objectives and their translation into measurable 
performance indicators in the public sector and in civil society organisations. 
Due to these problems, it is disputed whether or not performance indicators 
improve efficiency and strengthen accountability for outcomes.90
A first problem is that performance measures tend to be simple indicators 
that can easily fail to reflect the complexity of the issue addressed. Matthew 
Diller finds this to be the case with the indicators chosen during the welfare 
reform in the US and believes that the problem is not easy to remedy:
In the new regime that focuses on results, the most visible and quantifi-
able of outcomes become the most important. […] While performance-
based government may be effective if the goal is defined in terms as 
simple and unequivocal as caseload reduction, the introduction of caveats 
and countervailing interests may render it ineffective as a means of estab-
lishing central control.
(Diller, 2000, pp. 1183 and 1184)
Secondly, several analysts find that the indicators chosen to measure per-
formance are often not sufficiently clearly related to the organisation’s 
overall goals. Propper and Wilson, for example, cite a study on the effects 
of the performance measures introduced as part of the US Job Training and 
Partnership Act of 1982. The study finds that most performance indicators 
are evaluated on a short-term basis and that as a result,
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the long term added-value goals are not met. Instead, the short-term PMs 
[performance measures] that are used in their place are either uncorre-
lated with, or negatively correlated with, long-term value added.
(Propper and Wilson, 2003, p. 257)
Thirdly, as a result of poorly chosen indicators, managers and staff can face 
perverse incentives. Thus, for example, the focus on standardised school tests 
may force teachers who are genuinely interested in furthering their students’ 
knowledge, ability to learn and think critically to ‘teach to the test’ and 
neglect their broader educational objectives.91
Implementation partnerships intent on strengthening their accountability 
for outcomes should learn from the controversial experiences made in the 
public sector and in civil society organisations and adhere to the following 
standards when defining their organisational objectives and performance 
targets:
Invest significant efforts into the definition of organisational objectives 
and performance targets. Experiences with the introduction of perform-
ance measures in the public sector and in civil society organisations 
have shown that poorly chosen performance indicators can be counter-
productive. Because of their strong focus on outcome accountability, 
implementation partnerships must evaluate their performance. In order 
to avoid the potential problems related to indicator selection, they 
should, however, be prepared to invest the necessary effort to establish a 
well-designed system for performance evaluation.
Demonstrate how performance indicators are linked to and will lead 
to the achievement of broader organisational objectives. A first crucial 
requirement is that the indicators chosen are positively correlated to 
the partnership’s goals. Where possible, the indicators should therefore 
include measures directly assessing changes in the intended outcomes. 
Moreover, partnerships should establish exactly how their own activities 
are intended to contribute to the desired goal and develop a strategy for 
evaluating these activities as well as their effects.
Involve stakeholders in the definition of goals and indicators. 
Implementation partnerships typically seek to deliver a good or service to 
an underserved community. An important aspect of performance is thus 
to what degree and how partnership activities affect the position or wel-
fare of their target groups. The affected individuals or groups themselves 
are best placed to establish which elements are most important for their 
well-being. They should therefore be strongly involved in the definition 
of performance indicators for implementation partnerships.92
Combine objective and subjective, as well as quantitative and qualitative 
indicators. To avoid some of the potential counterproductive effects of 
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a mix of different kinds of indicators. Thus they should not only rely 
on objective data, such as a reduction in waiting times or the number 
of goods delivered, but also on subjective data, such as service satisfac-
tion or individual welfare assessments. To avoid the misinterpretation of 
quantitative data, moreover, the inclusion of qualitative data collection 
methods can be very helpful.
5.3.2.2 Monitor performance and create incentives for performance 
improvement
By establishing clear objectives and performance indicators or targets, organi-
sations create the basis for evaluating their activities and clarify expectations 
for their behaviour. Following the basic model of accountability proposed in 
section 2.2.1, creating accountability additionally requires collecting infor-
mation about the agent’s behaviour and defining sanctions and incentives 
to encourage compliance or improvement. To effectively strengthen their 
accountability for outcomes, implementation partnerships should therefore 
monitor performance and create incentives to improve it.
The corporate sector strongly emphasises the necessity of accurate per-
formance measurement and reporting. Especially for publicly traded com-
panies, most relevant aspects relating to accounting, reporting and auditing 
are strictly regulated. Thus, for example, accountants and auditors have to 
comply with strict professional norms concerning both their training and 
the principles they apply. Moreover, most governments have passed legal 
regulations determining what information has to be recorded, when and 
how it has to be reported and whether it has to receive independent con-
firmation. As mentioned earlier, companies and their managers also face 
manifold incentives for performing well.
In the public and civil society sectors, by contrast, only certain aspects 
relating to financial accounting and reporting are subject to regulations. For 
the monitoring and reporting of performance results, no similar rules exist. 
Those government agencies and NGOs, however, that have determined per-
formance indicators for their work, are also often monitoring and reporting 
on their performance. Whether and how performance results are linked to 
sanctions or incentives differs strongly. In some instances, for example, per-
formance data are made public and influence the organisation’s reputation. 
Even if only used internally or shared with donors, though, performance 
results can have an impact on promotions, on budget developments and the 
conclusion of new contracts.
Again, analysts have pointed to a number of potential problems and com-
plications that can arise in the context of performance measurement in the 
public and non-profit sectors.93 A first risk is that staff and managers manipu-
late performance data to their own advantage. Courty and Marschke, for 
example, analyse the phenomenon of ‘gaming’ in government organisations. 
They find that when agents strategically report their performance outcomes 
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to maximise their awards, this can have a negative impact on the real goals of 
the organisation (Courty and Marschke, 2004). In addition to gaming, Peter 
Smith describes how the publication of performance data in the UK tempts 
officials to misrepresent data (Smith, 1995).
Secondly, researchers have found that a strong focus on quantitative 
performance targets can inhibit organisational learning. Thus, for instance, 
Thomas Freeman finds that as performance indicators are used to create 
external accountability and verification, they can undermine the condi-
tions necessary for quality improvement (Freeman, 2002). Similarly, Alnoor 
Ebrahim contends that too much accountability can hinder NGOs in achiev-
ing their missions. More specifically, his concern is ‘about instances of too 
narrowly focused upward accountability – where donor demands for infor-
mation are satisfied at the expense of longer-term processes of organizational 
learning’ (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 81).
Finally, performance measurement in the public and non-profit sectors is 
often confronted with complex technical problems. Relevant reliable and 
valid data are often difficult to come by. Moreover, in complex policy areas, 
it can be very hard to establish cause and effect or to measure the impact 
of an individual organisation on the final outcome.94 As Hugo Slim puts it 
for NGOs:
[T]he current art and science of social and environmental accounting 
is truly complex on occasion. Accounting for the impact or outcome of 
NGO work can be uncertain, is usually contested and can border on pure 
speculation at times as NGOs try to track cause and effect between their 
actions and the personal, social, economic, environmental and political 
change around their projects.
(Slim, 2002, p. 4)
For implementation partnerships, these experiences contain the following 
lessons:
Consider issues relating to performance measurement already during the 
planning process and start collecting data early. To assess the impact of 
partnership (or other organisations’) activities on a public policy problem, 
it is standard practice to compare the actual situation to a counterfac-
tual, that is, to the hypothetical case in which the activities did not take 
place.95 To construct a convincing counterfactual, data describing the 
situation prior to the intervention are of central importance. Therefore, 
implementation partnerships should ensure they have access to or should 
collect relevant data as early as possible.
Ensure objectivity of data and their presentation. Implementation part-
nerships can take various steps to reduce the risk of data manipulation 
and misrepresentation. Firstly, they can try to rely on external sources 
•
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of data, such as independent opinion polls or official statistics. Secondly, 
they can task independent agencies of good reputation to collect data on 
their behalf. Thirdly, they should conform to relevant existing rules con-
cerning accounting, reporting and auditing.96
Encourage learning by emphasising positive incentives. Performance 
evaluations have long been seen to pursue two purposes: creating account-
ability and encouraging learning.97 Where accountability, however, means 
punishment,98 it encourages a risk-averse culture and thus undermines 
efforts to learn from past experience and improve performance. To over-
come the apparent accountability–learning dichotomy, implementation 
partnerships should involve their staff and managers in the evaluation 
process and reward good performance rather than simply punishing bad 
performance.99 Moreover, partnerships should avoid giving perverse incen-
tives. This is the case, for example, when current performance is used to 
determine future performance targets, which effectively punishes good 
performers.
5.3.3 Outcome accountability through the introduction of 
market elements
In the private sector, functioning markets have two main effects on outcome 
accountability. Competition creates continuous pressure on companies to 
enhance the efficiency of their operations. In addition, consumer choice 
gives individuals a powerful means of expressing their preferences and of 
indicating which products best fit their needs.
In the public sector, various strategies have been used to introduce market 
elements in the provision of public goods and services. In some areas, full 
privatisation is possible. Many governments have privatised formerly public 
utilities such as the providers of gas, water, electricity or telecommunica-
tion services, which share many characteristics of private goods.100 In many 
other areas, however, governments do not consider privatisation a desirable 
option.101 Instead of full privatisation, many governments have tried to intro-
duce alternative means for creating the two effects described above. In order 
to generate competition, many governments delegate important tasks to pri-
vate providers, using competitive bidding processes for allocating contracts.102 
Outsourcing can subject private and public service providers to competitive 
pressures. Most often, however, beneficiaries cannot make ‘consumption 
choices’ on those products and therefore play little or no role in assessing the 
quality and efficiency of the services provided. To remedy the situation in this 
context as well as in cases where government agencies continue to act as serv-
ice providers, governments often employ client satisfaction surveys, recipient 
focus groups or similar means to collect beneficiary feedback.103
What lessons do these experiences hold for implementation partnerships? 
Full privatisation is usually not a viable alternative for the partnerships under 
consideration here. Their objective is to contribute to the achievement of 
•
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public policy goals and to deliver goods and services in areas not sufficiently 
served by governments or companies. On their own, markets are therefore 
unlikely to generate the desired outcomes. The options for partnerships to 
increase their outcome accountability through the introduction of market 
elements thus include outsourcing and the gathering of beneficiary feedback. 
In both areas, partnerships should take on board the lessons learnt from simi-
lar experiences made by the public sector and civil society organisations.
5.3.3.1 Outsource suitable tasks through competitive bidding processes
Implementation partnerships can introduce an element of competition in 
their work by outsourcing certain tasks to competing providers. Among the 
case examples, almost all implementation partnerships allocate a significant 
amount of their resources to third providers. The Global Fund has gone 
furthest in this respect. It exclusively operates as a financial instrument, 
providing grants enabling other organisations to implement policies to fight 
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. In its ‘performance-based grant making’, the 
Global Fund emphasises results. Thus funding proposals are evaluated by 
a technical review committee before the board takes decisions; local fund 
agents assess the financial management and administrative capacities of 
recipients; success indicators and reporting requirements are agreed with the 
recipient agency and included in the contract; regular progress reports and 
audits are conducted on programmes and ongoing disbursements depend on 
the results of these evaluations.104
Analysts and commentators have identified several potential problems 
related to outsourcing as practised in the public sector. Firstly, they have 
raised the general concern that the introduction of market-based reforms 
may undermine traditional forms of governmental legitimacy and account-
ability.105 Partnerships, however, are not naturally endowed with similar 
levels and types of accountability and legitimacy as governments. It is for 
this very reason that partnerships have been strongly criticised as a form of 
public private governance. It has been argued throughout this book that to 
counter these challenges, partnerships should adopt appropriate account-
ability mechanisms. For implementation partnerships, it was determined 
that because of their use and allocation of significant resources, a focus on 
accountability for outcomes was appropriate. In an answer to this general 
critique of outsourcing, implementation partnerships should therefore 
adopt the measures for enhancing outcome accountability discussed in this 
chapter.
Secondly, empirical studies have found that outsourcing does not neces-
sarily lead to enhanced competition. This can be due to several reasons. 
Public agencies may not use competitive bidding processes to allocate con-
tracts; where competitive bids are used, they may not attract a sufficient 
number of submissions to create competition; bids may not be evaluated in 
a fair manner but be used as a sham for allocating nepotistic contracts; and 
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contractors may not really fear sanctions such as losing their contracts as a 
result of bad performance.106
Thirdly, analyses of performance-based contracts used in outsourcing or 
in agreements with independent government agencies often criticise the 
way performance is evaluated. The contracts typically define the goals to be 
pursued by the contractor and specify which indicators will be used to assess 
performance. Since the chances of gaining future contracts and often the 
level of compensation for current activities depend on these performance 
evaluations, indicator targets have great importance for contractors. As dis-
cussed in the previous section of this chapter, there is a strong risk that the 
chosen performance indicators do not reflect all or even the most important 
aspects of the desired outcomes. Just as deciding on suitable performance 
indicators is key to establishing outcome accountability for partnership 
operations generally, it is also crucial for designing functioning performance-
based contracts with subcontractors.
Building on the experiences of the public sector, implementation partner-
ships should pay heed to the following principles when outsourcing parts 
of their tasks:
Use competitive and transparent bidding processes to allocate contracts. 
Outsourcing can only increase the efficiency of partnership operations 
and enhance accountability for outcomes if it introduces competition in 
the provision of goods and services. Only contract allocation practices in 
which potential providers submit offers competing on price as well as the 
type or quality of services offered are therefore suitable for implementa-
tion partnerships.
Ensure that a sufficient number of bids are submitted. To achieve this 
partnerships should only consider activity areas for outsourcing in which 
a number of different potential providers exist. Partnerships should also 
specify a minimum number of bids (for example, 3) required before any 
contract can be concluded.
Use a transparent and fair process for evaluating bids and allocating 
contracts. Where competitive bidding processes are opaque, staff may 
be influenced by factors not related to the bidding document, including 
instances of corruption. Partnerships should therefore ensure transpar-
ency in dealing with submissions and evaluate bids in an objective and 
fair manner.
Define adequate performance indicators to be included in the outsourcing 
contracts. Implementation partnerships should choose those activity areas 
for outsourcing where it is comparatively easy to define good performance 
indicators. Beyond that, partnerships should follow the standards for set-
ting performance indicators outlined in the previous section.
Link contractor performance to sanctions and incentives. Competitive 
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their performance. Where contracts are relatively long-term, partnerships 
should disburse resources in stages and make further payments dependent 
on performance. The prospect of new future contracts can also work as a 
powerful incentive. Work areas requiring ongoing or repeated efforts there-
fore lend themselves more easily to outsourcing than one-off contracts.
5.3.3.2 Collect beneficiary feedback to assess performance
Another critical contribution of markets to outcome accountability is that 
they provide consumers with an automatic and powerful avenue for express-
ing their opinions about products and services. Implementation partner-
ships, even if they do not operate under market conditions, can simulate this 
effect by gathering feedback from their clients or beneficiaries. This infor-
mation can be crucial for assessing the quality of the products and services 
delivered and for evaluating whether partnership activities meet the needs 
of their target groups.107
Among the case examples, some implementation partnerships are col-
lecting beneficiary and stakeholder feedback when evaluating their own or 
their contractors’ activities. Yet there is much scope for further expanding 
this practice. One positive example is RBM. When it conducted an intensive 
external evaluation of its activities in 2002, an important part of the process 
included interviews with stakeholders in affected countries.108 Similarly, the 
external evaluation conducted for the Stop TB partnership included sev-
eral interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries in affected and targeted 
countries.109
Stakeholder interviews enable partnerships or external evaluators to gather 
focused in-depth information from a relatively broad range of participants. 
They are, however, comparatively expensive to conduct and are thus rarely 
used on an ongoing basis. A cheaper alternative with an even broader reach 
is using client or beneficiary satisfaction surveys. They are used by many 
companies as well as governments in countries where the introduction of 
results-based management techniques is advanced, such as Australia, the UK 
or the US.110 Both interviews and surveys, however, have a range of short-
comings. Thus they do not encourage debate or the exchange of information 
between different stakeholders, they are not suitable for providing ongoing 
feedback and they tend to strongly predetermine which topics are dealt 
with.111 Another option used by both governments and companies are focus 
groups. These smaller group discussions allow for a more intensive exchange 
and give stakeholders a stronger role in setting the agenda.112 Finally, many 
companies and governments have set up permanent complaints mecha-
nisms, such as complaints hotlines or complaints boxes. These encourage all 
clients or beneficiaries to voice their grievances but are often only used by 
strongly disaffected or engaged users.113
This brief discussion shows that each specific technique for gathering 
beneficiary feedback has its distinct advantages and problems. To provide 
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useful input to an assessment of the partnership’s performance, feedback 
mechanisms should include information from diverse relevant sources and 
generate an accurate picture of beneficiary perceptions and opinions.114 To 
achieve this, implementation partnerships should adhere to the following 
principles when designing feedback mechanisms for beneficiaries:
Routinely gather information about beneficiary satisfaction and prefer-
ences. The implementation partnerships analysed as case examples here 
have mainly conducted stakeholder interviews as one-off or very irregular 
exercises. To engage in continuous quality improvement and to adapt 
their products and services to the needs of beneficiaries, however, part-
nerships should collect beneficiary feedback on a regular basis.
Combine several methods for collecting beneficiary feedback. When 
choosing a technique for gathering information from beneficiaries, part-
nerships usually face a trade-off between the reach of the chosen method, 
the depth and openness of the information it can generate and the dura-
tion and frequency with which it can be used. To optimise the supply of 
information, partnerships should therefore employ several methods at the 
same time.
Ensure coverage of relevant sources of information. Partnerships should 
make sure they receive feedback from the most relevant sources. Depending 
on the activities of the partnership, this may include, for example, poten-
tial beneficiaries who chose not to participate in a programme or it may 
require the collection of feedback over a longer period of time.
5.3.4 Summary of standards



















Invest significant efforts into the 
definition of organisational objectives 
and performance indicators
Demonstrate how performance 
indicators will contribute to the 
achievement of broader organisational 
objectives
Involve stakeholders in the definition 
of goals and targets
Combine objective and subjective, as 
well as quantitative and qualitative 
indicators
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Use competitive bidding processes to 
allocate contracts
Ensure submission of a sufficient 
number of bids
Use a transparent and fair process 
for evaluating bids and allocating 
contracts
Define adequate performance indicators 
for inclusion in the contracts
Link contractor performance to 
sanctions and incentives
Collect beneficiary 
feedback to assess 
performance
Routinely gather information about 
beneficiary satisfaction and preferences
Combine several methods for 
collecting beneficiary feedback
Ensure coverage of all relevant sources 
of information
5.4 Standards for information-generating partnerships
A final group of partnerships identified among the case examples is con-
cerned with the generation of information. Typically, partnerships work 
with two different kinds of information. One set of partnerships develops 
factual or technical information and knowledge about certain, often contro-
versial, issue areas. The WCD, for example, invested a major effort into the 
development of a ‘knowledge base’ to create a shared understanding among 
different stakeholder groups on the development effectiveness of dams.115
Another set of partnerships generates information with the aim of veri-
fying or certifying to what degree other organisations are complying with 
specific rules. The MSC, for instance, has created standards for sustainable 
fisheries. Companies complying with these rules can have their perform-
ance verified by independent certification organisations and apply the MSC 
label to their products.116 Similarly, the 4C initiative contains an element 
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of compliance verification. Rather than certifying full compliance with its 
standards, however, 4C engages organisations in a performance improve-
ment process. Thus the organisations themselves submit information relat-
ing to their compliance and draw up improvement plans for problematic 
areas. Implementation and the systems used for verification are subject to 
external audit or evaluation.117
As these examples show, partnerships rarely pursue the generation of 
information as their sole or even predominant goal. In the three cases just 
mentioned, information generation constitutes a major element of the part-
nerships’ work. Even they, however, do not see information generation as a 
goal in itself but rather as a means to achieve other objectives. Thus, for the 
WCD, it was an instrument to prepare the ground for consensual rules; MSC 
uses certification as a lever for increasing compliance with its standards and 
the 4C initiative supports its advocacy work by evaluating the implementa-
tion and verification of improvement plans.
Irrespective of what broader objectives the partnerships pursue, their 
information-generating activities are linked to specific accountability 
requirements. When partnerships create information or knowledge, they 
do so with the intention that other actors use and rely on that information. 
In other words, they want to achieve ex-post authorisation by their user 
groups to produce information on their behalf. Potential users are likely to 
do that if they feel they can trust the delivered information. To achieve this, 
partnerships must be able to demonstrate that they are independent and 
unbiased and that their work stands up to high professional standards.
As illustrated in Figure 5.4, where partnerships focus on the generation of 
information, they should emphasise accountability for independence and 
professionalism.
5.4.1 Transferable accountability practices in universities and the 
judiciary and guidance from relevant international standards
Like the other types of partnerships, information-generating partnerships do 
not have to build their accountability practices in a void. Rather, they can 
draw lessons from other, functionally similar organisations with more estab-
lished accountability traditions. As already mentioned, information genera-
tion can mean two different things to partnerships. They are usually either 
concerned with creating factual or technical information and knowledge or 
with assessing the compliance of other actors with certain standards or rules. 
These two kinds of information correspond to two different organisational 
functions. Information-generating partnerships can therefore draw on two 
types of institutions as role models for their accountability arrangements: 
universities and the judiciary. Moreover, they can orient themselves along 
international standards that have been developed for evaluation, compli-
ance verification and accreditation organisations.
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Universities form the classical institutional context for the creation of 
knowledge. Since the accountability arrangements of universities have not 
yet been discussed in this book, they warrant a slightly longer explanation 
at this stage. A crucial principle informing the governance characteristics of 
universities is the concept of academic freedom. Academic freedom describes 
the liberty of students, teachers and academic institutions to pursue their 
knowledge interests without undue interference. The unhampered search 
for truth is seen to confer benefits on society as a whole and the principle 
is closely linked to other precepts of liberal democratic thought. Today, aca-
demic freedom is broadly recognised as a normative ideal.118 The principle is 
most strongly protected in Germany, where it enjoys the status of a funda-
mental right and is enshrined in the constitution: ‘Kunst und Wissenschaft, 
Forschung und Lehre sind frei. Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet nicht von der 
Treue zur Verfassung’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, Art. 5, § 3).119
In the US, to cite another national example, academic freedom is not 
directly referred to in the constitution. The Supreme Court has, however, 
consistently interpreted academic freedom as part of the first amendment 
right to free speech.120 Moreover, most US-American academic institutions 
have endorsed the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure (American Association of University Professors and Association of 
American Colleges, 1940). By subscribing to this document, colleges and 
universities commit to protecting the freedom of their staff in teaching and 
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research. Similarly, the academic freedom of university teachers is enshrined 
in the UK’s 1988 Education Reform Act.121
To guarantee academic freedom, academic institutions and their staff 
need to enjoy a certain degree of independence. Two main mechanisms 
serve to ensure this independence. Firstly, universities are usually conceived 
as autonomous organisations. This means that even where universities are 
public institutions, they handle all issues relating to teaching and research 
internally.122 Secondly, the independence of individual university teachers is 
secured through the institution of tenure. Tenure provides university teach-
ers with a strong, though not unconditional, guarantee of employment. It 
ensures that they cannot be fired or financially penalised for pursuing a 
specific line of inquiry in research or teaching.123
The accountability arrangements of institutions of higher learning are, 
however, not only determined by the principle of academic freedom. Another 
strong concern for universities and their funders is to ensure a high quality 
of research and teaching. Ongoing mechanisms of quality control can easily 
undermine the independence of university teachers. Classically, universi-
ties have therefore defined very strict professional criteria for applicants to 
academic posts. These standards introduce formal criteria for academic staff 
and create strong peer control. To achieve a tenured position, scholars need 
to pass a range of formal exams, such as Bachelors’, Masters’ and get doctoral 
degrees. In addition, professors in the Anglo-American world can only receive 
tenure after a lengthy period of probation.124 Germany and Austria, by con-
trast, still largely rely on the more formalistic quality assessment provided 
by an additional postdoctoral qualification, the habilitation. Academic peers 
play an important role in determining the qualification of their colleagues. 
Only the academic staff of recognised institutions of higher learning can 
decide whether individuals pass the formal tests and have the authority to 
award academic titles. Moreover, committees composed of fellow professors 
and other staff usually have a strong say in the selection of candidates for 
academic positions.
Through formal tests and strict appointment procedures, universities 
guarantee that their teachers and researchers are highly qualified. While 
these mechanisms are well suited for ensuring high professional standards 
when appointing new academic staff, they are less apt at vouching for good 
ongoing quality. Especially tenured professors, who enjoy job and income 
security, only face soft incentives for maintaining high standards. Many 
see the lure of prestige and a good reputation as an insufficient means of 
quality control. Over recent years, an increasing number of countries and 
universities have therefore increased their efforts at creating mechanisms for 
ongoing quality assurance. As consequence, promotion, tender and budget 
allocation decisions do now often take into account the results of perform-
ance assessments, based, for example, on student assessments or publication 
indices. In addition, university rankings focusing on the quality of teaching 
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and research create more transparency and competition among institutions 
of higher learning.125
Ongoing mechanisms of quality control have become a popular element 
of academic accountability. Despite their popularity, however, they are fre-
quently criticised for undermining academic freedom.126 There is thus often 
a tension between the two pillars of accountability in academia, independ-
ence and high quality or professionalism.
If independence and professionalism are the two main principles underly-
ing academic accountability, how does this compare to the other possible role 
model for information-generating partnerships, the judiciary? One author 
has likened the role of tenured professors to that of judges: ‘In relation to ten-
ure the position of the faculty member resembles that of the judge who holds 
office during good behavior to safeguard his fearlessness and objectivity in 
the performance of his duties’ (Fuchs, 1963, p. 431). Indeed, typical judicial 
accountability arrangements show important similarities to these principles 
of academic accountability. In the liberal democratic tradition the judiciary 
is subject to few external controls. To ensure accountability, the judiciary 
instead relies mainly on independence and self-control.
Judicial independence entails firstly the formal autonomy of courts and 
judges. Accordingly, other state organs or external actors have no authority 
to change and reverse judgements or to interfere with judicial processes. 
Secondly, special measures serve to undergird the de facto independence of 
individual judges. Thus, for example, they usually enjoy long or life tenures 
as well as guaranteed salaries.
Again, independence is not the only relevant element of judicial account-
ability. To avoid the abuse of authority and ensure professionalism in the 
work of the judiciary, several mechanisms of self-control are typically in 
operation. The appeals process provides a bulwark against arbitrary individ-
ual decisions and promotes the consistent interpretation and application of 
legal principles. Compliance verification partnerships also pass judgement 
over whether or not individuals or organisations comply with specific sets of 
rules. Unlike the judiciary, however, partnerships mostly deal with voluntary 
norms and only have access to soft enforcement mechanisms. The institution 
of a full appeals process is therefore not required of information-generating 
partnerships.
Other measures adopted in the judiciary focus on the qualification and 
professionalism of legal staff. Thus most countries have defined very strict 
professional standards. They typically involve a formal education as well as 
official entry exams. In most cases, only the best-qualified individuals are 
eligible for the office of judge.
Both universities and the judiciary, then, stress independence and profes-
sionalism or quality control in their accountability arrangements. These 
principles are also reflected in international standards for inspection, certi-
fication and accreditation bodies. Relevant standards include, for example, 
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the ISO guide 65 defining general requirements for bodies operating product 
certification systems (International Organization for Standardization, 1996), 
ISO standard 17011 for accreditation bodies (International Organization 
for Standardization, 2004) and ISO standard 19011 for quality and envi-
ronmental management systems auditing (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2002). These standards vary in their focus and in some of 
the details of their recommendations. Overall, however, they all define crite-
ria to safeguard the impartiality and independence, as well as the quality and 
professionalism of organisations and their staff.
5.4.2 Accountability for impartiality through independence
Other actors will only rely on the information generated by partnerships if 
they trust it. The results of studies or enquiries quickly lose their trustworthi-
ness if suspected to be biased or influenced by specific interests. To create 
accountability for generating trustworthy information, partnerships must 
ensure their impartiality and independence.
The partnerships analysed as case examples above have chosen different 
strategies to guarantee that their information-generating activities are impar-
tial. The WCD was itself ultimately responsible for compiling the report on 
the development effectiveness of dams. The commission was independent in 
so far as its findings were not subject to the control of any external party. The 
commission also enjoyed relative financial independence because it received 
support from a wide range of donors from all sectors and did not grant these 
donors any special role in its governance structure. Moreover, the commis-
sioners were chosen to represent a balance among different stakeholder 
groups, they all enjoyed good international standing and reputation, were 
appointed for the entire duration of the process and were not financially 
dependent on their work as commissioners.
The 4C initiative, by contrast, has commissioned independent external 
organisations with the task of auditing and verifying the compliance of 
its members. Local verifiers have to be accredited by the Common Code 
Association. They are independent but can be subject to a systems verifica-
tion, in turn conducted by an independent external organisation. Moreover, 
the 4C initiative demands that local verifiers disclose conflicts of interest. 
Similarly, MSC delegates compliance verification and certification to inde-
pendent, accredited evaluators. The partnership goes a step further than the 
4C initiative in that it even entrusts the accreditation process to an independ-
ent body. Explicitly following ISO standards 17011 and 19011, the agency 
(Accreditation Services International) accredits certification agencies, which 
in turn conduct certification assessments.
Which specific standards, then, should both kinds of information-generat-
ing partnerships fulfil relating to their impartiality and independence? The 
experiences of the judiciary and academia as well as the standards defined 
by ISO suggest that two complementary steps are necessary: Safeguarding the 
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institutional independence of the bodies in charge of generating information 
and ensuring the personal independence of their staff members.
5.4.2.1 Ensure institutional independence
A first step to guarantee the impartiality of the knowledge or assessments 
developed by partnerships is to grant the bodies responsible for generating 
information institutional independence. Institutional independence has 
various dimensions.
Firstly, and most importantly, information-generating bodies should enjoy 
formal authority over their findings and results. Neither academia, nor the 
judiciary, for example, enjoys total autonomy. Thus universities are usu-
ally either public bodies or they need to be officially accredited. In many 
countries, moreover, the government formally appoints key academic staff. 
Similarly, judicial institutions are typically part of the government appara-
tus, rather than fully independent of it. Courts are public institutions and 
their judges are most often civil servants that are formally appointed by the 
government. Yet, both kinds of institutions are formally autonomous in the 
sense that no other institution has the right to interfere with their substantial 
results or decisions.
Thus academic freedom entails that universities can choose their focus 
in teaching and research and that research results are not subject to censor-
ship.127 Analogously, the verdicts of courts are considered binding and final 
and can only be reversed or changed through other judicial decisions.128 
According to ISO, the same standard should apply to certification bodies. It 
demands that the certification body be responsible for all decisions relating 
to the granting, maintaining, extending, suspending and withdrawing of 
certifications.129
Secondly, the financial position of the information-generating body can 
play an important role. Financial dependence on interested parties can under-
mine de facto institutional independence. The judiciary and academia, for 
example, typically receive the overwhelming majority of their resources from 
the public purse. But at the same time, the principles of judicial independence 
and academic freedom are grounded in public law. Public financial support 
can therefore not be tied to conditions relating to the substance of the work of 
these institutions.130 Referring to the same question, the ISO standards stress 
that the bodies responsible for certification or accreditation should be free 
from undue commercial, financial or other pressures. They also emphasise 
that these bodies should describe their sources of income and avoid conflicts 
of interest.131
Finally, especially where complete independence from external interests 
cannot be guaranteed, institutional impartiality may entail the involvement 
of a balanced group of stakeholder representatives. In court, for example, 
judges are expected to be neutral and independent. At the same time, how-
ever, both the plaintiff and the defendant are represented through their 
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legal counsels. Similarly, the ISO standards and guidelines request at several 
occasions that processes should be open to the participation of interested 
stakeholder groups.132 Balanced multi-stakeholder arrangements may be 
particularly relevant for partnerships, which by definition are made up of 
different interest groups.
Following these examples, information-generating partnerships should 
adhere to a set of principles to ensure their impartiality and independence:
Grant information-generating bodies formal and final authority over find-
ings and results. To ensure that no external interests can manipulate the 
findings of the bodies in charge of generating information, they should 
have the last word on the subject. Correspondingly, no other institution 
should have the authority to correct, change, or otherwise amend their 
results.
Seek unconditional, diverse and transparent institutional funding. The 
institutional entities responsible for generating information should enjoy 
as much financial security as possible. To avoid vulnerability to external 
pressure, information-generating partnerships should try to receive finan-
cial support that is not tied to any substantive results. Preferably, they 
should rely on diverse funding sources and they should always create 
maximum transparency concerning their sources of funds.
Where complete independence from external interests is not possible, 
seek a balanced multi-stakeholder representation. As an alternative to 
full independence from external parties, partnerships can foster their 
impartiality by including a balanced number of representatives of diverse 
interests in their information-generating committees.
5.4.2.2 Foster personal independence
Institutional independence is only one side of the coin. To create a further 
bulwark against the manipulation of their findings, key staff members must 
be protected against external pressures and enjoy personal independence. 
Several factors can help to strengthen the independent position of key staff 
members.
Firstly, both academia and the judiciary rely on a high degree of job and 
income security for professors and judges to increase their immunity against 
external pressure. In the US, for example, life tenure and guaranteed salaries 
for judges are even enshrined in the constitution:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.
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Similarly, the academic world has a tradition of granting life tenure to 
 professors.134 The practice here, however, is not handled as strictly as in the 
judiciary. Following the criticism that tenure can have a negative impact on 
performance, an increasing number of teachers and researchers work off the 
tenure track. In addition, tenured professors can often be dismissed on the 
basis of a faculty decision.
Other organisations may find it difficult to create as much job and income 
security as the judiciary or academia. They may, for instance, not have the 
necessary financial security and planning horizon to offer lifetime appoint-
ments. In addition, the tasks they pursue may be of shorter duration. ISO 
has therefore proposed a more general formulation for the employees of 
accreditation bodies that can be transferred more easily to public policy 
partnerships:
All accreditation body personnel and committees that could influence 
the accreditation process shall act objectively and shall be free from any 
undue commercial, financial and other pressures that could compromise 
impartiality.
(International Organization for Standardization, 
2004, clause 4.3.4.)
A second common step for ensuring the objectivity and independence 
of individual findings or assessments is to exclude conflicts of interest. 
Psychological research has found that financial interests create a self-serving 
bias in the perceptions and assessments of individuals. Interestingly, most 
test persons were unable to avoid this bias even when it would have been in 
their best interest to do so.135 Institutions valuing objectivity therefore usu-
ally adopt practical measures to prevent or deal with conflicts of interest.
In the judiciary, impartiality is a core value. It is symbolised, for example, 
by Iustitia, the Roman Goddess of Justice, who in many depictions wears a 
blindfold to indicate that she assesses the merits of each case objectively. 
To ensure the impartiality of individual judges in practice, two measures 
are common in the judiciary. Firstly, the principle of impartiality and its 
practical implications are usually contained in the codes of ethics adopted 
by courts or professional associations.136 Secondly, procedural rules of justice 
often contain elements protecting the impartiality of judgements. Thus, for 
example, some legal systems allow for the exclusion of judges from trials 
when they are reasonably suspected to be biased and others allow for appeals 
when bias can be demonstrated.137
In academia, an important control mechanism for ensuring the impartial-
ity of research findings works on an informal level. Peer control, the public 
debate of research results and reputation effects create accountability for 
impartiality. In addition, however, universities, professional organisations 
and in some cases public authorities have also found more formal ways to 
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deal with potential conflicts of interest. Thus the codes of ethics adopted 
by many professional associations and universities often contain principles 
relating to conflicts of interest.138 In some countries, in addition, many pro-
fessors enjoy the rank of civil servants. In that case, they are subject to more 
general regulations for civil servants, which often include the requirements 
to disclose financial interests or to obtain permission for engaging in addi-
tional occupations.139
The ISO standards and guidelines, finally, also make frequent reference to 
and propose concrete rules for dealing with conflicts of interest. Thus, for 
example, ISO guide 65 requests that certification bodies be free from external 
pressures and that they do not supply or design products of the type they 
certify, that they do not provide applicants with advice or consulting services 
related to the certification process and that they provide no other products or 
services which could compromise the confidentiality, objectivity and impar-
tiality of their decisions (International Organization for Standardization, 
1996, clauses 4.2.n and 4.2.o). Similarly, ISO standard 17011 prescribes that 
accreditation bodies shall not offer any service that may affect their imparti-
ality and that they shall identify potential conflicts of interest that can arise 
from their or from related bodies’ activities (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2004, clauses 4.3.6 and 4.3.7).
Thirdly, independence is not only a matter of objective circumstances 
but also of personal character. John Ferejohn, for example, explicitly intro-
duces this aspect in his discussion of judicial independence: ‘Independence, 
or impartiality, in this sense is a desirable aspect of a judge’s character’ 
(Ferejohn, 1999b, p. 353).
It is difficult to establish formal criteria and procedures for assessing an 
individual’s character. In academia and the judiciary, however, the selec-
tion or election and appointment processes leave ample space for character 
considerations. ISO has attempted to define the desirable personal attributes 
of individuals conducting quality or environmental management systems 
audits. Accordingly, an auditor should be ethical, open-minded, diplo-
matic, observant, perceptive, versatile, tenacious, decisive and self-reliant 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2002, clause 7.2).
In designing their accountability arrangements focusing on the personal 
independence of key staff members, information-generating partnerships 
should orient themselves along these examples and observe the following 
principles:
Ensure that staff members are free from undue commercial or finan-
cial pressures. To achieve this, institutions concerned with generating 
information can adopt two different strategies. One option is to work 
with financially independent experts that are not reliant on any income 
 generated through their participation in the partnership. As an alternative, 
•
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partnerships can offer reasonable job and income security for information-
generating staff. This can involve, for example, fixed-term contracts as well 
as lump sum payments that are agreed upon at the outset and cannot be 
reduced based on the content of the results delivered.
Adopt a written conflict of interest policy and require the disclosure of 
financial interests. Information-generating bodies should adopt explicit 
conflict of interest policies, outlining which external activities of key 
staff members are acceptable and which are not. Moreover, they should 
require all key personnel to indicate which other interests they hold.
Appoint individuals of strong, independent character. To enhance the 
probability that individual researchers and evaluators are personally 
little susceptible to external pressure, information-generating partner-
ships can include a list of desired personal attributes in their job descrip-
tions. Moreover, the selection and appointment process should enable a 
relatively large group of individuals to assess said personal characteristics 
alongside professional qualifications.
5.4.3 Accountability for accuracy and quality through 
professionalism
For information to be reliable and trustworthy, it does not only need to be 
unbiased. In addition, it needs to be accurate and of high quality. Next to 
safeguarding the independence of their information-generating bodies and 
staff, partnerships should therefore also ensure that they are professional 
and adhere to high quality standards.
The information-generating partnerships among the case examples rely 
on several strategies for ensuring the accuracy and quality of their results. 
For the creation of its knowledge base, the WCD, for example, selected com-
missioners of high repute representing different stakeholder interests. The 
commission then collected various kinds of inputs, including case studies 
of important dam projects, public submissions and debates with involved 
groups. Moreover, the commission relied on the WCD Forum to test the 
conclusions it drew from this evidence.
The 4C initiative also employs several parallel mechanisms to ensure 
the accuracy and quality of its assessment and verification schemes. 
Independent local verifiers verify the self-assessments submitted by local 
4C units. These verifiers must fulfil specific conditions, be listed by the 4C 
Secretariat and receive special 4C training.140 In addition, local verifications 
can be subject to a systems verification. These verifications are conducted 
by ‘internationally recognised bodies’ appointed by the executive board of 
the 4C association. The initiative also has several channels for dealing with 
disputes arising in the context of verification. Potential complaints are dealt 
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In a similar vein, MSC has various mechanisms in place to ensure the 
accuracy and quality of its certification processes. All certification bodies 
have to be accredited by an independent accrediting agency contracted 
by MSC. Moreover, MSC has defined standards relating to the professional 
expertise each assessment team must include.141 In parallel to these stand-
ards, stakeholders and interested parties are given several opportunities to 
comment on the certification process.142 If they are not satisfied with the 
final assessment, they can also lodge a formal objection. The certification 
body itself hears objections, but appeals to the MSC Objections Panel are 
also possible.
The practice of these information-generation partnerships, the experi-
ences of the judiciary and academia and the standards defined by ISO sug-
gest that partnerships should take two main steps to ensure that their results 
are accurate and of good quality: they should entrust the task of generating 
information to experts with relevant professional qualifications and they 
should create avenues for verifying results.
5.4.3.1 Recruit experts with formal qualification and good reputation
A crucial measure for fostering trust in a partnership’s findings is to ensure 
that the individuals entrusted with generating information have appropriate 
professional qualifications and enjoy a good reputation.
Academia and the judiciary rely on similar practical steps to guarantee 
the professionalism of their staff. Both use specialised higher education 
programmes and professional training combined with official admissions 
tests as formal selection criteria. Thus only individuals that have successfully 
completed the relevant university education and that have passed the respec-
tive bar or state exams are eligible as candidates. In many cases, the ensuing 
selection and appointment process introduces an additional element of peer 
or popular evaluation. In academia, for example, the faculty usually plays a 
strong role in assessing and ranking potential new colleagues. In the judiciary, 
only some countries include peer or popular assessments in their selection 
procedures. In the US, for example, many judges are appointed following 
popular elections. Other judges are selected based on merit. In this case, a 
nomination committee comprising fellow lawyers as well as non-lawyers 
 usually nominates them.143
The judiciary and different academic subjects each have their own 
dedicated higher education programmes as well as specialised qualification 
exams. Other institutions concerned with producing knowledge or assessing 
behaviour may be younger and may concentrate on much smaller thematic 
niches. For many, it is therefore difficult to resort to equally formalised and 
standardised selection practices. Instead, however, they can provide clear 
definitions of the formal qualifications and practical experiences they require 
of candidates. And they can offer additional specialised training to their staff. 
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ISO, for example, has defined such standards for quality and environmental 
management systems auditors.144 In addition, ISO requires that auditors dem-
onstrate their continual professional development and that they undergo 
regular evaluation.
To achieve similar levels of professionalism to the institutions discussed 
above, the partnership or independent bodies entrusted with generating 
information should comply with the following standards:
Define necessary professional qualifications in terms of skills, education, 
work experience and training. For the recruitment of their research-
ers, evaluators or certifiers, information-generating partnerships should 
clearly outline formal qualification requirements. These should include 
a description of necessary generic skills as well as concrete conditions 
concerning the applicant’s formal education, training and years and type 
of work experience.
Include elements of peer or stakeholder assessment in the selection proc-
ess of staff members. In addition to meeting formal criteria, it is important 
that candidates demonstrate the quality of their work. A proven practical 
way of achieving this is to involve peers or a broader group of stakeholder 
representatives in the nomination and selection of applicants.
Where tasks are very specific, provide staff members with targeted training. 
Especially in partnerships engaged in compliance verification and certifica-
tion, it is important that evaluators interpret and apply criteria consistently 
and follow comparable assessment strategies. To ensure staff members are 
able to do that, specialised training may be necessary.
Encourage continuous professional development and periodically evaluate 
staff competences. Finally, information-generating partnerships should 
also be concerned with further developing the competences and experi-
ences of their staff. They should therefore invest in the creation of pro-
fessional development strategies. Regular evaluations of staff skills can, 
moreover, help to identify competence gaps and training needs.
5.4.3.2 Create possibilities for verifying or disputing results
Even the best-qualified and independent researchers and assessors can err 
in their analyses and judgements. A final important step for increasing the 
trustworthiness of the generated information therefore involves creating 
avenues for debating, disputing or verifying results.
In the academic world, open debate is a fundamental principle contrib-
uting to the advancement of science. The academic community is so big 
and structured in such a way that there are usually one or several groups 
of researchers focusing on the same or very similar topics. In this environ-
ment, new findings are subject to intense scrutiny and debate. And, with-
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results enter the canon of established knowledge. With the emergence of 
new approaches or contrary research results, however, even ‘established 
knowledge’ can be challenged at any time. Academia also acknowledges the 
importance of peer opinions in a more structured way. Thus, for example, 
the most respected scientific journals tend to be those involving a peer-
review process. The reputation and influence of individual researchers, in 
turn, depends in part on how many articles they manage to publish in 
recognised journals.
A much more formal approach to debating or verifying results is dominant 
in the judiciary. Most judicial systems include a hierarchy of courts. Parties 
who feel wronged by a judgement can appeal to and have their case reheard 
by a court at a higher level.145 Only the decisions of the highest court can-
not be challenged within the judicial system. Appeals processes have been 
recognised as very effective means of recognising and rectifying judicial 
mistakes.146
For organisations involved in certification and accreditation activities at 
the international level, ISO has defined relevant standards. Accordingly, 
these organisations should have a – preferably independent – person or 
body to deal with complaints, appeals or disputes. The processes should 
include a decision on the validity of the appeal, the taking of appropriate 
action and a public documentation of all appeals, decisions and correspond-
ing actions.147
For information-generating partnerships, these practices and rules can be 
translated into the following standards:
Develop a procedure for soliciting public comments on drafts. Information 
generating partnerships should make copies of their preliminary findings 
available to the public. They should also adopt a formal procedure for 
dealing with comments received.
Encourage and facilitate open debate about findings and results. 
Especially partnerships engaged in the creation of knowledge should 
actively promote debate on their findings. Depending on the context of 
the initiative, this may require holding local or regional discussion fora 
or establishing electronic debate platforms. Formal peer-review processes 
can further enhance the credibility of their results.
Create a formal complaints or appeals processes. Partnerships engaged in 
verifying or certifying compliance with certain standards should, moreo-
ver, have formal and institutionalised complaints and appeals processes. 
This involves having a designated, preferably independent, person or 
body for hearing complaints and a clear process for deciding and taking 
action on appeals. In addition, the process should be made transparent 
by maintaining and publishing records of all complaints and appeals, as 
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5.4.4 Summary of standards
Table 5.4 provides an overview of relevant accountability standards for 
information-generating partnerships.











Grant information-generating bodies 
formal and final authority over their 
findings and results
Seek unconditional, diverse and 
transparent financial support
Where complete independence from 
external interests is not possible, seek 
balanced stakeholder representation
Foster personal 
independence of key 
staff
Ensure that staff members are free 
from undue commercial and financial 
pressures
Adopt a conflict of interest policy 
and require the disclosure of financial 
interests
Appoint individuals of strong, 
independent character
Accountability 







Define necessary professional 
qualifications in terms of skills, 
education, work experience and 
training
Include elements of peer or stakeholder 
assessment in the selection process for 
staff members
Where tasks are very specific, provide 
staff members with targeted training
Encourage continuous professional 






Develop a procedure for soliciting 
public comments on drafts 
Encourage and facilitate open debate 
about findings and results (especially 
for partnerships generating knowledge)
Create a formal complaints or appeals 
process (especially for partnerships 
verifying compliance)
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6.1 Summary of findings
This book seeks to contribute to the debate and practice of partnerships by 
clarifying what accountability means, why partnerships should have more 
of it and what that entails in practice. It provides a detailed and theoreti-
cally well-founded account of why partnerships ought to have appropriate 
accountability arrangements and defines concrete accountability standards 
for different types of partnerships on that basis.
The study reaches its conclusions in four argumentative steps.1 It begins 
by clarifying the concepts of ‘partnership’ and ‘accountability’. The term 
partnership has many different uses. In the context of questions of govern-
ance, it can best be defined as a voluntary arrangement involving public, 
private and/or civil society organisations that is formalised, has common, 
non-hierarchical decision-making procedures and addresses a public policy 
issue. This definition has certain overlaps with the concepts of ‘corporatism’ 
and ‘networks’. This study prefers to work with the term partnership, how-
ever, because it describes the empirical phenomenon under investigation 
more adequately and because it carries less theoretical baggage.
The core meaning of ‘accountability’ is deduced from the etymology of 
the term and from its theoretical foundations in principal–agent theory. 
Accountability can be understood as a mechanism designed to ensure that 
agents act in the best interest of their principals and do not abuse their 
authority. Based on this understanding, this book develops a model showing 
the general workings of accountability mechanisms.2 The model suggests 
that different measures can contribute to a strengthening of  accountability. 
Clarifying the agent’s responsibilities and contributions to outcomes, 
improving the provision of information on the agent’s behaviour, clarifying 
the principal’s expectations and strengthening sanctions and incentives. 
A more concrete analysis of different accountability mechanisms reveals an 
accountability dilemma. Creating accountability can be costly and different 
kinds of accountability can contradict each other. Too much or the wrong 
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kind of accountability can therefore hamper organisational efficiency. From 
this, the study concludes that partnership accountability cannot simply be a 
case of ‘the more, the better’, but that partnerships need to choose carefully 
which accountability mechanisms are best suited to their situation.
Determining which accountability arrangements are necessary under 
what circumstances demands a clear understanding of the normative 
rationale underlying accountability. A second important step therefore is 
to analyse why we believe that organisations ought to be accountable. This 
study draws on well-established political, economic, legal and moral theo-
ries to argue that delegation creates the need for appropriate accountability 
arrangements. This argument intersects and overlaps in various ways with 
other justifications of accountability sketched earlier in Chapter 3. However, 
it provides a theoretical basis for accountability that at the same time creates 
a firmer normative basis and leads to more differentiated practical results.
The delegation of authority creates a duty for the agent to act in the best 
interest of the principal. Accountability mechanisms enable principals to 
monitor the behaviour of agents and to apply sanctions or incentives. In 
institutional settings, appropriate accountability mechanisms are necessary 
to ensure that agents fulfil their duties. Therefore, delegation creates an obli-
gation to institute appropriate accountability arrangements, irrespective of 
whether it is explicit or implicit, ex-ante, ex-post or hypothetical. What kind 
of authority is delegated, in turn, determines which type of accountability is 
appropriate. The delegated or (in the case of ex-post or  hypothetical delega-
tion) assumed authority reflects itself in the function exercised by the organ-
isation in question. Therefore, this study concludes that it is organisational 
function that defines which accountability  arrangements are appropriate.
If organisational function determines accountability requirements, then a 
third important step is to establish which functions partnerships  exercise. This 
study distinguishes between four relevant partnership  functions: advocacy 
and awareness raising, rule setting and regulation, policy  implementation 
and information generation (including both partnerships for knowledge 
creation and compliance verification).
In a fourth and final step, concrete accountability principles and  standards 
are defined for each type of partnership. These standards are summarised in 
Table 6.1.
Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships only require the delegation 
of basic forms of authority, including a licence to operate, authority over 
operational resources and support from partner or member organisations. 
Correspondingly, they need to espouse only basic forms of accountability, 
namely accountability for complying with relevant rules and regulations, 
basic financial accountability and accountability for working towards the part-
nership’s mission. All types of partnerships need the forms of authority listed 
above to be able to operate. Therefore, the accountability  standards defined 
for advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships apply to all  partnerships.
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Choose a well-governed host 
organisation
Adopt clear internal rules
Create an effective oversight body with 
the  ability to apply sanctions
Financial 
accountability
Adopt a system of internal financial 
controls
Adopt accounting policies generating 
 reliable, relevant, comparable and 
understandable  information
Adopt reporting practices generating 
reliable, relevant, comparable and 
understandable  information and 
complying with donor demands
Conduct independent audits for large 
partnerships
Accountability for 
working towards the 
partnership’s mission
Define a clear mission
Orient activities along the mission






























Formal possibilities for participation
alternative (a): include stakeholder 
representatives in decision-making 
bodies
Formal possibilities for participation
alternative (b): conduct stakeholder 
consultation processes
Formal possibilities for participation
supplement: establish permanent 
comments and complaints procedures
Create transparency
Democratic 
 accountability to 
avoid the abuse of 
authority
Partnerships setting voluntary rules 
need no additional accountability 
Partnerships setting binding 
rules should achieve appropriate 
authorisation, define a clear mandate 
and create a process of judicial 
review 
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Rule setting and regulation partnerships in addition assume or are 
granted the authority to set norms and rules. Therefore, they should adhere 
to democratic standards of accountability. This involves creating formal 
 possibilities for participation, generating a high degree of transparency and 
providing safeguards against the abuse of authority.
Implementation partnerships, in turn, have or seek authority over 
 substantial resources. This triggers the need for creating accountability for 
outcomes. Outcome accountability can be strengthened, for example, through 
 performance evaluations or through the introduction of market  mechanisms.
Knowledge creation and compliance verification partnerships, finally, aspire 
to achieving ex-post authorisation by their user groups to  generate information 
on their behalf. Similar to academia and the judiciary, they should  therefore 
emphasise the trustworthiness of their information. Independence and 
 professionalism should be the cornerstones of their accountability  systems.
6.2 Lessons and applications
The preceding paragraphs have summarised the main results of this study 
in very brief terms. How, though, can we use those findings and what 
are their implications for the theory and practice of partnerships and 
 accountability?



























Define clear objectives and performance 
targets
Monitor performance and create 







Outsource suitable tasks through 
competitive bidding processes


























foster personal independence of key 
staff
Accountability 
for accuracy and 
quality through 
professionalism
Recruit experts with formal 
qualifications and good reputations
Create possibilities for debating, 
disputing and verifying results
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Firstly, the outcomes of this study have direct practical applications. 
Most obviously, the standards can be used to evaluate whether or not indi-
vidual partnerships are sufficiently accountable. Practitioners can also use 
the accountability standards as guidelines for the institutional design of 
 partnerships. By differentiating partnerships according to their function, the 
standards can help practitioners to identify priorities in designing account-
ability systems. They also indicate which practical measures can be taken to 
implement these priorities.
Secondly, this study contributes to the abstract debate on partnerships. 
The legitimacy of the partnership approach to governance is hotly debated. 
Can partnerships help the traditional nation state reassert its authority in 
an ever more complex world? Or do they, to the contrary, undermine demo-
cratic accountability standards that were hard fought for? The definition 
of different accountability requirements for different types of  partnerships 
can render this discussion more differentiated. Moreover, the  accountability 
standards defined in this study create the basis for  systematic empirical 
research which could answer the question of whether or not partnerships 
are sufficiently accountable in practice.
Thirdly, the study adds to our conceptual and normative  understanding 
of accountability since it proposes a generally applicable model of 
 accountability. Most contributions to the theory of accountability to date 
are sector-specific, that is, they focus on accountability either in the context 
of the public sector, or the private sector or civil society. The reflections out-
lined here are more comprehensive because they deal with accountability 
at a more abstract level. At the same time, the argument proposed here not 
only accommodates but also proposes an explanation for the differences 
in accountability expectations and traditions between as well as within the 
various sectors of society.
Finally, this new understanding of accountability has important 
 implications for the respective debates within the three sectors. The pub-
lic sector, for example, currently faces a controversy over the new public 
management demand to create more accountability for outcomes. An 
 application of the accountability concept generated here would suggest that 
this claim should neither be backed nor rejected in its entirety. Instead, it 
should be supported for all and only for those cases where public bodies 
operate as implementing agencies.
In the private sector, a current focus of discussion is on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and the related demand that companies should become 
more accountable in a democratic sense. The argument proposed here 
would reject this demand on normative grounds as long as companies do 
not get involved in setting rules for societies.
Relating to civil society organisations, finally, the results of this study 
would support those contributions suggesting different accountability 
arrangements depending on their functions. Rather than seeing this as 
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a matter of strategic choice on the part of the NGOs, however, it would 
 conceptualise this as a normative requirement.3
As the boundaries between the three sectors blur progressively and 
many organisations assume new functions, it is critical to operate with a 
 comprehensive, yet differentiated concept of accountability. While this 
book cannot explore all its implications in detail, it lays the conceptual and 
 normative foundations for subsequent studies to do so.
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1 Introduction
 1. CorpWatch, for example, is a US-American NGO investigating and exposing 
 corporate violations of human rights, environmental crimes, fraud and corrup-
tion with the aim of holding these companies accountable for their actions. 
AccountAbility is an international NGO collecting and developing tools to increase 
accountability worldwide. The Campaign for Accountability of Our Media Voice 
seeks to increase the accountability of the media, especially of broadcast televi-
sion. Corporate Accountability International is an NGO seeking to hold corpora-
tions accountable through lawsuits. These are just a few examples to illustrate the 
importance of ‘accountability’ as a political catchword. The list could be extended 
at will.
 2. In the US Congress, for example, a large number of proposed bills even contain 
the term ‘accountability’ in their title. Melvin Dubnick lists 52 examples of legis-
lation proposed by the 107th Congress including ‘accountability’ in their head-
ings (Dubnick, 2002, p. 29).
 3. A similar point is made by Richard Mulgan, who puts it in the following terms: 
‘That “accountability” is a complex and chameleon-like term is now a common-
place of the public administration literature. A word which a few decades or so 
ago was used only rarely and with relatively restricted meaning […] now crops up 
everywhere performing all manner of analytical and rhetorical tasks and carrying 
most of the major burdens of democratic “governance” […]. In the process, the 
concept of “accountability” has lost some of its former straightforwardness and 
has come to require constant clarification and increasingly complex categoriza-
tion’ (Mulgan, 2000a, p. 555).
 4. In the political sciences, the term ‘civil society’ is disputed. Here, however, the 
purpose is not to contribute to that debate. In the following, the definition pro-
posed by the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society will be used: 
‘Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared 
interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from 
those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between 
state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. 
Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional 
forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies 
are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development 
non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, 
faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help 
groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups’ 
(Centre for Civil Society, 2004).
 5. Since the possibilities for citizen control are limited, constitutional theorists have 
long argued for systems that control themselves. This is what is meant today 
by ‘checks and balances’ – independent political institutions that can check 
each other’s power. In the words of Persson, Roland and Tabellini: ‘Checks and 
balances work by creating conflict of interests between the executive and the 
Notes
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legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the 
two bodies discipline each other at the voters’ advantage’ (Persson et al., 1997, 
p. 1163). Originally, the concept had a slightly different connotation and goes 
back to Aristotle’s idea of mixed government. Walter Bagehot summarised this 
doctrine like this: ‘A great theory, called the theory of “Checks and Balances,” 
pervades an immense part of political literature, and much of it is collected from 
or supported by English experience. Monarchy, it is said, has some faults, some 
bad tendencies, aristocracy others, democracy, again others; but England has 
shown that a government can be constructed in which these evil tendencies 
exactly check, balance, and destroy one another – in which a good whole is con-
structed not simply in spite of, but by means of, the counteracting defects of the 
constituent parts’ (Bagehot, 1873, p. 43).
In the current discourse on accountability, checks and balances are often 
referred to as ‘horizontal accountability’. Guillermo O’Donnell, who has coined 
the term, defines it as ‘the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled 
and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from 
routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or 
 omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlaw-
ful’ (O’Donnell, 1999, p. 38). The claim that different state institutions relate 
to each other in a horizontal, that is, non-hierarchical way, has sparked much 
debate (see e.g. Kenney, 2000; Plattner, 1999; Schmitter, 1999; Schmitter, 2004; 
and Sklar, 1999). Despite the controversy, the spacial metaphor is frequently used 
in the discourse on public accountability.
 6. Ebrahim (2005), for example, focuses on evaluations as accountability tools for 
non-profit organisations; Friedman and Phillips (2004) on the role of councils 
for professional organisations; Lee (2004) on public reporting for non-profit 
organisations; Young (2002) on accountability to mission of non-profit executives; 
Garn (2001) on the use of market-based accountability mechanisms in schools; Blasi 
(2002) on performance measurement for public service providers; and Schmitter 
(2004) on various mechanisms to create accountability for public officials.
 7. See section 2.1.1 for a detailed discussion of the definition of ‘partnership’ used 
here.
 8. Sources on GRI include Global Reporting Initiative (2002a), Global Reporting 
Initiative (2002b), Global Reporting Initiative (2002c), Global Reporting Initiative 
(2003), Global Reporting Initiative (2006a), http://www.globalreporting.org (last 
accessed 31 March 2010), Brown et al. (2007), Willis (2003), personal communi-
cation with Debbie Dickinson, Communications Coordinator, Global Reporting 
Initiative, 9 May 2007.
 9. References on the Global Fund include The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (2006), Technical Evaluation Reference Group (2006), 
Low-Beer et al. (2007), Fortier (2007), Wilkinson et al. (2006), http://www.
theglobalfund.org (last accessed 31 March 2010), personal communication with 
Beatrice Bernescut of the Global Fund on 14 May 2007.
 10. All partnerships discussed in this study engage in activities with an international 
or global reach. The context for accountability and legitimacy is very different at 
the national and the international level and this study espouses an international 
perspective.
 11. These concerns are echoed, for example, in Ann-Marie Slaughter’s reflections on 
transgovernmental networks, that is, cooperative arrangements between differ-
ent governmental institutions: ‘Transgovernmental networks that arise outside 
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the framework of international organizations and executive agreements are most 
likely to spawn fears of runaway technocracy. That a regulatory agency would 
reach out on its own account to its foreign counterparts, even in an effort to solve 
common problems, raises not only the possibilities of policy collusion, whereby 
transgovernmental support can be marshaled [sic] against domestic bureaucratic 
opponents, but also of the removal of issues from the domestic political sphere 
through deliberate technocratic de-politicization’ (Slaughter, 2001, p. 18). Since 
accountability problems are even more complex and severe when networks 
involve not only governments but also civil society and business actors, her argu-
ment also applies to cross-sectoral partnerships.
 12. Judith Richter, for example, describes public private partnerships as a tool used 
by industry to manipulate NGOs and steal their good image without making 
corporations more accountable. As a consequence, she argues that the term 
‘ partnership’ should be abolished. Cf. Richter, 2001, p. 170.
 13. Activists have dubbed this ‘greenwash’ or ‘bluewash’, depending on whether 
corporations are accused of abusing the good environmental, ‘green’ reputation 
of NGOs or the ‘blue’ reputation of the United Nations. ‘Greenwash’ is defined as 
‘an attempt to achieve the appearance of social and environmental good without 
corresponding substance. Such greenwash is being used skilfully to manipulate 
public perceptions of corporations and diffuse public pressure to impose binding 
regulations. Through branding, corporate philanthropy, high-profile partnerships 
with NGOs and governments, and isolated but highly publicised “best practice” 
projects, corporations are making every effort to improve their image. All in order 
to avoid making the necessary changes to their core business practices demanded 
of them by civil society’ (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2002, pp. 1–2).
 14. Cf. e.g. Mallaby (2004).
 15. An author who explicitly formulates his critique in terms of accountability is 
Robert Goodin, who warns that ‘arrangements that straddle sectors (whether 
through partnership or competition) […] undermine the accountability of each 
sector in its own terms and, hence, the interlocking system of social account-
ability overall’ (Goodin, 2003, pp. 4–5). Similarly, Taylor and Warburton argue 
that as governments ‘place an increasing emphasis on partnerships, the question 
of legitimacy and accountability is being blurred across the board’ (Taylor and 
Warburton, 2003, p. 336).
 16. The relationship between accountability and legitimacy, including the contribu-
tion made by accountability to input legitimacy, is discussed in greater detail in 
section 2.2.1.
 17. The United Nations (UN) Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), for 
example, is a crucial promoter of partnerships at the international level and 
within the UN system. It is also at the forefront of efforts to define criteria 
and guidelines for partnerships. One of its key demands is that ‘Partnerships 
should be designed and implemented in a transparent and accountable manner’ 
(Commission on Sustainable Development, 2003, Art. 22h). This is echoed by 
activists who state, for example, that ‘Accountability is therefore key in deliver-
ing the legitimacy of partnerships required by a wider group of stakeholders’ 
(Raynard and Cohen, 2003, p. 7).
 18. A notable exception is the work of AccountAbility, an NGO promoting account-
ability. It has developed a concrete accountability standard called ‘AA 1000’. This 
standard is designed to apply to all kinds of organisations, including all types 
of partnerships. AccountAbility explicitly states that ‘AA 1000 is designed to 
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encompass the needs and requirements of adopters from all types of organisation. 
These include: (a) Large and small organisations. (b) Single site organisations, 
and multi-site, multinational organisations. (c) Public, private and non-profit 
organisations’ (AccountAbility, 1999, p. 13). The definition of concrete criteria 
for accountability is a significant step forward. But their broad applicability also 
creates difficulties. As will be argued in this book, accountability requirements are 
determined by organisational function. Using the same criteria for assessing all 
types of partnerships, let alone organisations from the public, private and non-
profit sectors, is therefore deeply problematic.
 19. Over recent years, the discipline of political science has witnessed a rapidly 
growing debate on ‘governance’, both at the national and the international or 
global level of politics. For some of the many contributions to this debate see, 
for example, Albert and Kopp-Malek (2002), Bevir et al. (2003), Choudhury and 
Ahmed (2002), Finkelstein (1995), Hewson and Sinclair (1999), Hooghe and 
Marks (2003), Jordan et al. (2005), Keohane (2001), Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002), 
Kooiman (1993), Krahmann (2003), Nuscheler (2000), Nye and Donahue (2000), 
Pierre (2000), Rhodes (1996), Rosenau (1995), Stoker (1998), Vayrynen (1999). 
Key issues in this debate relate among others to the definition of the concept, 
empirical analyses of how governance works and the implications of new forms 
of governance for traditional government, its workings, legitimacy and account-
ability. In many instances, the governance discourse relies on strong normative 
assumptions. This includes, for example, the assertion that it is necessary and 
good for governments to reassert their ability to shape policies by developing 
new ways of steering, but also that engagement in networks or partnerships can 
undermine traditional forms of democratic accountability, while at the same time 
creating new possibilities for citizen participation. Cf. Rhodes, 1997, Chapter 3.
Partnerships are a form of governance. By defining concrete accountability 
requirements for partnerships, this book thus makes an indirect and concrete 
contribution to the question of what implications new forms of governance can 
have for accountability.
2 The Concepts of Partnerships and Accountability
 1. The term ‘global public policy’ was introduced in Reinicke (1998).
 2. Thus, for example, major international partnership events in 2007 included 
the International Aid and Trade Event ‘Building Partnerships for Relief and 
Development’; a partnerships fair held during the intergovernmental prepara-
tory meeting for CSD 15; an OECD forum on improving cross-sector and multi-
level cooperation; the Oslo conference on good governance and social and 
environmental responsibility titled ‘Partnerships for Sustainable Development’; 
a partnerships fair held during the 15th CSD session; the 2007 conference on 
global health, ‘Partnerships: Working Together for Global Health’; and a meet-
ing of the Inter-American Water Resources Network, ‘Strengthening Partnerships 
and Building the Basis for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals’. A list of 
relevant meetings is published, for example, by the United Nations Division for 
Sustainable Development (DESA) and is available at http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/
partnerships/calendar/public/displayEvents.do (last accessed 27 August 2009).
 3. Rodal and Mulder, for example, confirm this by writing: ‘The word “partnership” 
has been over-used, misused, and often used imprecisely, to the point that it is 
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sometimes indistinguishable from other “good” management practices, such as 
consultations, either with external parties or internally with employees, or sim-
ply coordination of activities across an organization’ (Rodal and Mulder, 1993, 
pp. 27–8). Even when focusing only on UN partnerships, Carmen Malena notes 
that ‘Reviewing the literature and talking to UN and civil society representatives 
quickly reveals that there is little common understanding regarding the meaning 
of partnership’ (Malena, 2004).
 4. The ‘ideal type’ as a method for defining social scientific concepts is commonly 
ascribed to Max Weber. Social reality is usually so complex and varied that no 
conceptual apparatus can do it justice. Nevertheless, Weber argued, social sci-
entists should define clear concepts that try to capture important similarities 
of phenomena and thus facilitate analysis and enquiry. Cf. for example, Käsler 
(1995), pp. 229–34.
 5. Cf. the so-called Bali guiding principles (available at http://www.un.org/esa/
sustdev/partnerships/bali_guiding_principles.htm, last accessed 27 August 2009) 
and the CSD 11 decision (Commission on Sustainable Development, 2003).
 6. ‘Unter “Public Private Partnerships” verstehen wir Entwicklungspartnerschaften 
mit der Privatwirtschaft: Die Partnerschaften bestehen aus gemeinsam finanzi-
erten Projekten von Unternehmen und entwicklungspolitischen Institutionen’ 
(Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2004).
 7. The concept of corporatism has changed over time, sometimes creating confusion 
as to its exact meaning. Williamson (1985b), for example, provides a comprehen-
sive discussion of the concept of corporatism and distinguishes three different 
usages of the term as a body of prescriptive economic and social thought, as a 
practice of a range of authoritarian regimes and as an analytical tool to examine 
the relations between organised groups and the state in liberal democracies.
 8. Philippe S. Schmitter, a leading contemporary theorist on corporatism, for 
example, reflects the ambiguous connotations of the term when he states that 
‘Corporatism, either as a practice in political life or as a concept in political 
theory, has always been politically controversial. It has been heralded as a novel 
and promising way of ensuring harmony between conflicting social classes. It has 
also been condemned as a reactionary and antidemocratic formula for suppress-
ing the demands of autonomous associations and movements’ (Schmitter, 1995, 
p. 309).
 9. This argument has been made most explicitly for partnerships operating at the 
international or transnational level by Marina Ottaway. To her, recent trends sug-
gest that corporatist solutions at the global level are on the rise. Analysing the 
historical track record of corporatism, she comes to the conclusion that the main 
danger of corporatism as implemented in nation states, namely the emergence of 
authoritarianism, is not a risk at the global level. Yet she still concludes that cor-
poratism’s costs exceed it benefits: ‘And this is what corporatism has always done: 
it absorbs groups that challenge the status quo in the political system, where they 
can have some impact on policy reform but are neutralized as vehicles for radical 
change’ (Ottaway, 2001, p. 280).
For the local level, Vivien Lowndes has emphasised that partnerships have the 
same shortcomings as the traditional corporatist model. Cf. Lowndes (2001).
 10. Cf. Saul (1999).
 11. The argument has been made most powerfully for NGOs operating at the transna-
tional or international level. Thus, for example, Anderson and Rieff criticise the 
standard account of transnational NGOs as constituting ‘global civil society’ and 
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the connected claim that NGOs are representative and provide systems of global 
governance with legitimacy by giving ordinary people a voice. Instead, they argue 
that transnational and international NGOs are better seen as ‘a revival of the 
post-religious of the earlier European and American missionary movements’ or as 
‘a movement seeking to universalise the ultimately parochial model of European 
Union integration’ (Anderson and Rieff, 2005, p. 26). Similarly, Martens (2001) 
argues that a corporatist framework is better suited than the predominant plu-
ralist approaches for analysing and understanding the role played by NGOs in 
international organisations.
 12. That large NGOs have a comparative advantage in engaging with partnerships 
was one of the points debated during the 2002 WSSD in Johannesburg. It is 
reflected, for example, in the summary of the Johannesburg debate provided 
by Witte and Streck: ‘Moreover, there is a widespread perception that the small 
are losing out to the big once again. Whereas large NGOs – such as Greenpeace, 
IUCN-World Conservation Union or the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) – have 
the means and the leverage to design and develop partnerships according to their 
gusto, the voices of small NGOs or representatives of small businesses are often 
lost in the partnership hype’ (Witte and Streck, 2003, p. 3).
 13. Sources on the World Commission on Dams include World Commission on 
Dams (1999), World Commission on Dams (2000, 2001), Scudder (2001). Since 
the commission has been disbanded, there was no personal communication with 
the commission secretariat or individual commission members. Several intensive 
studies on the commission based on a large number of personal interviews with 
commission members, staff and stakeholders have been conducted by other 
researchers. They include Dubash et al. (2001), Khagram (1999), Dingwerth 
(2003) and Dingwerth (2005), who focuses on the legitimacy of the rule-setting 
process and includes a detailed analysis of the commission’s governance struc-
tures and processes.
 14. A notable exception to this is the International Labour Organization (ILO), which 
traditionally has a tripartite governance structure, involving national govern-
ments as well as employers and workers in all its bodies. For more information 
see http://www.ilo.org (last accessed 27 August 2009).
 15. Cf. Scharpf (1993).
 16. In ‘Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung’ (1908), 
Simmel argued that the primary focus of sociology should be on the interactions 
between agents and analysed dyadic and triadic relationships. Cf. Rank (2003), 
p. 28.
 17. See, for example, the edited volume by Boissevain and Mitchell (1973), in which 
a number of social anthropologists focus on interactions among people in order 
to remedy the perceived shortcomings of the hitherto dominant structural-
 functional approach to anthropological studies.
 18. In the analysis of policy networks, for example, typologies have been developed 
that differentiate networks according to their degree of integration, membership, 
the distribution of resources among their members, their level of stability or the 
object of exchange involved. For a detailed discussion of a range of typologies for 
policy networks, see Thatcher (1998).
 19. R. A. W. Rhodes even defines governance in terms of networks: ‘So, governance 
refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdepend-
ence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the 
state’ (Rhodes, 1997, p. 15, emphasis original). Other authors using the concept 
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of governance to describe non-hierarchical models of governing, relying on net-
works, include, for example, Bulmer (1994), Kooiman (1993) and Rosenau and 
Czempiel (1992).
 20. R. A. W. Rhodes in his influential writings has termed this the ‘hollowing out of the 
state’ which ‘refers to the loss of functions upwards to the European Union, down-
wards to special-purpose bodies and outwards to agencies’ (Rhodes, 1997, p. 17).
 21. For a similar definition of governance, as well as a critical analysis of the different 
and changing meanings of ‘governance’ by a long-term contributor to the debate, 
see, for example, Mayntz (2003). Cf. also Marin and Mayntz (1991).
 22. Mark Thatcher, for example, finds that ‘the concept of policy network appears 
so general that it is almost meaningless’, and that the ‘breadth of the concept of 
policy networks makes it difficult to operationalize and apply in empirical stud-
ies’ (Thatcher, 1998, p. 401). For a detailed description, application and critique 
of ‘social network analysis’, see Thompson (2003), Chapter 3. Rhodes (1997, 
pp. 10–13) also contains a summary of the criticisms levelled against the network 
approach.
 23. Cf., for example, Thompson (2003), Chapters 2 and 3. For more references on 
transaction cost analysis and the New Institutional Economics, see section 2.2.1.
 24. Cf. Rank (2003), p. 35.
 25. In fact, the two terms are often used synonymously. See, for example, the article 
‘Local Economic Development Partnerships: An Analysis of Policy Networks 
in EC-LEDA Local Employment Development Strategies’ by Bennett and Krebs 
(1994); Bobrowsky’s ‘Creating a Global Public Policy Network in the Apparel 
Industry: The Apparel Industry Partnership’ (Bobrowsky, 1999); Considine’s ‘The 
End of the Line? Accountable Governance in the Age of Networks, Partnerships, 
and Joined-up Services’ (Considine, 2002); or Reinicke and Deng (2000).
 26. Mark Thatcher, for example, describes as one extreme the ‘issue network’, which 
has broad membership but where ‘participants are constantly changing, and the 
degree of mutual commitment and interdependence varies between them […]. 
No one is in control of the policies and issues covered by a network’ (Thatcher, 
1998, pp. 391–2). At the other extreme, Grahame Thompson lists ‘corporatism’ as 
a possible network (Thompson, 2003, pp. 155–6). Anne-Marie Slaughter focuses 
on networks among national government officials, which she describes as either 
arising in the context of international organisations (such as the networks that 
have developed within the OECD), as created by executive agreement (e.g. the 
1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership Agreement) or spontaneously (e.g. the 
Basle Committee working on banking regulation) (Slaughter, 2001, section 2).
 27. Cf. Benner et al. (2004). The authors include flexibility and complementarity as 
additional network characteristics. Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) focus on mutual 
dependence, describe networks as interaction that arises around policy issues and 
resource clusters and emphasise that networks require active steering to manage 
the conflicting interests of participants.
 28. For a more detailed discussion about solidarity, altruism, loyalty, trust and reci-
procity as characteristic attributes of networks, see Thompson (2003), Chapter 2.
 29. Cf. Douglas-Harper, entry for ‘account’.
 30. Cf. for example, some contributions to Arnull and Wincott (2002), Chaskin 
(2003), Genders (2002), Keohane (2002b), Naidoo (2004), Slim (2002) or Taiclet 
(2001).
 31. Fritz Scharpf, probably the most influential contemporary contributor to the 
debate about legitimacy, has defined legitimacy as a ‘socially sanctioned obligation 
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to comply with government policies even if these violate the actor’s own interests 
or normative preferences, and even if official sanctions could be avoided at low 
cost’ (Scharpf, 2003, p. 1). Thus legitimacy as a concept refers to a perceived qual-
ity of an institution or organisation, whereas accountability refers to a relationship 
between actors.
 32. Weber (1976), p. 124, cf. Käsler (1995), pp. 207–15.
 33. The widely accepted distinction between input and output legitimacy goes back 
to Fritz Scharpf. Cf. Scharpf (1970) and Scharpf (1999).
 34. Thomas Risse, for example, writing on transnational, horizontal forms of govern-
ance, emphasises the connection between accountability and input legitimacy: 
‘If the agents involved in governance arrangements are both internally accounta-
ble to their “clients” – be it shareholders of firms or citizens of governments – and 
externally accountable to those who are affected by their decisions – the various 
“stakeholders” – input legitimacy should be insured’ (Risse, 2006, p. 186).
 35. The process of defining obligations and expectations can be very complex and 
can take various shapes in different situations. Thus, for example, obligations can 
be defined through contracts, as is the case in most economic interactions, from 
which the principal–agent theory was derived. Other situations, particularly in 
the political and social fields, however, are too complex and involve too many 
imponderables to be fixed in a contract. Here, obligations and expectations are 
defined socially and often remain diffuse. The various processes of defining obli-
gations and expectations on the basis of which behaviour is evaluated are not 
included in Figure 2.3.
 36. Again, Adam Smith provided a formulation of the problem of information asym-
metry and information-cost for the principal hindering effective control of the 
agent that is still valid today: ‘The trade of a joint stock company is always man-
aged by a court of directors. This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many 
respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors. But the greater part of 
those proprietors seldom pretend to understand any thing of the business of the 
company; and when the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them, 
give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half yearly or 
yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make to them’ (Smith, 1937, 
p. 699).
 37. In an early and influential paper on the principal–agent relationship, Jensen and 
Meckling defined agency costs as follows: ‘The principal can limit divergences 
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by 
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. 
In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding 
costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the 
principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such 
actions. However, it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero 
cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s 
viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur 
positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), 
and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and 
those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal’ ( Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 311). Total agency cost, then, is the sum of monitoring expen-
ditures, bonding expenditures and residual loss.
 38. As the definition of agency relationships by Ross used above suggests, principal–
agent situations are not even restricted to contractual arrangements but include 
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any arrangement in which somebody acts for, on behalf of or as a representative 
of somebody else.
 39. The ‘father’ of stakeholder theory, R. Edward Freeman, developed his concept as 
an alternative to existing theories of the firm. He proposed replacing the legal and 
moral fiduciary duty of managers to stockholders with a similar duty to different 
stakeholder groups: ‘Corporations shall be managed in the interests of its stake-
holders, defined as employees, financiers, customers, suppliers, and communities’ 
(Freeman, 2001, p. 47).
 40. These questions reflect in part those asked by Slim (2002) in relation to the 
accountability of NGOs.
 41. Robert Keohane, for example, argues that ‘it seems likely that […] units will be 
able to evade accountability by blaming other units, or the operation of the 
system as a whole’. He describes different strategies to avoid accountability: 
‘Avoiding accountability relationships altogether’, ‘controlling the nominal prin-
cipal’, ‘strategically limiting information to the principal’ and ‘creating so many 
principals that accountability is avoided’ (Keohane, 2002b, pp. 12–14).
A classic legal example is the M/S Herald of Free Enterprise case. In 1987, a pas-
senger and car ferry capsized, leading to the death of 193 individuals. Although 
the behaviour of several crew members as well as the corporate culture were 
found seriously problematic, all crew members as well as the company itself were 
acquitted from the charge of manslaughter. For the official inquiry into the dis-
aster, see Department of Transport (1987).
 42. Thus, for example, a range of German companies are held accountable today 
through legal proceedings as well as public opinion pressure for activities they 
undertook during the Second World War, particularly relating to the use of forced 
labour in their factories.
 43. Governments often operate with hierarchical models of accountability, when 
ministers are held to account for the conduct of their ministries. Yet when a min-
ister can credibly claim she did not authorise or know about the activities in ques-
tion, she might evade formalised sanctions, that is, resignation, and only suffer 
reputational damage. Thus the American secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 
experienced no formal personal consequences from the prisoner abuse scandal 
in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison. At the same time, if a resignation is forced under 
similar circumstances, it is not clear how these sanctions contribute immediately 
to preventing similar misconduct in the future.
In the aftermath of the Enron scandal in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also 
increased hierarchical accountability in public companies. Thus it specifies that 
chief executive officers and chief financial officers are responsible for the accu-
racy and validity of financial reports. Cf. One Hundred Seventh Congress of the 
United States of America (2002), title III.
 44. Systems of collective accountability depend on strong collective identities. 
Societies based on a strong clan structure, for example, often experience blood 
feuds in which individual clan members are sanctioned for the behaviour of the 
family group as a whole. Similarly, in times of war national or ethnic identities 
tend to be strengthened and individuals can be attacked on the basis of their 
ethnic or national identity. With much less radical effects, the same mechanism 
is in effect when staff members of a company with bad reputation are shunned 
or criticised by other members of society.
 45. A common case for the analysis of problems of multiple principals is a pub-
licly traded company. Here, ownership does usually not reside with any one 
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 individual or institution but is dispersed among a range of shareholders. The term 
‘ fragmented principal’ describes this situation. It differs from other situations 
involving multiple principals in so far as the interests of fragmented principals 
tend to be broadly similar, while multiple principals in other instances can have 
contradicting interests.
 46. The economic literature on problems of control arising from fragmented princi-
pals is extensive. In a recent addition to this body of literature, Peter Gourevitch 
links corporate scandals such as Enron to collective action problems in situations 
with multiple principals. He describes the collective action problem as follows: 
‘no one has an incentive to pay the transactions [sic] costs required to monitor 
the managers’ (Gourevitch, 2002, p. 3). Sean Gailmard uses a similar approach 
to analyse the problem of multiple principals in bureaucratic policymaking 
(Gailmard, 2002).
 47. Edward Freeman in his important text ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern 
Corporation’ described the conflicting claims of these stakeholders as follows: 
‘Owners want higher financial returns, while customers want more money spent 
on research and development. Employees want higher wages and better benefits, 
while the local community wants better parks and day-care facilities’ (Freeman, 
2001, p. 44).
 48. Mark Bovens has termed this problem the ‘problem of many eyes’: ‘From a socio-
logical perspective, public managers face multiple accountabilities. They may have 
to account for various elements of their conduct to a variety of forums. To make 
things even more complicated, each of the forums may have different expecta-
tions, based on different sets of norms, about the propriety of the manager’s con-
duct, and may therefore pass different judgments’ (Bovens, 2005, p. 186).
 49. Remember Keohane’s argument that agents may deliberately multiply the number 
of principals they are accountable to in order to reduce their overall accountabil-
ity: ‘In a democratic era, it is difficult for an agent to say, ‘the public be damned’ 
and explicitly to dismiss accountability claims. It may be more feasible, and more 
clever, to multiply the number of principals to whom one is responsible – and 
principles on the basis of which one is responsible – that accountability is eroded 
in practice’ (Keohane, 2002b, p. 14).
 50. One notable exception is the United Nations. While its headquarters are located 
in the US, it enjoys extraterritorial status and its staff is protected from national 
legal procedures through diplomatic immunity. The ongoing dispute about 
unpaid parking tickets from UN diplomats illustrates the frustrations that can 
arise from such an exemption. The UN, though, seeks to counteract this account-
ability gap by designing its own internal rules and enforcement mechanisms. 
Similarly, diplomatic missions around the world, to which comparable exemp-
tions apply, are bound by the laws and regulations of their home countries. 
Recent efforts to create international court systems, such as the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), have to be seen as an attempt by the 
international community to close accountability gaps for grave abuses of human 
rights that arise when national legal systems fail.
 51. Remember the close semantic proximity between ‘accountability’ and ‘account-
ing’ discussed above. Melvin Dubnick traces the origins of the word ‘account-
ability’ back to the old French ‘comptes à rendre’, which suggests a similar link 
to recording and explaining financial transactions (Dubnick, 2002, p. 3).
 52. It is well known that the sources of funds and other resources are carefully 
watched in the public sector and for civil society organisations. More recently, 
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they have increasingly become an issue in the private sector as well. Private audit 
companies, for example, are easily exposed to a conflict of interest because they 
generate their income from the clients they are supposed to evaluate objectively. 
Collusion between auditors and fraudulent managers has been blamed as one of 
the reasons for spectacular corporate scandals such as Enron.
 53. The term ‘due diligence’ comes from the discipline of economics. It is used in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions to designate the process of carefully evaluat-
ing all available evidence before taking the decision whether or not to invest in 
another business, cf. for example, Reed Lajoux and Elson (2000).
 54. Both were accused of basing their decisions on faulty evidence. Greenpeace 
accused Shell of seriously underestimating the amount of chemicals left over 
in the oil buoy ‘Brent Spar’ and on this basis called for a boycott against Shell. 
Subsequent investigations proved that these allegations were wrong. The Bush 
administration made its original case for going to war against Iraq on the basis 
that it was producing weapons of mass destruction. The evidence leading to this 
assessment was found seriously flawed.
 55. Transparency requirements are usually most far reaching for democratic govern-
ments and their agencies who have to publish detailed budgets, agendas and 
records of meetings as well as decisions. In the business sector, transparency 
demands by shareholders traditionally referred only to financial aspects. More 
recently, however, pressure by civil society groups and governments has led to 
increased social and environmental and, finally, sustainability reporting, that is, 
improved access to information about the non-financial aspects of a corporation’s 
operations.
 56. Financial reporting and auditing are highly regulated activities in most countries. 
There is also a widely accepted international set of standards, the International 
Financial Reporting Standards, which have been established by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Foundation, a private organisation. 
Standards for social, environmental or ‘sustainability’ reporting and accounting 
are only slowly emerging. Organisations leading the effort to design common 
standards include the US-American non-profit Social Accountability International 
(SAI) as well as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).
 57. Cf. section 2.2.1.
 58. This is Thompson’s ‘problem of many hands’ which I referred to above: when 
various individuals or organisations contribute to a complex outcome, it is often 
difficult to establish whose behaviour had what impact on that outcome.
 59. This approach differs, for example, from that espoused by Robert Keohane, who 
focuses on only one of these aspects, namely ‘the mechanisms used to sanction 
agents’ (Keohane, 2002b, p. 14, emphasis original). Based on these criteria for 
identification, he distinguishes hierarchical, supervisory, electoral, fiscal, legal, 
market, participatory and public reputational accountability.
 60. This holds at least for what I have called ‘proactive’ or ‘preventive accountabil-
ity’. When we consider ‘retroactive’ accountability, that is, a situation where 
the principal actually employs sanctions to hold the agent to account for earlier 
wrongdoings, then unclear expectations of the principal might be an exception: 
particularly where sanctions are informal, for example, in the case of consumer 
reactions, they can be used even when there were no clearly defined expectations 
concerning the agent’s behaviour.
 61. The centrality of access to information for all kinds of accountability is 
reflected, for example, in criteria chosen by the One World Trust to evaluate the 
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 accountability of intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and corporations: The 
‘Global Accountability Report’ uses access to information as one of only two 
general criteria for determining an organisation’s level of accountability (Kovach 
et al., 2003, p. iv). Many authors also include increased transparency prominently 
in their list of recommendations for making specific institutions more account-
able. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, includes it as one of four measures to 
make government networks more accountable to citizens: ‘A second step toward 
holding government networks as accountable as possible to domestic constitu-
ents is to make their activity as visible as possible to legislators, interest groups 
and ordinary citizens by ensuring that they operate in a real or virtual public 
space’ (Slaughter, 2004, p. 172).
 62. Alnoor Ebrahim discusses in greater detail the advantages and downsides of inter-
nal and external performance evaluations for NGOs (Ebrahim, 2003).
 63. Cf. Pope (2000), Chapter 24.
 64. Take, for example, the workings of a central bank, a highly formalised and easily 
quantifiable process. In democratic systems with independent central banks, the 
objectives of monetary policy are usually defined by law. In European systems, 
two goals are often mentioned: price stability and support for the economic 
policies of the government. Since this leaves it to the bank to determine how 
to balance these two objectives, de Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger see an 
accountability gap: ‘Where a central bank has both instrument and goal inde-
pendence the body charged with holding the central bank accountable is not 
provided with an effective statutory yardstick to evaluate the performance of the 
bank, and thus to hold the bank accountable for its conduct of monetary policy’ 
(de Haan et al., 1998, p. 4). But even where only price stability is defined as the 
objective of monetary policy, a bank has leeway since ‘the objective of price 
stability has different interpretations: price level constancy versus zero inflation’ 
(ibid.).
 65. This brings us back to square one of principal–agent theory. One of the main 
assumptions of the original formulation of that theory was that the agent acts 
under conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, a complete definition of the agent’s 
activities in a contract is not possible and the dilemma of control and account-
ability begins. Cf. Ross (1973).
 66. Cf. Keohane (2002b), p. 14.
 67. Since this dilemma is so difficult to solve, the Bible prescribes: ‘No man can 
serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he 
will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon’ 
(Matthew 6:24, King James Version).
In a more humoristic interpretation, Carlo Goldoni’s play ‘Il Servitore di Due 
Padroni’ or ‘The Servant of Two Masters’ portrays the numerous problems that 
Truffaldino encounters when he attempts to serve to masters at the same time.
 68. This list resembles, but is not entirely congruent with, the ones proposed among 
others by Benner et al. (2004), Keohane (2002b), Keohane and Nye (2001), Newell 
and Bellour (2002).
 69. Despite the fact that elections are generally considered to be the main mechanism 
for creating democratic accountability, top politicians are often limited in the 
number of re-elections they can seek. James D. Fearon therefore argues that elec-
tions are not only used as mechanisms to create accountability through sanctions 
but also as a means of selecting ‘good’ politicians who will act in the citizens’ best 
interest out of their own accord. Cf. Fearon (1999), p. 61.
9780230238978_08_notes.indd   187 8/17/2010   8:55:34 PM
188  Notes
 70. This is what Albert O. Hirschman termed the option of ‘exit’ that actors can 
use if they cannot change elements they criticise through ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 
1972).
 71. Because reputation is hard to measure and often hard to influence, it often gets 
little consideration in debates and strategies. An indicator for the fact that the 
hard-nosed corporate sector is taking reputation more seriously as a factor for 
corporate success is the work of the Reputation Institute, which dedicates its 
work exclusively to this topic. For more information, see http://www.reputation
institute.com (last accessed 27 August 2009).
 72. These strategies are reflected, for example, in Anne-Marie Slaughter’s recom-
mendations on how to improve the accountability of government networks to 
 domestic constituencies. Next to creating visibility and transparency, she advo-
cates ‘to ensure that government networks link legislators across borders as much 
as they do regulators and judges, to ensure that all three branches of government, 
with their relative strengths and weaknesses, are represented’, that is, the inclu-
sion of legislators in those networks, and ‘to use government networks as the 
spines of larger policy networks, helping to mobilize transnational society’, that 
is,  facilitating collective action (Slaughter, 2004, p. 173).
 73. Figure 2.4 is a very basic depiction of an ‘accountability game’, following the 
prescriptions on how to formalise a situation in the form of a game contained in 
Morrow (1994, Chapter 3).
 74. John Ferejohn builds a formal model of political accountability and explains the 
agent’s interest in strengthening accountability as follows: ‘increasing the degree 
of accountability in an agency contract can increase the power of the agent, all 
things considered, and therefore […] agents have an incentive to make them-
selves accountable’. Thus to ‘the extent that the actions of elected officials can 
be monitored, citizens will be willing to invest more in government’. As a result, 
‘the increase in governmental authority has been brought about by the provision 
for increased agent observability’ (Ferejohn, 1999a, pp. 140–1 and 148).
 75. Cf. Jonathan Koppell who concludes: ‘Accountability is good. There is little disa-
greement on this point. Complaints that an organization is “too accountable” are 
rarely heard’ (Koppell, 2003, p. 174).
 76. Thus, for example, Benner, Reinicke and Witte argue that ‘While by now there 
is a sophisticated academic debate on the “democratic deficit” in global policy-
 making, all too often contributions to the debate fall short of operationalizing 
their findings for the daily practice of global governance: what approaches should 
we use to make global public policy-making more accountable?’ (Benner et al., 
2004, p. 191). More explicitly, the Global Accountability Report argues that 
institutions operating at the international level need more accountability: ‘These 
institutions [international governmental organisations, transnational corpora-
tions and international NGOs] need to become more transparent and account-
able to their stakeholders […]. This will increase their legitimacy and lead to more 
effective decision-making’ (Kovach et al., 2003, p. iv).
 77. An indicator that this has been recognised as a problem in practice can be found 
in different attempts to limit the accountability of people or institutions. Thus 
the development of the limited liability company allowed entrepreneurs to take 
more risks and this contributed to economic growth over the last century. In the 
political sphere, the limitation of terms of office is often justified with enabling 
political leaders to pursue more long-term objectives, which can be hampered by 
electoral accountability.
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 78. The literature on the European Union’s governance in general and its democratic 
deficit and accountability in particular is vast. For a few examples, see Amtenbrink 
(1999), Arnull and Wincott (2002), Asbach (2002), Chryssochoou et al. (1998), 
Coultrap (1999), Decker (2000), Grande (1996), Gustavsson (2000), Gusy (1998), 
Habermas (1998), Harlow (2002), Katz (2001), Kiernan (1997), Laffan (2003), 
Lemke (1999), Lindseth (1999), Lodge (1996, 2003), Lopez Coterilla and Vicente 
(1998), Lord (1998, 2001), Meadowcroft (2002), Misch (1996), Moravcsik (2002), 
Moussis (2000), Neunreither (1994), Norris (1997), Oberreuter (1999), Pasquino 
(2000), Pogge (1997), Rosanvallon (2002), Scharpf (1999), Tsebelis and Garrett 
(2000), Weiler et al. (1995), Wiener and Della-Sala (1997), Williams (1990), 
Wincott (1998), Wolf (2000), Zürn (2000), Zweifel (2002).
 79. The operating framework for the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, for example, 
explicitly quotes increased accountability as a reason for choosing a partnership 
approach: ‘A Partnership offers the prospect of a heightened level of account-
ability and responsibility of all partners, which is needed for achieving country 
agreed targets’ (Roll Back Malaria Partnership, 2004, p. 2).
 80. For a detailed discussion of the scandal, subsequent investigations and the 
changes introduced as a response, see Harlow (2002), Chapter 3.
 81. For an analysis of the impacts of the Enron scandal on corporate governance, see 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) Chapter 2.
 82. An important collection of the data on partnerships is the partnership database 
provided by the UN’s Commission on Sustainable Development, which con-
tains information on partnerships that register with CSD (see http://webapps01.
un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/browse.do, last accessed 27 August 2009). Since 
CSD explicitly encouraged the creation and registration of new partnerships, the 
data is most likely biased with respect to partnership age. Yet the total number of 
partnerships listed is relatively large (319 at the time of the writing of the 2006 
report of the secretary-general on partnerships for sustainable development to the 
Commission on Sustainable Development, 346 by 27 August 2009). Therefore, 
the following findings at least contain an indication as to how prevalent young 
partnerships are: ‘A majority of the partnerships registered with the Commission 
secretariat were launched at or around the time of the World Summit. […] Less 
than one tenth (9 per cent) of registered partnerships were in existence prior to 
2002’ (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2006, p. 9).
 83. Again, the business example clearly illustrates this. While Freeman claims that his 
‘stakeholder theory does not give primacy to one stakeholder group over another’ 
(Freeman, 2001, p. 44), the reality looks different. Thus even the proponents 
of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) practices, that is, those who advocate 
taking responsibilities to stakeholder groups other than shareholders seriously, 
have had to recognise the predominance of owners and shareholders. As a conse-
quence, most CSR advocates are now upholding the ‘business case for CSR’, that 
is, the argument that taking the concerns of other stakeholders into account is 
good for business. Among the many examples for ‘business cases’ for CSR, see, for 
example, Wieland and Conrad (2002), Hopkins and Cowe (2003) and Hartmann 
(2003).
 84. Acar and Robertson emphasise this point: ‘public–private partnerships are cre-
ated in the first place to attain objectives that are jointly defined by individuals 
and organizations coming from public, private, and non-profit organizations. 
However, it is often the case that these actors’ underlying values and operating 
goals vary to a great extent’ (Acar and Robertson, 2004, p. 333).
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3 Why Organisations Ought to be Accountable
 1. And in fact, Brown and Moore take this step only reluctantly. Rather inconsist-
ently, they argue that even though they abandon accountability as an ‘abstract, 
fixed moral ideal’, their account has accountability as ‘both morally good and 
practically useful’ (Brown and Moore, 2001, p. 2).
 2. The notion of trust plays an important role in transaction cost economics. For an 
explicit discussion of trust in this context see, for example, Williamson (1993). 
For empirical studies analysing the influence of trust on transaction costs see, for 
example, Zaheer et al. (1998), Dyer and Chu (2003) and den Butter and Mosch 
(2003).
 3. In a similar vein, Regina Herzlinger proposes that to restore trust in governmen-
tal agencies and non-profit organisations, one should ‘Increase the disclosure, 
analysis, and dissemination of information on the performance of nonprofit and 
governmental organizations, and apply sanctions against those that do not com-
ply with these requirements’ (Herzlinger, 1996, p. 8, emphasis original). In other 
words, she concurs that stronger accountability can lead to increased trust. For 
similar arguments see, for example, Brody (2002), Fleishman (1999), Herzlinger 
(1996) or Kearns (1996).
Onora O’Neill, by contrast, argues that accountability is ultimately insufficient 
to create trust: ‘Elaborate measures to ensure that people keep agreements and 
do not betray trust must, in the end, be backed by – trust. At some point we just 
have to trust. There is no complete answer to the old question: “who will guard 
the guardians?” On the contrary, trust is needed precisely because all guarantees 
are incomplete’ (O’Neill, 2002, p. 6).
 4. Cf. the discussion on the relationship between ‘legitimacy’ and ‘accountability’ in 
section 2.2.1. Similarly, Klaus Dingwerth identifies ‘three core concepts of demo-
cratic governance’ which determine the democratic legitimacy of an institution or 
process: ‘inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability’ (Dingwerth, 2005, p. 72).
 5. On consequentialist and principled justifications for authoritarianism see, for 
example, Mayer (2001). Most recently, people have defended authoritarianism as 
the more efficient form of government in the context of the Asian ‘tiger states’. 
Their economic success, it was argued, was explained by their ‘Asian values’, 
which include strong paternalistic and authoritarian elements. Cf. for example, 
Sen (1999) or Thompson (2001).
 6. When it comes to delivering public services, this is one of the arguments (apart 
from the one concerned with the effects of competition) for why the private 
sector might be more efficient than the public sector. Richard Mulgan states 
this explicitly: ‘Contracting out has the potential to reduce the extent of public 
accountability by transferring the provision of public services to members of the 
private sector who are generally not subject to the same accountability require-
ments as public officials. Indeed, reduction in such accountability requirements 
may be one of the reasons for the greater efficiency of the private sector’(Mulgan, 
1997, p. 1).
 7. Stakeholders are also those who can influence a company. Advocates of stake-
holder theory find it easy, though, to make the case for respecting those stake-
holders’ interests on prudential or instrumental grounds. A moral justification 
is necessary to justify why stakeholders who have no power over the company 
should be taken seriously and to determine whether or not any one stakeholder 
group should be treated preferentially.
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Goodpaster claims that Freeman only includes groups that are affected by 
the company as stakeholders because they, too, could ultimately have an effect 
on the company (Goodpaster, 2002, p. 52). This claim is not convincing, how-
ever, since Freeman explicitly adopts a Kantian approach, that is, one in which 
the morality of actions is only judged by the motives underlying the action, 
not its consequences. Considering stakeholder claims only because they could 
have an impact on the company, by contrast, would be a consequentialist 
argument.
 8. In fact, there were so many contributions to stakeholder theory over the last two 
decades, many asserting slightly different claims, that it is difficult to speak of one 
‘stakeholder theory’. Already in 1995, Donaldson and Preston counted ‘about a 
dozen books and more than 100 articles’ on stakeholder theory and found that 
‘Unfortunately, anyone looking into this large and evolving literature with a criti-
cal eye, will observe that the concepts stakeholder, stakeholder model, stakeholder 
management and stakeholder theory are explained and used by various authors in 
very different ways and supported (or critiqued) with diverse and often contra-
dictory evidence and arguments’ (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, pp. 65 and 66, 
emphasis original).
The aim here, however, is not to provide a full account of stakeholder theories 
with all their variations but to use them as an example of a normative theory that 
links the claim for accountability to power. Since Freeman originally articulated 
the theory and uses an explicit normative argument to justify his claims, this 
section refers mainly to his version of stakeholder theory.
 9. An article written by Freeman and Evan even contains this normative basis in 
its title: ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism’ 
(Evan and Freeman, 1988).
 10. Immanuel Kant formulated this principle as follows: ‘Es liegt also der moralische 
Wert einer Handlung nicht in einer Wirkung, die daraus erwartet wird […]. Es 
kann daher nichts anderes als die Vorstellung des Gesetzes an sich selbst, die freilich 
nur im vernünftigen Wesen stattfindet, so fern sie, nicht aber die verhoffte Wirkung, 
der Bestimmungsgrund des Willens ist, das so vorzügliche Gute, welches wir sit-
tlich nennen, ausmachen’ (Kant, 1996b, p. 185, emphasis original).
 11. In Kant’s words, ‘Der praktische Imperativ wird also folgender sein: Handle so, 
daß du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen, 
jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchest’ (Kant, 1996c, p. 216, 
emphasis original).
 12. Without going through the stakeholder concept, but by applying Kant’s different 
formulations of the categorical imperative directly to businesses, Norman Bowie 
comes to a similar conclusion. According to his interpretation, the duty to treat 
others as ends in themselves creates a duty for managers among others to pro-
vide meaningful work (which is freely chosen, provides autonomy and furthers 
the rational development of workers) to employees. Since ‘[s]ome management 
attitudes and practices are more conducive toward meeting this obligation than 
others […] Kantian managers need to create a certain kind of organization’. 
The organisational requirements include that the company ‘should have those 
affected by the firm’s rules and policies participate in the determination of those 
rules and policies before they are implemented’ (Bowie, 2002, p. 67).
 13. Not least, much of the current hype surrounding partnerships themselves comes 
from the fact that they are ‘multi-stakeholder’ and are seen as one possible way 
of institutionalising stakeholder participation in political processes.
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 14. Friedman discusses the connection between economic and political freedom at 
much greater length in his seminal book ‘Capitalism and Freedom’. He argues 
that ‘Economic arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society. 
On the one hand, freedom in economic arrangements is itself a component of 
freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself. In the sec-
ond place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achieve-
ment of political freedom. […] Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, 
economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentra-
tion or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that provides 
economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes politi-
cal freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this 
way enables the one to offset the other’ (Friedman, 1962, pp. 52–3).
 15. The German ‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’, for example, decrees that in companies 
with more than 2000 employees, half the seats of the supervisory board are 
reserved for employee representatives.
 16. Freeman and Reed’s definition applies to the stakeholders of corporations. 
According to them, stakeholders in the narrow sense include employees, cus-
tomer segments, certain suppliers, key government agencies, shareowners and 
certain financial institutions. Stakeholders in the wider sense include in addition 
public interest groups, protest groups, government agencies, trade associations, 
competitors and unions. Cf. Freeman and Reed (1983) p. 91.
For an application of the narrow stakeholder concept to non-profit organisa-
tions see, for example, Theuvsen (2001). For civil society groups, stakeholders 
in the narrow sense, who are important for the organisation’s survival, would, 
for example, be donors, certain government regulators, beneficiaries who pay 
for the organisation’s services or unpaid volunteers. Other beneficiaries or those 
marginalised groups on behalf of whom the NGO claims to speak, by contrast, 
would only count as stakeholders in the wider sense. An important contribution 
concerning the relative salience of stakeholder claims in this context is Mitchell 
et al. (1997).
 17. This distinction between a normative and a strategic or instrumental version of 
stakeholder theory is also made, for example, by Ludwig Theuvsen. He writes: 
‘Das Stakeholder-Konzept kann zum einen normativ-ethisch orientiert sein. […] 
Die Berücksichtigung der Anliegen aller Stakeholder einer Organisation wird bei 
dieser Ausrichtung als Wert als socher betrachtet; es wird davon ausgegangen, 
daß die Interessen aller Stakeholder einen Eigenwert besitzen und der gleichen 
Aufmerksamkeit bedürfen. Die zweite mögliche Ausrichtung eines Stakeholder-
Managements gibt die Auffassung, daß alle Stakeholder dieselbe Beachtung ver-
dienen, auf. […] Im Mittelpunkt des Stakeholder-Managements steht vielmehr 
das Ziel, einen Beitrag zur langfristigen Überlebensfähigkeit einer Organisation 
zu leisten’ (Theuvsen, 2001, p. 1).
 18. Kenneth Goodpaster solves this problem by arguing for a ‘stakeholder synthesis’ 
that acknowledges the moral obligation of managers to stakeholders but does 
not treat them at the same level as shareholders. He writes that taking ‘business 
ethics seriously need not mean that management bear additional fiduciary rela-
tionships to third parties (nonstockholder constituencies) […]. It may mean that 
there are morally significant nonfiduciary obligations to third parties surrounding 
any fiduciary relationship. [… This] is not an expansion of the list of principals’ 
(Goodpaster, 2002, pp. 57–8, emphasis original). By saying that stakeholders 
other than shareholders should not be recognised as principals, Goodpaster 
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 effectively argues that there should be no accountability relationship between 
these stakeholders and managers.
 19. David Held confirms this national focus. ‘Throughout the twentieth century, 
especially, democratic theory has focused on the organizational and socioeco-
nomic context of democratic procedures and the effects this context has on the 
operation of ‘majority rule’. From the development of the theory of competitive 
elitism to the elaboration of classic pluralism, or to the critique of these ideas in 
the writing of contemporary radicals, the focus of modern democratic theory has 
been on the conditions which foster or hinder the democratic life of a nation’ 
(Held, 1996, p. 335).
 20. For powerful accounts of how states lose power due to economic globalisation 
see, for example, Strange (1996) or Sassen (1996).
 21. For a detailed discussion of what constitutes the democratic deficit in the case of 
the European Union see, for example, Scharpf (1999). Other contributions to this 
debate include, for example, Chryssochoou et al. (1998), Coultrap (1999), Decker 
(2000), Giorgi et al. (2001), Grewal (2001), Guisan-Dickinson (1999), Gusy (1998), 
Judge (1995), Katz (2001), Kiernan (1997), Koenig-Archibugi (2002), Lindseth 
(1999), Lodge (1996), Lopez Coterilla and Vicente (1998), Lord (2001), Manzella 
(2002), Meadowcroft (2002), Misch (1996), Moravcsik (2002), Neunreither (1994), 
Norris (1997), Pasquino (2000), Pogge (1997), Williams (1990).
Over the last decade or two, analyses finding a democratic deficit in the EU’s 
institutional design and proposing all kinds of solutions for it have proliferated. 
But the diagnosis is contested with an increasing number of authors questioning 
whether the EU really lacks democratic credentials. Probably the most vocifer-
ous critic of the democratic deficit hypothesis is Andrew Moravcsic. He argues 
‘that an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of a real-world international 
institution is as much social scientific as philosophical. If such an assessment is 
not to be an exercise in utopian thinking, then international institutions should 
not be compared to ideal democratic systems. Instead we must ask whether they 
approximate the “real world” democracy generally achieved by existing advanced 
democracies, which face constraints of limited public information and interest, 
regulatory capture, the credibility of commitments, and bounded consensus. 
[…] If we adopt these reasonable normative and empirical criteria for evaluating 
democracy, moreover, it is unclear that international institutions lack democratic 
legitimacy, as most analysts assume’ (Moravcsik, 2004, p. 337). For a similar argu-
ment see, for example, Zweifel (2002).
 22. Cf. for example, Howse (2003), Stiglitz (2002) or Woods (2003).
 23. Reform proposals for the United Nations abound. For an overview see, for exam-
ple, Ghebali (1997) or Hüfner and Martens (2000).
 24. Stutzer and Frey, for example, analyse international (i.e. intergovernmental) 
organisations (Stutzer and Frey, 2005) and Ann-Marie Slaughter focuses on inter-
governmental networks (Slaughter, 2004).
 25. The proliferation of the democratic argument as a critique of international institu-
tions has led to frustration for some scholars. Moravcsik, for example, writes, ‘Is 
global governance – the structure of international institutions – democratically 
legitimate, or does it suffer from a “democratic deficit”? This is emerging as one 
of the central questions – perhaps the central question – in contemporary world 
politics. Whatever their underlying motivations, critics these days ranging from 
the extreme right to the extreme left, and at almost every point in between, couch 
criticisms of globalization in democratic rhetoric’ (Moravcsik, 2004, p. 336).
9780230238978_08_notes.indd   193 8/17/2010   8:55:35 PM
194  Notes
 26. Klaus Dingwerth goes even a step further by claiming: ‘There appears to be a more 
or less broad consensus that the current system of global governance ought to be 
democratised. What the concept of democracy entails when it is transferred to 
the global level of decision-making, which structures would best satisfy the call 
for democratisation, and why exactly such a call deserves our support in the first 
place, is however far from clear’ (Dingwerth, 2007, p. 14). As argued later, however, 
some analysts and activists propose to remedy the democratic deficit by limiting 
the influence of international institutions and by restoring national autonomy.
 27. For a good overview over the thinking of ‘the new sovereigntists’ and a powerful 
rebuttal of their arguments see, for example, Spiro (2000).
 28. Archibugi (2004) provides not only a good summary of the principles of ‘cosmo-
politan democracy’ but also discusses the main criticisms levelled against this 
proposal and attempts to rebut them.
 29. Cf. for example, Anheier et al. (2005), Arts (1998), Breitmeier and Rittberger 
(1998), Brunnengräber et al. (2001), Charnovitz (1997), Fox and Brown (1998), 
Keck and Sikkink (1998), Salamon et al. (1999) or Willetts (2000).
 30. See, for example, Gereffi et al. (2001), Johns (2003), Mallaby (2004), Ottaway 
(2001) or Schmidt and Take (1997).
 31. The control function of parliaments is less relevant at the international level 
since no formal executive exists. In addition, parliaments traditionally exercise 
their control function mainly through the budget. Currently, no direct taxes are 
levied internationally. The control requirement based on ‘no taxation without 
representation’ therefore also loses relevance.
 32. Klaus Dingwerth, one of the very few authors explicitly analysing the democratic 
legitimacy of partnerships as instruments of global governance also focuses exclu-
sively on their rule-making capacity (Dingwerth, 2007).
 33. For a critique of this approach arguing that these two elements are incompatible 
see Patterson (1992).
 34. Cf. DeMott (1988), p. 908.
 35. Cf. Weinrib (1975), p. 3.
 36. Regarding equivalent institutions in other jurisdictions, he states that ‘There is 
great variety – mainly in civil law systems – among institutions that are function-
ally equivalent to trust or Treuhand; they serve similar purposes, but the techni-
calities of their juridical construction differ’ (Grundmann, 1999, p. 402). For an 
overview see, for example, Dyer and van Loon (1982).
 37. On the concept of negotiorum gestio in civil law countries see, for example, 
Sheehan (2006). He argues that a similar principle exists in English law.
 38. Boucher and Kelly describe how social contract thinkers differ with respect to the 
purpose they use the contract for, the nature of the contract, the identity of the 
parties to the contract and the motivation for entering a contract: ‘The choice 
may be to create society; civil society; a sovereign; procedural rules of justice; or 
morality itself. It may be a choice of contract that binds in perpetuity, or one 
renewed with each succeeding generation. The choice may be historical, ideal 
or hypothetical, its expression explicit or tacit, and the contractees may be each 
individual contracting with every other, individuals contracting with their rulers 
and God […], the heads of families agreeing among themselves, corporations or 
cities contractually bound to a superior, or the people as a body contracting with 
a ruler or king. Furthermore, the motivation for the choice may be a religious 
duty, personal security, economic welfare, or moral self-righteousness’ (Boucher 
and Kelly, 1994, p. 2).
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 39. In Thomas Hobbes’ version, conflict is a direct consequence of the legitimate 
human longing for self-preservation and the roughly equal physical and mental 
capacity of humans: ‘From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the 
attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which 
neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to 
their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their 
delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other’ (Hobbes, 1909, 
Chapter XIII).
 40. Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues strongly against Hobbes’ account of the state of 
nature. He contends that men lived in a peaceful original state, which was only 
corrupted by increasing interactions between humans: ‘As soon as men began to 
value one another, and the idea of consideration had got a footing in the mind, 
every one put in his claim to it, and it became impossible to refuse it to any 
with impunity. Hence arose the first obligations of civility even among savages; 
and every intended injury became an affront; because, besides the hurt which 
might result from it, the party injured was certain to find in it a contempt for his 
person, which was often more insupportable than the hurt itself. Thus, as every 
man punished the contempt shown him by others, in proportion to his opinion 
of himself, revenge became terrible, and men bloody and cruel’ (Rousseau, 1754, 
part II).
 41. In Rousseau’s words: ‘Il faut remarquer encore que la délibération publique, qui 
peut obliger tous les sujets envers le souverain, à cause des deux différents rapports 
sous lesquels chacun d’eux est envisagé, ne peut, par la raison contraire, obliger 
le souverain envers lui-même, et que, par conséquent, il est contre la nature du 
corps politique que le souverain s’impose une loi qu’il ne puisse enfreindre. Ne 
pouvant se considérer que sous un seul et même rapport il est alors dans le cas 
d’un particulier contractant avec soi-même: par où l’on voit qu’il n’y a ni ne peut 
y avoir nulle espèce de loi fondamentale obligatoire pour le corps du peuple, pas 
même le contrat social’ (Rousseau, 1762, Chapter VII).
 42. Claude Ake, for example, confirms this dominance: ‘This radical wing of the 
natural law school [following Locke in arguing for a right of revolution] was easily 
the strongest influence on the theoretical foundations of the Western “democra-
cies.” The great documents and theoreticians of the Western tradition – J. S. Mill, 
de Tocqueville, Jefferson, Paine, the Declaration of Independence, the American 
Constitution, the Federalist Papers, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen, and so on – speak the language of the radical wing. For example, men 
have rights which are inalienable; government depends on the consent of the 
governed; political obligation is limited by the end for which government was 
constituted’ (Ake, 1969, p. 248).
 43. The establishment of political authority in the liberal democratic tradition fol-
lowing John Locke is thus conditional. A corollary of this is that citizens no 
longer have an obligation to obey the government if the government does not 
fulfil its purpose. In Claude Ake’s words: ‘This theory of obligation posits that 
when a government ceases to fulfil the expectations which alone justified obedi-
ence to it, its citizens have a right to disobey it’ (Ake, 1969, p. 245). Ake goes on to 
argue that citizens actually have a duty to disobey. Bernard Wand criticises Ake’s 
justification for the duty to disobey, but offers another account that also results in 
the obligation to resist governments that violate individual rights (Wand, 1970).
 44. It goes beyond the scope of this book to review the criticisms of the social con-
tract theory and of liberal democratic thought. The communitarian, Marxist and 
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feminist critiques of the social contract, however, are briefly discussed in the 
section of this chapter dealing with hypothetical and ex-post consent and delega-
tion. For a brief discussion of the major objections to democracy articulated today 
from an economic efficiency and a cultural diversity perspective see, for example, 
Sen (1999).
 45. In fact, Max Weber argued that the emergence of representative democracy could 
only be explained by the historical and social peculiarities of ‘the West’: ‘Sowohl die 
genuine parlamentarische Repräsentation mit voluntarisitischem Interessenbetrieb 
der Politik, wie die daraus entwickelte plebiszitäre Parteiorganisation mit 
ihren Folgen, wie der moderne Gedanke rationaler Repräsentation durch 
Interessenvertreter sind dem Okzident eigentümlich und nur durch die dortige 
Stände- und Klassen-Entwicklung erklärlich, welche schon im Mittelalter hier, 
und nur hier, die Vorläufer schuf’ (Quoted in Käsler, 1995, p. 215, emphasis 
original).
 46. Francis Fukuyama takes this as the point of departure for his much debated 
argument about the ‘end of history’. One does not have to share Fukuyama’s 
Hegelian argument, however, to agree with his assessment that after the fall of 
communism, liberal democracy and free-market capitalism have become the 
dominant models for organising society across the globe. Cf. Fukuyama (1992). 
How many countries have actually embraced democracy remains controversial. 
The American organisation Freedom House, using a substantive rather than for-
mal definition of democracy, has been assessing the degree of civil liberties and 
political rights across the world since 1972 and has found a steady increase in 
freedom. Thus, in 1972, 68 countries were classified as ‘not free’, 35 as ‘partially 
free’ and 44 as ‘free’. In 1990, 49 were ‘not free’, 50 ‘partially free’ and 65 ‘free’. In 
2006, 45 were found ‘not free’, 57 ‘partially free’ and 91 ‘free’. Cf. Freedom House 
(2007).
 47. Smith’s original formulation of the invisible hand theorem relates to foreign trade. 
It is apparent throughout his work, though, that he sees self-interest giving rise to 
positive economic effects. When discussing the effects of commercial towns, for 
example, he writes: ‘A revolution of the greatest importance to the public hap-
piness was in this manner brought about by two different orders of people who 
had not the least intention to serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity 
was the sole motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much 
less ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in pursuit of 
their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got. 
Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of that great revolution which 
the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually bringing about. 
It is thus that through the greater part of Europe the commerce and manufactures 
of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and occasion of the 
improvement and cultivation of the country’ (Smith, 1904, Book III, Chapter 4, 
§17–18). Similarly, he writes on the choice of employment: ‘Every individual is 
continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for 
whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that 
of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, 
or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advanta-
geous to the society’ (Smith, 1904, Book IV, Chapter 2, §4).
 48. The basis of utilitarian moral philosophy is ‘the principle of utility’, also known 
as the ‘greatest happiness’ or ‘greatest felicity’ principle. In the words of its 
founder, Jeremy Bentham, it is ‘that principle which approves or disapproves of 
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every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to 
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question’ 
(Bentham, 2005, p. 11). There is considerable debate among utilitarians concern-
ing the application of the principle of utility. Firstly, there is disagreement as to 
what kind of utility should be considered. Bentham emphasised pleasure and 
pain, while his follower John Stuart Mill put greater weight on cultural, intellec-
tual and spiritual pleasure (Mill, 1863). Secondly, there is disagreement concern-
ing whose utility should be considered, the utility of the members of a society, 
as Bentham and Mill claimed, or those of all sentient beings, including animals 
(Singer, 1979) and future generations (Sidgwick, 1907). Thirdly, there are different 
proposals on how to calculate the biggest utility, especially whether total aggre-
gate utility or average utility should count. Finally, utilitarians debate whether the 
consequences of individual acts (Bentham, 2005) or of rules (Mill, 1863) should be 
evaluated. Despite these differences, most utilitarians would probably agree that, 
other things being equal, greater social wealth means greater happiness.
 49. Economists may also emphasise the contractual obligations of agents. Principals 
buy the services of managers or other agents and the terms of their mutual 
agreement are laid down in a contract. Contract keeping is essential for enabling 
market-based exchanges and is therefore justified as a norm on a utilitarian basis. 
This argument, however, does nothing to specify what the content of any given 
contract should be or whether it should contain accountability mechanisms.
 50. In their textbook on economic theories of organisation, Picot, Dietl and Franck, 
for example, describe this normative element of principal agent theory. They 
argue that humans seek to satisfy their needs under conditions of scarcity. An 
efficient use of resources is desirable because it increases the well-being of indi-
viduals. The division of labour, specialisation, trade and coordination are key 
mechanisms to ensure the efficient use of resources. Under optimal conditions 
of perfect information (so-called first-best solutions), agents always promote the 
interests of their principals and welfare is maximised. Since conditions in reality 
are not optimal, accountability mechanisms are desirable because, and in so far 
as, they reduce the losses incurred from delegation (Picot et al., 2004, pp. 1–3 
and 72–4).
 51. Cf. Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 6 and section 2.2.1.
 52. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional implications of liberal thought see, 
for example, Herz (1999).
 53. This is not the place to offer a comprehensive overview over the comparative 
political science literature, which is vast and includes both descriptive and nor-
mative contributions. A few selected examples must suffice: a good collection of 
articles focusing on different ways to control public agencies is contained, for 
example, in Kaufman et al. (1986). Jabbra and Dwivedi provide a compendium 
that compares the accountability arrangements of governments across the world 
( Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1988). A more recent collection exploring how elections 
and different governmental structures influence accountability is Przeworski 
et al. (1999).
 54. Important texts of the New Public Management literature include Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992), Barberis (1998), Borins (1995), Box et al. (2001) or Hood (1991). 
Behn, who criticises the New Public Management approach for overly reducing 
political accountability (Behn, 1998), proposes a comprehensive account of a new 
accountability system that is compatible with the values and goals of New Public 
Management (Behn, 2001).
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 55. A similar definition is offered by Schmitter and Karl: ‘Modern political democracy 
is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions 
in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and 
cooperation of their elected representatives’ (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 76).
 56. Manin, Przeworski and Stokes emphasise this special feature of government 
accountability: ‘The peculiarity of the principal-agent relation entailed in the 
relation of political representation is that our agents are our rulers’ (Manin et al., 
1999b, pp. 23–4).
 57. Other organisations like associations are also subject to governance and account-
ability requirements. These tend to be much less strict. Associations under 
German law, for example, are only required to have a board of directors that 
is elected by an assembly of all members (§§ 21–79 BGB). Registered charities 
usually have to promote certain public goods and have to provide transparency 
concerning the sources and use of funds (cf. e.g. the UK Charities Act of 1993).
 58. The list is available at http://www.independentsector.org/issues/accountability/
standards2.html (last accessed 27 August 2009).
 59. Prominent examples of corporate governance codes include the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2004), the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998) and 
Higgs (2003) reports of the UK government, the French Report (Vienot, 1999) 
and many more. Important codes for the non-profit sector include the report of 
the Canadian Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector 
(1999), the Standards for Charity Accountability of the BBB Wise Giving Alliance 
(available at http://www.bbb.org/us/Charity-Standards/ last accessed 27 August 
2009), or the report of the US-American Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (2005).
 60. Andrew Mason also distinguishes these two components of autonomy and argues 
that they give rise to various different conceptions of autonomy. Cf. Mason 
(1990), p. 435.
 61. This second aspect of autonomy is often referred to as ‘moral autonomy’. It has 
its roots in Immanuel Kant’s approach to ethics, which was already referred to 
above in the context of stakeholder theories. Kant writes: ‘Autonomie des Willens 
ist die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst (unabhängig von 
aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände des Wollens) ein Gesetz ist. Das Prinzip der 
Autonomie ist also: nicht anders zu wählen als so, daß die Maximen seiner Wahl 
in demselben Wollen zugleich als allgemeines Gesetz mit begriffen seien’ (Kant, 
1996/1786, p. 95). In other words, autonomous is who chooses to follow the 
categorical imperative, using his rationality to derive the rules conforming to this 
principle.
 62. Referring to Joel Feinberg, Susan Brison describes the different variations of 
the concept of autonomy as follows: ‘Although everyone agrees that the word 
“ autonomy”, true to its etymological roots, refers in some way to self-government, 
some consider it to denote a capacity to govern oneself, while others think it refers 
to an achieved state of self-government, a right to govern oneself, or an ideal of 
virtue, that is, a value to be pursued’ (Brison, 1998, p. 323).
 63. Andrew Mason, for example, has identified three different versions of what it 
means to be independent of the will of others. Most far reaching is the ‘inde-
pendent-minded’ conception of autonomy (supported e.g. by Robert Wolff 
and Thomas Scanlon), which posits that people need to reflect every time 
before they act and never do anything just because someone else tells them to. 
A slightly less demanding variety is the ‘critical reflection’ conception (proposed 
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e.g. by John Stuart Mill, Stanley Benn and Richard Lindley), which demands that 
people re-evaluate their conception of the good from time to time. A formal con-
ception of autonomy (backed e.g. by Gerald Dworkin) finally accepts anybody as 
autonomous who acts on a conception of the good which is based on an unma-
nipulated analysis of situations and available options. On this account, neither 
constant reflection, nor periodic re-evaluation is necessary for autonomy. Cf. 
Mason (1990), pp. 435–40.
 64. Philosophers using an autonomy argument against paternalism – which involves 
forcing individuals to do something against their will for their own good – 
include, for example, Arneson (1980), Brock (1983), Dworkin (1971), Feinberg 
(1971), Rawls (1971), Scoccia (1990), VanDeVeer (1986).
 65. For an extensive list of authors, including detailed references see, for example, 
Brison (1998), p. 312.
 66. For a critique of the autonomy argument against paternalism see, for example, 
Husak (1981). Brison (1998), for example, argues that unrestricted free speech 
cannot be justified on the basis of autonomy.
 67. The core assumption of rational choice or rational action models is that individu-
als have a consistent system for ranking alternative choices or courses of action 
and that they act to maximise their marginal utility. The foundational texts for 
this important strand of economic thought include Pareto (1909) and Hicks and 
Allen (1934).
 68. George Stigler and Gary Becker characterise the mainstream position held 
by economists as follows: ‘Tastes are the unchallengeable axioms of a man’s 
behavior: he may properly (usefully) be criticized for inefficiency in satisfying 
his desires, but the desires themselves are data’ (Stigler and Becker, 1977, p. 76, 
emphasis original). The same authors propose an alternative approach, suggest-
ing that preferences should be seen as stable and similar between people. The 
vast majority of economic theories and models, however, continue to operate 
on the assumption that preference functions vary both between people and over 
time. Accordingly, any preference function that is consistent, that is, complete 
and transitive, is generally accepted as ‘rational’. For a good overview of other 
approaches challenging the intrinsic rationality of preference functions see, for 
example, Hansson and Grüne-Yanoff (2006). The authors also show convincingly 
why these alternative arguments have remained marginal to the discipline of 
economics.
 69. Some see this as deeply problematic. They argue that because elections have a 
dual role, neither of the two functions is exercised well. Manin, Przeworski and 
Stokes, for example, write that ‘voters have only one instrument to reach two 
goals: to select better policies and politicians, and to induce them to behave well 
while in office. [… But] the system that Madison and his colleagues designed 
makes it possible to strive for one goal only at the expense of the other’. It is 
partly because of this that they conclude: ‘citizens’ control over politicians is at 
best highly imperfect in most democracies. Elections are not a sufficient mecha-
nism to insure that governments will do everything they can to maximise citi-
zens’ welfare’ (Manin et al., 1999a, pp. 45–6 and 50).
 70. Focusing on the delegation of legislative authority, Peter Lindseth, for example, 
also espouses a broad concept of delegation. He argues that governance in the 
European Union in reality is polyarchical and that many sources of normative 
power exist. While delegation from national parliaments is therefore not useful 
as an empirical-analytical concept for understanding regulatory power in the EU, 
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Lindseth argues that it should be maintained as a normative yardstick because the 
EU exercises the norm-setting functions that originally belong to parliaments. Cf. 
Lindseth (2002).
 71. Sources on RBM include Roll Back Malaria Partnership (2004), Roll Back Malaria 
Partnership (2005), Roll Back Malaria Partnership (2006), Korenromp et al. 
(2005), Malaria Consortium (2002), van Ballegoyen (1999), Low-Beer et al. 
(2007), Narasimhan and Attaran (2003), Waddington et al. (2005), http://www.
rollbackmalaria.org (last accessed 30 March 2010), personal communication 
with Pru Smith, Senior Communication Advisor, Roll Back Malaria Partnership 
Secretariat, 9 May 2007.
 72. Cf. for example, Einhorn, (2001) or Babb and Buira (2005). The term ‘mission 
creep’ is also frequently used in a military context to describe the unintended 
expansion of military missions. Another international organisation that has 
seen the continuous expansion of its authorities is the EU. Rather than apply-
ing the negative term of ‘mission creep’, however, analysts mainly rely on 
(neo-)functional theories of integration to explain how the delegation of one set 
of authorities creates functional pressures demanding the delegation of additional 
authorities so that the original tasks can be fulfilled properly. A major reason why 
‘mission creep’ has not become a rallying cry for EU critics is that member states 
continually update the formal mandate of the EU. For important neo-functional-
ist texts on regional integration see, for example, Haas (1961), Lindberg (1963), 
Lindberg and Scheingold (1971), Nye (1965), Schmitter (1969).
 73. Sources on the 4C initiative include Common Code of the Coffee Community 
(2004), Common Code of the Coffee Community (2006), Common Code of the 
Coffee Community (2007c), Hamm (2004), Kolk (2005), Vallejo and Hauselmann 
(2005), personal communication with Carsten Schmitz-Hoffmann, Senior Project 
Manager Common Code for the Coffee Community, 25 April 2007.
 74. Outside the European Union, most international organisations are intergovern-
mental in nature. The United Nations General Assembly, for example, is the 
institution that comes closest to being a ‘global parliament’. It can take decisions 
by majority vote, but these only have moral authority. To become binding, they 
have to be ratified by the member states – a form of ex-post delegation.
 75. To many, it seems puzzling that in the absence of an international legislature, 
executive and system of courts, a great and complex body of international law 
exists and is obeyed by most states most of the time. As defined in Article 38 (1) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, international conventions, 
international custom and the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations are recognised as the main sources of international law. Cf. Shaw (1997), 
pp. 54–6. International conventions are often drafted and originally signed by 
a small number of states and subsequently joined by more. Even the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, for example, which is an integral part of the 
Charter of the United Nations, was originally signed by only 51 states. Today, it 
has 192 members and has thus received significant ex-post consent. Custom as 
the second most important source of international law, by definition relies on 
implicit consent.
 76. Cynthia Stark, for example, discusses the connection between legitimacy and the 
obligation to comply. She proposes a view where ‘legitimacy is a necessary, but 
not a sufficient, condition for obligation’. Only principles and norms that are 
considered legitimate are therefore likely to be complied with by individuals: ‘the 
requirement that principles be justifiable to everyone is based upon the need for 
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compliance. If principles are not justifiable to all, then those to whom they are 
not will have no reason to comply’ (Stark, 2000, pp. 326 and 329).
 77. Wer ein Geschäft für einen anderen besorgt, ohne von ihm beauftragt oder ihm 
gegenüber sonst dazu berechtigt zu sein, hat das Geschäft so zu führen, wie das 
Interesse des Geschäftsherren mit Rücksicht auf dessen wirklichen oder mut-
maßlichen Willen es erfordert. […] Im Übrigen finden auf die Verpflichtungen 
des Geschäftsführers die für einen Beauftragten geltenden Vorschriften der §§ 666 
bis 668 entsprechende Anwendung.
 78. Cf. BGB (2006), § 683.
 79. Cf. for example, Sheehan (2006).
 80. Cf. section 3.2.1.
 81. For a summary of some of the main arguments against contract theory see, for 
example, Boucher and Kelly (1994) pp. 17–29.
 82. Cf. Filmer (1991).
 83. For an analysis of Locke’s two seemingly conflicting stories about the emergence 
of political societies, see Waldron (1994). Waldron concludes that Locke uses the 
social contract story in order to establish criteria and interprets history with their 
help.
 84. Translation by James W. Ellington (1785): ‘Act only according to that maxim 
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’
 85. On Kant’s political teachings, which are often contained in his writing about law 
or his philosophy of history see, for example, Hassner (1987).
 86. Das höchste Oberhaupt soll aber gerecht für sich selbst, und doch ein Mensch 
sein. Diese Aufgabe ist daher die schwerste unter allen; ja ihre vollkommene 
Auflösung ist unmöglich: aus so krummem Holze, als woraus der Mensch 
gemacht ist, kann nichts ganz Gerades gezimmert werden. Nur die Annäherung 
zu dieser Idee ist uns von der Natur auferlegt.
 87. Hanna Pitkin makes this argument in her influential essay ‘Obligation and 
Consent’: ‘Legitimate government acts within the limits of authority rational 
men would, abstractly and hypothetically, have to give to a government they are 
founding. Legitimate government is government which deserves consent’ (Pitkin, 
1965, p. 999, emphasis original).
 88. For an analysis of Hegel’s critique of the social contract see, for example, Boucher 
and Kelly (1994), pp. 23–6 or Haddock (1994). For a summary of communitar-
ian arguments against liberalism more generally see, for example, Buchanan 
(1989).
 89. An overview over the Marxist critique of the social contract is contained in Wilde 
(1994).
 90. Cf. for example, Pateman (1988), Coole (1994). For a race-conscious critique of 
the social contract tradition see, for example, Mills (1997).
 91. John Rawls set out to rescue the Kantian contract from its communitarian critics. 
He invented the original position and the veil of ignorance to abstract individuals 
from their social positions and create impartial judgements. This, however, failed 
to convince communitarian philosophers like Michael Sandel (Sandel, 1982). 
In his later book ‘Political Liberalism’, Rawls maintains the contract argument 
to justify why people would choose a liberal political regime. But he also makes 
significant concessions to the communitarians by recognising that individuals 
are socially embedded: ‘All those who affirm the political conception start from 
within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, 
and moral grounds it provides’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 147). Cf. Kelly (1994). Thomas 
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Scanlon runs into similar difficulties explaining how the criteria for his ‘reason-
able’ and ‘rational’ individuals can be justified.
 92. Cf. Stark (2000), p. 314. Similar arguments are made by Daniel Brudney, Jean 
Hampton, Henry Phelps-Brown, John Simmons and Jonathan Wolff.
 93. Cf. Stark (2000), p. 314.
 94. Thomas Lewis makes a similar argument. He questions whether the hypothetical 
consent of citizens is sufficient to ground a theory of obligation. But he argues 
that what he terms ‘subjective hypothetical consent’ ‘can be used as a standard 
for the exercise of political authority. This standard specifies that a political 
authority must treat subjects as if they had consented, even though they have 
not consented’ (Lewis, 1989, p. 798).
 95. A case in point is, for example, the Global Reporting Initiative. Without appropri-
ate prior authorisation, it proposes rules and guidelines for sustainability reports 
of organisations. While organisations may face some pressure from external 
groups to submit sustainability reports and to conform to the GRI guidelines 
while doing so, compliance with the guidelines can in most cases be seen as vol-
untary. While GRI does therefore not violate the rights of other organisations if 
it does not adopt appropriate accountability mechanisms, it may well jeopardise 
its chances of voluntary adoption.
 96. The One World Trust regularly applies the principles defined in its index and 
publishes a ‘global accountability report’ that rates the accountability of impor-
tant governmental, corporate and civil society organisations. Cf. Blagescu and 
Lloyd (2006). Another organisation proposing principles applicable to all types of 
organisations is AccountAbility. Its AA1000 Series defines process standards relat-
ing to planning, accounting, auditing and reporting, embedding and stakeholder 
engagement to ensure organisations operate in an accountable and inclusive way. 
Cf. AccountAbility (1999).
 97. Chapter 5 repeatedly refers to important accountability standards that were 
defined for other sectors, but have implications for specific types of partner-
ships.
 98. In section 2.2.2, four questions were used to define any concrete accountability 
relationship: Who is accountable, to whom, for what and how? Delegation offers 
answers to the first three of those questions. Agents are defined as those who 
exercise authority on somebody else’s behalf. Principals are those who originally 
or rightfully hold the authority and who – explicitly, implicitly, hypothetically 
or after the fact – delegate it to the agent. This definition establishes who is or 
should be accountable to whom. Agents ought to be accountable to principals. 
Delegation also explains what the agents are accountable for: for exercising their 
authority in a way that corresponds to the interests of the principals. Delegation 
does not directly answer the fourth question of how accountability is or should 
be created. But, as this section argues, it provides a general criterion for evaluating 
accountability arrangements.
 99. These examples are used here to illustrate that there are basic differences in the 
interests of principals and the corresponding accountability mechanisms. For this 
purpose, the examples are strongly simplified to uncover the core mechanisms 
at work. For the business and public sector examples, Dennis Young roughly 
confirms this interpretation: ‘In the grossest terms, businesses are accountable 
to their owners for making money. Government is accountable to its citizens for 
carrying out the public’s will, as ultimately reflected in voting, legislation, and 
judicial interpretation’ (Young, 2002, p. 3).
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 100. ‘Form follows function’ is a principle that was espoused by modern architec-
ture and important design schools like the Bauhaus movement. The original 
formulation is attributed to the architect Louis Henry Sullivan (1856–1924). Cf. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (2007).
4 Partnerships in Practice
 1. The terms ‘class’, ‘category’, ‘type’, ‘group’ and ‘kind’ can all have more specific 
meanings in different contexts. Within a biological taxonomy, for example, a 
class of animals occupies a clearly defined position in the hierarchy of groups, 
subgroups and further subdivisions. Likewise, categories in their original 
Aristotelian use denote a limited number of fundamental classes that together 
encompass all phenomena. Despite these differences, and corresponding to their 
common usage, the terms are used as rough equivalents here.
 2. For the purposes of a review of the literature and research on partnerships 
addressing social issues, Selsky and Parker, for example, organise partnerships in 
four ‘arenas’: non-profit – business partnerships; government – business partner-
ships; government – non-profit partnerships; and partnerships involving actors 
from all three sectors (Selsky and Parker, 2005, p. 854).
 3. The Business Partners for Development (BPD), for example, orient their work 
along partnership clusters, including partnerships working on natural resources, 
on water and sanitation, on youth development and road safety. For more infor-
mation on BPD’s work, see http://www.bpdweb.com (last accessed 27 August 
2009).
 4. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, categorises transnational regulatory networks 
based on their institutional characteristics. Thus she distinguishes networks of 
national government officials that develop and operate within international 
organisations from networks that are based on executive agreements between 
governments and those that arise ‘spontaneously’ outside existing institutional 
arrangements. These three types of transnational networks have significant dif-
ferences in their accountability (Slaughter, 2001, pp. 9–14).
 5. Börzel and Risse, though operating with a definition of partnerships that is much 
wider than the one employed here, use this criterion for classifying partnerships 
between public institutions and private organisations. They identify four types of 
partnerships: the regular consultation or cooptation of private partners; the del-
egation or ‘outsourcing’ of public functions to private institutions; co-regulation, 
where private actors hold at least a veto over outcomes; and publicly encouraged 
self-regulation of private actors. Cf. Börzel and Risse (2005) p. 200.
Similarly, Murphy and Bendell (1997) categorise partnerships between busi-
nesses and NGOs according to the degree to which NGOs are involved in busi-
ness operations. They distinguish involvement in business processes, in business 
projects or relating to a product.
 6. Klaus Dieter Wolf analyses the contribution of private actors to governance. To 
determine different levels of de-governmentalisation, he measures both the scope 
of involvement (from agenda setting to monitoring compliance) and its intensity 
(marking hierarchical, cooperative, complementary or intervening models). Cf. 
Wolf (2001), pp. 7–11.
Long and Arnold (1995) characterise environmental partnerships by the degree 
of conflict prevailing between partner organisations and distinguish between pre-
emptive, coalescing, exploration and leverage partnerships.
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 7. Rodal and Mulder (1993), for example, distinguish partnerships according to 
what they achieve for the principal partner. Their partnership types include con-
sultative or advisory partnerships, contributory or support sharing partnerships, 
operational or work sharing partnerships and collaborative or decision-making 
partnerships.
Löffler (2000) analyses partnerships between different governmental institu-
tions and distinguishes partnerships that serve to jointly produce products or 
services from those that are created to jointly manage a common resource and 
partnerships for planning and implementing joint investment projects.
 8. Categorising or classifying phenomena into groups is fundamental for human 
understanding, communication and analysis. Many classical philosophers tried 
to devise systems of classification that would encompass the entire universe of 
things or ideas. Thus, for example, Aristotle provided a list of ten highest order 
categories, which could each be further subdivided and would include all forms 
of being (Aristotle, 1975). Immanuel Kant criticised Aristotle for not using a clear 
method for arriving at these last categories and proposed an alternative attempt 
(Kant, 1968). In both cases, categories and subclasses were meant to be mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive at each level of a system of classification.
As the work of the cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues 
has shown, however, humans in reality rely much more strongly on prototypes 
than abstract criteria for grouping phenomena. This understanding acknowledges 
that the boundaries between categories are not always sharp and accounts for the 
fact that most categories are graded, that is, some objects belong more clearly 
to a category than others (Cf. Rosch (1983) and Rosch and Lloyd (1978)). As a 
result, categories do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive to be useful. Nevertheless they should be based on clear, consistent 
and relevant criteria for distinguishing between phenomena.
An example for an inconsistent categorisation is the one proposed by Ann 
Zammit for descriptive purposes: She distinguishes a number of partnerships 
according to their field of activity (partnerships to facilitate foreign investment 
and private sector development, partnerships to assist and promote SMEs, part-
nerships on environmental issues and partnerships for health) and includes the 
category of ‘Global Compact partnerships’ in the same classification (Zammit, 
2003, pp. 56–62).
 9. Thus, for example, partnerships encouraging innovation are either advocacy 
and awareness raising or implementation partnerships, depending on whether 
or not they invest resources in research and development. ‘Trading comparative 
advantage’ and ‘pulling together all available forces’ is a feature of most partner-
ships, independent of what authority they assume, and whether partnerships 
contribute to ‘closing the participatory gap’ depends on what accountability 
arrangements they choose, not on what authority they assume.
 10. Sources on PCFV include Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (2002), 
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (2003), Partnership for Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles (2005a), Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (2005b), Partnership 
for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (2005c), Valve Seat Working Group (2004) and 
http://www.unep.org/pcfv (last accessed 30 March 2010).
 11. Sources on the Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap include 
Health in Your Hands (2005), Health in Your Hands (2007), The London School 
of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (2002), Curtis (2002), Curtis et al. (2007), Thomas 
and Curtis (2003), Witte and Reinicke (2005), http://www.globalhandwashing.org 
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(last accessed 30 March 2010), personal communication with contact person for 
the partnership at the World Bank, Lene Jensen, 21 April 2007.
 12. Sources on EITI include Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2003), 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2005a), Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (2005b), EITI International Advisory Group (2006), Global 
Witness (2004), Haufler (2004), Leipprand and Rusch (2007), Ocheje (2006), 
Palley (2003), Schumacher (2004), Williams (2004), http://www. eitransparency.
org (last accessed 30 March 2010).
 13. Partnerships could also take a different approach to coordination, which would 
require the delegation or assumption of much more far-reaching authority. They 
could try to play the role of a central coordinating institution determining which 
tasks need to be fulfilled and allocating roles across various agencies. None of the 
partnerships analysed as part of the case examples as well as during the scoping 
exercise conducted for case selection, however, has such a far-reaching mandate 
or ambition.
 14. Sources on GWP include Kirby and Spedding (2006), Global Water Partnership 
(2003), Global Water Partnership Technical Committee (2004), Global 
Water Partnership (2006a), Global Water Partnership (2006b), Global Water 
Partnership (2006c), Global Water Partnership (2006d), http://www.gwpforum.
org (last accessed 31 March 2010), personal communication with James Lenahan, 
Communications Head, Secretariat, Global Water Partnership on 7 May 2007.
 15. Sources on ICANN include ICANN (2006), NGO and Academic ICANN Study 
(2001), Froomkin (2003), Hofmann (2002), Hunter (2003), Klein (2002), 
Kleinwaechter (2003), Koppell (2005), Leib (2002), One World Trust (2007), 
Weinberg (2000), http://www.icann.org (last accessed 31 March 2010).
 16. Sources on GAIN include Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (2004), Global 
Alliance for Improved Nutrition (2007), United Nations (2002), Ashraf (2003), 
Bekefi (2006), Carriere (2003), Sangvi et al. (2007), Witte and Reinicke (2005), 
http://www.gainhealth.org (last accessed 31 March 2010), personal communica-
tion with Floriane Marquis, Communication Department of the Global Alliance 
for Improved Nutrition, 10 May 2007.
 17. Sources on GAVI include GAVI Alliance (2006), GAVI Alliance Secretariat (2006a), 
GAVI Alliance Secretariat (2006b), http://www.gavialliance.org (last accessed 31 
March 2010), Brugha et al. (2002), Lu et al. (2006), Muraskin (2004).
 18. Sources on GVEP include Global Village Energy Partnership (2006), Global 
Village Energy Partnership (2005a), Global Village Energy Partnership (2005b), 
Energy and Security Group and Sustainable Energy Solutions (2007), Morales 
and Bergqvist (2002), http://www.gvepinternational.org (last accessed 31 March 
2010), personal communication with Sarah Adams, CEO of GVEP, 21 April 
2007.
 19. Sources on REEEP include Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
(2005), Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (2006), The Expert 
Group on Renewable Energy (2005), Nilsson et al. (2003), http://www.reep.org 
(last accessed 31 March 2007).
 20. Sources on MSC include Marine Stewardship Council (2006), Marine Stewardship 
Council (2007a), Marine Stewardship Council (2007b), Marine Stewardship 
Council (2007c), Cummins (2004), Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (2005), Peacey (2000), Phillips et al. (2003), http://www.msc.org 
(last accessed 31 March 2007), personal communication with Alli Barnes, infor-
mation officer at the Marine Stewardship Council on 9 May 2007.
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 21. Following the explicit wish of DFID to internationalise the initiative, presumably 
to increase its international legitimacy, the EITI Secretariat has been hosted by the 
Norwegian Government since 2007.
 22. Sources on Stop TB include Stop TB Partnership (2001a), Stop TB Partnership 
(2001b), Stop TB Partnership (2006a), Stop TB Partnership (2006b), Stop TB 
Partnership (2007), Institute for Health Sector Development (2003), World Health 
Organization and Stop TB Partnership (2006), World Health Organization (2007), 
Kumaresan et al. (2004), Raviglione and Uplekar (2006), http://www.stoptb.org 
(last accessed 31 March 2010), personal conversation with Louise Baker, Principal 
Officer at the Stop TB Partnership Secretariat, 29 May 2007.
 23. Sources on the Voluntary Principles include The Information Working Group of 
the Voluntary Principles (2006), Bennett (2002), Freeman and Hernández Uriz 
(2003), http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org (last accessed 31 March 2010), per-
sonal communication with Katie Swinerton, Business for Social Responsibility, 
25 April 2007, and conversation with Amanda Gardiner, Manager, Voluntary 
Principles Secretariat, International Business Leaders Forum, 29 May 2007.
 24. Cf. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (2005), p. 8.
 25. The results of this review are published in Curtis (2002).
 26. Cf. Roll Back Malaria Partnership (2005), p. 42.
5 Concrete Partnership Accountability Standards
 1. David Moore articulates the connection between tax exemption and increased 
demands for accountability as follows: ‘By granting public benefit status, the deci-
sion-maker lays the foundation for distinct regulatory treatment – treatment that 
entails both benefits (usually tax exemptions) and obligations (more stringent 
accountability requirements)’ (Moore, 2006, p. 4).
 2. For an overview over ‘global civil society’ and its activities see, for example, 
Anheier et al. (2005). Brown and Moore distinguish between NGOs delivering 
welfare and services, building capacity for self-help and influencing policy and 
institutions (Brown and Moore, 2001, p. 16). Korten (1989) distinguishes differ-
ent generations of NGOs, emphasising relief and welfare, community organisa-
tion and capacity building, the creation of sustainable development systems and 
the catalysation of large-scale social movements.
 3. Recent literature has stressed, for example, the increasing advocacy and policy 
work by NGOs focusing on development issues. Cf. for example, Bryer and 
Magrath (1999), Hudson (2002), de Senillosa (1998).
 4. To derive commonly applicable rules, the International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law has compiled a list of ‘generally accepted international practices regarding leg-
islation governing civil society organisations’. According to it, minimum govern-
ance requirements prescribed by law include the definition of a governing body 
that receives and approves reports on finances and operations and the specification 
of duties of the members of the governing board, including the duty to be loyal 
to the organisation, the duty of care and diligence and the obligation to respect 
confidentiality agreements. In addition, laws define reporting requirements, such 
as annual financial and activity reports, special reports demanded by tax authori-
ties, combined with the authority of the supervisory organ to conduct audits. For 
organisations with significant activities or assets, moreover, public reporting is 
usually required. Cf. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2006).
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 5. A study on registration practices in the US revealed that this instrument is rarely 
used. Thus, in 1994, only 520 of 46,887 applications were rejected. Cf. Hawks 
(1997).
 6. Cf. World Health Organization (2000), regulation 12.1.
 7. For the Global Fund’s policy on ethics and conflict of interest, see The Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (2003), annex 3. For the by-laws, 
see The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (2005).
 8. Cf. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2006), §§ 2.1 and 2.4.
 9. Cf. Wyatt (2004), p. 8a.
 10. Herman and Renz (1997), for example, identify the following list of commonly 
recommended good governance practices for non-profit boards: having a board 
nominating or board development committee, using a board profile when recruit-
ing new members, conducting interviews with nominees, relying on written 
selection criteria for board members, providing members with a board manual, 
conducting orientation sessions for new members, adopting a policy concern-
ing the attendance of meetings, dismissing members for absenteeism, giving all 
board members office or committee responsibilities, distributing agendas prior to 
meetings, organising an annual board retreat, establishing an executive commit-
tee with written roles and powers, conducting collective and individual evalua-
tions and providing feedback on them, formulating expectations on giving and 
soliciting in writing, establishing a board process for appraising the CEO, limiting 
the number of possible consecutive terms and providing board members with 
recognition for their services after retirement. For lists or codes including similar 
criteria see, for example, Bradshaw et al., (1992), Canadian Comprehensive Audit 
Foundation (1996), Drucker (1998), Gill et al. (2005), Silk (2004). For a good over-
view over relevant codes of corporate governance proposing similar measures see, 
for example, Gregory and Simmelkjaer (2002).
 11. Many, but not all partnership boards, coordinating committees or meetings of 
core partners have these authorities. For the governance of non-profit organisa-
tions, however, they are standard practice. Thus, for example, the Accountability 
Charter of International Non Governmental Organisations, which lists only 
minimal governance requirements, states that an NGO’s governing body should 
oversee the organisation’s CEO, budget and programmes (International Non 
Governmental Organisations, 2006, p. 4). The Panel on Accountability and 
Governance in the Voluntary Sector stipulates that boards need to exercise their 
fiduciary responsibilities, including approving the budget, monitoring expendi-
tures and approving annual reports (Panel on Accountability and Governance 
in the Voluntary Sector, 1999, p. 27). And the International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law sees it as a generally accepted practice that NGO governing bodies 
are required by law to receive and approve reports on finances and operations 
(International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2006, § 2.3).
 12. The Nonprofit Overhead Cost Project, a research project analysing non-profit 
overhead costs and their effects, for example, found that restricted contributions 
often limit the resources charities can spend on fund-raising and administration 
and lead to a reduced effectiveness of programmes. Cf. Nonprofit Overhead Cost 
Project (2004a).
 13. For their recommendations, see Charity Commission for England and Wales 
(2003), Mango (2005), Cuomo (2005). For governments, relatively similar basic 
internal control measures are standard. The main standard setter for government 
agencies in the US, the General Accounting Office, for example, also demands 
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a clear segregation of duties, a restriction of access to resources and records, 
the appropriate documentation of transactions and physical control over assets 
(United States General Accounting Office, 1999, pp. 11–16). At the international 
level, almost identical standards have been published by the International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) (INTOSAI, 2004).
 14. For IASB’s main website, see http://www.iasb.org (last accessed 27 August 2009).
 15. Another important international standard-setting body for the accounting pro-
fession is the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). It concentrates 
mainly on accounting policies for businesses, but also develops norms for public 
sector accountants, through its International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
Board (IPSASB). The respective websites of IFAC and IPSASB are http://www.ifac.
org and http://www.ifac.org/PublicSector/ (last accessed 27 August 2009).
 16. Both SSAPs and FRSs can be downloaded from http://www.frc.org.uk/asb/techni-
cal/standards/accounting.cfm (last accessed 27 August 2009). SSAP 4, for exam-
ple, deals with the accounting treatment and disclosure of government grants 
and other forms of government assistance. The provisions also apply to grants 
and assistance from other sources. Cf. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (1990). For smaller charities (defined as organisations that do 
not exceed two or more of the following criteria: annual turnover of £2,800,000, 
balance sheet of £1,400,000 and a maximum of 50 employees) the Financial 
Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities (FRSSE) find application (Accounting 
Standards Board, 2001).
 17. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is an impor-
tant standard setter for the accounting profession. It has recently published an 
updated audit and accounting guide for non-profit organisations, including guid-
ance from the latest relevant FASB statements (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 2006).
 18. According to the UK Charity Commission’s SORP, non-profits should account 
separately for unrestricted funds, be they general or designated, and restricted 
funds. It further recommends that NGOs distinguish their restricted funds 
between income and endowments, while further differentiating expendable and 
permanent endowments. Moreover, it asks charities to account for donated serv-
ices or facilities as incomes if they are reasonably quantifiable and measurable 
(Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2005, pp. 11 and 21). In its state-
ment 116, the US-American FASB demands that non-profits distinguish between 
permanently restricted, temporarily restricted and unrestricted contributions. 
It also requires that services are accounted for as contributions if they create or 
enhance non-financial assets or require specialised skills that would normally 
have to be purchased (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1993a).
 19. While the principle of differentiation is shared, the recommendations again 
differ in their details. Thus the charity commission wants charities to distin-
guish between the costs of generating funds, expenses for charitable activities, 
governance costs and other expenses (Charity Commission for England and 
Wales, 2005, p. 27). The FASB, in statement 117, merely requires non-profits to 
account separately for their expenses on mission-related programme activities 
and all other costs, including, for example, management, fund-raising, member-
ship development and general activities (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
1993b, p. 11).
 20. Thus the charity commission states that realised or unrealised gains or losses on 
assets as well as depreciation or a permanent fall in the value of assets have to 
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be accounted for (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2005, p. 11). The 
FASB deals with the same topic in its statement 124. Accordingly, investments in 
equity securities with readily determinable fair values and all investments in debt 
securities must be reported at fair value (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
1995). Following statement 93, non-profits have to recognise the costs of using 
up long-lived tangible assets in their financial statements (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 1987).
 21. According to the Global Civil Society Report 2004/5, a total of 17,952 interna-
tional or internationally oriented NGOs were counted in 2003. Of those, 3305 
had their headquarters and secretariats located in the US. The second biggest host 
country was the UK with 1923 headquarters or secretariats, followed by Belgium 
(1855) and France (1405). Cf. Anheier et al. (2005), pp. 297–302.
 22. IRS form 990 is available for download at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf 
(last accessed 27 August 2009).
 23. Cf. Keating and Frumkin (2000), p. 1.
 24. For more information about GuideStar, see the organisation’s website: http://
www.guidestar.org (last accessed 27 August 2009). Another important non-profit 
evaluator is Charity Navigator. It rates charities according to their organisational 
efficiency and capacity. It also relies mainly on data drawn from IRS form 990. For 
more information, see the organisation’s website: http://www.charitynavigator.
org (last accessed 27 August 2009).
While IRS form 990 is thus increasingly used for creating non-profit accounta-
bility, both the form and typical reporting practices have been strongly criticised. 
Elizabeth Keating and Peter Frumkin, for example, extensively discuss the merits 
and problems of the information provided by IRS form 990. They summarise the 
problems as follows: ‘First, filings are not useful because they are often one to two 
years out of date. […] Second, the typical Form 990 is riddled with mistakes and 
goes unverified. […] Third, the Form 990 fails to conform to GAAP’ (Keating and 
Frumkin, 2000, pp. 10–11).
 25. For the annual return form of the charity commission, including versions for organ-
isations with revenues between £10,000 and £250,000, those exceeding £250,000 
and the summary information return, see http://www.charity-commission.gov.
uk/investigations/ccmonlinks.asp (last accessed 27 August 2009).
 26. The charity registry can be accessed and searched online at http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/registeredcharities/first.asp. GuideStar UK can be accessed at 
http://www.guidestar.org.uk. Other non-profit rating or evaluation agencies in 
the UK relying strongly on data provided in annual returns include Development 
Ratings (http://www.developmentratings.com, all sites last accessed 27 August 
2009), as well as the Voluntary Sector Almanac published by the National Council 
for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) (Reichardt et al., 2007).
 27. Knack and Rahman, for example, emphasise that ‘Transaction costs associated 
with numerous and diverse donor rules and procedures for managing aid projects 
and programs […] can also be viewed as detracting from aid’s value’ (Knack and 
Rahman, 2004, p. 2).
 28. Another important standard setter for public reports is GRI, portrayed above as 
an example for rule-setting partnerships. GRI’s reporting framework, its principles 
and guidance, protocols, standard disclosures and sector supplements can be used 
by ‘organizations of any size, sector, or location’ (Global Reporting Initiative, 
2006b, p. 2). As such, the guidelines are also applicable to partnerships. The focus 
of the guidelines, however, is on so-called sustainability reporting. Sustainability 
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reporting is ‘the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being accountable to inter-
nal and external stakeholders for organizational performance towards the goal of 
sustainable development’ (Global Reporting Initiative, 2006b, p. 3). In contrast to 
regular activity and financial reporting, sustainability reporting is not a generally 
accepted and expected practice for NGOs and other organisations.
 29. Financial audits are the classical form of audit. More recently, however, organi-
sations also have other aspects of their work scrutinised by auditors. This can 
include internal structures and processes, for example through an audit of an 
organisation’s internal control systems. It can also concern particular aspects of 
the organisation’s performance, for example its environmental impact. Michael 
Power, for example, observes an ‘audit explosion’ in the UK, which he describes 
as follows: ‘In addition to financial audits, there are now environmental audits, 
value for money audits, management audits, forensic audits, data audits, intel-
lectual property audits, medical audits, teaching audits, technology audits, stress 
audits, democracy audits and many other besides’ (Power, 1994, p. 1).
 30. Within the European Union, for example, the minimum professional and registra-
tion requirements for auditors are regulated in a directive issued by the European 
Parliament and the council. Accordingly, only officially recognised and approved 
auditors may exercise the profession. For official approval, both auditing firms 
and individual auditors need to be of good repute. Moreover, auditors need to 
undergo adequate training, including university-level theoretical education and 
practical training. Auditors need to demonstrate their professional competence in 
a special exam. Cf. European Parliament and Council (2006a), §§ 3–13.
 31. United Way of America conducted an informal survey on audit costs among 
its members. Its findings indicate that while absolute audit costs increase with 
the size of the organisation, relative costs decrease. Organisations with annual 
revenues below 500,000 US$ were found to spend an average of 0.93 per cent of 
annual revenues on audits, organisations with revenues between 2 million and 
2.8 million US$ spent 0.37 per cent and organisations with budgets between 4 
and 9 million US$ spent 0.26 per cent. Quoted in Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 
(2005), p. 36.
 32. Throughout the EU, for example, audit requirements are regulated by directive 
78/660/EEC of 1978. It decrees that all European member states must require 
companies to have their annual accounts audited by authorised auditors. It 
allows member states to grant exemptions from this rule for small companies 
(European Parliament and Council, 1978, Art. 51 and 11). In 2006, the relevant 
thresholds were redefined in directive 2006/46/EC. Exemptions are possible for 
companies that do not exceed the limits of two or more of the following criteria: 
a net turnover of 8.8 million €, a total balance sheet of 4.4 million € and an aver-
age of 50 employees (European Parliament and Council, 2006b, Art. 1). Many 
European countries grant these exemptions only to private and not to publicly 
traded companies.
In the US, the regulations for audits have been tightened through the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adopted in the wake of the Enron scandal. The act only 
applies to publicly traded companies. It demands that public companies rotate 
their audit company or its lead partner at least every five years, that conflicts of 
interest between the auditor and the audited organisation be avoided, that audi-
tors are not used for non-auditing services, except the preparation of tax forms, 
and that critical accounting policies and practices be disclosed. Cf. One Hundred 
Seventh Congress of the United States of America (2002). Most of these elements 
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were already contained in the recommendations for corporate governance of the 
British 1992 Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992).
 33. Thomas Silk, for example, who works with an important law firm specialising in 
non-profit law, predicts that as one of ten major developments and trends in the 
governance of non-profit organisations, ‘[e]very nonprofit corporation with sub-
stantial assets or annual revenue should be audited annually by an independent 
auditing firm’ (Silk, 2004, p. 78).
 34. This regulation applies to accounting periods starting on or after 27 February 
2007. The charity commission has published these changes in its spring newslet-
ter (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2007).
 35. This threshold has been in force for the fiscal years ending after 31 December 
2003. The requirement is defined in circular A-133 of the Office of Management 
and Budget of the Executive Office of the President (OMB), (Office of Management 
and Budget, 2003, § 200).
 36. The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector was convened by the NGO Independent 
Sector. It presented its conclusions to the US Congress in 2005. Its recommenda-
tions concerning audits and reviews can be found at (Panel on the Nonprofit 
Sector, 2005, pp. 35–6).
 37. A broad range of other evaluation criteria and self-imposed NGO governance stand-
ards also contains audit requirements for NGOs. They include the Code of Conduct 
for Non Government Development Organisations of the Australian Council for 
International Development, which does not differentiate between internal and 
external audits (Australian Council for International Development, 2004); the 
Code of Ethics of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, which, like 
the Australian code, does not indicate a financial threshold for audits (Canadian 
Council of International Co-operation, 2002/1995); the Code of Ethics and 
Conduct for NGOs of the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations, 
which only demands audits for organisations with ‘substantial annual revenues’ 
(World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations, 2004); the ‘minimum 
norms of good governance’ of India’s Credibility Alliance, which asks all voluntary 
organisations to make signed, audited financial statements available (http://www.
credall.org.in/norms/norms.htm last accessed 27 August 2009); the Checklist for 
Accountability of the Independent Sector endorses the 1 million US$ threshold 
(Independent Sector, 2005); the NPO Certification Model of the Pakistan Centre 
for Philanthropy prescribes different levels of audit depending on organisational 
size (Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, 2004); the Private Voluntary Organization 
Standards of InterAction, the American Council for Voluntary International Action 
demands independent audits for all NGOs exceeding 100,000 US$ in revenues 
(http://www.interaction.org/pvostandards/index.html, last accessed 30 June 2007). 
For an annotated list of NGO codes and standards see, for example, http://www.
oneworldtrust.org/?display=ngoinitiatives#o, last accessed 27 August 2009.
 38. ISA 200 states explicitly that ‘Irrespective of whether an audit is being conducted 
in the private or public sector, the basic principles of auditing remain the same’ 
(International Federation of Accountants, 2007, p. 228).
 39. As mentioned above, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 introduced additional 
audit standards in the US. Some commentators and analysts recommend that 
non-profit organisations comply with these additional rules, cf. for example, Silk 
(2004), Graham (2004). This opinion, however, has not been broadly accepted 
and there are even claims that these rules impose undue burden on companies 
listed in the US.
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 40. Witte and Reinicke (2005), p. 63, for example, analyse the following motives for 
companies to engage in partnerships in decreasing order of importance: showing 
good corporate citizenship, increasing reputation, individual leadership, improv-
ing the investment market and meeting government requirements. According to 
Reich (2002), governments mainly engage in partnerships because they recognise 
that they need partners to address crucial public policy problems. Companies, by 
contrast, are suspected to pursue various objectives including future profits and 
markets, control over international agendas, tax deductions or subsidies for new 
products. For a more detailed account of the motives of governments, including 
local governments see, for example, Collin (1998).
 41. As mentioned earlier, accountability to mission is a fuzzier concept than account-
ability for complying with rules or financial accountability. As a result, there are 
no strict ‘standards’ governing the development of mission statements, neither 
for partnerships, nor for NGOs. There are, however, numerous handbooks provid-
ing relevant advice. Radtke (1998), for example, advises that mission statements 
should describe the purpose of the organisation, its contribution to that goal and 
the values guiding its work. Bryce (1992) recommends that missions should be 
so clearly defined that they can be applied to all NGO activities. Drohan (1999) 
emphasises that mission statements are working documents that require contin-
ued attention. Ingrim (1990) stresses that all those connected with the organisa-
tion should understand its mission and that the mission statement should serve 
as a guide for planning. For a more detailed annotated bibliography relating to 
NGO missions and visions see, for example, http://www.centerpointforleaders.
org/toolkit_biblio_vision.html, last accessed 27 August 2009.
 42. Logical frameworks and results chains are crucial elements of results-based man-
agement strategies. These management strategies are broadly applied in bilateral 
and multilateral development agencies and are increasingly adopted by other 
organisations working in the field of development. Results chains link short-term 
outputs to medium-term outcomes and long-term impacts. Thereby, they show 
how individual activities contribute to the achievement of broader development 
goals. The logical framework is a tool to help results-based planning which links 
the different levels of objectives and goals to information on how the objective 
can be measured, how relevant information can be obtained and what external 
factors could intervene. The handbook and ‘how-to’ literature on results-based 
management is vast. For a brief bibliography on logical frameworks see, for 
example, den Heyer (2001). UNDP has compiled a short bibliography on results-
based management (Evaluation Office, 2002, pp. 110–11), as has the Canadian 
International Development Agency (Results-Based Management Division, 2000, 
pp. 135–8).
 43. Edwards and Hulme, for example, emphasise the difficulty of measuring the 
performance of NGOs: ‘A great part of the dilemma faced by GROs [grassroots 
organisations] and NGOs lies in the nature of the work they do and the messy and 
complex world in which they do it – measuring performance in relation to the 
kind of development subscribed to by most NGOs is an extraordinarily difficult 
task, particularly in relation to “empowerment” and other qualitative changes’ 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1995, p. 11). Similarly, Slim (2002) stresses the difficulties 
of implementing social and environmental accounting practices in NGOs.
For the public sector, Göran Arvidsson has articulated the problems of effi-
ciency and effectiveness-focused performance evaluations as follows: ‘Public 
activities have intrinsic values which cannot be expressed in terms of economic 
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effectiveness or rationality’ (Arvidsson, 1986, p. 629). Similarly, Oliver and 
Drewry (1996) mention that the use of performance indicators in the public serv-
ice can be counterproductive; Harlow (2002) shows how value for money audits 
can lead to an abdication of ministerial responsibility; Neal (1995) and Sirotnik 
(2004) criticise the practice of performance measurement in higher education; 
and Dahl (1994) as well as Behn (2001) highlight the trade-offs involved in creat-
ing greater accountability for performance.
 44. For an introduction to benchmarking as a technique see, for example, Spendolini 
(1992). The dedicated journal, Benchmarking: An International Journal, discusses 
technical aspects as well as the application of benchmarking techniques in differ-
ent sectors.
 45. The importance of using the mission as a guide for setting programme priorities 
has been emphasised, for example, by Ingrim (1990).
 46. The BBB Wise Giving Alliance, for example, uses this standard as one of its rat-
ing criteria for NGOs. In addition, it requires organisations to spend no more 
than 35 per cent of funds raised on fund-raising activities (BBB Wise Giving 
Alliance, 2003). The US Office of Personnel Management also requires non-profit 
organisations to have combined fund-raising and administrative costs of less than 
35 per cent. For NGOs receiving funds raised through its Combined Federal 
Campaign, these costs have to remain below 25 per cent of total revenues. 
Cf. Office of Personnel Management (2006). Charity Navigator has more dif-
ferentiated score for ‘organisational efficiency’, including different thresholds 
for different types of charities. The thresholds are, though, in the same order of 
magnitude. Cf. http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm/bay/content.view/
cpid/48.htm (last accessed 27 August 2009). GuideStar, by contrast, rejects the 
use of financial ratios as criteria for organisational efficiency. Cf. http://www.
guidestar.org/news/features/ratios.jsp (last accessed 27 August 2009). For a discus-
sion about the merits and problems of imposing limits on overhead costs see, for 
example, Nonprofit Overhead Cost Project (2004b).
 47. International law can have a variety of sources. Art. 38 (1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice is widely recognised as the most authoritative 
statement on the sources of international law. It includes international conven-
tions, international custom, the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations, as well as judicial decisions and teachings as subsidiary means for deter-
mining the law. Cf. Brownlie (1995), p. 448. For a good introduction into the 
sources of international law see, for example, Shaw (1997), pp. 54–98.
 48. Klaus Dingwerth in his analysis of the democratic legitimacy of rule-making 
partnerships also considers the implications of the mostly non-binding nature of 
the proposed rules. While employing a different reasoning, he also concludes that 
rule making partnerships ought to have democratic legitimacy: ‘Thus, a further 
distinctive feature of public-private rule making is that it cannot establish legally 
binding rules. However, the observation that nonbinding guidelines and norms 
set by public-private bodies are being observed by states, and the experience that 
norms of soft law may serve as the foundation for later efforts to establish interna-
tionally binding rules – as, for instance, in the case of the OECD guidelines on the 
trade in hazardous waste and the Basel convention – provide strong reasons for 
examining the democratic legitimacy of the processes by which they are gener-
ated’ (Dingwerth, 2005, p. 80, emphasis original).
 49. As two researchers of the World Bank’s Development Research Group who have 
a critical attitude towards the benefits of participation put it: ‘Participation is 
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expected to lead to better designed projects, better targeted benefits, more cost-
effective and timely delivery of project inputs, and more equitably distributed 
project benefits with less corruption and other rent-seeking activity’ (Mansuri 
and Rao, 2004, p. 11).
 50. The principles contained in the ISO guide include, for example, the requirement 
that written procedures should exist and be made available for standard-setting 
processes, that an appeals mechanism should exist, that notice should be given 
to enable contributions, that materially and directly interested persons and 
organisations should be able to participate in the process and that the representa-
tion of interest categories in the standard-setting process should be balanced. Cf. 
International Organization for Standardization (1994).
 51. The ISEAL code recommends, for example, to include stakeholders in the devel-
opment of procedures for the standard-setting process, the publication of the 
standard-setting organisation’s work programme, the provision for two rounds of 
public comments of at least 60 days for new standards or amendments, participa-
tion reflecting a balance of interests among interested parties and of geographic 
scope and the proactive involvement of disadvantaged groups. Cf. International 
Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (2004), as well as 
the more detailed guidance document (International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, 2006).
 52. The Centre for Global Studies of the University of Victoria, for example, has 
published Rethinking Governance Handbook, which describes and assesses numer-
ous initiatives of international organisations that are designed to strengthen 
their accountability, the participation of affected stakeholders and their transpar-
ency (Centre for Global Studies, 2001); the World Bank’s Participation Sourcebook 
includes an analytical discussion of the concept of participation, examples of 
participatory projects from around the globe and practical guidance on how to 
design and implement participation (The World Bank, 1996); the OECD Handbook 
on Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making focuses on 
government officials. It explains the rationale for participation and provides prac-
tical guidance on how governments can strengthen their relations with citizens 
(Gramberger, 2001); FAO’s participation handbook focuses on the involvement 
of local communities in development programmes and the creation of sustain-
able livelihoods (Wilde, 2001). Studies analysing the effects of participation on 
development policies include, for example, Isham et al. (1995), Mansuri and Rao 
(2004) and Khwaja (2004).
 53. This categorisation of relevant stakeholder groups is contained in the report of 
the World Commission on Dams (World Commission on Dams, 2000, p. viii).
 54. While nation states usually have a clear definition of who does and who does not 
count as a citizen, these definitions are often hotly contested. This includes, for 
example, the question of who can apply under what conditions for nationality, 
whether the right to vote should be extended to minors, whether foreign resi-
dents should have the right to participate in certain elections or whether prison-
ers should be allowed to exercise their citizen rights. For a feminist perspective 
on the concept of citizenship see, for example, Lister (1997). For a general debate 
about the contested nature of the concept of citizenship, especially outside the 
national context see, for example, Bosniak (2000).
 55. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook states the difficulty of developing 
general rules for stakeholder identification powerfully: ‘Much still needs to be 
learned about how to identify and involve stakeholders. No hard or fast rules 
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exist to tell us whom to involve and how. What we do know is that stakeholder 
involvement is context-specific’ (The World Bank, 1996, p. 126).
 56. Cf. Dingwerth (2005), pp. 73–4.
 57. The limited representative nature of the commission and the lack of accountabil-
ity of its members to broader stakeholder groups were, however, compensated by 
other features. Thus stakeholder groups were directly involved in the creation of 
the knowledge base and could be included in the WCD Stakeholder Forum.
 58. For a rough practical guide outlining issues to be considered during a stakeholder 
identification process see, for example, Hemmati (2002), pp. 217–20.
 59. These points are also emphasised, for example, by Hemmati (2002), pp. 220–2.
 60. The WCD complemented its multi-stakeholder composition through consulta-
tions. Lack of information has been referred to as one of the shortcomings of 
that process: ‘it has been argued that in the early phase of the WCD process, the 
necessary publicity was missing in order to widen the discussion about the work 
program to a larger number of stakeholders’ (Dingwerth, 2005, p. 75).
 61. This risk is addressed by both ISO and ISEAL. ISO guide 59 demands that consen-
sus-building procedures should provide for a balanced representation of interest 
categories (International Organization for Standardization, 1994, art. 4.5). The 
ISEAL code of good practice requires that standard-setting organisations proac-
tively seek the contributions of directly affected parties. Moreover, it recommends 
that the constraints on disadvantaged groups (including financial hurdles as well 
as lack of expertise and knowledge) be addressed in the standard-setting process. 
Cf. International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance 
(2004), p. 6.
 62. ISEAL’s code of good practice addresses this problem directly. It demands that 
standard-setting organisations take the received comments into account. It speci-
fies that this entails considering all inputs on an equal and objective basis, giving 
justifications if an issue is not incorporated, as well as preparing and publishing a 
written synopsis on how each material issue has been addressed. Cf. International 
Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (2004), pp. 4–5 
and International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance 
(2006), p. 5.
 63. For a collection of different participatory tools currently employed by inter-
national organisations see, for example, Centre for Global Studies (2001). The 
handbook contains examples on capacity-building activities for participating 
organisations, the establishment of dedicated units or channels for engaging 
NGOs, community-based methods of participation, online fora, independent 
multi-stakeholder commissions and the involvement of private actors in advi-
sory bodies. For a description of additional participatory techniques, see also 
The World Bank (1996), Appendix 1. It includes workshop-based methods, com-
munity-based methods, methods for stakeholder consultation and methods for 
social analysis.
 64. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, for example, emphasises the importance 
of a wide dissemination of information, including the two elements of identify-
ing stakeholders and publishing information openly. Cf. The World Bank (1996), 
p. 128.
 65. For practical strategies on how to involve less powerful and less vocal groups or 
figures at the local level see, for example, Wilde (2001), pp. 32–3. The World Bank 
Participation Sourcebook describes the following strategies to involve the voiceless: 
build capacity, mandate representation, organise separate events, use ‘levelling 
9780230238978_08_notes.indd   215 8/17/2010   8:55:37 PM
216  Notes
techniques’ in facilitation or involve surrogates if it proves impossible to engage 
a certain stakeholder group. Cf. The World Bank (1996), pp. 132–4.
 66. Good democratic practice of dealing with open comments entails at least the 
right to receive an answer, preferably in a publicly transparent way. European citi-
zens submitting comments to European institutions, for example, have the right 
to receive a reply in the language of their submission. Cf. European Communities 
(2002), p. 45.
 67. All three complaints mechanisms are enshrined in ICANN’s by-laws, cf. ICANN 
(2006), Articles IV and V.
 68. Various Bundesländer in Germany, for example, allow citizens to introduce draft 
legislation to parliament if they reach a minimum number of signatures, cf. for 
example, Jung (1997). In Poland, 100,000 signatures are necessary to introduce 
draft legislation to the Sejm. For an overview of elements of direct democracy in 
various transition countries see, for example, Frey (2003).
Among the case examples, MSC has relatively open procedures for initiating 
new standard-setting procedures. Thus any MSC body can propose the develop-
ment of new consultations, whereupon the MSC board conducts consultations 
and takes the decision on whether or not to develop new norms. Since stake-
holders are represented in the Stakeholder Forum, they too can initiate new 
standards. Cf. Marine Stewardship Council (2007c), p. 2.
 69. Cf. International Organization for Standardization (1994), Art. 2.2 and 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance 
(2004), Art. 5.1.
 70. In his text, Madison describes the benefits of a general system of education. Since 
his point rings true more generally, however, various authors and institutions 
have adopted the quote to argue for the importance of transparency in govern-
ments. Transparency International, for example, uses the quote in support of a 
‘right to information’ (Pope, 2000, p. 235), as does the NGO Privacy International 
(cf. its theme page on freedom of information, available on the organisation’s 
website http://www.privacyinternational.org, last accessed 28 August 2009).
 71. Cf. United Nations General Assembly (1948), Art. 19 and United Nations General 
Assembly (1966), Art. 19. Organisations like Article 19 or Privacy International 
interpret this norm as including a general right to freedom of information. This 
interpretation remains, however, disputed.
 72. Cf. United Nations General Assembly (2003), Art. 10 and United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (1992), Principle 10.
 73. Cf. Banisar (2006), p. 6.
 74. Cf. International Organization for Standardization (1994) and International 
Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (2004).
 75. Thus despite their criticisms concerning the contents of the report, ‘dam builders 
and operators, whether actually or rhetorically, have already begun to use the 
recommendations of the commission as a point of reference’ (Dingwerth, 2005, 
p. 69).
 76. For a very accessible description of the technical requirements of the Internet see, 
for example, Weinberg (2000).
 77. The binding nature of ICANN’s policies and regulations has given rise to an 
intense debate. The Internet Governance Project, for example, summarises the 
problem as follows in its proposal for structural reform: ‘Today ICANN exercises 
quasi-governmental powers. However, it lacks corresponding mechanisms for 
accountability, oversight, and representation’ (Klein and Mueller, 2005, p. 2).
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 78. Partnerships setting rules with a strongly binding character can be compared to 
domestic regulatory agencies. Klein (2005), for example, bases his proposals for a 
reform of ICANN on the argument that ICANN is de facto a regulatory agency. The 
practice of delegating rule setting and regulatory tasks to independent agencies has 
been on the rise throughout the developed world for over two decades. For an anal-
ysis of the rise of regulatory agencies in Europe see, for example, Majone (1994), and 
for an analysis of the reasons for their diffusion see, for example, Gilardi (2005).
Authors vary in the precise elements they define as central to the good gov-
ernance and accountability of regulatory agencies. The standards are, however, 
usually related to the internal governance of regulatory agencies (which is more 
strongly linked to accountability through participation than to accountability to 
prevent the abuse of legislative authority), the authorisation and mandate of the 
agency, as well as to judicial review and, at times, political oversight. De Haan et al. 
(1998), for example, focus on the definition of a clear mandate and goals, on 
transparency and on the ability of parliament to authorise regulatory agencies 
and to change or withdraw that authorisation. Klein (2005) includes the elements 
of political authorisation, legislative mandate, internal processes, judicial review 
and political oversight in his list of ‘good regulatory practices’.
 79. The policy cycle is a standard way in political science of conceptualising the 
process by which public policy is developed and implemented. Authors vary in 
the labels and the exact number of stages they use in their models of the policy 
cycle. Typically, however, they include a form of problem definition and agenda 
setting, decision or policymaking, policy implementation and evaluation. For an 
introduction to the policy cycle including a description of the various models 
proposed over time see, for example, Jann and Wegrich (2003).
 80. Donors, be they government agencies, private organisations or individuals, can 
have a range of motives for engaging in philanthropic activities, ranging from a 
genuine interest in addressing a problem to personal gratification and reputational 
benefits. For an analysis of different altruistic and selfish motivations of public 
donors and their influence on donor policies see, for example, Canavire Bacarreza 
et al. (2005). On the motives of private donors see, for example, Harbaugh (1998). 
Even for deriving prestige and reputation, however, it is important that the chari-
table activities a donor engages in are seen as useful and effective.
 81. Proposals for increased outcome accountability in other sectors also often refer 
to corporate sector standards. In the public sector, for example, the dominant 
school of thought pushing for more outcome accountability is the New Public 
Management. Proponents of New Public Management reforms advocate the 
creation of greater efficiency in the public sector by introducing accountability 
mechanisms derived from the private sector.
 82. This follows the basic definition of performance evaluation proposed by Göran 
Arvidsson: ‘performance evaluation means to find out and appraise how well an 
activity, a program or an agency fulfills or has fulfilled its objectives’ (Arvidsson, 
1986, p. 627).
 83. Fowler actually contrasts NGOs in this respect from governments, arguing that 
governments have ‘political support’ as their bottom line. Political support, 
however, mainly expresses itself in relation to parties and elected politicians. 
Many public agencies, by contrast, are today under strong (political) pressure to 
demonstrate their efficiency and effectiveness. When attempting to evaluate their 
performance, these government agencies face very similar problems to NGOs and 
other non-profit organisations in defining performance criteria.
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 84. Cf. Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (2007).
 85. Cf. Stop TB Partnership (2006b).
 86. Cf. Roll Back Malaria Partnership (2005).
 87. Cf. GAVI Alliance Secretariat (2006c) and Low-Beer et al. (2007).
 88. On the widespread introduction of performance measures in the public sector in 
the US and the UK see, for example, Propper and Wilson (2003), pp. 250–1.
 89. The literature concerning this subject is much too broad to be reviewed com-
prehensively here. Several contributions, however, contain literature reviews or 
summaries of arguments. Freeman (2002), for example, provides a synthesis and 
review of the literature on the use of performance indicators to improve public 
health services in the UK; Marshall et al. (2000) summarise the empirical evidence 
on the effects of publishing performance data in the US-American health sector; 
Hepworth (1998) focuses on the use of the balanced score card in the US and the 
UK; Smith (1995) collects the unintended consequences related to the use of per-
formance indicators in the UK; and Dorsch and Yasin (1998) provide a literature 
review on benchmarking in the public sector.
 90. With respect to the public sector, one study concludes, for example, that ‘PMs 
are now widely used within public sector organizations, but there is a lack of 
evidence regarding their usefulness. Hence, it is still not clear to what extent PMs 
help agencies achieve the goals that have been set by policy-makers’ (Propper 
and Wilson, 2003, p. 264). Another study focusing on non-profit organisations 
concludes that ‘In theory, outcomes assessment can be a helpful tool for realiz-
ing publicly valued ends such as fiscal accountability, program integration, and 
citizen empowerment. However, our findings suggest that achieving these ends 
in practice will be rare rather than routine’ (Campbell, 2002, p. 254). By contrast, 
Boyne and Chen (2006) find that performance targets do improve the perform-
ance of English schools.
 91. For the ‘teaching to the test’ phenomenon see, for example, Pollitt (1995), p. 
215 and for a more general analysis of the problem of ‘measure fixation’ see, for 
example, Smith (1995).
 92. In the literature on performance evaluation in the public and non-profit sectors, 
there is broad consensus on the importance of involving stakeholders in the 
definition of performance criteria. Cf. for example, Herman and Renz (1998), 
Fowler (1995), Edwards and Hulme (1995), Freeman (2002), Kravchuk and Schack 
(1996).
 93. The British Royal Statistical Society concludes that ‘PM [performance measure-
ment] done well is broadly productive for those concerned. Done badly, it can be 
very costly and not merely ineffective but harmful and indeed destructive’ (Bird 
et al., 2005, p. 1).
 94. Wolfgang Wirth, for example, list the following necessary conditions for creating 
effective output control: ‘output control is feasible, if there are unambiguous, 
reliable and generally accepted measures of desired results available; if these 
measures capture all significant dimensions of performance and contain all the 
information required for full evaluation; if single or individual contributions to 
final outputs can be measured separately in case of complex, joint or interde-
pendent activities; and if results that are due to chance can be distinguished from 
those which can be attributed to foresight’ (Wirth, 1986a, p. 603).
 95. All classical methods for conducting social cost-benefit analyses concur that 
projects should be evaluated relative to a counterfactual. Cf. for example, 
Devarajan et al. (1997), pp. 35–6.
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 96. For a discussion of relevant accounting, reporting and auditing rules for NGOs, 
see section 5.1.2.2.
 97. These two purposes are emphasised, for example, by an analyst of performance 
evaluations in the development sector: ‘Ever since the evaluation of develop-
ment aid first began in the early 1960s in the USA, there has been a tension 
between the two competing objectives of evaluation, namely, accountability on 
the one hand, and lesson-learning on the other’ (Cracknell, 2000, p. 54).
 98. This refers to Robert Behn’s formulation that ‘Those whom we want to 
hold accountable have a clear understanding of what accountability means: 
Accountability means punishment’ (Behn, 2001, p. 3).
 99. On the importance of staff involvement and communication for learning see, 
for example, Forss et al. (1994).
 100. Private goods are those usually traded on markets. Their characteristics include 
that they are excludable, that is, they have a clearly identifiable owner, and that 
they are rival, that is, one person’s use or consumption of the good precludes 
another person’s use. Pure public goods exhibit the opposite attributes and are 
non-excludable as well as non-rival. Seen from an economic perspective, these 
traits give individuals benefiting from public goods a strong incentive to fre-
eride. As a result, public goods tend to be underprovided and economists accord 
governments an important role in providing public goods. For a brief explana-
tion of the concept of public good as well as its extension into the global realm 
see, for example, Kaul (2000).
 101. This can be based on the fact that the goods and services in question display 
some public good characteristics, that they create strong externalities or that 
they are linked to a natural monopoly. It can also be based on ideological prefer-
ences or equity concerns.
 102. This technique is often used for the provision of social services. Diller (2000), for 
example, analyses attempts by the US-American government to introduce per-
formance-based accountability in welfare services. The task of providing welfare 
services at the ground level was delegated either to government agencies enjoying 
broad discretion or to private providers, relying on performance-based contracts. 
Klingner et al. (2002) scrutinise a similar case of outsourcing in the context of the 
Kansas foster care reform. For a more detailed discussion of outsourcing and what 
it entails for federal and local governments see, for example, O’Looney (1998).
 103. Carr-Hill (1992), for example, analyses the use of patient satisfaction surveys in 
the health sector and compares this method of gathering beneficiary feedback 
to qualitative methods. A study on outcome measurement in NGOs reports that 
client satisfaction surveys are relatively frequently used by service providing 
non-profit organisations, with over half of the surveyed organisations in one 
study collecting such information from clients, indirect customers or other 
stakeholder (Morley et al., 2001, p. 6).
 104. For a description of the Global Fund’s policies on allocating resources, as well as 
an analysis of the results of this strategy see, for example, Low-Beer et al. (2007), 
esp. Chapter 4.
 105. Blanchard, Hinnant and Wong, for example, have described the introduction 
of market-based reforms as a move from the social contract to a ‘social sub-
contract’. They summarise their assessment as follows: ‘Although economic 
efficiency may be gained from market-based reforms, many questions related to 
the accountability and legitimacy of such arrangements have gone unanswered’ 
(Blanchard et al., 1998, pp. 508–9).
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 106. Gerald Blasi, for instance, has analysed human service contracts issued by 
various government entities in the US. He found that most, but not all, of the 
contracts were based on competitive bidding processes. Even where competitive 
bidding processes were used, he concludes that ‘[i]n reality, it is difficult to say 
whether this is a viable accountability method as the competitive aspect is ques-
tionable in that many human service contracts do not have multiple bidders’ 
(Blasi, 2002, pp. 526–7). Therefore, Blasi doubts whether the threat of losing a 
contract to the competition is a valid reality.
 107. When accountability standards for rule setting and regulation partnerships were 
developed, the importance of formal consultation processes with stakeholders 
was discussed (cf. section 5.2.2.1). While there is some overlap between the 
mechanisms employed, as well as the standards for using them, there are also 
significant differences. This is due to the fact that the consultation processes 
pursue different objectives in both cases. For rule-setting partnerships, stake-
holder consultations are designed to enable stakeholders to participate in the 
policymaking process of the partnership. For implementation partnerships, by 
contrast, stakeholder feedback is ‘only’ one means of several to collect informa-
tion for assessing partnership performance.
 108. For the report and a summary of the results of these stakeholder interviews, see 
Green (2002).
 109. For a list of interviewees for the Stop TB evaluation, see Institute for Health 
Sector Development (2003), Annex B.
 110. For an analysis of the importance of customer satisfaction in the US, as well as 
a guide on how to develop, implement and analyse corporate customer satisfac-
tion surveys see, for example, Hayes (1998). For a discussion about the use of 
satisfaction surveys in the public sector see, for example, Swindell and Kelly 
(2000).
 111. For an analysis of the shortcomings of surveys and stakeholder interviews, espe-
cially in areas requiring much technical information see, for example, Darnall 
and Jolley (2004).
 112. There is a broad literature on focus groups as a research method. For a discussion 
on the advantages of open-ended interview techniques and especially the use 
of focus groups in research see, for example, Krueger and Casey (2000), Morgan 
(1997) or Stewart et al. (2007).
 113. Batchelor et al. (1994), for example, analyse the use of complaints boxes and 
telephone hotlines in addition to client satisfaction surveys and interviews in 
health care.
 114. A study on outcome accountability in NGOs, for example, recommends that 
organisations collecting data for outcome measurement provide incentives to 
achieve adequate response rates in surveys, that surveys be tested and kept sim-
ple and that information be collected over a long period of time (12 months) 
(Morley et al., 2001, p. 8). Similarly, Blasi (2002) criticises that surveys do often 
not reach individuals who are not or no longer involved in the programme, that 
response rates are low and that outcomes are rarely measured on a long-term 
basis (p. 533).
 115. The main product of the WCD was its report ‘Dams and Development: A New 
Framework for Decision-Making’. Part I of the report, ‘Global Review of Large 
Dams’, presents the results of the various studies on economic, environmen-
tal and social performance of dams. Cf. World Commission on Dams (2000), 
pp. 35–194.
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 116. For a description of the progress made by MSC in certifying fisheries and fish 
producers and suppliers until March 2006, see the partnership’s annual report 
(Marine Stewardship Council, 2006).
 117. 4C describes the processes used for compliance verification, for example, in 
Common Code of the Coffee Community (2007a).
 118. For a history of the concept of academic freedom, the underlying rationale, its 
increasing acceptance throughout the world and different interpretations, for 
example, in the UK and the US see, for example, Fellman (1973–4).
 119. ‘Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teach-
ing shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution’ (translation 
by Inter Nationes).
 120. Cf. for example, the 1985 decision ‘Regents of the University of Michigan v. 
Ewing’ (US Supreme Court, 1985).
 121. It states that university commissioners need to ensure that ‘academic staff 
have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put 
forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing 
themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their 
institutions’ (United Kingdom Parliament, 1988, §202, 2a).
 122. On the concept of university autonomy, its different traditions, developments 
over time and institutional implications see, for example, Berg (1993), Tapper 
and Salter (1995) or Pechar (2005).
 123. On the principle of tenure and its relationship to academic freedom see, for 
example, Brown and Kurland (1990) or Haskell (1997).
 124. According to the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 
the probation period should not exceed seven years. Cf. American Association of 
University Professors and Association of American Colleges (1940), p. 4.
 125. Evaluations and performance assessments first became popular in the US and the 
UK. One analyst describes the fondness for assessments of American universities 
and colleges as follows: ‘Practically everybody in the academic community gets 
assessed these days, and practically everybody assesses somebody else’ (Astin, 
2003, p. 1). More recently, similar practices have also spread to Europe and other 
countries. For a discussion of the increasing use of evaluations in German uni-
versities and their reception by faculty and students see, for example, Wellhöfer 
et al. (2002).
 126. Haskell (1997), for example, finds that student evaluations of faculty members 
can seriously impinge on their academic freedom, leading teachers to lower their 
teaching and exam standards, lower their classroom requirements and adjusting 
courses to popular beliefs and notions. Berdahl (1990) criticises the introduction 
of competition as a method of quality control because it risks undermining the 
academic integrity of universities.
 127. The details of regulations for universities and other institutions of higher learn-
ing vary between countries. In most cases, public and private universities coexist 
and are subject to different kinds of government influence. Thus, for example, 
public universities are usually predominantly publicly financed and the govern-
ment often has a say in the appointment of the institution’s leadership and 
professors. Private universities can enjoy greater autonomy in their finances and 
appointment procedures but have to be publicly accredited to be able to award 
academic titles. To take an example from Germany, the State of Bavaria, for 
instance, regulates these aspects in its Hochschulgesetz (Landtag des Freistaates 
Bayern, 2006, esp. Art. 5, 13, 76). At the same time, this legal framework – as 
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well as many others – stresses the principle of academic freedom and the right 
of these institutions to regulate their internal matters autonomously (Landtag 
des Freistaates Bayern, 2006, Art. 3 and 11).
 128. In the US, for example, the constitution assigns the authority to appoint the 
judges of the Supreme Court to the president. Article II, section 2 reads: ‘he 
[the President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint […] Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of 
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, 
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments’. Article III, section 1, 
at the same time, places judicial power exclusively in the hands of the courts: 
‘The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.’
 129. Cf. International Organization for Standardization (1996), Clause 4.2 b.
 130. A World Bank background paper provides a good global overview over university 
finance. It finds that recent reform trends include various strategies to supple-
ment governmental with non-governmental revenues. Despite these reforms, 
the paper finds that ‘The financing of most higher education will remain 
substantially dependent on public revenues. Even in countries, like the United 
States, where private higher education is very developed, both private and public 
universities receive public aid’ ( Johnstone, 1998, p. 20). For more precise statis-
tics on public and private spending on higher education in OECD countries see, 
for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2003). 
Increasingly, public contributions to university budgets are also tied to perform-
ance criteria. Common criteria include, for example, ‘degrees awarded, degrees 
awarded in particular fields, average time to degree completion, performance of 
graduates on post graduate or licensure examinations, success of faculty in win-
ning competitive research grants, or peer-based scholarly reputation of the fac-
ulty’ ( Johnstone, 1998, p. 22). By contrast, performance criteria cannot include 
issues such as which research questions or methods are pursued, which results 
are achieved or which contents are taught.
Regarding the influence of public finance on the independence of the courts, 
Douglas and Hartley (2001) find no evidence that the government uses its power 
of the purse to influence judicial decisions and undermine judicial independ-
ence.
 131. Cf. for example, International Organization for Standardization (2004), Clauses 
4.3.4 and 4.5.2 and International Organization for Standardization (1996), 
Clause 4.2.m.
 132. Cf. for example, International Organization for Standardization (2004), Clause 
4.3.2 or International Organization for Standardization (1996), Clause 4.2.e.
 133. The only way to remove a US judge from office against her will is through an 
impeachment procedure. The concerned judge has to be impeached by the 
House of Representatives and convicted by the Senate, deciding with a two-
thirds majority. In Germany, federal judges, including judges serving on the con-
stitutional court (who are appointed for a non-renewable term of 12 years), can 
only be removed from office by a decision of the federal constitutional court, 
which also requires a two-thirds majority. Cf. Deutscher Bundestag (1993), §105 
BVerfGG.
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 134. Cf. for example, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure (American Association of University Professors and Association of 
American Colleges, 1940) or the German Hochschulrahmengesetz (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1999, § 46).
 135. The relevant research is summarised, for example, in Dana and Loewenstein 
(2003).
 136. Cf. for example, the Code of Judicial Ethics adopted by the International 
Criminal Court, which states: ‘Judges shall be impartial and ensure the appear-
ance of impartiality in the discharge of their judicial functions. Judges shall 
avoid any conflict of interest, or being placed in a situation which might reason-
ably be perceived as giving rise to a conflict of interest’ (International Criminal 
Court, 2005, Article 4). Similarly, the International Association of Judges in its 
Universal Charter of the Judge demands among others that ‘In the performance 
of the judicial duties the judge must be impartial and must so be seen’ and that 
‘The judge must not carry out any other function, whether public or private, 
paid or unpaid, that is not fully compatible with the duties and status of a 
judge’ (International Association of Judges, 1999, Articles 5 and 7). Similarly, 
the International Bar Association, a federation of national bar associations and 
legal societies (most of which have their own codes of ethics) has adopted an 
International Code of Ethics. It dedicates several paragraphs to conflicts of inter-
est. Cf. International Bar Association (1988), especially Articles 3, 12, 13.
 137. The exclusion of judges from trials in cases of reasonably suspected bias is, 
for example, strongly anchored in the German procedural rules of justice. 
Regulations on ‘Befangenheit’ of judges are laid down in § 42 ZPO and § 24 
StPO.
 138. The Statement on Professional Ethics of the American Association of University 
Professors, for example, contains the clause: ‘Although professors may follow 
subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or compromise 
their freedom of inquiry’ (American Association of University Professors, 1987, 
Article I). A statement of the Harvard University Policy on Conflicts of Interest 
and Commitment, including a disclosure form, for example, can be accessed 
at http://www.ogc.harvard.edu/documents/conflict_policy-senior_officials.doc. 
The Statement of Policy and Procedure on Conflict of Interest of Oxford 
University is available at http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/rso/integrity/conflict_
interest_policy.shtml (all sites last accessed 27 August 2009).
 139. In Germany, for example, where the overwhelming majority of professors are 
civil servants, the Länder are responsible for defining the details of rules relating 
to civil servants as well as to universities. The federal guidelines for university 
laws (‘Hochschulrahmengesetz’), however, decree that professors have to dis-
close all external activities for which they receive remuneration. Cf. Deutscher 
Bundestag (1999), § 52.
 140. The 4C initiative describes the listing criteria for local verifiers as ‘experience in 
social and/or environmental standards’ auditing, background knowledge in the 
coffee sector as well as a positive track record. […] In addition to the 4C criteria, 
either ISO9000 or ISO14000 accredited auditors as well as auditors active in sus-
tainable coffee certification qualify for listing by the 4C Association subject to 
attending an initial training’ (Common Code of the Coffee Community, 2007b, 
§§ 135 and 136).
 141. Thus each assessment team must have appropriate demonstrated technical 
expertise in fish stock assessment, fish stock biology/ecology (with at least five 
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years research expertise in target or similar species), fishing impacts on aquatic 
ecosystems (at least five years experience), fishery management and operations 
(at least ten years experience as practicing aquatic natural resource manager) 
and appropriate current knowledge of the country, language and local fishery 
context. Cf. Marine Stewardship Council (2004), section 2.2.3.
 142. This includes the possibility to comment on the composition of the assessment 
team, on the preparation of the assessment hierarchy (which determines criti-
cal thresholds for certification) and on the draft findings. For a more detailed 
description of the assessment process see, for example, Leadbitter and Grieve 
(2004).
 143. For a summary of the debate and historical evolution relating to the method for 
appointing judges in the US, as well as its implications for judicial accountability 
see, for example, Hanssen (1999) or Webster (1995).
 144. ISO defines the following benchmarks for the education, work experience and 
training of auditors: An auditor should have completed secondary education, at 
least five years of total work experience, at least two years of work experience in 
quality or environmental management, at least 40 hours of audit training and 
should have completed at least four complete audits as an auditor-in-training. 
Cf. International Organization for Standardization (2002), Table 1. More generi-
cally, ISO guide 65 demands that verification bodies define minimum criteria for 
the competence of staff and that they maintain and update records on the train-
ing and experience of their staff (International Organization for Standardization, 
1996, Clauses 5.2.1 and 5.2.3).
 145. Platto (1992), for example, describes the appeals processes in over 25 jurisdic-
tions. As Shapiro (1981) explains in his comparative analysis of court systems, 
most types of jurisdictions allow for appeals. Appeals processes are, however, 
limited under Islamic law.
 146. For an analysis of various possible rationales underlying the appeals process see, 
for example, Shavell (1995). Shavell concludes that appeals are a very cost effec-
tive way to correct errors.
 147. These standards are contained in International Organization for Standardization 
(2004), Clauses 5.9 and 7.10 and International Organization for Standardization 
(1996), Clauses 4.5.3.m, 7.1 and 7.2. Only the former, ISO standard 17011, 
demands that the person or body investigating the appeal be independent of 
the subject of the appeal.
6 Conclusion
 1. Cf. Figure 1.1.
 2. Cf. Figure 2.2.
 3. This comment refers to a paper by Brown and Moore. It distinguishes desirable 
accountability arrangements for NGOs depending on their main function, but 
sees the issue as an issue of strategy, rather than a question of norms and values. 
Cf. Brown and Moore (2001).
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